Issouf Coubaly, Individually and on Behalf of Proposed Class Members v. Cargill Incorporated

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 22, 2024 Decided July 22, 2025
No. 22-7104
ISSOUF COUBALY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
PROPOSED CLASS MEMBERS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
CARGILL INCORPORATED, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-00386)
Terrence P. Collingsworth argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellants.
Ellen Noble and Anita Yandle were on the brief for amici
curiae Law Professors in support of appellants. Shelby H.
Leighton entered an appearance.
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. argued the cause for appellees.
With him on the briefs were Perlette Michèle Jura, Jacob T.
Spencer, John E. Hall, Henry Liu, David M. Zionts, John A.
Boeglin, Emily Johnson Henn, Andrew J. Pincus, Carmen
Longoria-Green, Steven A. Zalesin, David Forkner, Craig A.

-- 1 of 16 --

2
Hoover, David M. Foster, Danielle Desaulniers Stempel, Paul
C. Rosenthal, and Lauri A. Mazzuchetti. Stephanie A. Carroll
entered an appearance.
Paul Lettow, John B. Bellinger, III, John P. Elwood,
Kaitlin Konkel, and Sean A. Mirski were on the brief for amicus
curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in support of appellees.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, MILLETT and WALKER,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
WALKER, Circuit Judge: Eight Malian citizens allege that
they were forced to work as children on cocoa farms in Côte
d’Ivoire. They sued seven cocoa importers on behalf of a
putative class. Because their complaint does not allege injuries
fairly traceable to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs lack standing
to sue in federal court.
I
Chocolate requires cocoa beans. They are plucked from
the pods of a tree native to the Amazon rainforest. Today, most
cocoa beans come from tens of thousands of small farms in
West Africa.
A former French colony called Côte d’Ivoire leads West
Africa (and the world) in growing cocoa.1 Its median farm is a
1 See Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Crops
& Livestock Products Data, fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL (see
“Production Quantity” of “Cocoa beans” for all countries in 2023)

-- 2 of 16 --

3
small five hectares, roughly the size of ten football fields.2 An
estimated 790,000 children work on those farms, and many of
them are enslaved.3
Plaintiff Issouf Coubaly was one of them. Trafficked from
Mali to Côte d’Ivoire at age 15, Coubaly worked alone without
pay on a small, isolated cocoa farm called Guezouba. After
five years, he managed to return penniless to Mali.
The seven other named Plaintiffs have stories much like
Coubaly’s. Traffickers lured them from Mali as children with
the promise of well-paying jobs and forced them to work on
small cocoa farms in remote regions of Côte d’Ivoire. After
months (for some) and years (for others), each Plaintiff found
his way back home.
The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the United
States District Court against seven cocoa importers: Cargill,
Nestlé, Mondelēz, Hershey, Olam, Barry Callebaut, and Mars.
They accused those Importers of violating the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. 4 “The TVPRA
creates a civil remedy against any person who ‘knowingly
benefits . . . from participation in a venture’ that violates
federal slavery and human trafficking laws.” Doe 1 v. Apple
(Côte d’Ivoire accounts for 42% of the world’s cocoa supply,
followed by Ghana at 12%).
2 One hectare is about 2.5 acres, or roughly two football fields.
3 See Santadarshan Sadhu et al., Assessing Progress in Reducing
Child Labor in Cocoa Production in Cocoa Growing Areas of Côte
d’Ivoire and Ghana 9-10, (Oct. 2020) (NORC at U. Chicago),
https://perma.cc/T6RN-GZZQ.
4 The complaint also asserts several common law claims. The
Plaintiffs rely on the same theory of standing for these claims as for
their TVPRA claims, so we do not discuss them separately.

