Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.a.c.

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 17, 2025 Decided June 24, 2025
No. 24-7053
M ETROPOLITAN M UNICIPALITY OF L IMA,
APPELLANT
v.
R UTAS DE LIMA S.A.C.,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-02155)
David M. Lehn argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
David G. Hille argued the cause for appellee. With him on
the brief were Nicolle E. Kownacki, Blair E. Trahan, and
Renata Rogers de Castilho.
Before: W ALKER , Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS .

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EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge: In 2013, the
Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (“Lima”) and Rutas de
Lima S.A.C. (“Rutas”) executed a Concession Contract for the
construction, improvement, and operation of urban roads in
Lima, Peru. As part of the Concession Contract, Rutas agreed
to finance the project and construct, improve, and operate the
roads in exchange for revenue from toll units. In addition, Lima
agreed to perform some preliminary activities related to the
existing road infrastructure prior to Rutas’s work. However, the
Concession Contract permitted Rutas to perform the
preliminary activities if Lima failed to do so. Between 2014
and 2016, Lima and Rutas entered into additional agreements
related to the Concession Contract. Essentially, those
agreements transferred Lima’s obligation to perform the
preliminary activities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate
increases.
The project covered by the Concession Contract met with
difficulties when social protests and riots broke out in Lima in
response to rate increases at one of the toll units. Lima closed
one of the new toll units and refused to comply with the
scheduled toll rate increases at other units. In response, Rutas
commenced two international arbitrations, claiming that Lima
had breached its obligations under the Concession Contract.
Lima, in turn, alleged that the Concession Contract and related
agreements were null and void because Rutas’s parent
company, Odebrecht S.A. (“Odebrecht”), bribed local officials
to secure the agreements.
Two arbitration tribunals rejected Lima’s arguments and
issued awards in Rutas’s favor. Both tribunals concluded that
there was insufficient evidence connecting Odebrecht’s corrupt
payments to the Concession Contract and related agreements.
Lima filed suit in the District Court, seeking to vacate the two
arbitration awards pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act

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(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Rutas, in turn, cross-moved to
confirm the awards.
Lima’s principal claims before the District Court that are
relevant to this appeal were that the awards should be vacated
because: (1) confirming the awards would violate the United
States’ public policy against enforcing contracts obtained
through corruption; (2) Rutas committed fraud during the first
arbitration proceedings by falsely denying that it had
documents responsive to a discovery request; and (3) the
second tribunal engaged in misconduct by refusing to hear
certain evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions to
vacate the arbitration awards and granted Rutas’s cross-
motions to confirm the awards. Metro. Mun. of Lima v. Rutas
de Lima S.A.C., Nos. 20-cv-02155, 23-cv-00680, 2024 WL
1071119, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2024).
On appeal before this court, Lima presses claims similar to
those raised with the District Court. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. Even if
the tribunals’ key findings and conclusions are susceptible to
scrutiny, in this case they easily withstand that scrutiny. First,
we find that the District Court did not err in declining to
overturn the arbitration awards based on Lima’s contentions
that enforcement of the Concession Contract would violate
U.S. public policy. The arbitration tribunals found that Lima
failed to establish that Rutas obtained the Concession Contract
and other agreements through bribery and fraud. Second, the
District Court did not err in rejecting Lima’s claim that it was
unable to present its case to the first tribunal due to Rutas’s
alleged false responses to discovery. Lima suffered no
prejudice from the exclusion of that evidence. Finally, Lima
contends that the District Court erred in rejecting its claim that
the second tribunal improperly refused to admit evidence. We

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reject this contention because the record does not support it.
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment in full.
I. B ACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
“Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial
indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring [it]
and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all
other contracts.’” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
To that end, the FAA “provides for expedited judicial review
to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards.” Id. at 578.
And it lists four grounds for vacatur. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). As
relevant here, the FAA authorizes federal courts to vacate an
arbitration award when, inter alia, the arbitrator is “guilty of
misconduct … in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy” or “where the award was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means.” Id. § 10(a)(1), (3).
The FAA also implements the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (“New York Convention”). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208;
Comm’ns Imp. Exp. S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, 757 F.3d
321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The New York Convention is a
multilateral treaty that generally “obligates participating
countries to honor international commercial arbitration
agreements and to recognize and enforce arbitral awards
rendered pursuant to such agreements.” Enron Nigeria Power
Holding, Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 844 F.3d 281, 283
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the FAA
directs courts to confirm arbitration awards falling under the
New York Convention unless they find that one of the grounds
for refusing enforcement of an award applies. 9 U.S.C. § 207.

