Kleo Ag, Astock Corporation Formed Under the Laws of the Principality of Liechtenstein v. Rivada Networks, Inc., Adelaware Limited Liability Company

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 31, 2025 Decided August 19, 2025
No. 23-7175
KLEO AG, A STOCK CORPORATION FORMED UNDER THE LAWS
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN,
APPELLANT
v.
RIVADA NETWORKS, INC., A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-01664)
David M. Parker argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs was Torsten M. Kracht. Elbert Lin entered an
appearance.
Daryoush Behbood argued the cause for appellee. On the
brief was Peter H. White.
Before: PILLARD and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

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Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
GARCIA, Circuit Judge: KLEO AG, a satellite company,
sued its competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., for defamation.
The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that KLEO
was required, but failed, to adequately allege that the
challenged statements caused it specific harms. We affirm the
district court’s ruling that the complaint needed to identify
KLEO’s harms and explain how Rivada’s statements caused
them. But unlike the district court, we conclude that the
complaint adequately did so. Accordingly, we reverse in part.
I
A
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the truth of the
factual allegations in KLEO’s complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
KLEO AG is a corporation based in Liechtenstein. It is
working to develop a constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites
that will support a global data network. Satellites rely on the
radio-frequency spectrum to transmit information. To avoid
signal interference, international regulations prohibit satellite
operators from accessing the radio-frequency spectrum unless
they obtain usage rights from their national governments.
In 2018, the Liechtenstein government allocated radio-
frequency rights to another company, TRION AG. The
Liechtenstein government also approved a contract under
which TRION licensed its usage rights to KLEO. To comply
with regulatory requirements for holders of radio-frequency
rights, KLEO successfully launched and operated two test
satellites the following year.

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One of KLEO’s competitors, Rivada Networks, Inc.,
wanted KLEO’s frequency rights for itself. To that end, Rivada
commenced a corporate takeover of TRION in 2021. As a
result of the takeover, TRION’s board members voted to
terminate the contract licensing the company’s radio-frequency
rights to KLEO. TRION eventually transferred those rights to
Rivada. KLEO disputed the legality of those actions, and the
purported cancellation of KLEO’s contract with TRION
remains the subject of ongoing litigation and arbitration in
Europe.
About three weeks after TRION’s vote, Rivada’s
Chairman and CEO, Declan Ganley, appeared for an interview
on Space Café Radio, a podcast for satellite-industry insiders.
Ganley stated during the interview that KLEO “only ever had
a provisional and subjective” license to use the radio-frequency
spectrum, that KLEO “no longer ha[d] the use of [its]
license[],” and that any usage rights KLEO once enjoyed had
“been terminated” and “amputated from the filings.” J.A. 86
¶ 40. Ganley further claimed that KLEO’s plan all along had
been to move control of the satellite network to China:
There w[as] a group of Chinese government-
backed shareholders . . . . [L]et’s just say
that there was absolutely no way in the world
that this plan of theirs was credible or was
capable of being executed upon, and
furthermore, there are some very strict rules
with regard to moving, or de facto moving, [a
license for] constellation rights from one
place to another. . . . These are European
filings and it was pretty obvious, not just
obvious, but actually categorically stated that
the plan was to move these to China, and
while there would’ve been, if you like, a sort
of front organization left remaining in

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Germany, everything else would’ve been
moved . . . .
Id. (last alteration in original).
The podcast aired during the second day of a four-day
satellite conference in Washington, D.C. The conference bills
itself as the most widely attended event each year among
executives and customers in the satellite industry. The podcast
was also distributed on an authoritative news platform that
professionals across the industry followed.
During the conference, manufacturers approached KLEO
to express doubt about its satellite network’s viability. Some
of those same manufacturers then refused to partner with
KLEO in its planned satellite project.
B
KLEO sued Rivada for defamation under District of
Columbia law (as well as for tortious interference with
contract, though it later abandoned that claim). The district
court had diversity jurisdiction over the suit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2).
To state a defamation claim under D.C. law, a plaintiff
must allege “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory
statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3)
that the defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted
to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was
actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or
that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.” See
Crowley v. N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169, 1172 n.2
(D.C. 1997) (quoting Prins v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 757 F.
Supp. 87, 90 (D.D.C. 1991)). This case concerns the final
element, which (as the quoted language suggests) can be
pleaded in two ways. First, a plaintiff can allege that the

