Sierra Club and Public Citizen v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 17, 2025 Decided August 1, 2025
No. 24-1199
SIERRA CLUB AND PUBLIC CITIZEN,
PETITIONERS
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT
MEXICO PACIFIC LIMITED LLC AND SAGUARO CONNECTOR
PIPELINE, L.L.C,
INTERVENORS
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Rebecca McCreary argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the joint briefs were Douglas Hayes and Nandan
M. Joshi. Eric E. Huber entered an appearance.
Jared Fish, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on
the brief were David L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel, and
Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor. Lona T. Perry, Attorney,
entered an appearance.

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Jeremy C. Marwell argued the cause for intervenors in
support of respondent. With him on the joint brief were James
F. Bowe, Jr., Ashley C. Parrish, Garrett T. Meisman, and Ryan
J. Collins.
Before: MILLETT, KATSAS and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
WALKER, Circuit Judge: The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission approved 1,000 feet of natural-gas pipeline
straddling the border with Mexico. That led to this petition by
the Sierra Club and Public Citizen.
First, the Petitioners say that FERC needed to exercise
jurisdiction over a much longer stretch of pipeline, which
begins at the 1,000-foot border pipeline and runs for 157 miles
into rural Texas. Second, the Petitioners argue that even if
FERC properly declined jurisdiction, FERC still should have
considered the environmental impact of that pipeline. Third,
they claim that FERC improperly failed to consider alternatives
to the border-crossing pipeline. And fourth, they briefly argue
that FERC’s approval of the border-crossing pipeline itself was
arbitrary and capricious.
We reject all of the Petitioners’ arguments and deny their
petition.
I
A
“As a creature of statute, FERC has only those powers
endowed upon it by statute.” Emera Maine v. FERC, 854 F.3d

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9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Under the Natural Gas
Act, and by delegation from the Energy Department, FERC has
authority over the “particular facilities” used in natural-gas
exports, as well as “the place of . . . exit for exports.”
Department of Energy Delegation Order No. S1-DEL-FERC-
2006 (“DOE Order”), § 1.21(A) (May 16, 2006); see also 15
U.S.C. § 717b(a) (NGA § 3) (requiring authorization by
FERC’s predecessor agency to “export any natural gas”). It
also has authority over “the transportation in interstate
commerce of natural gas.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(2) (NGA § 7);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (NGA “shall apply to the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce . . . and to
the importation or exportation of natural gas in foreign
commerce . . . , but shall not apply to any other transportation
or sale of natural gas . . . .”); DOE Order, § 1.21(B) (delegating
to FERC the ability to “[c]arry out all functions under
section[ ] . . . 7 of the Natural Gas Act”).
In plain English, FERC has jurisdiction when natural gas
crosses the nation’s border (its § 3 jurisdiction) and when it
crosses state lines (its § 7 jurisdiction). Meanwhile, state
regulators have the power to regulate intrastate natural-gas
infrastructure. See Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 899
F.2d 1250, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“FERC lacks jurisdiction
over the transportation of gas in intrastate commerce; the states
regulate such transportation.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 3301(16)
(definition of “intrastate pipeline”). So, as a general matter,
FERC handles interstate and international pipelines, and state
regulators handle intrastate pipelines.
But sometimes there’s overlap: Some intrastate pipelines
carry interstate gas, and other intrastate pipelines connect with
international pipelines or terminate at liquified-natural-gas
terminals for natural-gas exports abroad. In those situations,
special rules apply.

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First, under § 311 of the Natural Gas Policy Act, FERC
“may . . . authorize any intrastate pipeline to transport natural
gas on behalf of . . . any interstate pipeline” without thereby
bringing the intrastate pipeline within FERC’s § 7 jurisdiction.
15 U.S.C. § 3371(a)(2) (emphases added); id. § 3431(a)(2)(A).
Second, an intrastate pipeline that transports natural gas to
a domestic liquified-natural-gas terminal for export
abroad — even a lengthy pipeline entirely within a single
state — is subject to FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. See id.
§ 717a(11) (definition of liquified-natural-gas terminal
includes “all natural gas facilities located onshore . . . that are
used to . . . transport . . . natural gas that is . . . exported to a
foreign country”); id. § 717b(e) (“exclusive authority” over
liquified-natural-gas terminals).
And third, when an otherwise intrastate pipeline runs to
the border and connects with an international pipeline, FERC
has § 3 jurisdiction over that pipeline, but FERC may cede its
authority over the intrastate portion of the pipeline to the state
regulator. See Distrigas Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,
495 F.2d 1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In practice, FERC has
almost invariably done so — generally ceding jurisdiction over
all but 1,000 feet or so of border-crossing pipeline to state
regulators. See infra, section III.A.
When FERC’s approval of a pipeline constitutes a “major
Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment,” it must consider the “reasonably
foreseeable environmental effects” of that action under the
National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(ii). FERC must also consider “a reasonable
range of alternatives to the proposed agency action . . . that are
technically and economically feasible, and [that] meet the