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In pertinent part, the New York Convention provides that
recognition and enforcement of an award may be declined if
enforcement of that award would be contrary to the public
policy of the country where recognition and enforcement are
sought, or if a party was unable to present its case. New York
Convention, art. V(1)(b), (2)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 42.
B. Factual Background
In April 2010, two Brazilian subsidiaries of Odebrecht
formed the Líneas Viales de Lima Consortium (“Consortium”)
in Lima, Peru. Shortly thereafter, the Consortium submitted the
Vías Nuevas de Lima Private-Sector Initiative Proposal (“PSI
Proposal”) to Lima for the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of new and existing urban roads in Lima. The
parties negotiated over the next two years. The Consortium
submitted various versions of the PSI Proposal to Lima,
culminating in a fifth and final version in March 2012. One
month later, an external consulting firm confirmed that the
latest PSI Proposal incorporated Lima’s requests and complied
with the applicable legal frameworks. Around the same time,
Lima’s Municipal Council issued a formal declaration of public
interest regarding the PSI Proposal, requesting that interested
third parties express their interest in the execution of the same
or an alternative project within 90 days. But none did.
Accordingly, Lima awarded the PSI Proposal project to the
Consortium in September 2012. By that time, the Consortium
had been incorporated and renamed Rutas de Lima S.A.C.
During the relevant period, Odebrecht was Rutas’s majority
shareholder.
In January 2013, Lima and Rutas entered into the
Concession Contract, which, inter alia, implemented the PSI
Proposal and established a rate system for the roads. In a

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nutshell, the parties agreed that Rutas would construct,
improve, and operate the roads with its own resources and
financing in exchange for receiving the toll proceeds. Lima also
consented to performing certain preliminary activities before
Rutas’s work, such as ensuring that the preexisting roads met
specific serviceability conditions. The Concession Contract
further provided that Rutas would perform those preliminary
activities for additional compensation if Lima was unable to
execute that work.
Significantly, while the parties negotiated and signed the
Concession Contract, Lima’s then-mayor, Susana Villarán de
la Puente (“Villarán”), faced a mayoral recall referendum. This
process started with Lima’s Citizen Initiative Committee
submitting signatures of people supporting Villarán’s recall to
the National Office of Vital Records in April 2012. The
National Elections Office then submitted the recall referendum
request to the National Elections Tribunal in October 2012; a
few days later, the National Elections Tribunal called for a
referendum on the recall to be held in March 2013. Villarán ran
an anti-recall campaign and ultimately survived the recall.
Overall, Odebrecht contributed $3 million to her anti-recall
campaign. Villarán unsuccessfully ran for reelection in 2014.
In February 2014, Lima and Rutas signed the Bankability
Addendum to the Concession Contract. This addendum
provided that Rutas, rather than Lima, would perform the
preliminary activities assigned to Lima in the Concession
Contract, and it established a compensation mechanism for that
work. In December 2015, the parties signed a memorandum of
agreement (“2015 Memorandum of Agreement”), in which
Lima agreed to compensate Rutas for the preliminary work
through toll rate increases. In June 2016, the parties signed
another memorandum of agreement (“2016 Memorandum of

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Agreement”), in which Lima agreed to increase the scheduled
toll rates outlined in the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement.
A few months later, the U.S. Government and Odebrecht
entered into a plea agreement, in which Odebrecht pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit offenses against the United
States – namely, to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As relevant here, Odebrecht
admitted that, between 2005 and 2014, it had paid $29 million
in bribes to government officials in Peru to obtain public works
contracts. However, the plea agreement did not mention Rutas
or the Vías Nuevas de Lima project.
In January 2017, after Lima and Rutas implemented the
toll rate increase at the New Chillón Toll Unit, social protests
and riots occurred. Consequently, Rutas was unable to collect
tolls at the New Chillón Toll Unit and Existing Chillón Toll
Unit. And Lima subsequently suspended the New Chillón Toll
Unit.
During that same year, more disagreements arose between
Lima and Rutas regarding other toll units. Specifically, in
December 2017, Lima requested that Rutas forego the
stipulated toll increase at other toll units due to its concern
about future social protests. Although Rutas agreed to
temporarily suspend the scheduled rate increases, Lima later
claimed that the increases were unwarranted because Rutas had
failed to complete the required preliminary work covered by
the Concession Contract. After Rutas continued implementing
the toll rate increases, Lima attempted to invalidate Rutas’s
actions by filing claims in Peruvian courts.
Following failed negotiations with Lima regarding the
New Chillón Toll Unit and Existing Chillón Toll Unit, Rutas
initiated the First Arbitration in May 2018. Rutas sought, inter