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challenged statements were so inherently harmful that they
were defamatory per se, in which case no additional showing
of damages is required. See Farnum v. Colbert, 293 A.2d 279,
281–82 (D.C. 1972). Second, a plaintiff can allege that the
statements caused “special damages,” a term that “refers to
actual pecuniary loss.” 1 Law of Defamation § 1:15 (2d ed.
May 2025 update). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(g), special damages “must be specifically stated.”
Rivada moved to dismiss KLEO’s complaint for failure to
state a claim. KLEO twice amended the complaint, and each
time it did so, Rivada filed a renewed motion. Rivada argued
that KLEO had not plausibly claimed any injury from the
podcast. KLEO responded that Ganley’s statements were
defamatory per se and that, in any event, the second amended
complaint (hereinafter the “complaint”) adequately pleaded
special damages. KLEO pointed to several allegations in the
complaint detailing the harms it sustained from Ganley’s
interview, including the costs of repairing its relationships with
satellite manufacturers and establishing new partnerships.
The district court granted each of Rivada’s motions and
ultimately dismissed KLEO’s lawsuit with prejudice. See
KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc., 2023 WL 7921969, at *1
(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2023). Assuming without deciding that
Ganley’s statements were false and defamatory, the court ruled
that they were not defamatory per se. The district court then
determined that KLEO had not pleaded special damages
because the complaint did not adequately allege a causal tie
between Ganley’s statements and KLEO’s losses.
KLEO now appeals.
II
We review the district court’s dismissal of KLEO’s suit de
novo. See Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

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“In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [we] must construe the
complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617
F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
On appeal, KLEO reprises its argument that it has stated a
defamation per se claim and that, in the alternative, it has
adequately pleaded special damages. We affirm the district
court’s determination that Ganley’s statements did not amount
to defamation per se. We hold, however, that KLEO
adequately pleaded one theory of special damages and remand
for further proceedings on that issue.
A
Only “statements about extreme subjects” are considered
defamatory per se. Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (per curiam). That category includes “statements
imputing to a person a criminal offense; a loathsome disease;
matter affecting adversely a person’s fitness for trade, business,
or profession; or serious sexual misconduct.” Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 262 n.18 (1978). Statements like those are
“virtually certain” to damage someone’s reputation, so a
defamation plaintiff need not separately establish that the
statements caused actual harm. Id. at 262.
KLEO insists that Ganley attributed to it a matter
adversely affecting its fitness for the satellite industry in two
ways: first, by communicating that KLEO lacked the radio-
frequency rights needed to operate its satellite system; second,
by claiming that KLEO “planned to transfer control of [its
satellite] network to China.” Appellant’s Brief 9. Neither
argument succeeds.

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To start, it was not defamatory per se for Ganley to claim
that KLEO had lost its radio-frequency rights. Ganley’s
statements described a business deal that fell through, not
anything so “extreme” as to constitute defamation per se.
Smith, 886 F.3d at 128.
KLEO resists that basic point by relying on cases about
individual professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, who
sued for defamation over allegedly false statements that they
had lost their licenses, were in danger of losing their licenses,
or were incapable of performing the work of their trade. See
Appellant’s Brief 18–20 (citing Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256,
1264 (D.C. 1984); Krishnan v. Blueprint Healthcare LLC,
2021 WL 4255359, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2021); Cretella v.
Kuzminski, 640 F. Supp. 2d 741, 763 (E.D. Va. 2009); Mimms
v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2017 WL 25456, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Jan.
3, 2017), rev’d in part on other grounds, 889 F.3d 865 (7th Cir.
2018); and Elibol v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 747 N.Y.S.2d
649, 650 (2002)). Courts found the statements at issue in those
cases defamatory per se, and KLEO submits that the same
reasoning should control here: After all, KLEO says, Ganley
said it “lack[ed] a license necessary to conduct its business.”
Id. at 19.
But a statement alleging the lack of a license does not
amount to defamation per se in all settings. The unifying theme
of the cases KLEO cites is that they involved lines of work
where such an accusation tends to seriously damage a
professional’s reputation. For example, a statement that a
doctor or a lawyer no longer has a license can communicate
that she has engaged in “illegal or unethical behavior,” Mimms,
2017 WL 25456, at *9, or that she is so “incompetent” as to fall
woefully short of basic professional standards, Cretella, 640 F.
Supp. 2d at 763; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 791–92 (5th ed. 1984)
(explaining that statements may be defamatory per se if they

