Gary Sebastian Brown, Iii v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 14, 2025 Decided July 15, 2025
No. 23-5244
GARY SEBASTIAN BROWN, III,
APPELLANT
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-01639)
Joshua M. Wesneski, appointed by the court, argued the
cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on
the briefs were Chloe S. Fife and Zachary D. Tripp, appointed
by the court.
Gary Sebastian Brown III, pro se, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for appellant.
Sarah N. Smith, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney. Kenneth A. Adebonojo

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and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered
appearances.
Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
WALKER, Circuit Judge: Gary Sebastian Brown, III filed a
Freedom of Information Act request with the FBI for “witness
accounts, narratives, or statements” related to the 2015 terrorist
attack in San Bernardino, California. JA 16. Brown
contends that the FBI’s search was inadequate, and that the FBI
improperly withheld responsive information. The district
court granted summary judgment for the FBI. Because the
FBI’s search was adequate and its redactions were consistent
with FOIA, we affirm.
I. Background
On November 7, 2019, Brown sent a FOIA request to the
FBI for “any witness accounts, narratives, or statements
provided by witnesses from an incident which occurred on
December 2nd, 2015 at the Inland Regional Center in San
Bernardino, CA.” JA 16. “Of particular importance” to
Brown were “any descriptions of the perpetrators such as, the
number of attackers, their behavior, apparel, equipment, and
any other details regarding their appearance.” Id.
A few weeks later, the FBI sent Brown 19 pages it had
previously released in response to a similar FOIA request.
The FBI explained that it provided the previously released
documents in “an effort to” fulfill Brown’s request “as
expeditiously as possible,” and that Brown could request “an
additional search” if the provided records were unsatisfactory.

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JA 19. Brown was unsatisfied, so he requested an additional
search “consistent with [his] original request.” JA 22-23.
The FBI conducted a new search and located responsive
records. But because the resulting records were law-
enforcement records related to a pending investigation, the FBI
invoked FOIA Exemption 7(A) and declined to release them.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (exempting from disclosure “law
enforcement records” that “could reasonably be expected to
interfere with enforcement proceedings”).
Brown pursued an administrative appeal. That appeal
was unsuccessful, so in June 2021, Brown filed a pro se action
in district court. Then, in May 2022, the FBI determined that
its investigation into the San Bernadino attack “was no longer
pending,” and that Exemption 7(A) “was no longer
applicable.” JA 57. So it released a tranche of records to
Brown and moved for summary judgment.
The FBI attached a 42-page declaration to its summary
judgment motion, which explained how the FBI conducted its
search and its rationales for applying various FOIA
exemptions. The declaration stated that the FBI searched its
Central Records System for “Inland Regional Center,” the
location of the attack. JA 62. The FBI then filtered the
results for witness interviews, which it understood to be the
object of Brown’s request. That yielded 411 pages. Pursuant
to various FOIA exemptions, the FBI redacted many of those
pages and withheld one entirely. It also withheld four
duplicative pages. In total, the FBI provided Brown 406
pages.
The district court granted summary judgment for the FBI.
Brown appealed. We appointed Joshua M. Wesneski as an

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amicus to present arguments in favor of Brown’s position.1
II. Analysis
The Freedom of Information Act requires agencies to
disclose records upon request unless one of FOIA’s
exemptions applies. 5 U.S.C. § 552. Brown argues that the
FBI’s search was inadequate because it construed his request
too narrowly, and that the FBI misused Exemptions 6, 7(C),
and 7(D) to withhold records. Our review of the district
court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. Kowal v.
United States Department of Justice, 107 F.4th 1018, 1027
(D.C. Cir. 2024).
A. Adequacy of the FBI’s Search
FOIA requires agencies to make “a good faith effort to
conduct a search for the requested records, using methods
which can be reasonably expected to produce the information
requested.” Oglesby v. United States Department of Army,
920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “An agency need not
‘search every record system’ or ‘demonstrate that all
responsive documents were found and that no other relevant
documents could possibly exist.’” Watkins Law & Advocacy,
PLLC v. United States Department of Justice, 78 F.4th 436,
442 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68).
Instead, our inquiry focuses on “whether the agency’s search
was reasonable based on the specific information requested and
the agency’s efforts to produce that information.” Kowal, 107
F.4th at 1027; see also Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“adequacy is measured by the reasonableness
of the effort in light of the specific request”).
1 Mr. Wesneski has ably discharged his duties, and we thank him and
the other Amicus counsel of record for their assistance.

