United States of America v. Luz Irene Fajardo Campos, Also Known As La Comadre, Also Known As Jenny Campos, Also…

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 16, 2025 Decided May 23, 2025
No. 21-3051
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
LUZ IRENE FAJARDO CAMPOS, ALSO KNOWN AS LA COMADRE,
ALSO KNOWN AS JENNY CAMPOS, ALSO KNOWN AS JENNY
AVILES, ALSO KNOWN AS JENCA,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:16-cr-00154-1)
Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A.J.
Kramer, Federal Public Defender.
Allaya Lloyd, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were
Kaitlin Sahni, Acting Deputy Chief, and Imani Hutty, Trial
Attorney. Jonathan R. Hornok, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, entered an appearance.

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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge,
and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a
judgment of conviction by a jury of conspiracy with intent to
distribute cocaine and manufacture and distribute
methamphetamine into the United States, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(H), and 963. The
district court sentenced appellant to 264 months’ imprisonment
and 60 months’ supervised release, and ordered appellant to
forfeit $18,000,000.
Appellant seeks reversal on multiple grounds, including
for lack of proper venue under Article III, Section 2, Clause 3
of the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment
because no part of the conspiracy occurred in the District of
Columbia. Even assuming plain error review is available
without a showing of good cause under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), appellant fails to show such error
occurred by prosecuting her in the District of Columbia. The
remaining challenges are also unpersuasive. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as the
court must, the jury could reasonably find the essential
elements of the single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
The record is clear that appellant’s contention she was denied
the effective assistance of trial counsel under the Sixth
Amendment fails to show deficient performance by counsel,
and her challenges to sentencing and the order of forfeiture
present no ground for remand. Accordingly, the court affirms
the judgment of conviction.

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I.
By indictment filed in the District of Columbia on August
30, 2016, as amended January 16, 2019, appellant was charged
under 21 U.S.C. § 963 with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C.
§ 959 by distributing 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and
manufacturing and distributing 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine knowing or having cause to believe the
drugs would be imported into the United States.1 The alleged
drug trafficking occurred in Colombia, South America,
Mexico, Ecuador, Panama, the United States and elsewhere
between January 2010 and the date of the indictment. U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents seized
methamphetamine in Arizona in 2012 and county police seized
methamphetamine in Mississippi in 2015. Joint stipulations of
the parties established that appellant was arrested in Bogotá,
Colombia on March 31, 2017, and voluntarily agreed to
accompany DEA agents to the United States.
Challenging her prosecution in the District of Columbia
for lack of proper venue, appellant maintains the government
never alleged or proved any nexus between the District of
Columbia and the charged conspiracy. Cor. Appellant Br. 7–
10. The evidence presented by the government to prove the
violation of Section 959, she states, consisted primarily of
1 21 U.S.C. § 963 provides: “Any person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”
During the conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1996) provided, in
pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture or
distribute a controlled substance in schedule I or II . . . (1) intending
that such substance or chemical will be unlawfully imported into the
United States . . . ; or (2) knowing that such substance or chemical
will be unlawfully imported into the United States.”

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methamphetamine transactions in Arizona and Mississippi and
related government drug seizures whereas the “vast majority of
the evidence consisted of discrete conversations that occurred
in Mexico about transactions wholly outside the United States
with only an occasional reference to the United States at all.”
Id. at 9–10. The government responds that appellant has
waived any challenge to venue by not objecting prior to trial
and by not specifying an objection in moving for a judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government’s evidence, and that the
challenge lacks merit.
“The Constitution twice safeguards the defendant’s venue
right” in Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth
Amendment.2 United States v. Miller, 808 F.3d 607, 613 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6
(1998)). The government bears the burden of establishing
proper venue by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Haire, 371 F.3d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2004), vacated on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005).
Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a defendant to challenge improper venue
“by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then
reasonably available.” Still, “[i]f a party does not meet the
deadline . . . a court may consider the defense, objection, or
2 Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 provides: “The Trial of all
Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed.” The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides in
pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 18.