-- 3 of 16 --

4
Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Pub. L. No.
110-457, § 221, 122 Stat. 5044, 5067 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a))); see 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (crime to “participat[e] in
a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of
[forced] labor or services”).
The Plaintiffs allege that the Importers “are the architects
and defenders of the cocoa production system of Côte
d’Ivoire.” JA 89 ¶ 154. The Importers allegedly “formed,
operate and control a cocoa supply chain ‘venture’ to provide
them[selves] with . . . cheap cocoa” harvested by enslaved
children. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b)). And to “delay . . .
taking any effective action” against child labor, the Importers
allegedly “created and are the leaders of” what the Plaintiffs
characterize as a nice-sounding, do-nothing organization called
the World Cocoa Foundation. Id. at 89-90 ¶ 155.
The Importers moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
standing. The district court granted the motion, concluding that
the Plaintiffs did not “connect the defendants to any specific
cocoa plantations,” let alone the plantation on which the
Plaintiffs had worked as children. Coubaly v. Cargill, Inc., 610
F. Supp. 3d 173, 180 (D.D.C. 2022). So the complaint’s
“[g]eneral industry-wide allegations . . . lack the specificity
necessary to establish causation with the particularity that
Article III requires.” Id. at 181.
The Plaintiffs appealed, and we held their appeal in
abeyance pending the disposition of a somewhat similar
case — Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
There, former child cobalt miners alleged that American
technology companies violated the TVPRA by participating in
a supply-chain “venture” that supplied them with Congolese
cobalt. Id. at 406-08. Last year, we held that the Apple

-- 4 of 16 --

5
plaintiffs had standing but failed to state a claim under the
TVPRA. Id. at 417.
II
Article III of the Constitution vests the Judiciary with the
power to decide only “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. To present a case or controversy, a “plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to
the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Those three
elements — injury, causation, and redressability — constitute
the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing to sue in
federal court. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
This case concerns causation.5
A
Coubaly and the other Plaintiffs must show a “causal
connection” between their undisputed injury (forced labor) and
the Importers’ allegedly unlawful conduct (participation in a
“supply chain venture”). See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; JA 7 ¶ 2
(Plaintiffs’ injury), 89-93 ¶ 154-58 (Importers’ conduct). This
“chain of causation may not be attenuated, nor can [the asserted
injury] result from the independent action of some third party
not before the court.” Apple, 96 F.4th at 409 (cleaned up); see
also Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024)
(underscoring the latter “bedrock principle”).
5 “We review the district court’s standing determination de novo.”
National Council for Adoption v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 106, 110 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 2021).

-- 5 of 16 --

6
“Congress has the power to articulate [new] chains of
causation.” Apple, 96 F.4th at 409 (cleaned up). It exercised
that power in the TVPRA, “allowing plaintiffs to sue
defendants who are involved indirectly with slavery” through
their “participation in a venture.” Id. at 410 (cleaned up). The
“TVPRA’s indirect liability for ‘participation in a venture’
satisfies the constitutional minimum because it mirrors the
aiding and abetting liability long established at common law.”
Id. at 411 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b)).
At this early stage of the litigation, the Plaintiffs need not
prove that the Importers “were in fact participating in a
venture” — “a question for the merits” that is “not part of the
threshold jurisdictional inquiry.” Id. at 409. Rather, we
assume that the Plaintiffs’ “view of the statute is
correct” — that a commodity’s supply chain can be a “venture”
under the TVPRA — and that the Plaintiffs “will be successful
on the merits.” Id. But, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the
Plaintiffs still must plausibly “allege facts demonstrating” that
their personal injuries are fairly traceable to the Importers’
venture. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (cleaned up).
That means that the Plaintiffs’ allegations cannot be
conclusory. Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 865-66 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). We will “not assume” the truth of “general
averments and conclusory allegations.” Air Excursions LLC v.
Yellen, 66 F.4th 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
Article III requires more “particularized allegations of fact.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
B
The Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not “clearly
allege[d] facts demonstrating” the causal connection between

-- 6 of 16 --

7
the Importers’ alleged supply chain venture and the Plaintiffs’
forced labor. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (cleaned up). This
court’s decision in Apple is not to the contrary. Rather, it
confirms our conclusion.
1
The Plaintiffs’ first mistake is their failure to clearly — or
even coherently — define the “venture” in which the Importers
allegedly participated. See JA 89-93 ¶¶ 154-58. Is it the World
Cocoa Foundation — an association of the Importers
themselves, without “any individual or entity that injured” the
Plaintiffs?6 Or are the Importers “in a venture with each other
and their cocoa suppliers,” who “were responsible for the
forced labor and trafficking” of the Plaintiffs?7 The complaint
does not clarify.8
Even if we set that aside, the Plaintiffs’ complaint does not
contain sufficient “factual matter” to render plausible any
6 See Appellee’s Supp. Br. 6; see also id. at 3; id. at 13 & n.3 (citing
JA 89-90 ¶¶ 154-55).
7 See Appellant’s Supp. Br. 11 (emphasis added), 13-14; see also id.
at 6 (claiming to have “alleged with specificity that the [Importers]
are in a . . . ‘venture’ under the TVPRA with their cocoa suppliers”
(emphasis added)); Appellant’s Br. 29 (the Importers “were in a
‘venture’ that included their cocoa farmers”); id. at 35-36 (“The
foundation of [the Importers’] venture with their cocoa suppliers was
their supplier agreements.” (citing, inter alia, JA 89-93 ¶¶ 154-58)).
8 Compare, e.g., JA 89 (“The Cocoa Supply Chain Is a ‘Venture’”),
and JA 28-29 ¶¶ 50-51 (alleging that the Importers provided
financial support, supplies, and training to local farmers as part of
the “exclusive supplier/buyer relationships” that contribute to the
Importers’ supply chain venture), with JA 90 ¶ 155 (“the [World
Cocoa Foundation] . . . constitutes . . . a cocoa supply chain ‘venture’
within the meaning of . . . the TVPRA”).