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portray the plaintiff as “dishonest, incompetent,” or otherwise
having traits “incompatible with the proper conduct” of her
trade (footnotes omitted)). Those cases make sense because
the types of professionals they address—doctors, lawyers, and
the like—generally lose their licenses as a form of discipline
for misconduct.
The allegations here are materially different. Ganley
stated that KLEO had lost a contract to use the radio-frequency
rights allocated to TRION. That statement does not inherently
impute to KLEO any professional malfeasance or ineptitude.
Contracts can fall through for any number of reasons, some
more benign than others. Indeed, the alleged defamatory
statements explicitly included such a reason: Ganley said
KLEO lost its rights because his company had “stepped in” and
“terminated” the contract KLEO had with TRION. J.A. 86
¶ 40. Ganley never indicated that KLEO was “not capable of”
operating a satellite system, only that KLEO needed to obtain
another contract for radio-frequency rights before it could do
so. Ingber, 479 A.2d at 1264 (emphasis omitted).
KLEO also asserts that questioning a competitor’s
solvency can constitute defamation per se. See Appellant’s
Brief 17 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 cmt. c
(A.L.I. 1977 Supp. Oct. 2024)). Even if that is so, KLEO never
actually argues that Ganley cast it as insolvent. The closest
KLEO comes is its repeated reference to an allegation in the
complaint that, according to one foreign tribunal, “the
withdrawal of these [radio-frequency] rights would ‘destroy
the existence’ of KLEO.” J.A. 84 ¶ 33. But that quotation—
which postdated the podcast by about seven months—does not
retroactively infuse Ganley’s statements with the same
meaning.
The complaint elsewhere claims that Ganley’s statements
about the loss of frequency rights were defamatory per se

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insofar as they discouraged investors and potential business
partners “from dealing with KLEO.” J.A. 89 ¶ 41(ii). But on
that logic, any statement tending to cause unease among the
investing public could constitute defamation per se. KLEO
would have us broaden the category considerably, forgetting
that it is “reserved for statements about extreme subjects.”
Smith, 886 F.3d at 128.
KLEO’s second theory of defamation per se fares no
better. KLEO zeroes in on Ganley’s statements that “the plan
was to move [the satellite network] to China,” and that “there
would’ve been . . . a sort of front organization left remaining in
[Europe].” J.A. 86 ¶ 40.
On appeal, KLEO asserts that, through these remarks,
Ganley accused it of “deceiv[ing] European regulators.”
Appellant’s Brief 1. The most cogent gloss on KLEO’s
argument looks something like this: A European regulator
would not have approved a company based in China to use the
radio-frequency spectrum. Ganley implied that KLEO
established a European presence for the sole purpose of duping
a European regulator into granting it frequency rights. All
along, Ganley said, KLEO planned to shift control of the
satellite network to China while leaving only a nominal
presence in Europe.
In theory, KLEO is correct that a statement impugning
someone’s “honesty in business” can be defamatory per se.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 (1977) cmt. c (A.L.I.
1977 Supp. Oct. 2024); see also Golden Palace, Inc. v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974). The
problem for KLEO is that Ganley’s statements are far too
vague to support the meaning KLEO now seeks to ascribe to
them. Ganley did not even mention European regulators, much
less state that KLEO was conniving to deceive them. And the
complaint, even after KLEO amended it multiple times, does

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not allege other facts that might fill in the gaps. For example,
the complaint does not identify which entity was purportedly
deceived, nor why it would have been impermissible for KLEO
to move control of the satellite network to China. And KLEO’s
solitary and conclusory assertion that Ganley accused it of
“fraud and deception” is no substitute for well-pleaded facts
explaining how that is so. J.A. 95 ¶ 50. At bottom, KLEO asks
us to read an accusation that KLEO was scheming to deceive
European regulators into Ganley’s remarks without providing
the context we would need to make that interpretive leap.
KLEO also argues that Ganley’s statements about China
were defamatory per se because they “stok[ed] fears among
investors, satellite manufacturers, and launch service providers
that management of the project [would] be taken over by the
Chinese government.” Appellant’s Brief 9 (first alteration in
original) (quoting J.A. 87 ¶ 41(i)). But as we have explained,
a statement is not defamatory per se just because it might shake
stakeholder confidence.
In the end, Ganley left the podcast’s listeners only with the
impression that KLEO planned on conducting its business in
China. That does not remotely meet the standards of a
defamation per se claim.
B
With defamation per se off the table, the remaining
question is whether KLEO has properly pleaded that Ganley’s
statements caused it special damages. Special damages
encompass “those elements of damages that are the natural, but
not the necessary or usual, consequence of the defendant’s
conduct.” 5A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1310 (4th ed. Supp. May 2025).
When “an item of special damage is claimed,” Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) requires that it “be specifically