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alia, damages for lost toll revenues at those units. Lima, in turn,
claimed that the tribunal could declare, on its own authority,
that the Concession Contract and amendments were null and
void because Rutas obtained those agreements through
Odebrecht’s bribery and corruption. In particular, Lima argued
that Rutas secured the Concession Contract because Odebrecht
bribed Lima’s then-mayor, Villarán – principally, by
contributing to her anti-recall campaign in late 2012 and early
2013. In addition, Lima alleged that Rutas secured the
Bankability Addendum because Odebrecht made two
payments in 2014 to Lima’s then-municipal manager, José
Miguel Castro Gutiérrez (“Castro”). As evidence, Lima
primarily relied on investigatory reports and the testimony of
Jorge Miguel Ramírez (“Ramírez”), the public prosecutor in
Peru for the Odebrecht case. For instance, one report referred
to the Odebrecht payroll, which included an entry titled
“Concessão Rutas de Lima” from February 2014 adjacent to
two payments to a person identified with the code “Budián.”
Budián was Castro’s codename in ledgers.
The First Arbitration was held in Washington, D.C., and
conducted under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules. During the
discovery phase of the proceedings, Lima requested from Rutas
documents in its possession containing analysis, mention, or
discussion of payments from Rutas to employees and officials
of the government of Lima (Document Request No. 19).
However, the tribunal denied this request after Rutas asserted
that it was unaware of any such documents.
In May 2020, the first tribunal issued an arbitration award
in Rutas’s favor and granted Rutas damages for failed rate
collection at the Existing Chillón Toll Unit and New Chillón
Toll Unit. Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard,
the tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence to link

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Odebrecht’s corrupt payments to the Concession Contract and
its amendments.
First, the tribunal explained that Lima awarded the PSI
Proposal project to Rutas in September 2012, which was before
the National Jury of Elections organized the recall referendum;
as such, it determined that there was no evidence that Rutas
secured the project through bribes to the anti-recall campaign.
It also noted that the Concession Contract’s terms were not
more favorable to Rutas than those already provided for in the
Declaration of Interest for the PSI Proposal.
Second, the tribunal concluded that Odebrecht’s two
payments to Castro in February 2014 did not establish adequate
evidence of corruption because the payments were made more
than two years before the execution of the 2016 Memorandum
of Agreement and more than one year after the execution of the
Concession Contract. Likewise, the tribunal did not find
sufficient evidence linking the payments to the Bankability
Addendum and 2015 and 2016 Memoranda of Agreement
because the Concession Contract already provided a
mechanism for Rutas to perform the preliminary work in
Lima’s stead, and there was no evidence that Rutas received
any undue benefits (i.e., inflated prices) in the amendments.
Instead, the tribunal emphasized that the Bankability
Addendum created more onerous conditions for Rutas by
shortening the time for completing the preliminary activities.
Third, the tribunal observed that the testimony of
Odebrecht’s representative, Jorge Henrique Simoes Barata
(“Barata”), confirmed that the payments to Villarán's anti-
recall campaign did not impact the validity of the Concession
Contract. In particular, Barata denied that Odebrecht’s
payments to Villarán’s anti-recall campaign were made to aid

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Rutas with the Concession Contract because that contract had
already been assigned.
Fourth, the tribunal cast doubt on Prosecutor Ramírez’s
testimony because he was unable to proffer specific
information to confirm that the Concession Contract or
amendments were stained by acts of corruption.
Nevertheless, the legal fight between Rutas and Lima did
not end there. In March 2019, Rutas commenced the Second
Arbitration, seeking damages from Lima’s refusal to
implement the 2017 and 2018 toll rate increases. This
arbitration was also seated in Washington, D.C. and conducted
under the UNCITRAL rules. For its part, Lima again claimed
that the Concession Contract and amendments were void
because of bribery and corruption. As support, Lima primarily
relied on the testimony of Castro and Special Prosecutor Rafael
Ernesto Vela Barba, and documents from the ongoing criminal
investigation into Villarán and others. Notably, Lima
contended that the prosecution’s evidence showed that
Odebrecht and Rutas illegally financed Villarán’s reelection
campaign by Rutas entering into fictitious contracts
[hereinafter “Meiggs Contracts”] with César Meiggs’s
company, known as Generación S.A., to funnel the campaign
contributions. According to Lima, the purpose of the bribes
was for Rutas to gain additional benefits under the Concession
Contract, which resulted in the Bankability Addendum.
Over the course of the proceedings, Peruvian prosecutors
eventually filed an indictment against Villarán and others for
alleged crimes, such as illicit association and collusion. Lima
claimed that the crimes were related to the Concession Contract
and sought to introduce “the relevant documents” as evidence.
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 356. The tribunal initially denied this
request. But it later permitted Lima to introduce portions of the