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Brown argues that the FBI construed his request for
“witness accounts, narratives, or statements” too narrowly by
searching only for witness interviews. JA 16. We disagree.
Although we have said that “an agency . . . has a duty to
construe a FOIA request liberally,” Nation Magazine,
Washington Bureau v. United States Customs Service, 71 F.3d
885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995), an agency is required only “to read
[the request] as drafted,” Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 777
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In addition, a FOIA requester bears the
burden of “reasonably describ[ing]” the records he seeks, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), in a manner that “the agency is able to
determine precisely what records are being requested.”
Kowalczyk v. Department of Justice, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). Consistent with these principles,
“[a]gencies have the discretion to construe requests
reasonably.” Kowal, 107 F.4th at 1028.
Here, the FBI had to translate Brown’s request for
“witness accounts, narratives, or statements” into agency
parlance. Given the context of Brown’s request — seeking
records related to an FBI investigation — the FBI construed
Brown’s request against the backdrop of its standard
investigative practices. It determined that the information
Brown sought — “witness accounts, narratives, or
statements” — would have been captured through formal
witness interviews and memorialized on FD-302 forms.2 So
it crafted its search accordingly.
Brown believes that a broader search could have
uncovered “records of 911 calls,” “logs and audio records of
police radio communications,” and “raw recordings of witness
2 “FD-302s are internal FBI forms in which evidence is often
documented, usually the results of FBI interviews.” JA 140.

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interviews.” Appellant Br. 43. But Brown’s speculation as
to what other records the FBI may possess — particularly those
which would have been generated by other law enforcement
agencies — “is insufficient to demonstrate” that the FBI’s
search was “inadequate.” Kowal, 107 F.4th at 1029 (citing
SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1991)). Moreover, our inquiry turns on the reasonableness of
the FBI’s approach — not “whether there might exist any other
documents possibly responsive to the request.” Weisberg v.
United States Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
Brown is, of course, free to “submit a second, more
specific FOIA request.” Kowal, 107 F.4th at 1028. But
because the FBI’s search was reasonable, we hold that it
satisfies FOIA.
B. The FBI Properly Withheld Information
Next, Brown challenges the FBI’s invocation of
Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold certain records. We
uphold an agency’s reliance on a FOIA exemption if the
agency “describes the justifications for withholding the
information with specific detail, demonstrates that the
information withheld logically falls within the claimed
exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the
record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith.” Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. United States Department of Defense, 715 F.3d
937, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
Additionally, an agency may withhold information under
one of these exemptions “only if . . . the agency reasonably
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by”
the relevant exemption, or if “disclosure is prohibited by law.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A). To satisfy that requirement, the

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agency must “articulate both the nature of the harm from
release and the link between the specified harm and specific
information contained in the material withheld.” Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 369
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
1. Exemptions 6 & 7(C)
The FBI relied on Exemptions 6 & 7(C) to withhold
personal information about FBI employees, other federal and
local government personnel, and third parties.3 On appeal,
Brown challenges only the FBI’s withholding of names and
identifying information about: (1) third-party sources; (2) third
parties merely mentioned; and (3) third-party victims.
Exemption 7(C) permits agencies to withhold “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes” when the
release of such records “could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). To invoke this exemption, an
agency must find that the privacy interests at stake outweigh
any public interest in disclosure. SafeCard Services, 926 F.2d
at 1205.
Brown does not challenge the FBI’s balancing of the
public interest in disclosure. Instead, he argues that the harms
3 Exemption 6 covers “personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). “When, as
here, the request is for records compiled for law enforcement
purposes, the information protected by Exemption 6 is a subset of
that protected by Exemption 7(C), so we need only analyze the
latter.” Kowal, 107 F.4th at 1030.