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stated.” As the district court correctly explained, a plaintiff
pleading special damages as part of a defamation claim must
identify a specific economic loss and “evidence of causation”
linking that loss to the challenged statements. Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Rivada does not
ask us to reconsider the district court’s ruling that KLEO’s
complaint detailed several specific economic losses. Instead,
the parties dispute whether the complaint adequately pleaded a
causal tie between Ganley’s statements and KLEO’s damages.
We will assess that question by asking, as the district court
did, whether the causal relationship KLEO posits is supported
by “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To
be sure, some of our pre-Twombly cases describe Rule 9(g) as
imposing a “heightened pleading standard” to allegations of
causation as compared to the generally applicable standard
under Rule 8 for stating a claim. Browning, 292 F.3d at 245;
see also Fowler v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 182 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). But the parties both assume that the Twombly
standard applies to measure KLEO’s causation allegations and
that we should draw all reasonable inferences in KLEO’s favor
at the motion-to-dismiss stage, notwithstanding their fleeting
references to Rule 9(g)’s “heightened pleading standard.” See
Appellant’s Brief 16, 25; Appellee’s Brief 13–14, 26–27. So
did the district court. See KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at
*1–2; id. at *4–5. We will do the same.
We conclude that KLEO has alleged a plausible causal
connection between Ganley’s statements and one category of
special damages: costs related to KLEO’s loss of business
relationships with satellite manufacturers. The complaint
specifically alleges that Ganley’s statements caused KLEO to
incur “at least €4,000 in travel expenses” to rebuild those

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relationships and “secure [other] partnerships” to replace
relationships that were beyond repair. J.A. 93 ¶ 42.1
The complaint tells the following story about how
Ganley’s statements caused those damages. KLEO was
making progress toward commercializing its frequency rights,
having launched and operated two test satellites, when Rivada
initiated a corporate takeover that culminated in the purported
termination of KLEO’s contract with TRION. See J.A. 82 ¶ 22;
J.A. 82–83 ¶¶ 26–29. Knowing how attuned the satellite
industry was to the media, Ganley made his defamatory
statements on the second day of the year’s most important and
widely attended conference in the industry, and on a podcast
that the satellite community followed. See J.A. 85 ¶¶ 36–37.
The podcast was then circulated on a well-respected platform
for satellite-related news. See id. ¶ 38. Manufacturers began
approaching KLEO “[d]uring” the conference with concerns
“that KLEO’s satellite project appeared likely to fail, or had
already failed.” J.A. 93 ¶ 42. Those same manufacturers have
since refused to partner with KLEO. See id.
The sequence of events that KLEO describes is clear,
logical, and factually grounded. And it gives rise to a natural
1 The complaint identifies three other types of special damages:
KLEO’s loss of frequency rights, its loss of a prominent space
consultant’s services, and its loss of employees. The district court
deemed the first two allegations plainly insufficient under Rule 9(g).
See KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *3 n.2 (finding KLEO’s
allegation about the space consultant “speculative and vague”); id. at
*4 n.3 (noting that KLEO lost its frequency rights “before [the]
allegedly defamatory statements”). KLEO does not challenge those
aspects of the district court’s ruling. Nor has KLEO offered any
argument on appeal that the complaint adequately alleges how
Ganley’s statements caused it to lose employees. Any such argument
is therefore forfeited. See Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 199
(D.C. Cir. 2014).

