Adam Steele and Krystal Comer v. United States of America

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 16, 2024 Decided July 18, 2025
No. 24-5076
ADAM STEELE AND KRYSTAL COMER,
APPELLANTS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:23-cv-00918)
Allen Buckley argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants.
Robert J. Branman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was
Jennifer M. Rubin, Attorney.
Before: MILLETT and CHILDS , Circuit Judges, and
GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .

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CHILDS , Circuit Judge: Each year, tax return preparers
help millions of Americans file their federal income taxes.
Federal law requires those preparers to obtain or renew a
Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). I.R.C. § 6109(a)(4). To do so, they
must complete Form W-12, which requires users to pay a fee
and disclose personal information. Treas. Reg. § 1.6109-2.
Adam Steele and Krystal Comer (Plaintiffs) have long
contested these requirements. In 2014, they joined a still-
pending class action challenging the IRS’s authority to impose
user fees for issuing and renewing PTINs. That suit initially
included separate claims challenging the PTIN renewal process
itself, and the amount of information Form W-12 requires for
that renewal. Class counsel later withdrew those claims.
Plaintiffs now seek a second bite at the apple by attempting
to revive their abandoned claims in a parallel suit. The district
court dismissed their complaint for violating the rule against
claim-splitting. On appeal, Plaintiffs insist the court erred in
dismissing their case. The government disagrees and adds that
the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) bars judicial review of
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the amount of information the IRS
collects through Form W-12.
We hold that the PRA precludes review only of the
Director’s decision to approve, disapprove, or take no action
on an agency collection of information—not of the agency’s
legal authority to demand information. Plaintiffs’ suit still
cannot proceed. Claim-splitting bars duplicative litigation
between the same parties asserting the same claims, even
absent a final judgment by the court with jurisdiction over the
first litigation. Plaintiffs’ claims were raised, then withdrawn;
Plaintiffs were later denied leave to amend in the class action;
they then refiled the same claims in this litigation. We affirm.

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I.
A.
1.
Writing in 1789, Benjamin Franklin famously remarked
that “nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”
Letter from Benjamin Franklin, President, to Jean Baptiste
Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), in THE W RITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 69, 69 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907). True to
Franklin’s words, the Sixteenth Amendment authorized the
federal income tax, U.S. Const. amend. XVI, prompting
Congress to enact the Revenue Act of 1913, which required
individuals to file returns. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II,
38 Stat. 114, 166–81. That obligation ultimately spurred
today’s widespread reliance on professional tax assistance.
In 1976, Congress authorized the Treasury Secretary to
require that returns filed by paid preparers “bear such
identifying number . . . as may be prescribed.” Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(d), 90 Stat. 1520, 1691
(codified at I.R.C. § 6109(a)). A “tax return preparer” is any
person paid to prepare tax returns or refund claims, or who
employs others to do so. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A). Preparers
initially signed returns using their social security numbers, see
§ 1203(d), 90 Stat. at 1691, until privacy concerns arose about
“inappropriate use” of such information. S. Rep. No. 105-174,
at 106 (1998).
Congress responded in 1998 by authorizing alternative
identifiers. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, § 3710, 112 Stat. 685, 779. The IRS approved
PTINs the next year, which remained voluntary to use in place
of the social security number for over a decade. Furnishing