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the FBI identified are not reasonably foreseeable and that the
redactions were overbroad. We disagree.
First, the FBI detailed the foreseeable harms three separate
groups could experience from disclosure.
• As for third-party sources, the FBI explained that
because association with an FBI investigation “can
carry an extremely negative connotation,” disclosure
of sources’ identities “could subject these individuals
to harassment or embarrassment, undue public
attention, or unwanted inquiries for information
related to their assistance.” JA 78, 79. Even worse,
sources “could also be targeted for retaliation by
investigative subjects, those sympathetic to
investigative subjects, or by those who simply
disparage cooperation with law enforcement.” JA
79.
• As for third parties merely mentioned, the FBI
explained that disclosure of their identities could
subject them “to possible harassment or criticism and
focus derogatory inferences and suspicion” on those
“tangentially mentioned in conjunction with FBI
investigative efforts.” JA 79-80.
• And as for third-party victims, the FBI explained that
it withheld identifying information to avoid inflicting
“unsolicited and unnecessary attention” on victims, to
protect their “dignity and privacy,” and to avoid
“forc[ing] them to relive traumatic events.” JA 80-
81.
With those explanations, the FBI identified reasonably
foreseeable harms linked to the disclosure of the personally
identifiable information the FBI withheld.

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Second, Brown points to certain paragraph-long redactions
and contends that those redactions cannot possibly contain only
personally identifiable information. Appellant Br. 25-27; see
also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II) (agencies must “take
reasonable steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt
information”). But Brown misunderstands the nature of the
redactions. As the district court explained, the FBI invoked
additional exemptions “on nearly every page where [Brown]
has challenged the use of Exemption 7(C).” Brown v. FBI,
No. 21-cv-01639, 2023 WL 5333210, at *13 (D.D.C. Aug. 18,
2023). Those other exemptions — particularly
Exemption 7(D), discussed below — justify the longer
redactions.
Therefore, we conclude that the FBI properly invoked
Exemptions 6 and 7(C).
2. Exemption 7(D)
Brown also challenges the FBI’s invocation of
Exemption 7(D). That exemption permits the FBI to withhold
“records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source” and, in criminal
investigations, the “information furnished by a confidential
source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). Here, the exemption is
met because witnesses provided information to the FBI “under
implied assurances of confidentiality.” Appellee Br. 28.
The FBI adequately explained why all the witnesses had a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Because of the
nature of the crime — a gruesome, ISIS-inspired terrorist
attack — and the witnesses’ “proximity . . . to the investigative
subjects and events they described,” it is “reasonable to infer”

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that sources would not want to be publicly associated with the
attack. JA 85, 86; United States Department of Justice v.
Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993) (“the character of the crime
at issue” and “the source’s relation to the crime” “may be
relevant to determining whether a source cooperated with the
FBI with an implied assurance of confidentiality”).
Moreover, much of the information the witnesses provided is
singular in nature and could be attributed to them “by those
familiar with the events described.” JA 85. Thus, disclosure
of the information the witnesses provided “could subject these
individuals, as well as their families, to retaliation or
backlash.”4 JA 86.
The FBI also adequately explained how disclosure of
witnesses’ descriptions of the shooters would cause
foreseeable harm to the FBI’s interest in protecting the identity
of confidential sources.5 That harm is twofold.
First, as discussed above, disclosure would create a risk of
4 Brown cites Landano for the uncontroversial proposition that there
is no presumption that “all FBI sources” are “confidential.” 508
U.S. at 174. To the extent this argument is preserved, it doesn’t help
Brown. The Landano Court emphasized that although there is no
“prophylactic rule protecting the identities of all FBI criminal
investigative sources,” id. at 180-81, “the Government often can
point to” “circumstances in which an implied assurance of
confidentiality fairly can be inferred,” id. at 179. It has done so
here.
5 Amicus also argues that the district court failed to address
foreseeable harm, and that we should remand to the district court to
evaluate that requirement in the first instance. But our review is de
novo, and “we can affirm a district court judgment on any basis
supported by the record.” Smith v. Lanier, 726 F.3d 166, 169 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (quoting Carney v. American University, 151 F.3d 1090,
1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). So a remand is not necessary.