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inference that the companies refused to partner with KLEO
because of Ganley’s statements.
KLEO’s complaint also compares favorably to others that
courts have found to satisfy Rule 9(g). For example, in Schoen
v. Washington Post, 246 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1957), we held
that the plaintiff adequately pleaded special damages by
alleging that he lost business relationships close on the heels of
a defamatory news story. Id. at 672. The plaintiff alleged that
his gross receipts declined after the story’s publication, that the
decrease “resulted solely and proximately from the [associated]
damage to his good name and reputation,” and that the story
had caused three named persons to withdraw their business and
other potential customers to withhold theirs. Id. at 671–72;2
see also Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610,
614 (7th Cir. 2013) (deeming sufficient under Rule 9(g) a
complaint that also relied on the sequencing of events). For its
part, Rivada has not identified any decision finding similar
allegations insufficient. In the cases Rivada relies on most
heavily, the plaintiff “allege[d] no facts suggesting causation”
whatsoever. Browning, 292 F.3d at 246; see also Smith, 886
F.3d at 128 (noting that complaint included only “a boilerplate
recitation, unaccompanied by any factual detail”); Fowler, 182
F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (similar). Unlike in those cases,
the complaint here contains ample facts to suggest that Rivada
carefully selected the time of the interview and the podcast that
broadcast it to maximize the damage to KLEO’s reputation,
2 Schoen noted that even under Rule 9(g), a plaintiff need not
plead a “causal relationship . . . with as great precision as might be
possible or desirable.” Schoen, 246 F.2d at 672. The dissent would
dismiss Schoen as a relic of the “notice-pleading approach which
Twombly has long since supplanted.” Dissenting Op. 6 n.2. This
court, however, has already considered and rejected the argument
that Schoen merely applied a “notice pleading” standard. See
Browning, 292 F.3d at 246.

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that the participants in the conference heard Ganley’s
statements, and that the statements had their intended effect.
In concluding otherwise, the district court erred in four
ways.
First, the district court found that the complaint was
“unclear” about whether the manufacturers expressed their
misgivings “before or after Rivada made its allegedly
defamatory statements.” KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *4.
The complaint states that the manufacturers voiced concerns to
KLEO “[d]uring the” conference, without specifying when
over the course of the conference’s four days those encounters
occurred. J.A. 93 ¶ 42. “Presumably,” KLEO explains, “the
district court [reasoned] that because Rivada’s statement
occurred on the second day of this conference, the
manufacturers could have approached KLEO . . . on the first
day, or earlier [on] the second day.” Appellant’s Brief 28.
Against the backdrop of the complaint’s other well-
pleaded allegations, KLEO is entitled to a reasonable inference
that its conversations with manufacturers occurred after the
podcast had already aired. The complaint, again, alleges that
Ganley made his statements on day two of the four-day
conference, and that manufacturers approached KLEO with
concerns during the conference. It further alleges that “[t]he
most immediate impacts of the [podcast] were felt in
Washington, [D.C.],” J.A. 85 ¶ 39, and that “the purpose and
result” of the podcast were “to discredit KLEO among its
industry peers who were attending the conference,” J.A. 78
(emphases added). The plain thrust of KLEO’s allegations is
that manufacturers approached it after hearing Ganley’s
statements, and the district court should have construed the
complaint accordingly. To conclude otherwise, we would have
to draw an inference against KLEO, which is not proper at this
stage. See Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476.

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Second, the district court faulted the complaint for
“vaguely alleg[ing] that KLEO lost business” without
providing “specific dates.” KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at
*4. That “degree of detail” is unnecessary at the motion-to-
dismiss stage. Browning, 292 F.3d at 246 (citation modified).
KLEO’s other factual allegations make out a sufficiently
plausible causal chain to suggest that the manufacturers, in
refusing to partner with KLEO, were acting on the concerns
that they had mentioned during the conference. That is so
regardless of the precise date the manufacturers declined to
work with KLEO. At this early stage of the litigation, our
inability to precisely discern the alleged lag time between the
conference’s end and KLEO’s loss of business is not fatal to
KLEO’s defamation claim.
Third, the district court gave undue weight to a potential
alternative explanation for KLEO’s losses: TRION’s purported
termination of KLEO’s usage rights, which preceded the
conference by about three weeks. TRION’s announcement,
according to the district court, “support[ed] an inference that
KLEO’s business relationships suffered because of its loss of
frequency rights, not because of Rivada’s statements.” KLEO
AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *4 n.3. The dissent reasons
similarly. See Dissenting Op. 5.
The problem with that theory is that the complaint does not
include any allegation that even supports an inference that the
conference participants learned about TRION’s purported
cancellation of KLEO’s frequency rights independently of
Ganley’s podcast interview. True, the complaint states that the
satellite industry was monitoring “the ongoing arbitration and
litigation” involving KLEO, Rivada, and TRION. J.A. 84 ¶ 34.
But the only milestones in the litigation identified in the
complaint all postdated the conference by several months. The
most natural reading of the complaint, drawing all reasonable
inferences in KLEO’s favor, is that the conference participants