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Identifying Number of Income Tax Return Preparer, 64 Fed.
Reg. 43,910, 43,911 (Aug. 12, 1999).
That changed in 2010, when the Treasury Department
issued regulations requiring all paid preparers to obtain and
annually renew PTINs, for a fee. Furnishing Identifying
Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,309, 60,309–
10 (Sept. 30, 2010); User Fees Relating to Enrollment and
Preparer Tax Identification Numbers, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,316,
60,317–19 (Sept. 30, 2010). In 2011, additional regulations
required non-attorneys, CPAs, or enrolled agents to pass exams
and take annual training to remain “registered tax return
preparers.” Regulations Governing Practice Before the IRS, 76
Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,286–88 (June 3, 2011).
Preparers challenged the changes resulting from the 2011
regulations. The district court ruled in their favor, and we
affirmed, holding that the IRS “may not unilaterally expand its
authority through such an expansive, atextual, and ahistorical
reading of Section 330.” Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67
(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
While Loving invalidated the IRS’s licensing rules, it left the
PTIN renewal requirement intact. Montrois v. United States,
916 F.3d 1056, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Thereafter, preparers
shifted focus to whether the IRS could demand their
information at all. That question turns on the statutory limits
governing federal information collection.
2.
The PRA imposes requirements on agencies when they
collect information from the public. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3521. Congress enacted the statute to “minimize the
paperwork burden” and promote coordinated, efficient
information policies. Id. § 3501(1)–(7). A “collection of

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information” includes agency requests for identical data from
ten or more people, including standardized forms and
recordkeeping. See id. § 3502(3); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c).
A valid collection must display an Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) control number and expiration date. See
44 U.S.C. § 3507(a); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(b)(1). Agencies must
inform respondents of the purpose, whether a response is
required, and the expected burden. 44 U.S.C.
§ 3506(c)(1)(B)(iii); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(b)(3). The statute
includes a “public protection” provision: if a collection lacks a
valid OMB control number, “no person shall be subject to any
penalty for failing to comply.” 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a). Once
approved and assigned a control number, the PRA bars judicial
review of the Director’s decision to authorize the collection of
information. See id. § 3507(d)(6).
Form W-12 is a “collection of information” subject to the
PRA. See id. §§ 3501(1), 3507(a), 3512(a); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.6109-2(d)–(e). In 2010, the IRS sought emergency
OMB approval to implement Form W-12, which replaced the
prior version. See Information Collection Request, Form W-
12, ICR Reference No. 2010008-1545-048 (2010), available at
https://perma.cc/9WAD-HL2M. OMB approved the
submission and assigned it Control Number 1545-2190. Id.
The IRS later pursued notice and comment rulemaking.1 Each
version of Form W-12 from 2010 to 2022 displays a valid
OMB control number.
1 See e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 70971 (Nov. 19, 2010); 76 Fed. Reg. 14458
(Mar. 16, 2011); 78 Fed. Reg. 76892 (Dec. 19, 2013); 79 Fed. Reg.
29841 (May 23, 2014); 82 Fed. Reg. 18212 (Apr. 17, 2017); 82 Fed.
Reg. 49480 (Oct. 25, 2017); 85 Fed. Reg. 81286 (Dec. 15, 2020); 86
Fed. Reg. 16657 (Mar. 30, 2021).

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B.
This appeal arises from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) dismissal. The “relevant facts are those alleged in the
complaint, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s]
and with all reasonable inferences drawn in [their] favor.”
Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
In 2014, Adam Steele and Brittany Montrois (Class
Plaintiffs) filed a putative class action challenging the IRS’s
PTIN regulations. J.A. 63–95. They alleged, among other
things, that the IRS lacked authority to charge user fees,
require PTIN renewal (PTIN renewal claim), and that IRS
Form W-12 requested more information than necessary
(excessive questioning claim). J.A. 75–78 ¶¶ 46–57, 88 ¶¶ 98–
99, 90 ¶ 107. The complaint sought declaratory relief halting
PTIN renewal requirements and fees, and an injunction
limiting the IRS to collecting only necessary information once.
J.A. 92, 94.
In 2015, the district court consolidated the class action
with a related case and appointed Motley Rice LLC as interim
class counsel. See Steele v. United States (Steele I), No. 14-cv-
1523, 2020 WL 7123100, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2020). Motley
Rice amended the complaint to challenge the user fees only,
omitting the PTIN renewal and excessive questioning claims.
J.A. 96–111. As the attorney that initiated the class action for
Mr. Steele and Ms. Montrois, Mr. Allen Buckley objected to
Motley Rice’s strategic choice to withdraw those claims.2
2 Allen Buckley is both an attorney and a licensed certified public
accountant. J.A. 47. Though the class action claims apply to him as
a preparer, Mr. Buckley is excluded from the suit due to his role as
counsel. J.A. 66 ¶ 13. Assisted by another attorney, J.A. 95, he filed
Steele I on behalf of Class Plaintiffs. Oral Arg. Tr. 7:5–7. Mr.