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request if the party shows good cause.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
12(c)(3). A defendant may also object to venue by moving for
acquittal at the close of the government’s evidence and
“specifically” addressing whether venue in the district court
was proper. United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 824–25
(D.C. Cir. 2018); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
Appellant did not file a pretrial motion to challenge venue,
and in moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
government’s evidence appellant did not specify a venue
objection. Neither the government nor the district court had an
opportunity to address appellant’s concern and even if a venue
error may not bar retrial, Smith v. United States, 599 U.S. 236,
253–54 (2023), retrials are not without costs, Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Appellant responds
that the concern about proper venue “was not apparent to [her]
until the close of evidence,” noting the extensive nature of the
charged conspiracy. Cor. Reply Br. 3–4. Yet in moving for a
judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s
evidence, appellant did not identify any concern about venue.
The court need not decide whether an untimely Rule
12(b)(3) motion is subject to review for plain error without a
showing of a good cause. Other circuits are split. United States
v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing
cases). Assuming plain error review is available without
showing good cause, appellant fails to show plain error that
affected her “substantial rights.” Sitzmann, 893 F.3d at 830
(citation omitted). The court will exercise discretion to correct
an error only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 467 (1997)); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).

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Article III of the Constitution contemplates elaboration on
venue requirements in legislation for offenses committed
outside of the United States. See United States v. Dawson, 56
U.S. 467, 488 (1853). The government relies on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3238 and 21 U.S.C. § 959(c).
Section 3238 provides:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed . . . out of
the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall
be in the district in which the offender, or any one of
two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first
brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so
arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or
information may be filed in the district of the last
known residence of the offender or of any one of two
or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is
known the indictment or information may be filed in
the District of Columbia. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized text indicates Section 3238 applies here.
Recounting the history of Section 3238, known colloquially as
the “‘high seas’ venue statute” and originating in the Act of
April 30, 1790, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit observed that Section 3238 has been accorded
broad meaning and application. Miller, 808 F.3d at 616 (citing
the First Circuit and its own precedent).
Section 959(c) provided during the period of the charged
conspiracy: “Any person who violates this section shall be tried
in the United States district court at the point of entry where
such person enters the United States, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 959(c) (1996). The venue provision has since been removed.

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21 U.S.C. § 959 (2017); see Nat’l Def. Auth. Act FY 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1012(b), 131 Stat. 1283, 1546 (2017).
In United States v. Thompson, 921 F.3d 263, 265, 266 n.1,
267 (D.C. Cir. 2019), the court held that the crime of
conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 963 has extraterritorial
application through Section 959(c). Appellant maintains
conspiracy under Section 963 “does not contain a clear
statement of extraterritorial effect” and the “presumption
against extraterritoriality dictates a lack of jurisdiction and,
thus, no basis for venue either.” Cor. Appellant Br. 10 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Article III and the
Sixth Amendment, appellant continues, “do not allow
Congress to set venue wherever it may choose whenever part
of a crime was committed extraterritorially.” Id. at 11 (citing
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232 (1924); United States v.
Jackalow, 66 U.S. 484, 486 (1862)). As illustrative, appellant
cites cases involving different venue statutes and factual
circumstances. Id. at 11–12. For instance, United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402–03 (1927), states that
“[s]ince the indictment did not charge the formation of the
conspiracy or agreement within” a specific district, the district
court “was without jurisdiction unless some act pursuant to the
agreement or conspiracy took place there.” But the defendants
there were indicted for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the Supreme Court did not discuss applicable venue statutes.
Id. Appellant acknowledges her objection to Thompson is
made in order to preserve the issue for review by the Supreme
Court. Cor. Appellant Br. 10.
To the extent appellant objects that venue does not lie in
the District of Columbia because part of the conspiracy was
committed in Arizona and in Mississippi and no part was
committed in the District of Columbia, her reasoning is flawed.
At common law, the crime of conspiracy takes place upon the