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learned of the fallout with TRION from Ganley’s podcast
appearance.
Fourth and finally, the district court focused myopically on
KLEO’s allegations that, “[o]n information and belief,” the
special damages it sustained were “caused by Rivada’s
defamatory statements.” J.A. 93–94 ¶¶ 42–43. The district
court deemed these allegations conclusory and found that
“KLEO has thus failed to plead causation.” KLEO AG, 2023
WL 7921969, at *3. Once again, the dissent is in accord. See
Dissenting Op. 3. But the conclusion does not follow from the
premise. The one sentence alleging causation on information
and belief may have been “boilerplate,” KLEO AG, 2023 WL
7921969, at *3 (quotation omitted), but the point is that
KLEO’s other allegations, detailed above, lend factual support
to its claims about causation. To take just one example, the
complaint does not directly allege that manufacturers heard
Ganley’s remarks on the podcast. But it does allege that
Ganley made the statements during the largest annual industry
convention, J.A. 85 ¶ 36–37, that the statements were
“distributed publicly and globally” through “a well-known and
authoritative source for news within the close-knit satellite-
communications industry,” id. ¶ 38, and that the “most
immediate impacts of the” statements were “felt” at the
convention, id. ¶ 39. The presence of some conclusory
allegations does not negate the combined force of other well
pleaded factual contentions.
To be sure, the dissent makes a strong case that KLEO
omitted from its complaint details that would have placed its
claim on stronger footing. Although the matter is close, we
conclude that when the complaint is read as a whole and
reasonable inferences are drawn in KLEO’s favor, KLEO has
done enough to “nudge[]” its “claim[] across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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Accordingly, we hold that KLEO has adequately pleaded
special damages under Rule 9(g), and that the district court
erred by dismissing its defamation claim.
III
The decision below is affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.

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RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
In this defamation action, satellite company KLEO AG
asserts that a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., falsely
impugned KLEO’s business. I agree that the defamation per se
theory and three of the four claimed “special damages” injuries
fail, see Majority Op. 6, 12 n.1, and I accordingly join parts I
and II.A of the majority opinion.
But my colleagues’ otherwise admirable opinion falters in
its analysis of KLEO’s sole remaining injury: the loss of
business partnerships. The complaint is replete with conclusory
statements that Rivada is to blame, but it is bereft of any factual
allegations actually showing a connection between the
statements and the losses. Despite this insufficient pleading, the
majority knits together unrelated facts to “tell[]” a “story” of
causation—one KLEO left untold. Majority Op. 12. This
storytelling exercise is not only inconsistent with Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), but also contravenes the
heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(g). I therefore would affirm in full.
I.
To survive a motion to dismiss, Rule 9(g) requires “special
damages” to be “specifically stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g). As1
the majority agrees, this entails showing both a “specific
economic loss and ‘evidence of causation’ linking that loss to
This is a diversity of citizenship case, and the parties agree that the 1
substantive law of defamation is that of the District of Columbia. But
federal law provides the procedural rules for this case, including the
pleading standards. See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d
1328, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 472 (1965); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).

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the challenged statements.” Majority Op. 11 (quoting Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
The majority believes that we measure the complaint
against these elements by using the motion to dismiss standard
from Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See
Majority Op. 11. If Twombly is the correct standard—more on
that later—KLEO must provide evidence of causation by
alleging “sufficient factual matter” to make its claim
“plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (second excerpt quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While we “draw all reasonable
inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor, those inferences must
themselves be “plausible” and supported by “sufficient facts.”
Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (first
excerpt quoting N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244,
1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). And a reasonable inference requires
something more than “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
While KLEO did claim a specific economic loss, the
entirety of the complaint’s pleading on causation is the
following paragraph:
These defamatory statements caused specific harm to
KLEO. After these statements, many satellite manufacturers
have refused to partner with KLEO and KLEO Connect
GmbH in the planned satellite project. During the DC
SATELLITE Conference, some of these manufacturers
expressed their belief that KLEO’s satellite project
appeared likely to fail, or had already failed. On
information and belief, the loss of these relationships was
caused by Rivada’s defamatory statements. Further, the loss
of these relationships has caused KLEO specific pecuniary
harm, because KLEO has spent time and resources