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harm for witnesses. Many of the witness accounts contain
“singular” descriptions of the shooters that could be attributed
to specific witnesses — thereby exposing those witnesses to
reprisal and retaliation. JA 86. Brown speculates that the
FBI’s redactions are overly broad and omit more than just
singular descriptions. But Brown has offered no material
reason to doubt the FBI, and bolstering the FBI’s credibility is
the fact that it did not redact certain non-singular descriptions
of the shooters. See, e.g., JA 241, 254.
Second, the FBI explained that disclosure would
undermine the efficacy of future witness interviews — “one of
the FBI’s most important means of collecting
information” — because witnesses are more likely to “hedge
or withhold information” if they believe “their cooperation
with the FBI will later be made public.” JA 84, 85. Amicus
questions how one could “deter cooperation with an
investigation that has concluded.” Amicus Br. 39. But that
framing is too narrow: The FBI has an institutional interest in
ensuring witness cooperation in future investigations, not just
its investigation into the San Bernadino attack.
Amicus points out that the FBI has invoked an interest in
ensuring future witness cooperation “in numerous other cases
involving Exemption 7(D) but arising under entirely different
facts.” Amicus Reply Br. 17. But that in no way belies the
FBI’s invocation of the same interest here. Rather, it is
difficult to imagine a criminal investigation in which that
interest would not be applicable. Perhaps that’s why
Exemption 7(D) categorically exempts from disclosure
“information furnished by a confidential source” in criminal
investigations, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D), unlike other FOIA
exemptions that require fact-specific inquiries to determine
whether a specific interest would be served by withholding
records, cf., e.g., id. § 552(b)(6) (requiring a finding that

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disclosure of “personnel and medical” records “would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”); id. § 552(b)(7)(A) (requiring a finding that
disclosure of “law enforcement records” could “interfere with
enforcement proceedings”). Accordingly, we are doubtful
that the FBI needed to articulate any harm beyond the harm
already identified in Congress’s decision to create a special
exemption for “information furnished by a confidential
source.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(D).
We therefore conclude that the FBI validly withheld
information under Exemption 7(D).
C. In Camera Review
Finally, Brown argues that the district court should have
reviewed the redactions in camera. We review a district
court’s denial of in camera review for abuse of discretion.
ACLU v. United States Department of Defense, 628 F.3d 612,
626 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
As Brown acknowledges, district courts have “broad
discretion” in determining whether to order in camera review.
Appellant Br. 20 (quoting Spirko v. U.S. Postal Service, 147
F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (permitting, but not requiring, district courts to
conduct in camera review in FOIA cases). Here, the FBI
provided a detailed declaration explaining why it invoked
various exemptions; there is no evidence of bad faith; and
neither Brown nor Amicus has identified anything in the record
that contradicts the FBI’s declaration. Cf. ACLU, 628 F.3d at
626 (not an abuse of discretion to deny in camera review absent
“contradict[ion] in the record” or “evidence . . . of agency bad
faith”). So the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying in camera review.

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III. Conclusion
Because the FBI reasonably construed Brown’s request
and appropriately withheld records exempt from disclosure, we
affirm the district court.
So ordered.

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