-- 7 of 16 --

8
causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ forced labor and the
Importers’ purchase of Ivorian cocoa. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); see also Air Excursions,
66 F.4th at 279 (no standing because “complaint supplies no
factual support” for allegations necessary to show causation).
In other words, the complaint fails to articulate a plausible
causal link between the Importers and the specific farms where
the Plaintiffs worked.
Nowhere, for instance, does Coubaly plausibly allege that
Guezouba, the small farm where he was forced to work,
supplied one of the Importers that he sued. Nor does he allege
that Guezouba supplied an intermediary company that in turn
supplied a specific Importer. See JA 71 ¶ 127 (alleging
generally that Guezouba was in an “area” of Côte d’Ivoire that
“was primarily supplying cocoa to Defendants Nestlé, Cargill
and Olam”). The same goes for the other named Plaintiffs and
the farms where they worked, only some of which are even
identified by name.9
9 JA 73 ¶ 130 (Sidiki Bamba worked on a plantation “called ‘Karou’”
that was “in an area that supplied cocoa to all Defendants”); id. at 75
¶ 133 (Tenimba Djamoutene worked on a “plantation called Yofla
near Sinfra,” “a major cocoa-producing region . . . [that] was
primarily supplying cocoa to Defendants Nestlé, Cargill, Barry
Callebaut, and Olam”); id. at 77 ¶ 136 (Oudou Ouattara worked on
an unnamed plantation in “Divo,” “a major cocoa-producing area
from which all Defendants obtain cocoa” — but the complaint also
alleges that this “area” “was primarily supplying cocoa to
Defendants Barry Callebaut and Olam, which supplied Defendant
Nestlé”); id. at 80 ¶ 139-40 (Ousmane Ouattara and Issouf Bagayoko
worked on a plantation identified only by the owner’s name and its
relative proximity to the “small isolated village of Souroudouga” —
an “area . . . known as the ‘wild west’ of the cocoa production areas”
where “all the Defendants purchase . . . cocoa”); id. at 82-83 ¶ 143

-- 8 of 16 --

9
At most, the Plaintiffs allege that some farms were in
“areas” that “primarily” sold cocoa to certain Importers, and
other farms were in “areas” that sold to “all” Importers. See,
e.g., JA 72 ¶ 129; 75 ¶ 133, 73 ¶ 130; see also supra n.9. That
does not plausibly allege that the Importers or their venture
caused the Plaintiffs’ individual injuries. So it is thin factual
support for the Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that they
worked “on farms in Côte d’Ivoire . . . [that] supply cocoa
beans to the [Importers].” JA 7 ¶ 2; cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556-57 (“an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion
of conspiracy will not suffice” to plead a Sherman Act
violation). Indeed, their allegations hardly amount to “factual
support” at all. See Air Excursions, 66 F.4th at 278-79.
The Plaintiffs place much weight on one particular
statistic: The Importers buy nearly 70% of Ivorian cocoa. Of
course, that statistic does not identify which farm sold to which
Importer — or which farm sold to which intermediary that then
sold to which Importer. Instead, the Plaintiffs simply say that
because the Importers “are responsible for more than 70
percent of the cocoa exported from Côte D’Ivoire, it is more
likely than not that each Plaintiff was forced to harvest cocoa
for one or more of the [Importers] operating within the
venture.” JA 95 ¶ 164 (emphasis added); see also Appellants’
Br. 40; Appellants’ Reply Br. 19 & n.8; Appellant’s Supp. Br.
19-20.
(Arouna Ballo worked at an unnamed plantation owned by someone
named “Sidibe” about “two hours” by foot from Grabo in an area
where “all the Defendants purchase . . . cocoa”); id. at 84-85 ¶ 146
(Mohamed Traore worked on an unnamed “plantation near the
village of Niama,” an “area” that “was primarily supplying cocoa to
Defendants Barry Callebaut and Olam, which supplied Defendant
Nestlé”).