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purpose and need of the proposal.” Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
Importantly, however, FERC has “broad latitude” to decide
“where to draw the line” in considering environmental effects,
and “substantial discretion” to determine what constitute
“feasible alternatives.” Seven County Infrastructure
Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1512-
13 (2025).
B
This case concerns a proposed natural-gas pipeline in
Hudspeth County, Texas — twice the landmass of Delaware,
with 0.3% of its population. A major public pipeline
company, ONEOK Inc., plans to build the Saguaro Pipeline
from the heart of a prolific oil-and-gas-producing region,
through several West Texas counties, to the Rio Grande in
Hudspeth County. There it would cross the border and
connect with a Mexican pipeline that runs to a liquified-
natural-gas export terminal on Mexico’s Sonoran coast.1
Though the proposed pipeline would be completely
contiguous, you can think of it as having three segments:
(1) the “Connector Pipeline,” which extends about 155 miles
from a natural-gas price-reporting point called the “Waha Hub”
to the verge of the Mexican border;2 (2) the “Border Facility,”
a 1,000-foot stretch that crosses the Rio Grande into Mexico;
and (3) the Mexican “Sierra Madre” pipeline starting at the
1 The Mexican part of the pipeline would be built by ONEOK’s joint
intervenor here, Mexico Pacific Limited. ONEOK intervenes under
the name of its wholly owned subsidiary, Saguaro Connector
Pipeline LLC.
2 The Petitioners say that the Connector Pipeline is 157 miles long;
FERC says it is 155 miles long. Neither party explains the two-mile
discrepancy.

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border, crossing Mexico, and ending at a liquified-natural-gas
terminal on the Gulf of California.
FERC concluded that it did not have — or would not
exercise — jurisdiction over Texas’s Connector Pipeline. 186
FERC ¶ 61114, at pp. 61649-53 (2024). It reasoned that the
Connector Pipeline will not cross the international border, will
not cross a state line, and will not carry interstate gas upon
entering service. Id. at p. 61650-51. As to the 1,000-foot
Border Facility, FERC conducted an Environmental
Assessment, determined that the environmental impact is
minimal, and elected not to produce a full-blown
environmental impact statement. FERC deemed the Border
Facility in the public interest. Id. at p. 61669.
After FERC reached the same conclusions on rehearing,
the Petitioners brought this petition. See generally 188 FERC
¶ 61029 (2024).
II
We review FERC’s orders to ensure that they’re not
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). FERC’s
actions must be “reasonable and reasonably explained,” and its
factual findings must be supported by “substantial evidence.”
Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v. FERC, 100 F.4th
207, 210, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2024). In conducting NEPA analysis,
FERC has “substantial discretion,” so we “should afford
substantial deference” to “agency choices” that “fall within a
broad zone of reasonableness.” Seven County Infrastructure
Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1512-
13 (2025). Indeed, the “bedrock principle of judicial review
in NEPA cases can be stated in a word: Deference.” Id. at
1515.

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III
The Petitioners say that FERC was required to exercise
jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline under § 3 or § 7 of the
Natural Gas Act. We disagree. While FERC had the
authority to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline
under § 3 of the Natural Gas Act, it also had authority to decline
to do so. Here, FERC reasonably declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline. We also conclude
that FERC correctly declined to assert jurisdiction under § 7 of
the Natural Gas Act.
A
FERC declined to wield § 3 authority over the (157-mile)
Connector Pipeline. 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at pp. 61132-34
(2024). Instead, it exercised its § 3 authority over only the
(1,000-foot) Border Facility. Id. at pp. 61134-36. This
decision is consistent with FERC’s prior practice, and it
reasonably respects the role of state regulators in our federal
system.
The Petitioners contend that “the entire 157-mile Saguaro
Pipeline is a single facility that is to be used for the export of
gas from the Waha Hub to Mexico,” and that “the entire
pipeline is necessary to accomplish the export of gas from the
Waha Hub to Mexico.” Petitioners Br. 16 (citing 18 C.F.R.
§ 153.5(a) (“facilit[y] . . . used for . . . export”); Trunkline Gas
Co., LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61328, at p. 63008 (2016) (“necessary
to accomplish an export”)). They appeal to the pipeline’s
obvious big-picture purpose: to facilitate the export of natural
gas from Texas to Mexico. Because the Connector Pipeline
serves that purpose, the Petitioners maintain, it’s within
FERC’s § 3 jurisdiction.