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indictment, without additional annexes or writings, relating to
an alleged route of illicit money that was delivered by
Odebrecht.
In December 2022, the second tribunal issued an
arbitration award in Rutas’s favor and granted Rutas lost-profit
damages. Applying a “flexible balance of probabilities
standard,” the second tribunal reached the same conclusion as
the first tribunal regarding Lima’s claims of corruption. J.A.
193. While the tribunal recognized that the undisputed
evidence showed that Odebrecht bribed public officials in Peru
and contributed $3 million to Villarán’s anti-recall campaign,
it nonetheless found that the evidence did not sufficiently show
that such payments were made as quid pro quo for the award of
the PSI Proposal project or for the execution of the Concession
Contract and other agreements. Likewise, the tribunal
concluded that although Rutas might have been used as a
vehicle to finance Villarán’s reelection campaign, there was
still insufficient evidence of quid pro quo for the relevant
agreements.
First, the tribunal observed that Lima awarded the project
to Rutas before any meetings between Barata and Castro to
arrange Odebrecht’s payments to the anti-recall campaign
occurred in late 2012 and early 2013. It also noted that Lima
failed to provide evidence showing that Peruvian law allowed
the mayor to unilaterally suspend or prevent the execution of a
contract that had already been awarded. The tribunal, therefore,
concluded that Odebrecht had no reason to bribe officials to
officially secure the execution of the Concession Contract since
Lima had already awarded the project to Rutas.
Second, the tribunal explained that the negotiations and
revisions of the PSI Proposal and the consulting firm’s
verification that the proposal complied with legal requirements

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occurred before April 4, 2012, which was when the Citizen
Initiative Committee requested a recall referendum for
Villarán. It further reasoned that the approval process for the
proposal – which continued to occur after April 4 – followed
the relevant law. Accordingly, the tribunal found that there was
insufficient evidence to connect the recall process to the
Municipal Council’s approval of the PSI Proposal.
Third, as to the Bankability Addendum, the tribunal noted
that the Concession Contract already provided for the
possibility that Rutas could perform the preliminary work in
Lima’s stead. It also stressed that Lima failed to present
evidence of any additional benefits that Rutas received from
the Bankability Addendum. The tribunal acknowledged gaps
in the evidence concerning the parties’ reasoning for
transferring the responsibility for the preliminary activities to
Rutas. However, it identified other potential legitimate reasons
for the transfer, such as Lima’s failure to act with diligence in
satisfying its obligations. Overall, the tribunal found that Lima
failed to show that Odebrecht’s payments to the anti-recall
campaign in February 2014 were quid pro quo for the
Bankability Addendum.
Fourth, the tribunal rejected Lima’s claim that Rutas
procured the 2015 and 2016 Memoranda of Agreement through
corruption. Because Lima did not present independent
evidence of corruption for those agreements and there was
insufficient evidence showing that the Concession Contract
and Bankability Addendum were obtained through corruption,
the tribunal reasoned that the 2015 and 2016 Memoranda of
Agreement were not tainted by corruption.
Fifth, the tribunal highlighted significant issues with
Lima’s evidence. Namely, the tribunal found that the
Prosecution Office did not provide all non-privileged and non-