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formation of the conspiracy agreement; no overt act is required.
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 213–14 (2005);
Appellee Br. 24. Consistent with that rule, a Section 963
conspiracy is complete at the moment of the agreement. United
States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Cobar, Crim. No. 05-
451, 2006 WL 3289267, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2006), is
misplaced because Section 3238 did not support venue in the
District of Columbia where one defendant had formed a
conspiracy abroad while another had been first indicted within
the United States. Here, neither party disputes that the charged
conspiracy began outside the United States, and appellant was
not charged in any other district. Appellant’s objection that
Section 3238 can provide no basis for venue in the District of
Columbia because the government failed to prove where the
conspiracy began is forfeited, having been raised only in the
reply brief. Cor. Reply Br. 9; see Am. Wildlands v.
Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In any
event, overt acts by co-conspirators in one district do not
necessarily render venue improper in another district or in the
District of Columbia. See Miller, 808 F.3d at 619–20 & n.10
(applying two-part test of United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno,
526 U.S. 275 (1999), and citing cases from the Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Circuits).
In United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006),
the court held venue in the District of Columbia was proper
under Section 3238 where Gurr “was not arrested or ‘first
brought’ into the United States until after he had been indicted
in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
Appellant, too, was not arrested or “first brought” into the
United States until after she had been indicted in the District of
Columbia on August 30, 2016. Because appellant has not
shown venue for her trial was plainly erroneous, and thus
unconstitutional for lack of proper venue, the court has no

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occasion to consider whether venue would have been proper
under Section 959(c).
Finally, appellant’s constitutional challenge to venue
based on an asserted lack of any connection between her
conspiracy offense and the District of Columbia fails. Because
that offense was committed outside of the United States,
Congress could provide for venue in the District of Columbia,
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and Section 3238 does.
II.
Appellant contends the government failed to prove a single
conspiracy as charged in the indictment because the evidence
“showed numerous separate transactions and agreements with
diverse objectives,” such as distributing methamphetamine in
the United States, manufacturing methamphetamine in
Mexico, or distributing cocaine in Mexico and Latin America.
Cor. Appellant Br. 15–16. Additionally, none of these
transactions “involved overlapping participants working in
integrated capacities toward a common goal.” Id. at 16.
Further, appellant maintains, the variance between the
indictment charging a “single, overarching methamphetamine
and cocaine importation conspiracy and the evidence of
multiple separate conspiracies presented at trial” was “fatally
prejudicial.” Id. at 25. Appellant suggests a risk of a
“spillover” effect of other crimes evidence from multiple
separate transactions, id. at 28–33, and claims the failure of the
jury instructions to address multiple conspiracies increased the
likelihood of a non-unanimous verdict, id. at 33–37.
For purposes of determining whether there was a single
conspiracy, the court must “ask ‘whether the participants’”
(1) “shared a common goal,” (2) “were involved together in
carrying out at least some parts of the plan,” and (3) “were

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dependent upon one another.” United States v. Lopesierra-
Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
Not all the drugs in a single conspiracy need be bound for the
United States. Id. As the court has long recognized, “[t]he
existence of a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is
primarily a question of fact for the jury,” United States v.
Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and the most
important factor is “whether the conspirators share a common
goal, such as the possession and distribution of narcotics for
profit,” id. at 1393. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, as the court must, United States
v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the jury could
reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant and
the co-conspirators were involved in a single conspiracy.
The government introduced evidence at trial that included:
(1) the testimony of cooperating witnesses and a “confidential
source” about appellant’s central role in planning and
coordinating the sale and transport of drugs and precursor
chemicals, Trial Tr. 584–635 (Dec. 12, 2019); Trial Tr. 772–
86, 827–41 (Dec. 13, 2019); (2) the testimony of law
enforcement officers, including a DEA expert on the means and
methods commonly used by drug traffickers to transport drugs,
the street value, and the meaning of specialized terms used in
speaking about the drugs and related plans with co-
conspirators, Trial Tr. 1159, 1161–68, 1170–71, 1182–96
(Dec. 17, 2019); (3) “BlackBerry” messages between appellant
and co-conspirators (identified by aliases) discussing drug
purchases and transport, id. at 1182–96; (4) telephone calls
between appellant and cooperating witnesses about drug
transactions in Arizona and Mississippi, Trial Tr. 762–63, 783–
86, 832–41 (Dec. 13, 2019); (5) emails: some with
photographs and specifications for private aircraft to transport
drugs from South America to Mexico; other emails regarding

