United States of America v. Lafonzo Leonard Iracks

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 10, 2024 Decided July 5, 2024
No. 23-3058
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
LAFONZO LEONARD IRACKS,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cr-00081-1)
A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.
Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R.
Kolb and John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: WILKINS and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellant LaFonzo Iracks pled
guilty to one count of unlawful firearm possession and one
count of possession with the intent to distribute Phencyclidine
(“PCP”). The District Court sentenced Iracks to 41 months of
incarceration, a sentence above the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range. Iracks challenges the District Court’s
decision to impose an above-Guidelines sentence. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm the District Court’s
sentence.
I.
Iracks was previously convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and use of a firearm during the commission of a
felony in Maryland. He pled guilty to both offenses, was
sentenced in January 2016, and was released from prison in
March 2021. In January 2022, he was caught with a firearm,
PCP, and other items for the distribution of PCP. Later that
year, he pled guilty to two offenses: (1) unlawful possession of
a firearm by a person who was previously convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and (2) possession with the
intent to distribute PCP, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
& (b)(1)(C).
During sentencing, the District Court had to decide which
base offense level should be used for the recent firearm charge;
the answer turned on whether Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction
was a crime of violence.1 The plea agreement calculated the
1 A crime of violence is “an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another” or “any other offense that is a felony and that,
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16. Both parties agree that the

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estimated total offense level and Guidelines range based on the
assumption that Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction was a crime
of violence, but gave Iracks the right to argue at sentencing that
it did not constitute a crime of violence and thus a lower base
offense level (and the resulting Guidelines range) should apply.
Also treating Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction as a crime of
violence, the probation office and the government
recommended that the District Court apply an offense level of
21 for the 2022 firearm charge. That would have resulted in a
Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, tallying with the
estimated range in the plea agreement. The probation office
and the government both endorsed this Guidelines range.
Disagreeing with their recommendations, the District Court
decided not to treat Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction as a crime
of violence. The District Court instead applied a lower offense
level of 14 for the 2022 firearm charge, which resulted in a
Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months.
In light of the District Court’s decision to apply the lower
offense level, the government revised its recommendation and
requested 32 months of imprisonment. Weighing the severity
of Iracks’s conduct, as discussed below, the District Court
departed from the government’s new recommendation, varied
upward from the Guidelines range, and sentenced Iracks to 41
months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release.
Soon after deciding on the applicable Guidelines range, the
District Court stated that “[t]he probation office has
recommended a sentence of 64 months -- that is a variance
upward -- of incarceration; and 36 months -- that is, 3 years -
- of supervised release.” A. 123 (emphasis added). Iracks’s
counsel clarified that the probation office’s initial 64-month
recommendation “was based off an anticipated higher
2015 manslaughter charge was not a crime of violence. The dispute
is only over the 2015 firearm charge.

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guidelines range of the 57 to 71 months.” A. 127. The District
Court responded, “Yeah. But I don't see probation coming in
here recommending such significant variances very often. I
took note of that.” Id.
At the end of the sentencing, Iracks’s counsel objected to
the upward variance. The District Court went on to reiterate
the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance:
THE COURT: Your objection is noted for the
record. I’d note that the probation office did
recommend an upward variance.
[IRACKS’S COUNSEL]: Well, they
recommended a guidelines range and [a]
within . . . guideline sentence. It wasn’t an
upward variance, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Right. Okay. Your objection is
noted for the record.
A. 144.
On appeal, neither party disputes the District Court’s
decision on the Guidelines range. Iracks challenges his above-
Guidelines sentence on three grounds. First, Iracks asserts that
the District Court erred in justifying its upward variance based
on the probation office’s recommendation when no such
recommendation was ever made. Second, Iracks argues that
the District Court’s reasons for an upward variance were
already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Finally,
Iracks contends that the District Court needed to, but failed to,
address his argument that his future probation revocation
proceedings in Maryland support a downward variance here.

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II.
When a defendant timely objects to a sentence, we review
it for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lawrence, 662 F.3d
551, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We first ask if the district court
committed any “significant procedural error,” including
“selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there is no
significant procedural error, we go on to examine whether the
district court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence. Id.
We must consider “the totality of the circumstances, including
the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. For
a sentence that is outside the Guidelines range, we “must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact
that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a
different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.” Id.
When a defendant fails to raise an objection at sentencing,
however, the higher plain error standard of review applies.
Lawrence, 662 F.3d at 556. To succeed under this standard,
the defendant must demonstrate a “plain” error that affects their
“substantial rights[.]” Id. If a defendant successfully makes
this showing, we can exercise our discretion to correct “a
forfeited error, but only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 556–57 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 349
F.3d 685, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
Iracks timely objected to the District Court’s decision to
apply an upward variance at the end of his sentencing, and so
we will review the District Court’s imposition of the upward
variance for abuse of direction. But Iracks did not timely
challenge the District Court’s failure to address his argument
that his future revocation proceedings in Maryland support a