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In 2017, the district court granted partial summary
judgment for the Class Plaintiffs. See Steele I, 260 F. Supp. 3d
52, 68 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Montrois v. United States, 916 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 3
After vacatur and remand by this Court, Mr. Buckley
represented Mr. Steele, who moved for leave to amend the
complaint to revive the earlier abandoned PTIN renewal and
excessive questioning claims. See Steele I, 2020 WL 7123100,
at *4–6. The district court denied that request, citing undue
delay, prejudice to the government, and futility. See id. at *6.
In April 2023, while Steele I remained pending, Mr.
Buckley filed a separate lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Steele,
reprising the abandoned claims. J.A. 43–44 ¶¶ 67–70, 44–45
¶¶ 1–4. In May 2023, Mr. Buckley amended the complaint to
add Ms. Comer. J.A. 29–30. The district court dismissed the
suit under the rule against claim-splitting, holding that
Plaintiffs’ complaint improperly duplicated claims raised and
withdrawn in the ongoing class litigation. See Steele v. United
States (Steele II), No. 23-cv-0918, 2024 WL 1111639, at *12–
13 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2024). Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Buckley later solicited Motley Rice LLC to serve as class counsel
given their experience with class actions. Id. 7:9–16.
3 Following our decision in Montrois, Mr. Buckley moved for a
preliminary injunction to bar the IRS from requiring PTIN renewals.
See Steele I, 2020 WL 7123100, at *2. Motley Rice LLC opposed
the motion alongside the government, which argued that the request
exceeded the scope of the amended complaint. Id. The district court
denied the motion. Id. at *1.

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III.
As an alternative ground to affirm, the government argues
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the PRA bars judicial review of Plaintiffs’ excessive
questioning claim. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(6). The district court
did not address that argument. Ordinarily, we refrain from
resolving issues the district court has not decided in the first
instance. See Pollack v. Hogan, 703 F.3d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.
2012). But the government squarely raised it below in its
motion to dismiss. See Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Br. 6–9.
Because federal appellate courts may consider any issue that
was either “pressed or passed upon below,” Blackmonn-Malloy
v. United States Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 707 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41
(1992)), we proceed to untangle the legal knot the government
has presented. Whether a statute bars judicial review is a legal
question reviewed de novo. See Porzecanski v. Azar, 943 F.3d
472, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Zhu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 292, 294
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
Although sovereign immunity bars suits against the United
States absent an express waiver, Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox,
Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1999), the APA supplies a general
waiver for suits challenging final agency action, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702. However, that waiver is unavailable where “statutes
preclude judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); Block v. Cmty.
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). There is a “strong
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action,” rebuttable only by “clear and
convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Amador
Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 379–80 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 671–72 (1986)).

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The PRA provides that the “decision by the Director [of
OMB] to approve or not act upon a collection of information
contained in an agency rule shall not be subject to judicial
review.” 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(6). The government contends
that, because the IRS secured OMB approval and displayed a
valid control number, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
assess the scope of information required by Form W-12.
Plaintiffs disagree. They argue that even full compliance under
the PRA cannot confer substantive authority Congress never
granted. In their view, agencies may not collect more than the
statute permits, regardless of OMB approval. Plaintiffs are
correct that the PRA’s jurisdictional bar is inapplicable to
challenges that question an agency’s statutory authority to act.
We begin with the text. The PRA speaks to the OMB
Director’s “decision.” Id. A plain language reading insulates
the Director’s discretionary judgment to allow or remain silent
on an agency’s proposed collection. It does not bar judicial
review of agency conduct taken after such approval. The PRA
imposes requirements on how agencies collect information and
assigns oversight responsibility to the OMB Director. While it
adds conditions to the collection process, it does not say
anything about whether an agency possesses statutory authority
to demand particular information. Thus, where a statute is
silent, we presume Congress did not displace the courts’
ordinary role in determining whether an agency has acted
within the bounds of its legal authority. See Salazar, 640 F.3d
at 379–80.
That reading accords with the PRA’s structure. Congress
enacted the PRA to improve coordination, efficiency, and
transparency in agency information practices. See 44 U.S.C. §
3501(1)–(7). The statute requires agencies to seek OMB
approval before imposing collections on the public. See id. §
3507; 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(a). That framework includes