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precursor chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine;
and emails with attached invoices and bills of lading for large
amounts of precursor chemicals, Trial Tr. 1070–80 (Dec. 16,
2019); and (6) photographs of drugs seized over multiple years
of the conspiracy, Trial Tr. 730–31, 815–16 (Dec. 13, 2019),
and of large quantities of drugs or precursor chemicals sent or
received by appellant and the co-conspirators, Trial Tr. 1028,
1032, 1034–1036, 1074–75 (Dec. 16, 2019).
Juan Antonio Erbe-Fabela (“Fabela”) pulled it all together
for the government. He testified that before becoming a
“confidential source” for the DEA and adviser on drug
trafficking to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, he
“perform[ed] favors” for the Sinaloa Cartel, which was a
“unification of several different drug trafficking groups”
operating on the western side of Mexico. Trial Tr. 573–77
(Dec. 12, 2019). He confirmed that appellant was the “female
face of the Sinaloa Cartel.” Id. at 658–59. Toward the end of
2011, appellant met with him about obtaining favors from the
Mexican Attorney General for the Sinaloa Cartel, and by 2012
he and appellant were exchanging 20 to 30 BlackBerry
messages a day and meeting in person “almost every day” she
was in Mexico City. Id. at 581–86.
Fabela’s testimony described appellant’s central role in
planning and coordinating conspirators in the sale and transport
of drugs and precursor chemicals, her use of private pilots and
purchase of an airplane to transport drugs, and ways she used
to protect and move her drugs, including bribing officers at the
Mexico City International Airport. His description of
appellant’s drug operations closely tracked the description by
the DEA expert of the methods commonly used in drug
trafficking — such as using family members in key roles and
transporting cocaine from South America to Mexico, including
using private aircraft before crossing the United States’ border.

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Fabela testified that appellant used commercial aircraft as well
to transport an estimated 1,200 to 1,400 kilograms of cocaine
through the Mexico City International Airport in a six-month
period starting in 2013. Fabela also testified that appellant
constructed a laboratory in Hermosillo, Mexico, to produce
methamphetamine, where her children handled the day-to-day
operations, and she arranged for precursor chemicals to
methamphetamine to be transported through Mexican ports.
More particularly, the jury could reasonably find beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1. Appellant, much like the “higher ups” in the drug
distribution network in Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 207,
was the “main conspirator” who organized, brokered, and
coordinated the charged drug trafficking operations and
“work[ed] with all the participants” for the purpose of
importing drugs for profit through her drug distribution
network. Fabela testified that appellant, as the female face of
a major drug cartel, organized the importation of cocaine from
South and Central America into Mexico by bribing the federal
police in Mexico and hiring pilots of private planes to transport
the drugs. Trial Tr. 599–612 (Dec. 12, 2019). In BlackBerry
messages appellant told Fabela to contact officials “in a
command position of the government at the airport to get
permission” to import cocaine. Id. at 601. Appellant began
branding her cocaine with her alias, “Jenca.” Trial Tr. 1022–
23 (Dec. 16, 2019); Trial Tr. 1183 (Dec. 17, 2019). Fabela also
testified that appellant “buil[t]” the methamphetamine
laboratory in Mexico, Trial Tr. 626–33 (Dec. 12, 2019), and
BlackBerry messages with one of her children indicated her
role in pricing the drug and in buying and coordinating delivery
of chemicals to manufacture it, Trial Tr. 1041–43 (Dec. 16,
2019); Trial Tr. 1130 (Dec. 17, 2019). Fabela confirmed as
well that appellant had “comment[ed]” about “sending her