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confidential documents presented to the Peruvian criminal
courts, that several documents containing witness statements
were excerpts without the full transcripts, and that some of the
transcripts were uncorroborated statements from prospective
cooperating defendants. In addition, the tribunal did not find
Castro’s testimony credible due to his inconsistent statements,
lack of detailed knowledge of the agreements, and partial
reliance on press reports for information. For example, the
tribunal criticized Castro’s reliance on inconclusive press
reports discussing Odebrecht’s alleged payments to the 2010
mayoral campaign of Municipal Councilwoman Lourdes
Flores Nano (“Flores”) for his claim that Lima approved the
PSI Proposal because of bribes. By contrast, the tribunal found
Barata’s testimony credible – specifically, his admission that
Odebrecht bribed officials for other projects but did not do so
to secure the Concession Contract.
C. Procedural History
Lima subsequently filed an action in the District Court to
vacate the first and second arbitration awards. Rutas cross-
moved to confirm both awards. Lima principally argued that
the awards should be vacated under the FAA or not confirmed
under the New York Convention because enforcing the awards
would violate the U.S. public policy against enforcing contracts
procured through corruption.
As noted above, the District Court denied Lima’s petitions
to vacate the first and second arbitration awards and granted
Rutas’s cross-motions to confirm the two awards. Metro. Mun.
of Lima, 2024 WL 1071119, at *2. The court rejected Lima’s
claims that it should vacate the awards on public policy
grounds. See id. at *18, *25. Specifically, it found that Lima’s
claims had to be determined exclusively by the arbitrators
because Lima alleged that the underlying contract, rather than

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the arbitration award, was invalid for violating public policy.
Id.
As to the first arbitration award, the court also rejected
Lima’s contention that it should vacate the award because
Rutas committed fraud by denying that it had responsive
documents for Document Request No. 19. See id. at *16-17. In
particular, the court reasoned that there was no clear and
convincing evidence that Rutas withheld documents
concerning sham contracts and invoices used to funnel money
to Villarán’s campaign. Id. at *17. In the court’s view, the so-
called Meiggs Contracts were not on their face responsive to
the request. Id. The court also concluded that the documents
would not have been material to the first tribunal because the
second tribunal considered the Meiggs Contracts and other
evidence, yet it still dismissed Lima’s argument of quid pro
quo. Id. at *18.
With respect to the second arbitration award, the court
rejected Lima’s claim that it should vacate the award because
the tribunal deprived it of a fair hearing by improperly
excluding the annexes and writings accompanying Villarán’s
indictment. Id. at *20-21, *24. Specifically, the court found that
Lima never requested for the tribunal to admit such documents.
Id. at *20. Furthermore, the court determined that Lima did not
suffer any prejudice from the exclusion of those materials. Id.
at *23-24. It explained that the annexes did not address the
critical flaw with the evidence in the indictment – that is, the
lack of evidence that the bribes to Villarán’s campaign were
made as consideration for the execution of the Concession
Contract and related agreements. Id. at *23.
Lastly, the court confirmed the first and second arbitration
awards under the New York Convention because Lima’s

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arguments opposing confirmation mirrored its unsuccessful
arguments for vacatur. Id. at *19, *25.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“[J]udicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited,
and we do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an
arbitrator as we would in reviewing decisions of lower courts.”
Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). In addressing whether
enforcement of an award should be denied on public policy
grounds, we give at least “substantial deference” to the
arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement, and “significant
weight to the arbitrator’s findings of fact.” Enron, 844 F.3d at
283, 289. In addition, we review de novo a district court’s order
refusing to vacate an arbitration award under the FAA. Selden
v. Airbnb, Inc., 4 F.4th 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2021). And we
review “a district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award
for clear error as to findings of fact and de novo as to questions
of law.” Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
B. Enforcement of the Arbitration Awards Does Not Violate
U.S. Public Policy.
First, Lima argues that both arbitration awards should be
vacated and not confirmed because enforcing the Concession
Contract would violate the U.S. public policy against enforcing
public contracts obtained through bribery and corruption. We
disagree. As the arbitrators recognized, there is insufficient
evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession
Contract, Bankability Addendum, and 2015 and 2016
Memoranda of Agreement.