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meaningful safeguards. The Director must determine whether
a proposed collection is “necessary for the proper performance
of the functions of the agency” and has “practical utility,” and
must both solicit public comment and respond to petitions for
review. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3508, 3517(a)–(b). Individuals need not
respond to collections lacking a valid control number. Id. §
3512(a).
However, the PRA does not authorize what information an
agency may collect, but rather governs the process authorizing
how any agency collects information that suits its objectives. It
prescribes a framework to ensure oversight, not to expand
substantive power. If OMB’s clearance were treated as an
unreviewable license to exceed statutory limits, it would invert
the statute’s purpose and design. The PRA neither states nor
supports that result.
That distinction is critical. The judgment that a collection
has “practical utility” lies with the Director of OMB, not with
the courts. Id. § 3508. Indeed, courts may not second guess
that determination. But they retain the responsibility to decide
whether the agency acted within the scope of its statutory
authority. That inquiry determines whether the APA’s waiver
of sovereign immunity applies. In this instance, it does.
Plaintiffs’ suit does not challenge the Director’s approval
of Form W-12. Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not question the validity
of the Director’s decision or allege defects in the PRA process.
They allege that “[r]equiring renewal of PTINs is an act beyond
[the IRS’s] pertinent statutory authority.” J.A. 31 ¶ 5. Their
claim is that, even with a valid control number, the IRS
exceeded the limits of I.R.C. § 6109(c) by demanding more
information than necessary to assign or renew a PTIN. Cf. J.A.
40 ¶ 56 (identifying allegedly necessary information); J.A. 41
¶ 59 (listing the form’s additional requirements). That is a

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substantive challenge to the agency’s authority, not an
objection to how it obtained OMB approval. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ excessive questioning claim falls within the APA’s
waiver. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706.
To be sure, Plaintiffs describe, in their complaint, the
form’s questions as “licensing-type” and burdensome. J.A. 42
¶ 61. That criticism might support a petition under 44 U.S.C.
§ 3517(b), which authorizes challenges to unnecessary or
unduly burdensome collections. But Plaintiffs do not invoke
that provision or claim a violation of its procedures. And the
government has offered no persuasive basis—in briefing or at
argument—to suggest that the PRA forecloses judicial review
of an agency’s statutory authority to collect information.
Courts must take care not to let parties sidestep the PRA’s
constraints by recasting them as statutory challenges—or the
reverse.
The government’s own case confirms the distinction. In
Tozzi v. EPA, the plaintiffs argued that the agency’s submission
to OMB was procedurally deficient and that the Director’s
approval should be set aside. 148 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42–48
(D.D.C. 2001). That claim targeted OMB’s judgment under
the PRA and was thus barred by § 3507(d)(6). Id. at 47–48.
Plaintiffs here make no such challenge. Their claim is that the
IRS lacked authority to request the information in the first
place—an analytically distinct inquiry Tozzi left untouched.
Hyatt v. Office of Mngt. & Budget reinforces the point.
There, the Ninth Circuit held that § 3507(d)(6) bars review only
of OMB’s decision to approve a collection “contained in an
agency rule,” and rejected the notion that such approval
insulates an agency from review of its statutory authority. 908
F.3d 1165, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2018). That reasoning applies
here. Plaintiffs do not challenge OMB’s action. They argue

