United States of America , Ex Rel . Anil Kini , and Anil Kini v. Tata Consultancy Services , Ltd

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 12, 2024 Decided August 8, 2025
No. 24-7032
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , EX REL . ANIL KINI ,
AND
ANIL KINI ,
APPELLANT
v.
TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES , LTD,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:17-cv-02526)
Daniel Kotchen argued the cause for appellant. On the
briefs was Daniel Low.
Daniel S. Volchok argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief were Lauren N. Moore and Howard M. Shapiro.
Before: WILKINS , KATSAS and CHILDS , Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

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Circuit Judge KATSAS .
CHILDS , Circuit Judge: Anil Kini appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his qui tam action brought under the False
Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. U.S. ex rel. Kini
v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., No. 17-cv-2526, 2024 WL
474260, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024). In his first amended
complaint, Kini alleges that his employer, Tata Consultancy
Services, Ltd. (TCS), fraudulently obtained L-1 and B-1 visas
for information technology (IT) employees who should have
been sponsored under the H-1B visa program and, by doing so,
avoided higher application fees and payroll taxes owed to the
government. Kini also alleges that TCS retaliated against him
for reporting the alleged misconduct to TCS’s management.
Based on these allegations, Kini asserts two FCA
violations: a reverse false claim for knowingly avoiding an
obligation to pay money to the government under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) and a retaliation claim for alleged adverse
employment actions taken in response to his protected
whistleblowing activity under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The
district court dismissed the first amended complaint for failure
to state a claim. Kini now appeals. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the reverse
false claim. However, we reverse the dismissal of Kini’s
retaliation claim and remand the case for further proceedings.1
I.
A.
Originally enacted during the Civil War, the FCA allows
1 Our colleague dissents only insofar as he would hold that Kini also
failed to state a claim for retaliation.

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individuals to bring claims on behalf of the government to
“protect[] federal funds from fraud.” U.S. ex rel. Totten v.
Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 545–46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see
also United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 305 n.1, 309
(1976); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
The FCA imposes civil penalties and treble damages on anyone
who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A). Two provisions of the FCA are relevant to
this action.
First, the reverse false claim provision imposes liability
for fraudulent conduct that deprives the government of money
that it is owed. The provision makes liable any person who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
a false record or statement material to an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government,
or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.
Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G). To state a reverse false claim, the relator
must allege this obligation and its effect(s) “with particularity.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The FCA defines an “obligation” as “an
established duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express
or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from
statute or regulation, or from the retention of any
overpayment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3).
Second, the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects
whistleblowers “who seek to expose or to prevent government
fraud.” Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 293 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). The provision’s purpose “‘assure[s] those who may

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be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected
from retaliatory acts.’” U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,
153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting S. Rep. No.
99-345, at 34 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5299). Section 3730(h) authorizes suit by an employee who “is
discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in
any other manner discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of employment because of lawful acts done . . . in
furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to
stop . . . violations of this subchapter.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
To state a retaliation claim, an employee must allege
(1) engagement in a protected activity, and (2) discrimination
because of that activity. Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414,
422 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Unlike reverse false claims, Rule 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard is inapplicable to retaliation
claims, even those alleging conduct protected by the FCA.
Singletary, 939 F.3d at 303.
B.
Because Kini appeals from an order granting a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
relevant facts are those “alleged in the complaint, any
documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint
and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Hurd
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d
621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “We accept all the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in . . . [Kini’s]
favor.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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TCS hired Kini in April 2006.2 TCS is “an Indian
multinational corporation that provides information technology
and consulting [outsource staffing] services” to a world-wide
client base. 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 5 (J.A. 8). While its
headquarters are in Mumbai, India, TCS operates twenty-two
offices in the U.S., which are staffed by approximately 40,000
employees.
Kini claims that when companies award contracts for
services to TCS in the U.S., TCS typically fills positions with
foreign workers “because it can pay these employees a fraction
of what American [IT] workers demand to perform the same or
similar work” and “earn[s] a substantial profit while
undercutting its competition by offering lower prices to
clients.” Id. ¶ 12 (J.A. 9). But there’s a catch: for these
foreigners to work in the U.S., they must possess a government
work visa. To that end, TCS “applies for and secures three
types of visas for its foreign workforce: H-1B, L-1, and B-1.”
Id. ¶ 14 (J.A. 10).
According to Kini, H-1B visas are for “specialty
occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise,” id.
¶ 15 (J.A. 10), and cost $6,460 to secure. He identifies the two
types of L-1 visas—L-1A for management-level supervisory
employees and L-1B for organizational subject matter
experts—and states that both require an application fee of
$5,460. Finally, Kini explains that B-1 visas are for temporary
activities and are generally inappropriate for any TCS job but
are the cheapest to procure at $160.
Kini contends that after TCS finalized a 5-year contract
with Western Union in November 2012, TCS assigned him to
2 Unless otherwise noted, the following background is derived from
Kini’s first amended complaint.