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The Petitioners have a point: FERC does have the statutory
authority to regulate the Connector Pipeline under § 3. But
must FERC exercise its § 3 authority to the fullest? No — and
very often it does not.
In Distrigas Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 495
F.2d 1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1974), this court said that “[u]nder
Section 3, the Commission’s authority over imports [and
exports] of natural gas is at once plenary and elastic.” Id.3
FERC’s power is plenary in that it has authority to regulate all
pipelines and pipeline facilities transporting natural gas to and
from places of import and export. See Department of Energy,
Delegation Order No. 00–004.00A, § 1.21(A) (May 16, 2006);
42 U.S.C. § 7172(f). And Distrigas called FERC’s § 3
authority “elastic” in the sense that its authority can be used to
cover gaps where “regulation cannot or will not, as a practical
3 Distrigas involved FERC’s predecessor agency, the Federal Power
Commission, but its holding still applies to FERC. See East
Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 631 F.2d 794, 796 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (explaining that “Congress abolished the FPC and
transferred responsibility for regulation under the Natural Gas Act to
the newly created Federal Energy Regulatory Commission”);
Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 204,
301(b), 401(a), 402(a)(1), 402(e), 642, 91 Stat. 565, 571, 578, 582-
83, 585, 599 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7134,
7151(b), 7171(a), 7172(a)(1), 7172(e), 7252) (creating FERC,
transferring the Federal Power Commission’s functions, and
authorizing the Energy Secretary to delegate responsibilities to
FERC); DOE Order, § 1.21(A)-(B) (delegating to FERC certain
NGA functions previously belonging to the Federal Power
Commission); cf. West Virginia Public Services Commission v.
Department of Energy, 681 F.2d 847, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The
DOE Act’s restructuring of the administrative framework did not
alter the flexibility of [federal energy agencies’] statutory authority
under [NGA] section 3.”).

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matter, be imposed by the states.” Id.; see also id. (“the
purpose of the Natural Gas Act” is “to be achieved by [FERC]
regulation broadly complementary to that reserved to the
States” (cleaned up)); Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972) (With the Natural
Gas Act, “Congress meant to create a comprehensive and
effective regulatory scheme of dual state and federal
authority.” (cleaned up)). In sum, Distrigas said that “Section
3 supplies the Commission not only with the power necessary
to prevent [such] gaps in regulation, but also with flexibility in
exercising that power.” 495 F.2d at 1064.
The upshot is that even though FERC has the power to
regulate the Connector Pipeline, FERC also has the power not
to regulate it. And in its exercise of that discretion, FERC will
often not regulate a pipeline when FERC expects that the
pipeline will be regulated by a state pipeline regulator like the
Texas Railroad Commission.4
FERC’s decision to exercise or decline to exercise § 3
jurisdiction must be “reasonable and reasonably explained”
and grounded in “substantial evidence.” Alabama Municipal
Distributors Group, 100 F.4th at 210, 212. That means FERC
must explain with “reasoned consideration and on the basis of
substantial evidence, whether and in what manner to exercise
its flexible Section 3 power.” Distrigas, 495 F.2d at 1066.
4 Yes, the Texas Railroad Commission. Established in 1891 to
regulate railroads, the Commission has also regulated pipelines (as
common carriers) and oil and gas production for more than a century.
See Regulating Pipe Lines, ch. 30, §§ 2, 4, 6, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws
48, 49-51; Conservation of the Oil and Gas Resources of the State;
Defining “Waste” and Empowering the Railroad Commission to
Make and Enforce Regulations with Reference to Same, ch. 155, art.
3, 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws 285, 286.

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In the administrative record, FERC offered a potpourri of
reasons why it didn’t regulate the Connector Pipeline. At
times, FERC erroneously suggested that § 3 prohibited it from
exercising jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline. 188
FERC ¶ 61029, at p. 61133; see also id. (“under NGA section
3, the Commission only has jurisdiction over the facility
located at the point of import or export”). That suggestion
contravenes Distrigas. But elsewhere — and in accord with
Distrigas — FERC acknowledged its “wide discretion” to
“strike[ ] a reasonable balance between the Commission’s
NGA section 3 jurisdiction and traditional state jurisdiction
over intrastate transportation, sales, and matters of primarily
local concerns.” Id. at p. 61135; see also Distrigas, 495 F.2d
at 1064.
Despite these incorrect statements, FERC’s declination to
exercise § 3 jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline was
reasonable and reasonably explained. That’s because FERC
ultimately acted consistently with Distrigas and with three
decades of its own precedents, which FERC repeatedly cited in
support of its decision here. See 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at pp.
61134-36 & nn.128, 132; id. at pp. 61131-32 & nn.89, 91, 92;
see also 186 FERC ¶ 61114, at p. 61649-50 & n.60 (2024).5
In explaining its decision to draw the “jurisdictional” line
at the 1,000-foot mark, FERC cited a remarkably consistent
line of decisions about long pipelines extending from the
border. See 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at p. 61132 n.92; id. at p.
61135 n.132; 186 FERC ¶ 61114, at p. 61649 n.60. All of
5 See, e.g., Valley Crossing Pipeline, LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61084, at p.
61564 (2017) (“When a company constructs a pipeline to import or
export volumes of natural gas, only a small segment of the pipeline
close to the border is deemed to be the import or export facility for
which section 3 authorization is necessary.”).