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that, even with approval, the IRS exceeded § 6109(c) by
collecting more information than necessary to assign a PTIN.
Hyatt confirms that such a claim is not subject to the PRA’s bar
on judicial review.
Therefore, we hold that the PRA does not bar judicial
review of Plaintiffs’ excessive questioning claim.
IV.
Claim-splitting operates as a corollary to claim preclusion.
Where claim preclusion bars successive litigation following a
final judgment, claim-splitting prohibits duplicative litigation
filed before judgment. That is the posture presented here.
Plaintiffs initiated Steele II to relitigate causes of action
that were voluntarily withdrawn and later denied reinstatement
in Steele I. That tactic cannot seclude their complaint from
dismissal. As the Tenth Circuit explained, “the fact that
plaintiff[s] w[ere] denied leave to amend does not give [them]
the right to file a second lawsuit based on the same facts.”
Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296
F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). That
principle accords with the rule long applied in this Circuit:
Parties may not “maintain two separate actions involving the
same subject matter at the same time in the same court and
against the same defendant.” Zerilli v. Evening News Ass’n,
628 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
Every circuit to address claim-splitting has adopted a
similar view.4 Consistent with longstanding precedent, we
4 See, e.g., Armadillo Hotel Grp., LLC v. Harris, 84 F.4th 623, 628
(5th Cir. 2023); Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine, 78 F.4th 1045, 1050
(8th Cir. 2023); Mendoza v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l, 30

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hold that the claim-splitting rule provides a valid, independent
basis for dismissal, even absent a final judgment. Dismissal
was therefore proper.
A.
Duplicative suits are typically dismissed under the
doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion. That doctrine
forecloses subsequent litigation where there has been prior
adjudication “(1) involving the same claims or cause of action,
(2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has
been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of
competent jurisdiction.” Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186,
192 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The district court did
not apply claim preclusion here because Steele I had not
reached final judgment on the issue of PTIN renewal. See
Steele II, 2024 WL 1111639, at *11. Recognizing, however,
that Plaintiffs had asserted and then withdrawn the same claims
in the earlier suit, the court turned instead to the closely related
rule against claim-splitting, which borrows from claim
preclusion to bar duplicative litigation filed before final
judgment. Id.
Claim-splitting obliges a plaintiff to “assert all . . . causes
of action arising from a common set of facts in one lawsuit.”
Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011); see also
F.4th 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2022); Scholz v. United States, 18 F.4th 941,
952 (7th Cir. 2021); Church Joint Venture, LP v. Blasingame, 817 F.
App’x 142, 146 (6th Cir. 2020); Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc.,
857 F.3d 833, 841–42 (11th Cir. 2017); Kanciper v. Suffolk Cnty.
Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 722 F.3d 88, 92 (2d
Cir. 2013); Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1217–18 (10th Cir.
2011); Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 273 F.
App’x 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2008); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,
924 F.2d 1161, 1166 (1st Cir. 1991).

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18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H.
Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406 & n.20
(3d ed. 2025). “Whether two cases involve the same cause of
action turns on whether they share the same ‘nucleus of facts.’”
Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Page
v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This
Court follows the Second Restatement of Judgments’
“transactional approach.” U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Const. Co.,
765 F.2d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24(1) (1982). In applying that framework, courts
consider “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’
expectations or business understanding or usage.” Apotex, Inc.
v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co.,
723 F.2d 944, 949 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The bar thus extends
not only to claims that were actually litigated, but also to those
that should or could have been. See 18 James Wm. Moore et
al., Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 131.20[1] (2025).
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review.
Plaintiffs invoke the default rule that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals
are reviewed de novo. See Hurd, 864 F.3d at 678 (citing
Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1128
(D.C. Cir. 2015)). The government, by contrast, urges the
abuse of discretion standard. Our sister circuits are divided.
Some analogize claim-splitting to res judicata and apply de