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attempting to repair these relationships, and also to secure
partnerships with other manufacturers, including at least
€4,000 in travel expenses, and more to be later proven.
Second Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (J.A. 93) (emphasis added).
This level of pleading is inadequate. KLEO had to plead
“evidence of causation.” But only one sentence of the complaint
actually bears on causation: “On information and belief, the loss
of these relationships was caused by Rivada’s defamatory
statements.” Id. The first three sentences simply describe the
post-statement events and the nature of the injury, explaining
that manufacturers refused to partner with KLEO and told it so;
the last sentence quantifies the loss.
KLEO’s bare assertion that Rivada “caused” the losses is
not evidence—it is an unsupported “legal conclusion” we should
not credit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Twombly and Iqbal
require “sufficient factual matter” to make causation plausible,
id., but KLEO provided no factual matter whatsoever. It did not
allege that its business partners heard Rivada’s statements, or
that they were influenced by the statements, or that they
mentioned the statements in cutting ties with KLEO, or even
that they changed their minds after the podcast was released.
KLEO merely stated a legal conclusion—causation—“[o]n
information and belief.”
KLEO’s invocation of “on information and belief” raises a
further problem. In some cases, this type of bare-bones pleading
is a “practical necessity,” 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1224 (4th ed. 2025),
since “the necessary information [may] lie[] within [the]
defendants’ control.” Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16
F.3d 1271, 1279 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). But plaintiffs in a

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position to have “personal knowledge”—or, conversely, those
lacking “sufficient data to justify interposing an
allegation”—may not use “on information and belief” pleading
to avoid alleging specific facts. Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224.
And when Rule 9 is in play, still more detail is required: “on
information and belief” pleadings must “be accompanied by a
statement of the facts upon which the allegations are based.”
Kareem, 986 F.3d at 866 (quoting Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1279 n.3);
see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224 (requiring, for “on
information and belief” pleading in Rule 9 “special damages”
cases, a statement of “the facts on which the pleader’s belief is
founded”).
These principles further confirm the insufficiency of
KLEO’s allegations. The relevant information about causation
is not within the defendant’s control—on the contrary, KLEO is
better positioned than Rivada to determine why its own business
partners cut ties. In addition, in lieu of a statement of facts
supporting its “information and belief,” KLEO has supplied only
a one-sentence legal conclusion. We have no basis for assuming
that the plaintiff has information about causation that is
reasonably supported by factual knowledge.
In recognition of the lack of any direct evidentiary
allegation of causation, the majority falls back on inferences. In
my colleagues’ telling, KLEO was riding high until “Rivada
initiated a corporate takeover,” transferred essential radio-
frequency licenses, and “made [the] defamatory statements,”
leading manufacturers to have “concerns” about KLEO’s
business. Majority Op. 12. KLEO’s complaint thus provides a
“story” which “gives rise to a natural inference” of causation. Id.
at 12–13. But there is nothing “natural” about this inferential
leap, and KLEO’s allegations do not support it. The majority’s
hypothesis rests on the business partners reversing course near
in time to the podcast, yet that temporal inference is