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those decisions drew the line at or around 1,000 feet from the
border, give or take a few hundred feet.6 These decisions are
rooted in a sensible concern for respecting “traditional state
jurisdiction,” which we endorsed in Distrigas, and which
FERC reiterated here. 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at p. 61135; see
Distrigas, 495 F.2d at 1064. That’s a reasonable explanation
for FERC’s decision.7
6 FERC cited nine decisions that limited jurisdiction to export
facilities of the following lengths (in feet): 703, 836, 900, 1,000,
1,086, 1,093, 1,375, and 1,400. See, e.g., NET Mexico Pipeline
Partners, LLC, 145 FERC ¶ 61112, at p. 61598 (2013) (1,400 ft.);
Coral Mexico Pipeline, LLC, 89 FERC ¶ 61171, at p. 61516 (1999)
(1,375 ft.); Trans-Pecos Pipeline, LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61140, at p.
61979 (2016) (1,093 ft.); Comanche Trail Pipeline, LLC, 155 FERC
¶ 61182, at p. 62231 (2016) (1,086 ft.); Valero Transmission, L.P.,
57 FERC ¶ 61299, at p. 61299 (1991) (1,000 ft.); Valley Crossing,
161 FERC ¶ 61084, at p. 61562 (1,000 ft.); Roadrunner Gas
Transmission, LLC, 153 FERC ¶ 61041, at p. 61227 (2015) (900 ft.);
Oasis Pipeline, LP, 127 FERC ¶ 61263, at p. 62150 (2009) (836 ft.);
Houston Pipe Line Co., 146 FERC ¶ 61195, at p. 61855 (2014) (703
ft.).
7 To the extent that FERC’s decision also rested on its position that
it had no discretion to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector
Pipeline, that view does not “reflect[ ] a pervasive frame of mind”
that “infuse[s]” the agency’s ultimate decision with legal error.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. FERC, 823 F.2d 630, 641-
42 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We therefore see no reason to vacate FERC’s
decision. Cf. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“When an agency offers multiple grounds for a decision, we
will affirm the agency so long as any one of the grounds is valid,
unless it is demonstrated that the agency would not have acted on
that basis if the alternative grounds were unavailable.”); United
States v. Ross, 848 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Agencies can
certainly rely on alternative rationales . . . .”).

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The Petitioners muster no compelling authority to show
that FERC acted inconsistently with its previous decisions.
To the contrary, the FERC decisions that the Petitioners cite are
exceptions that prove the rule. In Inter-City Minnesota
Pipelines, for example, the pipeline in question zig-zagged
back and forth across the Canadian Border — an odd-duck
pipeline presenting a unique reason for federal, rather than
state, oversight. See 29 FERC ¶ 61105, at p. 61203-05 (1984);
id. at p. 61203 (“no other U.S. pipeline has such a
configuration”). And in San Diego Gas & Electric Company,
FERC reasonably exercised jurisdiction over all of a two-mile
border-crossing pipeline rather than subdividing it, given its
exceptionally short length relative to the pipelines that FERC
subdivides. 64 FERC ¶ 61221, at p. 62650-52 (1993).8
Whereas a case like Inter-City may require FERC to
provide more explanation for its deviation from standard
practice, in a case like Saguaro’s, FERC ultimately and
reasonably adhered to its longstanding practice of exercising
§ 3 jurisdiction over only the section of a pipeline that is close
to the border.
8 The Petitioners also cite two cases involving intrastate pipelines
transporting natural gas to liquified-natural-gas terminals. See
Petitioners Br. 24-25 (citing Alaska Gasline Development Corp., 171
FERC ¶ 61134, at p. 61836 (2020), and Freeport LNG Development,
L.P., 107 FERC ¶ 61278, at p. 62294 (2004)). Those decisions are
inapposite because a separate statutory provision vests FERC with
exclusive jurisdiction over “all natural gas facilities located
onshore . . . that are used to . . . transport . . . natural gas” to liquified-
natural-gas terminals for export abroad. 15 U.S.C. § 717a(11)
(definition of liquified-natural-gas terminal) (emphasis added); id.
§ 717b(e) (“exclusive authority” over liquified-natural-gas
terminals).

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B
As a fallback argument, the Petitioners say that even if
FERC properly declined to exercise its § 3 jurisdiction over the
Connector Pipeline, the pipeline is going to transport interstate
natural gas (at least at some unknown time in the future), so it’s
separately subject to FERC’s § 7 jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(c)(2).
We reject the Petitioners’ arguments. Substantial
evidence supports FERC’s conclusion that the Connector
Pipeline is not subject to FERC’s § 7 jurisdiction.
1
The Petitioners first argue that the Connector Pipeline will
transport interstate gas from the get-go. They say there’s “no
dispute” that it will connect with the Waha Hub, a “major
interstate gas hub,” which receives gas from several states.
Petitioners Br. 29. And the Petitioners say that the Connector
Pipeline’s interconnection with the WesTex Transmission
system, an intrastate pipeline, will render the Connector
Pipeline interstate because WesTex carries some interstate gas.
The Petitioners are incorrect on both counts.
First, the Waha Hub is essentially a pricing center, not a
reservoir of mixed-source gas that all pipelines tap into.
Though lots of pipelines converge and interconnect at the
Waha Hub, FERC found that the Waha Hub does not
indiscriminately mix interstate and intrastate gas. While the
Petitioners offered evidence that they believe showed some
commingling of interstate and intrastate gas at the Waha Hub,
their evidence fails to satisfy their burden to show that FERC’s
conclusion lacked substantial evidence.