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drugs to the United States,” and told him that she had
distribution offices in Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and
Miami. Trial Tr. 635 (Dec. 12, 2019). BlackBerry messages
showed appellant contacted persons using aliases (“Pak-Man,”
“Jaen,” “Doroteo,” “ArleeS,” and “.tony (260001EE)”) about
sending drugs into the United States including in Boston,
Houston, Dallas, and New York, and to Canada.
From this evidence the jury could reasonably find that the
drug transactions involved cocaine and methamphetamine, and
that the individuals involved “had an interest in furthering the
distribution of [the drugs]” for profit through appellant’s drug
trafficking operations, which, in turn, showed that they “shared
a common goal with the other participants.” United States v.
Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir. 1999). Although some of
the drugs appellant distributed were not bound for the United
States, that alone “fails to demonstrate the existence of multiple
conspiracies.” Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 207.
2. There was overlap among the co-conspirators.
Appellant participated either directly or indirectly in the
transactions about which Fabela and other witnesses testified
and she discussed in BlackBerry messages. See United States
v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Some
participants may not have known each other, Cor. Appellant
Br. 17, but “there is no requirement that each conspirator know
the identity of every other conspirator” provided they know of
the larger conspiracy and need for other participants. United
States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Indeed, “any overlap among the participants in the allegedly
separate conspiracies” may be supportive of a single
conspiracy. Mathis, 216 F.3d at 23. Here, key players
overlapped — appellant’s children were involved in cocaine
and methamphetamine activities and worked with other co-
conspirators.

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3. Appellant and the co-conspirators were interdependent
because “each defendant’s actions ‘facilitate the endeavors of
other alleged co-conspirators or facilitate the venture as a
whole.’” United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l
Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal
citation omitted). Interdependence exists where there is
“evidence that [a defendant] engaged in an interlocking web of
drug transactions geared toward the common purpose of
possession and distribution of narcotics for profit with other
key players.” United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 929 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). When, as here, “there is advanced planning among
the alleged co-conspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of
drugs obviously not intended for personal use,” participants in
the transactions “may be presumed to know that they are part
of a broader conspiracy.” United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d
60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 1991); see United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d
571, 582–83 (10th Cir. 1984). The duration and regularity of
dealings, as here, also distinguishes a conspiracy from ad hoc
buyer-seller transactions by supporting the inference that co-
conspirators knew they were part of a larger distribution
network. See McGill, 815 F.3d at 929; United States v.
Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171–72 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United
States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1991).
The government’s evidence — including BlackBerry
messages about large shipments of drugs and emails with
attached invoices and bills of lading for wholesale quantities of
precursor chemicals — showed multiple agreements to
purchase large quantities of chemicals to manufacture
methamphetamine, and agreements between appellant and
persons using aliases (“tapiño” and “Doroteo”) for sale,
purchase, and transport of large quantities of drugs, including
cocaine, to be imported into the United States and elsewhere.
From this evidence the jury reasonably could find that “the

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[participants] knew or must have known that others unknown
to them were sharing in so large a project . . . [even if] they did
not know” their identities or roles. Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947).
Appellant counters that the government “attempted to
prove a chain conspiracy,” Cor. Appellant Br. 26, but alleged
appellant “was at the center of a single conspiracy that
resembled a hub with many spokes of a wheel” without
showing a “rim” enclosing the “spokes,” id. at 16. The hub-
and-spoke metaphor does not apply to all conspiracies,
including drug conspiracies, Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1392, and
the court need not decide whether the government alleged
appellant headed a chain or hub-and-spoke conspiracy. The
jury found appellant was responsible for 5 kilograms or more
of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, as
specified in the indictment. A special verdict form (Dec. 18,
2019) showed the jury found appellant guilty of a “[c]onspiracy
to distribute cocaine, intending or knowing that it would be
imported into the United States” and guilty of a “[c]onspiracy
to distribute and/or manufacture methamphetamine, intending
or knowing” the same. “[W]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict
on an indictment charging several acts in the
conjunctive, . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient
with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Griffin v. United
States, 502 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1991) (quoting Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970)). Here, the government
presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably find
beyond a reasonable doubt the key elements of a single
conspiracy — by reason of evidence of a common goal,
overlap of participants, and interdependence.