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novo review.5 Others treat it as a matter of case management
and afford district courts greater leeway.6
We need not resolve that disagreement. The dismissal
withstands scrutiny under either standard. The rule against
claim-splitting safeguards vital institutional values. It aims to
“conserve judicial resources, avoid inconsistent results,
engender respect for judgments of predictable and certain
effect,” and “prevent serial forum shopping and piecemeal
litigation.” Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). It also “shield[s] parties from vexatious concurrent
or duplicative litigation.” Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218. The Supreme
Court has long emphasized these systemic interests in
discouraging duplicative proceedings. See, e.g., Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894).
Whether framed as a rule of case management or as an outturn
of finality and fairness, claim-splitting is a proper basis for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Applying the transactional approach, claim-splitting
requires prior litigation (1) “involving the same claims or cause
of action,” (2) “between the same parties or their privies,” and
(3) before “a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Smalls, 471
F.3d at 192; Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218–19 (explaining that “the
test for claim splitting is not whether there is finality of
judgment, but whether the first suit, assuming it were final,
would preclude the second suit.”).
5 See, e.g., Kale, 924 F.2d at 1165; Sensormatic Sec. Corp., 273 F.
App’x at 264; Mendoza, 30 F.4th at 886.
6 See, e.g., Armadillo Hotel Grp., 84 F.4th at 628; Scholz, 18 F.4th
at 950–51; Church Joint Venture, L.P., 817 F. App’x at 146; Katz,
655 F.3d at 1217; Vanover, 857 F.3d at 837.

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First, Steele II plainly arises from the same nucleus of facts
as Steele I. Both suits challenge the same statutory and
regulatory framework governing PTIN renewal and
information disclosure. Compare J.A. 43 ¶¶ 67–68, with J.A.
75–76 ¶¶ 46–52. Both suits assert the same core claims
regarding PTIN renewal and excessive questioning. Compare
J.A. 44 ¶¶ 69–70, with J.A. 90 ¶ 107. Plaintiffs originally
asserted these claims in Steele I, voluntarily withdrew them
following appointment of new class counsel, and were later
denied leave to amend. See Steele II, 2024 WL 1111639, at
*2–4.
At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded as much
that the two suits rest on the same operative facts and legal
theories. Oral Arg. Tr. 4:18–25, 6:8–15. And Plaintiffs
identify no intervening change in law or fact that might excuse
a second round of litigation. See Pet’rs’ Br. 44–45. The claims
at issue would have formed a convenient trial unit in Steele I
and fall well within the scope of what the parties expected to
resolve in that litigation. That is enough to render them part of
the same “claim” under Restatement § 24. See Apotex, Inc.,
393 F.3d at 217.
Second, Plaintiffs are the same parties in both suits. Mr.
Steele is a named plaintiff in Steele I, and Ms. Comer is a
certified class member. See Steele II, 2024 WL 1111639, at
*9; J.A. 64. Though Mr. Buckley is not formally a party, his
appearance as counsel in both actions underscores the
duplicative nature of this suit.
Third, both suits were brought before the same court of
competent jurisdiction.

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In short, Steele II is not just a rerun—it is an impractical
detour designed to bypass the consequences of a prior strategic
decision. While claim preclusion would only apply upon entry
of final judgment, the claim-splitting rule blocks Plaintiffs’
restart in Steele II.
B.
Plaintiffs resist the district court’s dismissal on several
grounds. They challenge the validity of claim-splitting as a
basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), assert that a procedural
bar exempts this litigation, and contend that they lacked a fair
opportunity to litigate the claims. We address each in turn.
1.
Claim-splitting is a proper ground for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). Courts have long recognized that dismissal is
appropriate when a complaint establishes on its face a legal bar
to relief. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487–89 (1994). Rule 12(b)(6)
authorizes dismissal where a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
That determination turns not only on pleading defects, but also
on substantive legal impediments evident from the complaint
itself. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215 (citing Leveto v. Lapina, 258
F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001)) (“Whether a particular ground
for opposing a claim may be the basis for dismissal for failure
to state a claim depends on whether the allegations in the
complaint suffice to establish that ground,” including
affirmative defenses apparent on the face of the complaint).
Claim preclusion is one such defense. See Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(c); and then citing Blonder–Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.