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downward variance. We will review this part of the appeal for
plain error.2
III.
A.
The District Court repeatedly referenced the probation
office’s recommendation for an upward variance, but the
probation office made no such recommendation. The
sentencing transcript shows that the District Court referenced
the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance
during other parts of the sentencing, but not when it explained
its rationale for an upward variance. Iracks argues that the
District Court relied on the clearly erroneous fact—that the
probation office recommended an upward variance—to impose
an upward variance. The government responds that the District
Court imposed an upward variance based on other reasons.
Accordingly, the overarching question before us is whether the
District Court imposed an upward variance due to its mistaken
understanding of the probation office’s recommendation. We
find that the District Court did not.
For a sentence above or below the applicable Guidelines
range, the Sentencing Reform Act provides that the district
court must state “the specific reason for the imposition of a
sentence different from that described [in the Guidelines,]”
2 Iracks’s arguments against the application of the plain error
standard are meritless. Iracks argues that United States v. Pyles, 862
F.3d 82, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2017), stands for the proposition that the plain
error standard should not apply when the District Court does not give
defense counsel clear opportunities to raise objections and fails to
ask defense counsel whether they had any questions or issues to raise.
While good practice, Pyles does not require the District Court to
explicitly give a defendant an opportunity to raise objections in order
for us to find forfeiture later.

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both orally during the sentencing and on a written form
appended to the judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (emphasis
added).
Here, the District Court stated during the sentencing that
an upward variance is warranted due to Iracks’s “criminal
history and the circumstances of this case,” which involved him
“carrying a gun . . . while conducting the trafficking of PCP
after having been released on . . . a manslaughter charge under
which [he was] still in court supervision[.]” A. 138–39.
Required to specify a reason for imposing an upward variance,
the District Court pointed to those circumstances in this case,
not the probation office’s alleged recommendation. Nor did
the District Court reference the probation office’s alleged
recommendation as a specific reason for the upward variance
in the written statement of reasons appended to the judgment,
which instead stated that “the circumstances of the involuntary
manslaughter offense and the seriousness of dealing
Phencyclidine made Mr. Iracks’s conduct more harmful than
other defendants sentenced under USSG §2K2.1(a)(6).”
Statement of Reasons at 3, United States v. Iracks, No. 22-cr-
81 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2023), ECF No. 34. In short, we presume
that the District Court did not consider the erroneous fact
because the District Court did not expressly mention that fact
when imposing the sentence.
We have previously said, in the context of reviewing an
above-Guidelines sentence, that we “ordinarily presume a
district court imposing an alternative non-guidelines sentence
took into account all the factors listed in § 3553(a) and
accorded them the appropriate significance.” United States v.
Warren, 700 F.3d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). But
presuming that the District Court considered all the Guidelines
factors and mitigation arguments before imposing a non-
Guidelines sentence is a different kettle of fish than presuming

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that the District Court relied upon an erroneous fact, a
mitigation argument, or an aggravating circumstance that was
mentioned sometime during the proceeding or lurking
somewhere in the record to justify a variance. For this reason,
our decision to presume the former in Warren and Ayers does
not conflict with our decision not to presume the latter here and
in two of our prior cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ogbeide,
911 F.2d 793, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting as
“speculat[ion]” the government’s argument that the District
Court relied upon matters discussed in prefatory remarks
because “those were not among the reasons specifically given
by the [district c]ourt for its upward departure”); United States
v. Brown, 808 F.3d 865, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting the
government’s explanation for the district court’s upward
variance based on matters in the record because the district
court “made no mention of th[o]se considerations in its written
statement”).
B.
We next consider Iracks’s argument that the District
Court’s reasons for an upward variance were already accounted
for in the Guidelines calculation.
To justify an upward variance decision, the district court
has to find that the defendant’s “conduct was more harmful or
egregious than the typical case represented by the relevant
Sentencing Guidelines range” and “explain why the otherwise
applicable Guidelines calculation ‘does not fully account for
the described criminal conduct.’” United States v. Brown, 892
F.3d 385, 404–05 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown, 808 F.3d
at 867, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
The District Court has done so here. It explained during
the sentencing that Iracks’s “criminal history and the
circumstances of this case” warrant an upward variance,