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III.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, a defendant
must demonstrate (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient”
because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”
because “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 688, 694 (1984). A court need not address both
prongs of the Strickland test if the showing on one is
insufficient. United States v. Henderson, 108 F.4th 899, 903
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); United
States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This court
usually will not resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on direct appeal unless “the trial record alone conclusively
shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief, [or] when the
record conclusively shows the contrary.” United States v.
Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal
citation and quotations omitted). This is such a case.
Appellant contends that trial counsel’s failure to request
instructions requiring the jury to determine whether the
government proved the single conspiracy charged in the
indictment rather than multiple conspiracies seriously
prejudiced her. Cor. Appellant Br. 39. “The question is
whether an attorney’s representation amounted to
incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not
whether it deviated from best practices or most common
custom.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Defense counsel argued to the jury that appellant was a “mother
and a grandmother” who willingly came to the United States
for trial because she knew she was innocent. Trial Tr. 548
(Dec. 11, 2019). Counsel attacked the credibility of the

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government’s cooperating witnesses by emphasizing that they
had “a history of criminality and a history of lying.” Id. at 544.
Counsel also argued to the jury that the government had failed
to connect appellant with any conspiracy because there was no
evidence such as photographs or video showing appellant ever
met with any of the “cooperators.” Trial Tr. 1325 (Dec. 18,
2019).
Under the circumstances, the record clearly demonstrates
that “[d]efense counsel reasonably could have concluded that
the strength of [appellant’s] claim to innocence would have
been dissipated by arguing to the jury that [appellant] was part
of a conspiracy to distribute [drugs], but . . . was not part of the
conspiracy charged in the indictment.” United States v. Driver,
798 F.2d 248, 255 (7th Cir. 1986). Appellant’s position that
“[t]here was no strategic reason for counsel’s failure,” Cor.
Appellant Br. 41, is mistaken. Consequently, because
counsel’s failure to request instructions did not fall “below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” appellant has not met
the first prong under Strickland and her Sixth Amendment
challenge fails.
IV.
Appellant challenges her sentence on the grounds that the
district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines by:
(1) holding her responsible for 3,000 kilograms of cocaine; (2)
enhancing her sentence for using non-commercial aircraft to
import drugs; (3) holding her responsible for bribing law
enforcement; (4) finding she maintained a drug premises; and
(5) finding she was an organizer or leader of the charged
conspiracy. Appellant also contends the district court erred in
finding she obtained $18,000,000 in drug proceeds subject to
forfeiture. Upon review, these challenges fail.

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The court reviews legal questions de novo, United States
v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and the court
reviews a timely objection to sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Iracks, 106 F.4th 61, 66 (D.C. Cir.
2024); see Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169,
173 (2020). “That review, while deferential, looks for
‘significant procedural error,’ ‘clearly erroneous’ factual
findings, or a sentence that is substantively unreasonable.”
United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia, 133 F.4th 1072, 1076
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted). Where no
objection is raised at sentencing, court review is confined to
plain error, and it will vacate a sentence “only if it impinges
upon the defendant’s substantial rights in a way that seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Mack, 841 F.3d 514, 525, 526
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“An error is plain if the district court contravened an opinion
by this circuit or the Supreme Court on the issue, or some other
absolutely clear legal norm.” Gonzalez-Valencia, 133 F.4th at
1077 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In the special
context of sentencing,” this court has long acknowledged that
the plain error prejudice requirement is “less exacting than it is
in the context of trial errors.” United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d
283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Virtually the same standards of
review apply to review of an order of forfeiture. United States
v. Bikundi, 926 F.3d 761, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States
v. Wheeler, 753 F.3d 200, 210 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
(1) Appellant did not object to the drug weight calculation
in the presentence report or to the district court’s base offense
level determination, which was governed by the quantity of
drugs attributed to appellant. Cor. Appellant Br. 48–51. In
view of the trial evidence, appellant’s counsel chose not to
object. Sent. Tr. 9 (July 27, 2021). Appellant’s drug weight