-- 9 of 16 --

10
To show standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the
Plaintiffs needed to plausibly allege specific facts showing that
the Importers sourced cocoa from the farms where they
worked — either directly or through intermediaries. It’s not
enough to allege only that some Importer might (or might not)
have bought cocoa from a farm at a time that a Plaintiff might
(or might not) have been forced to work there.
Finally, we note that the Plaintiffs’ complaint gestures
(vaguely) toward the Importers’ “staff and agents operating
within Côte d’Ivoire.” JA 29 ¶ 51; see also JA 9 ¶ 4 (referring
to “local buyers, who are employees and/or agents of the
[Importers]”). But the complaint offers no facts about these
unnamed intermediaries, let alone how they interacted with the
farms where the Plaintiffs worked — it merely asserts the legal
conclusion of employment and agency. See Slinski v. Bank of
America, N.A., 981 F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The
existence of an agency relationship is a legal conclusion, which
the court need not accept unless it is supported by factual
allegations.”) . So here again, without more, the Plaintiffs’
complaint does not connect their all-too-real injuries to the
Importers.
In conclusion, the Plaintiffs would have Article III
standing to sue the Importers if they had plausibly alleged that
the Importers sourced cocoa (directly or through an
intermediary) from the farms where the Plaintiffs worked. Is
there a “possibility” that at least some of the Importers sourced
cocoa from those farms? Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Yes. But is it “plausible”? Id. (cleaned up). Not on
this complaint.

-- 10 of 16 --

11
2
The Plaintiffs’ complaint meaningfully differs from the
complaint in Doe 1 v. Apple.
On the surface, the cases look a lot alike. The Apple
plaintiffs had engaged in forced labor as children (as here). 96
F.4th at 407. They alleged that large global companies
benefitted from their forced labor through a “supply chain
venture” (as here). First Amended Complaint at 82 ¶ 110
(“Apple Complaint”), Doe 1 v. Apple, No. 19-cv-03737
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021); Apple, 96 F.4th at 408, 416. And they
sued those companies under the TVPRA (as here). 96 F.4th at
406.
But in Apple, the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the
defendants sourced cobalt from the very suppliers who
benefitted from the plaintiffs’ forced labor. So a direct line ran
from all the defendants, through their suppliers, to all the
plaintiffs.10 To take James Doe 1 as just one example, the
Apple complaint (1) identified the mine where James Doe 1
worked, (2) identified the company that owned and controlled
the subsidiary that operated the mine, and (3) plausibly alleged
that this company ultimately supplied cobalt to each defendant
10 See 96 F.4th at 411 (“plaintiffs have demonstrated causation
because they have alleged the Tech Companies are in a ‘venture’ . . .
with Glencore, Huayou, Eurasian Resources, and their [local]
subsidiaries who are responsible for the forced labor”); id. at 408
(“Each miner in the case was injured or killed at a mine operated by
a subsidiary of Glencore, Huayou, or Eurasian Resources. . . .
[T]hese companies supply cobalt to the Tech Companies.”); id. at
411-12 (underscoring the tech companies’ “business relationship[s]
with the offending cobalt suppliers”).

-- 11 of 16 --

12
(via clearly identified intermediaries). See Apple Complaint at
24-25 ¶ 30.11
By contrast, the Coubaly complaint against the Importers
(1) does not identify all the farms where the Plaintiffs worked,
(2) does not fully identify the farmers who owned and
controlled those farms, and (3) does not plausibly allege that
those (largely unidentified) farmers supplied cocoa to any of
the Importers (or any clearly identified intermediaries). See JA
70-89 ¶¶ 127-153. In other words, the Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged that the Importers sourced cocoa from the
farms where the Plaintiffs worked — unlike in Apple, where
the complaint connected the tech-company defendants to the
specific mines where the plaintiffs worked. 96 F.4th at 406-08,
411-12; see infra Appendix B.
We recognize that the Apple plaintiffs had standing even
though they did not connect the defendants to the specific
cobalt mined by the plaintiffs. See 96 F.4th at 409-12. But the
Apple plaintiffs did connect the defendants to the sellers of
cobalt mined by the plaintiffs. Id. Likewise, in today’s case,
Article III does not require the Plaintiffs to plausibly allege
facts connecting the Importers to the specific cocoa harvested
by the Plaintiffs. But, at this procedural juncture, Article III
does require the Plaintiffs to plausibly allege facts showing that
their own injuries can be fairly traced to the Importers’
venture.12
11 The Apple complaint did the same for each of the sixteen named
plaintiffs. See Appendix B.
12 The diagrams in Appendix A highlight the critical difference
between Apple and this case. To be clear, the Apple chart simplifies
things a bit. In Apple, the defendants’ suppliers operated through
subsidiaries that owned mines or mineral rights; certain suppliers