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Second, as to WesTex, it carries interstate gas under § 311
of the Natural Gas Policy Act, which means it is “not subject
to [FERC’s] jurisdiction . . . under the Natural Gas Act.” 15
U.S.C. § 3301(16) (definition of “intrastate pipeline”); see 15
U.S.C. § 3431(a)(2)(A) (“the jurisdiction of the Commission
under [the Natural Gas Act] shall not apply to any
transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas if such
transportation is . . . authorized by [FERC] under section
3371(a) of this title”); 15 U.S.C. § 3371(a)(2)(A) (FERC
“may . . . authorize any intrastate pipeline to transport natural
gas on behalf of . . . any interstate pipeline”).
Granted, it is not clear “whether the downstream, intrastate
transport of upstream [Natural Gas Policy Act] § 311 gas is
‘NGA-exempt.’” Respondent Br. 49-50 (emphasis omitted).
But FERC relied on longstanding agency precedent that such
transport is NGA-exempt. See Westar Transmission Co., 43
FERC ¶ 61050, at p. 61141 (1988) (“the most reasonable
interpretation of [the Natural Gas Policy Act] is that [it]
remove[s] . . . downstream transactions [of § 311 gas] from
NGA jurisdiction”); 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at pp. 61137-38
(discussing Westar).9 And because the Petitioners have not
contested that “pertinent legal question,” it’s forfeited. 10
9 See also Westar, 43 FERC ¶ 61050, at p. 61141 (“simply
exempting from NGA jurisdiction an intrastate pipeline’s purchase
of certain gas from out of state and the transportation of that gas to
the pipeline cannot serve Congress’s purpose of integrating the
interstate and intrastate markets, unless the pipeline’s subsequent
transportation and sale for resale of the gas are also exempted from
NGA jurisdiction” (emphases added)).
10 At most, the Petitioners mentioned — in a footnote — that
“Saguaro does not have authorization to transport interstate gas via
Section 311,” and they tersely characterized Westar as “fact-

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Respondent Br. 48-49. Plus, just because the Connector
Pipeline will have access to interstate gas via WesTex does not
necessarily mean that the Connector Pipeline will transport it,
as FERC reasonably explained. See Valley Crossing Pipeline,
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61084, at p. 61565 (2017) (“The mere
existence of a physical interconnection with an interstate
pipeline is not sufficient to bring an intrastate pipeline under
the [FERC’s] jurisdiction, since being capable of receiving
interstate gas is not the same as actually receiving it.”).
Moreover, Saguaro represented to FERC that “when [the
Connector Pipeline] begins service all of the gas it transports
will be produced in Texas and only transported in intrastate
commerce.” JA 36 (emphases added). FERC reasonably
relied on that representation, which Saguaro certified as true.
See 18 C.F.R. § 157.6(a)(4)(i).
2
Short of showing that the Connector Pipeline will transport
interstate gas upon commencing service, the Petitioners purport
to divine that Saguaro’s “primary purpose” or “ultimate intent”
is to transport interstate gas sometime in the future.
Petitioners Br. 43 (emphases added). Perhaps it is. Perhaps
it isn’t.
specific.” Petitioners Br. 42-43 & n.13. As we have held time and
again, arguments raised only briefly in footnotes or otherwise
underdeveloped are deemed forfeited. See, e.g., Federal Express
Corp. v. Department of Commerce, 39 F.4th 756, 766 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2022); Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(“A party forfeits an argument by mentioning it only in the most
skeletal way . . . .” (cleaned up)).

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The Petitioners say that FERC erred by “limiting its
inquiry to Saguaro’s near-term plans” and ignoring evidence
that the Connector Pipeline is really being built as a future
interstate pipeline. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). In other
words, the Petitioners claim that Saguaro currently styles itself
an “intrastate” pipeline purely for NEPA-evasion purposes, and
once built, the pipeline will pivot to interstate service. They
point to various statements by Saguaro, as well as a supposed
capacity differential between the Connector Pipeline and the
WesTex pipeline, as evidence of this intrastate–interstate bait-
and-switch.
Time will tell whether the Petitioners’ prediction is
correct. Maybe Saguaro will transport interstate gas
sometime in the future. Maybe it won’t. What matters is
that, on this record, we cannot know for sure (and neither can
the Petitioners).
Frankly, Saguaro itself may not even know. See, e.g., JA
8 n.8 (“Saguaro will not initially provide interstate
transportation service pursuant to NGPA Section 311. . . , but
may do so in the future . . . .”); id. at 31 (similar). Pipeline
builders have an incentive to maximize their options. After
all, customers may wish to source gas from different suppliers
“over time, in response to changing supply and market
conditions.” Intervenors Br. 16-17.
Saguaro is entitled to keep its options open. It can begin
with intrastate service, with the option to seek § 311
authorization later. When a company makes that choice,
nothing requires FERC to guess the future and assert § 7
jurisdiction up front. Cf. Big Bend Conservation Alliance v.
FERC, 896 F.3d 418, 422-23 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (It “merely
restates applicable law” to note that “if the pipeline someday
provides qualifying service under Section 311, that service will