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especially since Iracks’s criminal history involves charges
connected to a gun-related death and he committed another
gun-related offense again within a year of being released from
prison while he was still under court supervision for that gun-
related death. A. 139; see id. at 138–39. The District Court
was concerned that Iracks is “at a higher risk to recidivate”
since his prior sentence did not deter him from committing
more crimes. Id. at 137. In its written statement of reasons,
the District Court emphasized how “the circumstances of the
involuntary manslaughter offense and the seriousness of
dealing Phencyclidine made Mr. Iracks’s conduct more
harmful than other defendants sentenced under USSG
§ 2K2.1(a)(6).” Statement of Reasons at 3, United States v.
Iracks, No. 22-cr-81 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2023), ECF No. 34.
Despite Iracks’s claims to the contrary, those factors were
not already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. The
Guidelines calculation included the following: (1) seven points
for Iracks’s prior convictions, (2) two points because Iracks
committed the current offenses when he was still under a
sentence for a prior offense, (3) two points for Iracks’s PCP
offense because he possessed a gun while committing that
offense, and (4) four points for Iracks’s firearm offense because
of its connection with the PCP. But the Guidelines calculation
did not account for the similarity between Iracks’s prior and
current offenses. Focusing on the length of the prior sentence,
the Guidelines calculation did not include the context that
Iracks’s prior offenses were connected to a gun-related death
and that Iracks was convicted of a firearm-related offense
again. The Guidelines calculation also did not consider how
soon Iracks committed his offenses after being released from
prison for his prior offenses. The Guidelines calculation
simply looked at the fact that he was still under a sentence for
a prior offense. The District Court could reasonably conclude
there is a difference between committing additional offenses

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relatively soon after being released from prison and committing
them while still under supervised release, as one can be under
supervised release for a long time. Here, Iracks committed his
offenses less than ten months after his release. That was not
accounted for in the Guidelines calculation.
Iracks further argues that the District Court’s concern
regarding the seriousness of his PCP-related conduct was
already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation, which
includes a four-point upward adjustment to the firearm count
due to its connection with the PCP. But the four-point upward
adjustment to the firearm count was only due to its connection
to another felony offense. The other felony offense happened
to be the PCP offense here. This upward adjustment was not
meant to specifically account for the “danger[]” of PCP as “one
of the worst drugs[,]” which the District Court stated as a
reason for varying upward.
According to Iracks, the District Court’s reasons for an
upward variance are undercut by specific facts surrounding the
manslaughter for which he was previously convicted. Iracks
accidentally shot an individual during a music video
production. He says that the gun that he shot the victim with
was not his and that he did not bring the gun to the scene. He
further explains that the victim’s mother, who testified at his
prior sentencing in Maryland, asked for a lenient sentence.
Even if we assume that all of those facts are true, they do not
negate the District Court’s point that Iracks remained reckless
after serious convictions. See A. 137 (“[H]aving been
convicted of a case in which one person died, you’re out here
engaging in reckless and illegal and dangerous behavior,
dealing PCP with a loaded gun.”). The Guidelines calculation
did not account for such reckless behavior, so the District Court
can use it to justify its upward variance decision.

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C.
Finally, we consider whether the District Court plainly
erred in “fail[ing] to consider” Iracks’s argument that his future
probation-revocation proceedings in Maryland, where he will
face up to 11 years in prison for violating conditions of
probation, warrant a downward variance here. Iracks’s
Opening Br. 24.
During sentencing, the District Court asked Iracks’s
counsel if the court in Maryland has initiated any action yet.
After Iracks’s counsel explained that it will happen after he
serves his federal term, the District Court moved on and did not
say more on this issue.
Iracks is correct that the District Court “is required to
‘consider all non-frivolous reasons asserted for an alternative
sentence.’” Iracks’s Opening Br. 24 (quoting United States v.
Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). But the District
Court is not required “to individually and expressly address
every non-frivolous argument advanced by a defendant on the
record[.]” Pyles, 862 F.3d at 88. Instead, it is generally
presumed that “[s]o long as the [District Court] provides a
‘reasoned basis’” for its sentence, it has “adequately considered
all arguments” made by the defendant. Id. (quoting United
States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Here, the District Court provided a reasoned basis for
Iracks’s sentence and was not required to do more. While the
District Court had to consider the argument that the future
revocation proceedings warrant a downward variance, it did
not need to explain the reason for rejecting that argument. The
District Court did not say so, but it would have been reasonable
for it to have concluded that a downward variance should not
be based upon a future probation revocation that may never
occur or a future Maryland prison sentence of unknowable

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duration, even if revocation occurs. The District Court’s
question during the sentencing about the timing of revocation
proceedings in Maryland shows that the District Court did at
least consider this factor. Nothing more is required.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
above-Guidelines sentence.
So ordered.

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