-- 12 of 16 --

13
III
The Plaintiffs in this case deserve the greatest sympathy,
and the people who took away their childhoods deserve the
greatest condemnation. But the Plaintiffs did not plausibly
allege a connection between those people and the Importers.
The Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to sue the Importers.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’
complaint.
So ordered.
supplied only certain defendants; and certain defendants received
cobalt through a chain of multiple intermediaries. See Appendix B.
But those nuances do not negate this key point: Unlike the complaint
in today’s case, the Apple complaint plausibly alleged that the
defendants had direct or intermediated commercial relationships
with suppliers who were responsible for the plaintiffs’ forced labor.

-- 13 of 16 --

14
Appendix A
Doe 1 v. Apple
Coubaly v. Cargill

-- 14 of 16 --

15
Appendix B
Apple Complaint Traceability Allegations
Plaintiffs Mine & Intermediaries Defendants
James Doe 1
John Doe 7
Worked at Mashhamba East Mine 
which is operated by Kamoto Copper
Company (KCC)  which is owned
and controlled by Glencore  which
sells to Umicore  which sells to
defendants Apple, Alphabet, and
Microsoft  and to LG Chem 
which supplies defendants Dell and
Tesla. See First Amended Complaint
at 24-25 ¶ 30, 42 ¶ 45, Doe 1 v. Apple,
No. 19-cv-03737 (D.D.C. Nov. 2,
2021).
Apple
Alphabet
Microsoft
Dell
Tesla
John Doe 1
John Doe 8
John Doe 11
Worked at Lac Malo B5 mine 
which is operated by KCC  which
is owned and controlled by Glencore
 which sells to Umicore  which
sells to defendants Apple, Alphabet,
and Microsoft  and to LG Chem 
which supplies defendants Dell and
Tesla. See id. at 26 ¶ 32, 44 ¶ 47, 51
¶ 55.
Apple
Alphabet
Microsoft
Dell
Tesla

-- 15 of 16 --

16
Plaintiffs Mine & Intermediaries Defendants
James Doe 2
James Doe 3
James Doe 12
John Doe 4
John Doe 6
John Doe 9
Joshua Doe 2
Recruited by Coopérative Minière
Maadini kwa Kilimo  a cooperative
controlled by Glencore  to work at
Tilwezembe mine  where Glencore
owns the mineral rights  and
Glencore sells to Umicore  which
sells to defendants Apple, Alphabet,
and Microsoft  and to LG Chem 
which supplies defendants Dell and
Tesla. See id. at 28-29 ¶¶ 34-36, 33-
34 ¶¶ 38-39, 37-42 ¶¶ 41-44, 46-48
¶¶ 49-50, 53-55 ¶¶ 58-59, 55-56
¶¶ 61-62.
Apple
Alphabet
Microsoft
Dell
Tesla
John Doe 3
John Doe 5
Worked at a mine operated and
controlled by Congo Dongfang
Mining  a subsidiary of Zhejiang
Huayou Cobalt  which sells to
defendants Apple, Dell, and
Microsoft. See id. at 30 ¶ 37, 35 ¶ 40.
Apple
Dell
Microsoft
John Doe 10 Worked at Kamilombe No. 1 mine 
which is operated by Taruga Minerals
 with a concession owned by KCC
 which is owned and controlled by
Glencore  which sells to Umicore
 which sells to defendants Apple,
Alphabet, and Microsoft  and to LG
Chem  which supplies defendants
Dell and Tesla. See id. at 49-50 ¶ 53.
Apple
Alphabet
Microsoft
Dell
Tesla
John Doe 13 Worked at the Metalkol SA mine 
which is owned by the Eurasian
Resources Group  which supplies
defendant Tesla. See id. at 57 ¶ 64.
Tesla

-- 16 of 16 --