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not subject the pipeline to Section 7.”); id. at 423 (“FERC
precedent recogniz[es] that new intrastate pipelines may
provide Section 311 service after being placed into service”
(citing FERC decisions)).11
The Petitioners respond that Saguaro isn’t just reserving
the option to pursue § 311 service at some indeterminate point
down the road; Saguaro, they say, has designed the Connector
Pipeline with the present intent to seek § 311 service shortly
after circumventing §7 public-interest and NEPA review. In
support of their claim, they assert that Saguaro’s Connector
Pipeline will have significant capacity — 2.8 billion cubic
feet/day (Bcf) — which “dwarfs the WesTex pipeline system
that Saguaro claims will serve it.” Petitioners Br. 47-48.
But intrastate sources’ capacity actually dwarfs Saguaro’s.
Although the WesTex line currently has only about 0.8 Bcf
capacity, Saguaro identified eight other potential upstream
sources. Those sources have up to 5 Bcf in capacity.
11 The Intervenors say that it is “commonplace” for pipeline builders
to engage in an intrastate–interstate two-step; indeed, they say it’s a
“well-understood approach.” Intervenors Br. 28. The Petitioners,
meanwhile, worry that this approach effectively uses § 311 to
“bypass” § 7 public-interest and NEPA review. Petitioners Br. 50-
52. But we leave this hypothetical dispute for another day. As in
Big Bend, “the orders under review” here “do not prospectively
authorize” the Connector Pipeline “to transport natural gas under
Section 311.” 896 F.3d at 422. “[N]either the Authorizing Order
nor the Rehearing Order commits the agency to any particular course
of action should” Saguaro “seek to provide Section 311 service in
the future.” Id. at 423 (emphasis omitted). If FERC later
“discover[s] that Saguaro was just building this pipeline as a ruse to
transport [interstate] gas,” FERC will have the opportunity to address
the issue in the first instance. Oral Arg. Tr. 48-49 (FERC counsel).

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18
The Petitioners weakly protest that Saguaro hasn’t pinned
down which exact source(s) it will draw from or provided any
concrete precedent agreements or shipping contracts to
demonstrate its exact plans. But that hardly negates the
substantial evidence on which FERC relied. So the
Petitioners’ objection fails.
At bottom, this case is like Big Bend. 896 F.3d at 422-23.
On similar facts, Big Bend upheld FERC’s § 7 determination
that an export facility’s Texan connector pipeline wouldn’t
transport interstate gas ab initio, and that interstate gas
transport was not its “only realistic, or even primary, use.” Id.;
see also id. at 422 (“substantial evidence supports FERC’s
conclusion that the pipeline initially will only transport
[intrastate] natural gas” where (1) the “pipeline is located
entirely within Texas,” (2) the pipeline “is directly connected
with other intrastate pipelines,” (3) “there is abundant Texas-
sourced natural gas to supply the Trans-Pecos Pipeline without
relying on interstate volumes,” and (4) “Trans-Pecos
specifically represented that the pipeline would, in fact, carry
only gas produced in Texas” (cleaned up)). We reach the
same conclusion here.
Nothing in our decision precludes the Petitioners or
another party from bringing a challenge in the future should the
Petitioners’ prediction bear out. What matters for present
purposes is that here, as in Big Bend, FERC’s “orders under
review do not prospectively authorize” the Connector Pipeline
“to transport natural gas under Section 311.” Big Bend, 896
F.3d at 422. “[N]either the Authorizing Order nor the
Rehearing Order commits the agency to any particular course
of action should” Saguaro “seek to provide Section 311 service
in the future.” Id. at 423. If the record later reflects that the
primary purpose of the Connector Pipeline is to transport
interstate gas pursuant to Section 311, FERC can reconsider the

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19
pipeline’s regulated status at that point either on review of a
petition or of its own accord.12
* * *
To sum up on § 7 jurisdiction, FERC’s conclusions are
based on substantial evidence in the record: The Connector
Pipeline is located entirely within Texas; Saguaro certified that
the Connector Pipeline will carry only intrastate gas upon
commencing service; and the Connector Pipeline will have
access, via eight other upstream sources, to 5 Bcf of intrastate
gas — nearly double the Connector Pipeline’s capacity. See
JA 212-19, 431-39.13
Accordingly, the Connector Pipeline is not subject to
FERC’s § 7 jurisdiction.
IV
The Petitioners claim that FERC’s approval of the Border
Facility was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.
The Natural Gas Act “sets out a general presumption
favoring authorization.” Center for Biological Diversity v.
FERC, 67 F.4th 1176, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
12 We express no opinion about what options might then be available
to FERC.
13 The Petitioners make much of FERC’s supposed failure to verify
Saguaro’s certification that it will provide only intrastate service
initially. But Saguaro certified to the truth of its representations in
the administrative record much like lawyers certify to papers they
file. See 18 C.F.R. § 157.6(a)(4)(i); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). And
the Petitioners have offered no reason to doubt the veracity of those
representations.