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quantity objection is waived. United States v. Laslie, 716 F.3d
612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
(2) Appellant maintains enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(3)3 requires use of a private plane to cross the
United States’ border to import the drugs. Cor. Appellant Br.
52–54. Finding no such limitation in the text of the Guideline,
the district court concluded that “where the private aircraft was
used during one leg of the importation scheme,” the
enhancement applies. Sent. Tr. 15.
The Guideline refers to a private plane “used to
import . . . the controlled substance.” Three circuit courts of
appeals have concluded application of this enhancement does
not require proof of conviction of the substantive offense of the
conspiracy, United States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 722–26 (2d
Cir. 2019); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1329–30
(11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 124
(1st Cir. 2000), and the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
Guideline does not require a private plane be used on the last
leg of a drug’s journey, see United States v. Iacullo, 140 F.
App’x 94, 102 (11th Cir. 2005). Only the Ninth Circuit has
focused on the past tense “used to import” to conclude this
enhancement only applied when a private plane was used
3 Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(3) (2010) provides:
If the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled
substance under circumstances in which (A) an aircraft other
than a regularly scheduled commercial air carrier was used to
import or export the controlled substance, (B) a submersible
vessel or semi-submersible vessel as described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2285 was used, or (C) the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot,
captain, navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer
aboard any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance,
increase [the offense level] by 2 levels. (Emphasis added.)

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during the last leg of the journey to bring the drugs across the
border into the United States. United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d
174, 179–80 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1019
(1993), and the Second and the Eleventh Circuits have rejected
that approach, Flores, 945 F.3d at 722, 726–27; Iacullo, 140 F.
App’x at 102. The Sentencing Commission amended the
existing Guidelines, as relevant, to “clarif[y] and simplif[y] the
guideline provisions dealing with attempts and conspiracies in
drug cases.” Guidelines Appendix C, Vol. I, Amendment 447,
at 324 (eff. Nov. 1, 1992).
The Second Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the Guideline and understood the Sentencing
Commission to make no substantive change in Amendment
447. Flores, 945 F.3d at 725. That circuit’s thorough analysis
offers persuasive reason to conclude that the district court did
not err by failing to limit application of the enhancement to the
last leg of the drugs’ journey into the United States. Even
assuming error, the error was harmless. The district court
stated, on the record at sentencing, that appellant’s offense
level would still be 43 or above and her sentence would be life
imprisonment even without one or two of the sentencing
enhancements. Sent. Tr. 45. The government points out,
moreover, a court may apply a two-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) for the importation of
methamphetamine if the two-level aircraft enhancement under
Section 2D1.1(b)(3) does not apply. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
n.12.
(3) The district court did not clearly err in applying a
bribery enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(11). Cor.
Appellant Br. 55–56. The court relied on Fabela’s testimony
that (1) appellant “had a group of federal police at the airport
who were working with her and there wouldn’t be a problem”
when she wanted to use the airport to ship her drugs, and (2)

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“some police officers came out” at the Mexico City
International Airport who “were dressed in blue, and they
loaded three boxes” that contained cocaine “into the trunk of
the car.” Sent. Tr. 29. On their face, these statements undercut
appellant’s objections that being “dressed in blue” is
insufficient evidence to show the men were law enforcement
officers and that she conveyed or attempted to convey a bribe
to an officer.
(4) Neither did the district court clearly err in applying the
drug-premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).
Cor. Appellant Br. 56–59. Guidelines commentary advises the
court to consider “whether the defendant held a possessory
interest in” the premises and the extent the defendant
“controlled access” or “activities” at the premises. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.17; see United States v. Carter, 834 F.3d 259,
262 (3d Cir. 2016). There was evidence that appellant built the
methamphetamine laboratory in Hermosillo, Mexico, and that
she referred to bringing chemicals to produce
methamphetamine through Mexican ports. True, the district
court did not refer to “direct evidence” that appellant
personally controlled daily activities at the laboratory, but the
district court could reasonably find, given appellant’s
construction of the methamphetamine laboratory and its
operation by her children, that “it would strain credulity” to say
appellant did not maintain a drug premises. Sent. Tr. 35–36.
Even assuming error, the district court stated that appellant’s
offense level would still be 43 or above and her sentence would
be life imprisonment not applying a couple of the
enhancements. Id. at 45.
(5) Nor did the district court clearly err in applying a
leadership role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Cor.
Appellant Br. 59–63; Sent. Tr. 44. Evidence of appellant’s
controlling role at key stages of the drug trafficking operation