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As an initial matter, we note that we have previously
recognized non-statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award under the FAA, where the award “is in manifest
disregard of the law or is contrary to an explicit public policy.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However,
in Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that section 10 of the
FAA provides the “exclusive grounds” for vacatur of
arbitration awards. 552 U.S. at 584. That said, the Supreme
Court and this court have declined to decide whether the non-
statutory grounds for vacatur survived Hall Street. See Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3
(2010); Selden, 4 F.4th at 160 n.6. Because the record before
us plainly shows that Lima failed to establish that Rutas
obtained the Concession Contract and other agreements
through bribery, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether
public policy remains a viable and independent ground for
vacatur under the FAA. See Selden, 4 F.4th at 160 n.6 (adopting
a similar approach). Nor is it necessary to assess the District
Court’s view that arbitral tribunals exclusively determine
whether an underlying contract is invalid for violating public
policy. See Commodities & Mins. Enter. Ltd. v. CVG
Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A., 49 F.4th 802, 818-19 (2d Cir.
2022).
In this case, the District Court thoroughly reviewed and
explained the findings and analyses of the arbitral tribunals
relating to Lima’s corruption claims. See Metro. Mun. of Lima,
2024 WL 1071119, at *4-9. Furthermore, in addressing Lima’s
arguments, the District Court observed that the tribunals
thoroughly reviewed all of Lima’s evidence and found the
evidence insufficient to link the alleged bribery and fraud to the
Concession Contract and related agreements. See id. at *13,
*16. We agree with the District Court that we have no basis
here to overturn the arbitration awards on public policy
grounds. Even if the tribunals’ key conclusions regarding the

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insufficiency of the evidence are susceptible to scrutiny, they
easily withstand that review here. Indeed, those conclusions are
amply supported by the record. And, as explained above, we
give “significant weight” to the arbitrator’s factual findings.
Enron, 844 F.3d at 289; see also United Paperworkers Int’l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 45 (1987) (“The parties did
not bargain for the facts to be found by a court, but by an
arbitrator chosen by them …. Nor does the fact that it is
inquiring into a possible violation of public policy excuse a
court for doing the arbitrator’s task.”).
Tellingly, the tribunals identified temporal gaps between
Odebrecht’s payments to Villarán’s anti-recall campaign, and
Lima’s award of the PSI Proposal project to Rutas, that
undermined Lima’s claims. For example, before the initiation
of the recall referendum process, Rutas had already submitted
the final version of the PSI Proposal to Lima and an external
consulting firm had attested that the proposal complied with the
applicable legal requirements. In addition, Lima awarded the
project to Rutas before the National Elections Tribunal
formally organized the recall referendum. Further, the
meetings arranging the bribes to Villarán’s campaign did not
occur until after Lima awarded the project to Rutas.
Importantly, the Concession Contract implemented the PSI
Proposal and did not contain more favorable terms. As such,
the tribunals reasonably concluded that there was insufficient
evidence connecting Odebrecht’s payments to the anti-recall
campaign to the Concession Contract.
Moreover, the tribunals found that Lima’s failure to
identify any additional benefits that Rutas gained from the
Bankability Addendum and 2015 and 2016 Memoranda of
Agreement, weakened Lima’s claims. To be sure, Lima offered
evidence of Odebrecht’s ledgers that showed payments to
Castro in February 2014, and of Odebrecht’s use of fictitious

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contracts to contribute to Villarán’s reelection campaign in
2014. Nonetheless, the Concession Contract already provided
for the possibility that Rutas could perform the preliminary
work instead of Lima for additional compensation. And Lima
failed to point to any undue benefits that Rutas received in the
other agreements. Accordingly, the tribunals reasonably
determined that those payments were not likely quid pro quo
for the execution of the Bankability Addendum and 2015 and
2016 Memoranda of Agreement.
Lima’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Specifically,
Lima attempts to overcome the temporal gap by highlighting
evidence of Odebrecht’s illegal payments to Flores in 2010. For
example, Horacio Cánepa Torre, Flores’s campaign manager,
testified to Peruvian prosecutors that Odebrecht made
payments to Flores’s mayoral campaign with the understanding
that she would support the PSI Proposal. In Lima’s view, such
evidence temporally connects Odebrecht’s bribes to the
Concession Contract because it demonstrates that Odebrecht
paid Flores’s campaign to obtain approval of the PSI Proposal
from opposition councilmembers. However, Lima concedes
that, at the time of the arbitrations, the only evidence of these
payments presented to the arbitrators were Castro’s statements,
supported by press reports. And, as discussed above, the second
tribunal did not find Castro’s reliance on the press reports
persuasive because he did not personally witness any of the
alleged wrongdoing, Lima did not submit evidence of any
government investigations into the municipal councilmembers,
and the reports were inconclusive. Moreover, as the District
Court found, all the “new evidence” offered by Lima suffered
from deficiencies that made it largely unreliable. See Metro.
Mun. of Lima, 2024 WL 1071119, at *14. The District Court
concluded that it would “not rely on such a ramshackle record
to re-weigh the evidence or review the merits of decisions made