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20
“FERC ‘shall issue’ authorization” for export facilities
“‘unless’ it determines doing so ‘will not be consistent with the
public interest.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a)). The
Petitioners have the burden to rebut that presumption and show,
affirmatively, that approving the Border Facility is inconsistent
with the public interest.
The Petitioners argue that FERC treated adverse impacts
versus benefits inconsistently. On the Petitioners’ telling,
FERC asymmetrically considered benefits downstream of the
Border Facility while dismissing adverse impacts upstream of
the border crossing.
The record does not support that theory. FERC’s mention
of downstream benefits merely responded to an argument
during notice and comment from Petitioner Sierra Club. See
JA 411. This court has long affirmed reliance “on the
presumptions” in favor of authorizing natural-gas facilities, and
has put “the burden on the opponent consistent with section 3
of the NGA, requiring an affirmative showing of inconsistency
with the public interest to deny an application.” New England
Fuel Institute v. Economic Regulatory Administration, 875
F.2d 882, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (cleaned up) (emphasis
omitted); see also Sierra Club v. DOE, 867 F.3d 189, 203 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (requiring “affirmative showing of inconsistency
with the public interest to deny the application” (cleaned up)).
We reaffirm that reliance here and reject the Petitioners’
claim.
V
Finally, the Petitioners claim that FERC violated the
National Environmental Policy Act. They present three
theories. Each fails.

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21
A
First, the Petitioners accuse FERC of gerrymandering the
Border Facility’s “purpose and need” in the Environmental
Assessment to allow for only one feasible alternative: the
Border Facility as proposed. We cannot agree.
NEPA requires agencies to consider “a reasonable range
of alternatives to the proposed agency action . . . that are
technically and economically feasible, and meet the purpose
and need of the proposal.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). In
identifying “feasible alternatives” for NEPA analysis, FERC
“exercises substantial discretion,” and we “must be at [our]
‘most deferential.’” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v.
Eagle County, Colorado, 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1512 (2025)
(quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
The Petitioners’ objection to FERC’s Border Facility
alternatives analysis rests on the tension between a “reasonable
range” of options and a specific “purpose and need.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (emphasis added). Because objectives limit
alternatives, the more specific the objective, the narrower the
range of alternatives. This relationship can be exploited: If an
agency “define[s] the objectives of its action in terms so
unreasonably narrow that only one alternative . . . would
accomplish the goals of [its] action, . . . the [NEPA analysis]
would become a foreordained formality.” Citizens Against
Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Thomas, J.).
The Petitioners say that’s what happened here: FERC
defined the “purpose and need” of the Saguaro Border Facility
project in terms so “unreasonably narrow” that there was really
only one alternative. Petitioners Br. 55 (cleaned up). That

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22
purpose was to connect the Connector Pipeline from the Waha
Hub to the Sierra Madre pipeline in Mexico. And that
admitted of only one option: a 1,000-foot stretch of pipeline
straddling the Rio Grande at a particular location.
FERC reasonably explained, however, that it does not
have extraterritorial jurisdiction over the siting of the Mexican
Sierra Madre pipeline, nor does it have § 7 jurisdiction over the
intrastate Connector Pipeline.14 See Citizens Action Coalition
of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 229, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2025)
(“NEPA does not require FERC to consider . . . alternatives
that are outside of FERC’s jurisdiction and would fail to serve
the purpose of the Project.”). The purpose of the Saguaro
project before FERC is simply to connect these “two non-
jurisdictional pipelines at the U.S.–Mexico border.” 186
FERC ¶ 61114, at p. 61658 (2024). Nothing about FERC’s
framing of this purpose evinces an unreasonable or artificially
narrow constraint on the “reasonable range of alternatives” for
its NEPA analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
To be sure, FERC has no “license to fulfill [its] own
prophecies.” Busey, 938 F.2d at 196. But there is no self-
fulfilling prophecy where, as here, FERC “is asked to sanction
a specific plan,” and it has simply “take[n] into account the
needs and goals of the parties involved in the
application” — here, Saguaro’s need to link the Connector
Pipeline to the Sierra Madre pipeline across the Texas–Mexico
border.15 Id.; see Citizens Action, 125 F.4th at 237 (“Because
14 As already explained, FERC has elected — in keeping with its
consistent practice — not to wield its § 3 jurisdiction over the
Connector Pipeline. See supra section III.A.
15 Also, FERC “should always consider the views of Congress,
expressed . . . in the agency’s statutory authorization to act.” Busey,