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Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)). Although the burden
remains on the party invoking it, see Taylor, 553 U.S. at 907, a
complaint that discloses all necessary elements of preclusion is
ripe for dismissal. The same is true of claim-splitting, a close
doctrinal cousin that likewise bars duplicative litigation arising
from a common nucleus of operative fact. See Wright, Miller
& Cooper, supra § 4406 n.20 (“[C]laim-splitting analysis
supports dismissal if claim preclusion would arise from a final
judgment in the first action.”).
Courts have repeatedly affirmed that claim-splitting is a
proper basis for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal when the duplicative
nature of the action is plain from the face of the pleadings or
the judicially noticeable record. See, e.g., Vanover, 857 F.3d
at 836 & n.1, 841–42. Such dismissal is proper even in the
absence of a final judgment in the first suit.
All the same, claim-splitting addresses not merely when
litigation must end, but also how it must proceed. In operation,
it functions as a substantive defect in the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief—exactly the kind of legal insufficiency that Rule
12(b)(6) is meant to catch. When, as here, Plaintiffs attempt to
reassert claims that they previously raised, voluntarily
withdrew, and failed to revive through amendment, their
complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law. That
deficiency is clear from the face of the complaint and the
judicially noticeable docket in Steele I. Plaintiffs may not
transform a previously forfeited claim into a new lawsuit
simply by rewrapping it in fresh paper. The Federal Rules do
not afford litigants a revolving door to recycle abandoned
claims as if the first round of litigation never happened.

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2.
Plaintiffs point to Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
579 U.S. 582 (2016), to argue that claim preclusion cannot
apply where procedural barriers foreclosed resolution of their
claims in earlier litigation. See Pet’r’s Br. 29–33. But
Hellerstedt does not stretch nearly that far. There, the Court
rejected a preclusion defense because the second suit
challenged a distinct statutory requirement—the surgical-
center provision of Texas House Bill 2—that had not been
raised or litigated in the prior case involving the admitting-
privileges requirement. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. at 604 (“[T]he
surgical-center provision and the admitting-privileges
provision are separate, distinct provisions of H.B.2. They set
forth two different, independent requirements with different
enforcement dates.”); id. (“This Court has never suggested that
challenges to two different statutory provisions that serve two
different functions must be brought in a single suit.”).
That distinction mattered. The Court emphasized that the
two statutory provisions triggered separate legal obligations.
Id. at 604–05. The challenged surgical-center provision had
not even been implemented by the time of the earlier suit, and
the plaintiffs reasonably anticipated that the forthcoming
regulations might exempt them. Id. at 605. In other words, the
later filed claim arose from a “meaningful difference[],” id. at
604, not just a later procedural maneuver.
Not so here. Plaintiffs seek to relitigate claims arising
under the same statutory provision, I.R.C. § 6109, and based
on the same agency conduct—the use of Form W-12 to
implement the PTIN system—that they previously asserted,
voluntarily withdrew, and were denied leave to amend in Steele
I. That is a far cry from the factually and legally distinct claims
at issue in Hellerstedt. See 579 U.S. at 604–06.