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unsupported. The complaint contains no specific allegations
about dates, attitudes before and after the podcast, or any other
evidence connecting the statements and the injury. In lieu of that
factual backing, the majority’s narrative is just a post hoc ergo
propter hoc assumption—the logical fallacy “meaning ‘after
this, therefore because of this.’ A progression in time is
necessary for a causal relationship, but it’s not enough.” David
J. Hand, The Improbabilty Principle: Why Coincidences,
Miracles, and Rare Events Happen Every Day 18 (2014).
In any event, the majority’s recounting provides an obvious
alternative: the termination of KLEO’s access to radio
frequencies. See Majority Op. 2–3, 12 (discussing KLEO’s
contract with another entity, TRION, for radio frequencies). My
colleagues explain that the loss of this essential asset also
preceded the business partners’ “concerns ‘that KLEO’s satellite
project appeared likely to fail.’” Id. at 12 (quoting J.A. 93 ¶ 42).
And while the majority emphasizes that KLEO did not allege its
business partners independently heard of the lost frequencies,
see id. at 15, KLEO also did not allege they heard the podcast.
Accordingly, the complaint contains nothing that would make
the alleged defamatory podcast a more likely explanation, and
Iqbal requires us to dismiss a complaint containing facts
“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The majority’s choice to relax Twombly also breaks with
our decision in Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
There, applying Rule 9(g) post-Twombly, we rejected a
complaint containing the following one-sentence allegation
about causation: “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendant
Clinton’s statements, [plaintiffs] have suffered pecuniary
damage.” Id. at 128 (first alteration in original). That
unsupported assertion—similar to KLEO’s pleading—was “a
boilerplate recitation, unaccompanied by any factual detail,” and

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warranted dismissal. Id.2
II.
There is an additional problem with the majority’s opinion:
Twombly is not the appropriate standard. “Special damages”
pleading is governed by Rule 9(g)’s “heightened pleading
standard,” Browning, 292 F.3d at 245, not the typical Rule 8
requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Even if KLEO’s complaint could pass muster
under Twombly, it certainly could not survive Rule 9(g).
We have repeatedly held that Rule 9(g) requires a plaintiff
to describe the claimed injury with “‘particularity’ and specify
‘facts showing that such special damages were the natural and
direct result’ of the defendant’s conduct.” Browning, 292 F.3d
at 245 (quoting Fowler v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 182 F.2d 377, 379
(D.C. Cir. 1950)). In other words, instead of merely pleading
evidence of causation under Twombly’s plausibility standards,
a special damages plaintiff must state causation with “a good
deal of particularity,” describing “precisely in what way the
special damage resulted from the spoken or written words.”
Fowler, 182 F.2d at 379.3
The majority instead relies on Schoen v. Washington Post, 246 F.2d 2
670 (D.C. Cir. 1957), which held a defamation complaint was
sufficient even though causation was “not alleged with as great
precision as might be possible or desirable.” Id. at 672. But Schoen
emphasized that the plaintiff had “adequately notifie[d] both appellee
and the court as to the nature of the claimed damages,” id., a notice-
pleading approach which Twombly has long since supplanted.
This heightened standard arises from the theory of “special 3
damages.” In contrast to a defamation per se claim where the slander
is outrageous and damages are presumed, the common law was
skeptical of defamation claims arising from less extreme statements.

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Rule 9(g) is about eliminating flimsy lawsuits. It is not
enough for plaintiffs to propose theories, conjectures, and
hypotheses. Rule 9(g) demands an explanation, grounded in
evidence. KLEO’s complaint falls far short. Even if the
majority’s “natural inference[s]” of causation are permissible
under Twombly, Majority Op. 12–13, Rule 9(g) makes clear that
this is not sufficient for special damages. KLEO did not
“specify” any “facts” to explain why the loss of its business
relationships was the “natural and direct result” of Rivada’s
statements. And it did not explain “precisely in what way” its
business counterparties were influenced by Rivada’s statements.
Nor did Rivada forfeit an argument based on the Rule.
Contrary to the majority’s statement that the “parties both
assume that the Twombly standard applies” and “[s]o did the
district court,” Majority Op. 11, both Rivada and KLEO
explicitly refer to a heightened pleading standard in their briefs.
See Appellant Br. 26 n.5 (mentioning “Rule 9(g)’s heightened
pleading standard” (quoting In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2019))); Appellee
Br. 2, 10, 24, 27 (applying the “heightened pleading standard”
of Rule 9(g)). The district court also understood that compliance
with Rule 9(g) was at stake. As a result, the court applied “Rule
9(g)’s heightened pleading standard for special damages.”
KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc., No. 22-cv-01664, 2023 WL
7921969, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2023). To be sure, the parties’
general statements of the standard of review mention Twombly,
but both parties acknowledge that Rule 9(g) requires something
additional for special damages. That specificity is absent here.
When reputational injury is “not the necessary consequence” of the
defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff must plead his or her injury—and
how the defendant caused it—in greater detail. Browning, 292 F.3d at
245 (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1310 (2d ed. 1990)).

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For this reason too I would affirm the dismissal in its entirety.

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