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indicated appellant organized and controlled the distribution of
large amounts of cocaine and the manufacture and distribution
of large amounts of methamphetamine with intent to import the
drugs into the United States and elsewhere. Appellant
“brand[ed]” cocaine with her alias, “Jenca,” and she “buil[t]”
the methamphetamine laboratory operated by her children.
That appellant was involved in multiple transactions and
agreements is not the same as showing that the jury could not
reasonably find that there was a single conspiracy in which
appellant occupied the key leadership role. See Tarantino, 846
F.2d at 406–08. Moreover, the record as a whole shows that
any “error did not affect the district court’s selection of the
sentence imposed.” United States v. Kpodi, 824 F.3d 122, 129
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S.
193, 203 (1992)).
Finally, appellant contends that the order requiring
forfeiture of $18,000,000 must be reversed as a matter of law.
Cor. Appellant Br. 63–66. She maintains that she is being held
accountable for drug proceeds she never “actually acquired,”
and that the district court clearly erred in concluding she
obtained $18,000,000 from the drug conspiracy during the six-
month period in 2013 on which the district court relied. Id. at
64–66. At sentencing appellant objected to forfeiture “on
principle” because she did not have the money. Sent. Tr. 81.
On appeal, she objects that she had not “actually acquired” the
money forfeited. Cor. Appellant Br. 64–66.
A person convicted of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 963
“shall forfeit to the United States . . . any property constituting,
or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or
indirectly, as the result of such violation.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a)(1). The forfeiture is generally limited to property the
defendant actually acquired as the result of the crime.
Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443, 454 (2017). United

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States v. Leyva, 916 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2019), controls here.
There, the court affirmed attribution to “the leader of [an]
organization” of the “proceeds from activities directly
supervised by” him in a conspiracy to import drugs into the
United States. Id. at 19, 31. The court acknowledged that the
“case law . . . was (and is) far from clear that property acquired
by an organization cannot qualify as property ‘obtained,
directly or indirectly’ by a leader of that organization,” id. at
30, but concluded neither United States v. Cano-Flores, 796
F.3d 83, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2015), which stated 21 U.S.C. § 853
provides for “forfeiture only of amounts ‘obtained’ by the
defendant on whom the forfeiture is imposed,” nor Honeycutt
“involve[s] the leader of an organization, and hence did not
close this potential exception,” id. at 31.
The district court found that appellant obtained
$18,000,000 “directly and some part indirectly” from persons
under her control based on the volume of cocaine brought
through the Mexico City International Airport in suitcases.
Sent. Tr. 82. Fabela testified that appellant had the Mexican
federal police “working with her,” had Fabela “accompany her
bodyguard” at the airport so that “everything turned out okay,”
and “stopped importing cocaine” through the airport when
“things got hot.” Trial Tr. 603–05 (Dec. 12, 2019). In basing
the forfeiture amount on six months of activity beginning in
2013, Sent. Tr. 81–82, about which Fabela testified, Trial Tr.
599–606 (Dec. 12, 2019), the district court did not account for
the total proceeds of the six year conspiracy, including an
estimated ten kilograms of methamphetamine that the district
court included in the base offense level, Sent. Tr. 8; see Joint
Mot. to Am. Indictment 1. On this record, appellant fails to
show the district court plainly erred in attributing these
proceeds from the drug trafficking operations under her
control.

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Accordingly, the court affirms the judgment of conviction.

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