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Indeed, the concerns articulated in Hellerstedt do not apply
to Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court warned that construing the
doctrine to require simultaneous challenge to every provision
of a statutory scheme “would encourage a kitchen-sink
approach to any litigation” and was “less than optimal—not
only for litigants, but for courts.” Id. at 605. But that concern
arises only where different statutory provisions give rise to
different legal claims. When the same plaintiffs refile the same
claims under the same statute in the same court, the claim-
splitting rule bars the second bite. Nothing in Hellerstedt says
otherwise.
3.
We do not take lightly the denial of leave to amend,
particularly where a party has not yet had a meaningful
opportunity to litigate her claims. But where the plaintiff had
a fair chance to press those claims in the earlier action, the rule
against claim-splitting bars their revival—even when the
district court denied leave to amend. See Hatch v. Trail King
Indus., Inc., 699 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2012) (“It is axiomatic
that claim preclusion doctrine requires a party to live with its
strategic choices” (cleaned up)) (quoting Airframe Sys., Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2010)). The only
remaining question is whether the newly filed claims arise from
“the same conduct, transaction or event” and could have been
raised earlier. See Curtis v. Citibank, 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d
Cir. 2000); see also N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Square D Co.,
201 F.3d 84, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2000); cf. King v. Hoover Grp.,
Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 222–23 (8th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled
that denial of leave to amend constitutes res judicata on the
merits of the claims which were the subject of the proposed
amended pleading.”) (citations omitted).

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This case fits that rule hand in glove. Plaintiffs previously
raised these same claims in Steele I, voluntarily dismissed
them, and were denied leave to replead. They cannot now
sidestep that procedural history by repackaging the same legal
theory in a new complaint. The claim-splitting rule bars
precisely that form of duplicative litigation. Whether the
claims were fully adjudicated is beside the point; what matters
is that they could have been. See Moore’s supra § 131.20[1].
The point is not just procedural housekeeping. It reflects
a longstanding principle of litigation integrity: a plaintiff may
not “split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal,”
holding back claims to repackage them for another turn at the
courthouse door. Vanover, 857 F.3d at 841 (quoting Greene v.
H&R Block E. Enters., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (quoting Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477, 485 (1876)));
see also Hardison, 655 F.2d at 1288. As this Court has
explained, “a party who once has had a chance to litigate a
claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have
another.” SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Nor is a new lawsuit a proper
vehicle for appealing an interlocutory loss.
C.
The presence of a certified class raises a subsidiary issue.
Courts have long exercised caution when applying preclusion
doctrines to class actions, mindful that procedural constraints
or questions about the adequacy of representation may cabin
the claims a class can pursue. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893–95;
Smith v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 3d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2019).
Some courts have reasoned that claim-splitting “generally does
not apply to class actions.” Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 586, 597 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Others
have suggested the opposite—that splitting claims “is generally

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prohibited by the doctrine of res judicata, particularly in class
actions.” Brewer v. Lynch, No. 08-cv-1747, 2015 WL
13604257, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2015), aff’d 863 F.3d 861
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
That divergence reflects a deeper concern: a class action
may operate, functionally, as “a court of limited jurisdiction in
which only certain claims and certain forms of relief are
available.” Moore supra § 131.40 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c)). In those instances, at least
one court has hesitated to apply preclusion doctrines where
doing so might bind class members to a judgment that
compromised claims they never had the opportunity to pursue.
See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 256 F.R.D. at 597–98.
But those equitable concerns are not in play here. As
discussed, Mr. Steele and Ms. Comer were members of the
Steele I class, which had every opportunity to assert the very
claims now raised in Steele II. And indeed, it did. Those
claims were voluntarily withdrawn, and Class Plaintiffs’ later
attempt to reassert them through amendment was denied.
Beyond that, Plaintiffs make no claim that the boundaries of
the Steele I class, or any other feature of class procedure, stood
in the way of presenting their claims in that case. Whatever
prudential limits may apply to class action preclusion where
parties are limited in what claims they can pursue, those limits
do not bar application of claim-splitting to plaintiffs who had
every opportunity to litigate their claims the first time around.
That applies in full force here.
****
With all elements satisfied, this duplicative suit falls
squarely within the claim-splitting rule’s reach. A far cry from
an abuse of discretion or legal error, the district court’s ruling

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reflects a sound exercise of judicial authority to prevent
strategic end runs around procedural rulings and to preserve the
integrity of the adjudicative process.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
So ordered.

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