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23
FERC is considering a private proposal, it ‘may accord
substantial weight to the preferences of the applicant and/or
sponsor in the siting and design of the project.’” (quoting City
of Grapevine v. Department of Transportation, 17 F.3d 1502,
1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). Thus, and in accord with the
“substantial deference” that we owe to FERC’s alternatives
analysis, we reject the Petitioners’ argument. Seven County,
145 S. Ct. at 1513.16
B
The Petitioners next claim that as a part of its NEPA
review, FERC should have considered the upstream
environmental impacts of the Connector Pipeline as “[i]ndirect
effects” of the Border Facility. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(i)(2).
As the Petitioners have since recognized, this argument runs
headlong into the Supreme Court’s recent “course correction”
in Seven County. 145 S. Ct. at 1514; see Petitioners’ 28(j)
Letter (June 9, 2025) (express waiver).
Seven County pared back NEPA’s jurisprudential growth
from a “legislative acorn . . . into a judicial oak that has
hindered infrastructure development under the guise of just a
938 F.2d at 196. Here, Congress has expressed its support for
natural-gas exportation. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
16 The Petitioners also suggest that FERC should have considered
smaller alternatives to Saguaro’s proposed 48-inch diameter
pipeline. But they make no argument that a smaller-diameter
Border Facility would serve the project’s purposes, so FERC had no
obligation to consider the feasibility of a smaller pipeline as an
alternative. See Petitioners Br. 57-59; 186 FERC ¶ 61114, at pp.
61657, 61659; 188 FERC ¶ 61029, at p. 61154.

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24
little more process.” 145 S. Ct. at 1514 (cleaned up).17 “The
textual focus of NEPA is the ‘proposed action’ — that is, the
project at hand.” Id. at 1512 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)); see also id. at 1517. The Court made clear that
in considering the effects of a “proposed action” under NEPA,
an “agency may draw what it reasonably concludes is a
manageable line — one that encompasses the effects of the
project at hand, but not the effects of projects separate in time
or place.” Id. at 1517 (cleaned up). And even as to projects
“interrelated and close in time and place to the project at hand,”
courts “must remain deferential” to the line that the agency
draws “so long as” it is “reasonable and manageable.” Id.
(cleaned up).
Here, FERC drew the line at the Border Facility. That
line is reasonable, and we defer to FERC’s sound exercise of
discretion. See id. at 1518 (“An agency may decline to
evaluate environmental effects from separate projects upstream
or downstream from the project at issue.”). Because FERC
reasonably declined § 3 jurisdiction over the 157-mile
upstream pipeline, it reasonably concluded that that pipeline
was not part of a “single project within [its] authority” as to
which it had to assess environmental effects. Id. at 1517
(emphasis added); see id. at 1516 (“agencies are not required
to analyze the effects of projects over which they do not
exercise regulatory authority”); supra Section I.A. The
Supreme Court has shut the courthouse door to NEPA
nitpicking in the name of causally attenuated indirect effects.
See id. at 1515 (“The bedrock principle of judicial review in
NEPA cases can be stated in a word: Deference.”).
17 Cf. Appalachian Voices v. FERC, 139 F.4th 903, 922, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring) (describing how “lower courts
divined an entire common law of NEPA” that rendered its “blast
radius . . . boundless” (cleaned up)).

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25
C
Finally, the Petitioners argue that, per FERC’s own
regulation, it must “do an environmental review” of the
Connector Pipeline as a “project-related nonjurisdictional
facilit[y].” 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(c)(2)(ii). But that argument
is foreclosed by Big Bend Conservation Alliance v. FERC.
See 896 F.3d 418, 424-25 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
The FERC regulation in question presents a four-factor
balancing test used to determine whether there is sufficient
federal control over a state facility to necessitate NEPA
analysis. 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D); see Algonquin
Gas Transmission Co., 59 FERC ¶ 61255, at p. 61934 (1992).
Here, the Petitioners’ general idea is that FERC’s authorization
of the Border Facility suffices to “federalize” the related
upstream Connector Pipeline for purposes of NEPA review.
Cf. Big Bend, 896 F.3d at 424 (same argument).
Big Bend soundly rejected this “federalization theory.”
Id. at 424-25. “NEPA claims must be brought pursuant to the
APA,” which authorizes review only of “final agency
action” — that is, “final action by an agency of ‘the
Government of the United States.’” Id. at 424 (emphasis
added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)). Because FERC isn’t
authorizing the Connector Pipeline — the Texas Railroad
Commission is — there’s no final federal agency action to
serve as the basis for a NEPA–APA claim. See Sierra Club v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 803 F.3d 31, 50-51
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
VI
For these reasons, we deny the petition.

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26
So ordered.

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