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by two arbitral tribunals.” Id. We, too, agree that Lima’s new
evidence is inadequate to overturn the arbitration awards.
In sum, we find that the District Court did not err in
refusing to vacate the arbitration awards based on Lima’s
claims that enforcement of the Concession Contract and other
agreements would violate public policy.
C. Lima Was Not Prevented from Presenting Its Case to the
First Tribunal.
Second, Lima argues that the first arbitration award cannot
be confirmed under the New York Convention because Rutas’s
fabricated response to a discovery inquiry left Lima unable to
present its case. In Lima’s view, the tribunal prevented it from
taking discovery on the issue of illegal payments to Villarán’s
campaign. In support of this claim, Lima contends that Rutas
falsely stated that it was unaware of documents responsive to
Lima’s request for materials concerning payments by Rutas to
employees or officials of Lima, that the Meiggs Contracts were
responsive documents in Rutas’s possession, and that Rutas’s
actions materially impacted the first tribunal’s factfinding. We
see no merit in these claims.
Courts may deny enforcement of an arbitration award if
“[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was . . . unable
to present his case.” New York Convention, art. V(1)(b). At
bottom, arbitrators “must provide a fundamentally fair
hearing.” Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123,
1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Howard Univ.
v. Metro. Campus Police Officer’s Union, 512 F.3d 716, 721
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (requiring the same when a litigant claims,
under the FAA, that an arbitrator is guilty of misconduct in
refusing to hear evidence). “‘[E]very failure of an arbitrator to
receive relevant evidence does not constitute misconduct

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requiring vacatur.’” Selden, 4 F.4th at 160 (citation omitted).
Rather, “we vacate the award only if the failure ‘prejudices the
rights of the parties.’” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, the
party seeking vacatur “must establish that (1) the arbitrator
committed some error, and (2) the error made a difference.” Id.
The problem with Lima’s argument is that it cannot show
actual prejudice from the alleged exclusion of the Meiggs
Contracts from evidence. Tellingly, Lima presented this
evidence to the second tribunal, yet the tribunal nevertheless
determined that Lima had failed to establish that Odebrecht’s
illegal payments were quid pro quo for the Concession
Contract and other agreements. See J.A. 188-89 (“Rutas de
Lima might have been used as a vehicle for transferring the
funds intended to finance Susana Villarán’s reelection
campaign, by apparently entering into fictitious contracts with
Generación S.A …. [But] there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that such payments were made as a quid pro
[quo]….” (cleaned up)). Due to the absence of prejudice, Lima
has failed to show that it was unable to present its case to the
first tribunal.
Accordingly, the District Court correctly rejected Lima’s
claim and denied vacatur on this ground.
D. The Second Tribunal Did Not Refuse to Hear Pertinent
and Material Evidence.
Finally, Lima contends that the second arbitration award
must be vacated because the tribunal’s exclusion of the annexes
to Villarán’s indictment denied fair process to Lima. We
disagree.
Courts may vacate an arbitration award “where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct … in refusing to hear

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evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(3). To warrant vacatur, Lima must establish that the
second tribunal committed an error. See Selden, 4 F.4th at 160.
However, Lima cannot do so. The District Court concluded that
the tribunal never refused to admit the annexes, and we discern
no clear error. Indeed, the correspondence between Lima and
the tribunal repudiates Lima’s argument.
The sequence of events unfolded as follows. Lima
informed the tribunal about Villarán’s indictment and then
requested authorization to incorporate the “relevant
documents” when it obtained them. J.A. 356. After the tribunal
denied this initial request, Lima subsequently requested
reconsideration of the decision and sought to introduce the
indictment document. Importantly, Lima did not mention any
annexes to the indictment document. Following the tribunal’s
denial of Lima’s request, Lima responded that the filing of the
indictment itself was probative on several points, including to
controvert Rutas’s arguments about the lack of an indictment.
Moreover, Lima stressed that the indictment corroborated its
allegations, which could thereafter be confirmed by “the mere
fact of the filing of the Indictment and on the relevant pages of
the document.” Id. at 358. It then “reiterate[d] its request to
include the Indictment in the file.” Id.
This exchange demonstrates that the tribunal reasonably
concluded that Lima’s request for admission of evidence
pertained to the indictment document itself rather than the
annexes accompanying the indictment. As such, the District
Court appropriately denied Lima’s claim that the second
tribunal improperly refused to admit evidence.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
So ordered.

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