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serve as the onsite service delivery manager for the Western
Union account, prompting his relocation to Denver, Colorado.
In 2014, Kini’s responsibilities allegedly expanded to include
reviewing the petitions for extensions to the L-1A visas held by
his team members. In that capacity, Kini says that “he noticed
a number of discrepancies in his team members’ roles and
reporting structure, which . . . did not match the actual role or
reporting hierarchy for L-1A employees on the Western Union
client account.” Id. ¶ 52 (J.A. 23). When Kini raised the issue,
a TCS client partner purportedly advised that Kini should not
get involved.
Sometime between September 2016 and January 2017,
TCS made Kini the “Business Relationship Manager for
Western Union.” Id. ¶ 31 (J.A. 15). “In this role, . . . Kini
managed the business development of the client by identifying
and implementing IT-related services to meet Western Union’s
needs.” Id. Despite the promotion, Kini allegedly remained
responsible for reviewing L-1A visa materials for TCS
employees. Id. ¶ 53 (J.A. 23). In that capacity, Kini says he
observed TCS’s ongoing use of fraudulent visa practices,
including the requirement that he “fabricate employee roles and
reporting structures” to align with “the information contained
in the employees’ L-1A visa petitions.” Id. ¶ 53 (J.A. 23–24).
On May 1, 2017, Kini submitted a “whistleblower report”
to both the CEO and vice president of human resources of TCS,
detailing what he described as “fraudulent visa practices and
other illegal, corrupt, and unethical conduct he had observed
while working on the Western Union client account.” Id. ¶ 63
(J.A. 28) (referencing J.A. 59–115). On June 22, 2017, Kini
submitted a “follow-up report” “detailing additional visa
abuses and illegal practices within the Western Union client
account since the time of his initial May 1, 2017 report.” Id.
¶ 65 (J.A. 29) (referencing J.A. 117–129). Five days later, on

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June 27, 2017, TCS informed Kini that it had hired an
independent investigator to “look into the issues raised in . . .
Kini’s whistleblower reports.” Id. ¶ 66 (J.A. 29).
During the remaining months of 2017, Kini exchanged
communications and information with the independent
investigator regarding the alleged visa fraud. He also filed a
qui tam action under seal in the district court on November 22,
2017, alleging that TCS violated the FCA and retaliated against
him for engaging in activity protected by the statute. See
Compl., Kini, 2024 WL 474260 (No. 1:17-cv-02526), Dkt. No.
1.
On January 2, 2018, Kini submitted a “follow-up
whistleblower complaint” to the independent investigator,
reiterating “his concerns regarding ongoing visa fraud and the
discrimination/hostility he had experienced within the Western
Union account and by [TCS] after raising his concerns.” 1st
Am. Compl. ¶ 71 (J.A. 30) (referencing J.A. 166–79).
Following that submission, Kini alleges that TCS immediately
began imposing “unrealistic performance goals” on him. Id.
¶ 72 (J.A. 31). Approximately two weeks later, on January 18,
2018, Kini submitted an additional “follow-up whistleblower
complaint” to TCS regarding the purported L-1A visa fraud.
Id. (J.A. 30) (referencing J.A. 181–91). The next day, TCS
allegedly removed Kini from the Western Union account and
told him “that if he did not find a new project role within two
weeks, he would be terminated.” Id. ¶ 77 (J.A. 34).
On May 30, 2018, TCS’s vice president of human
resources informed Kini about the results of the independent
investigator’s investigation, stating that “‘most of the issues
raised by [Mr. Kini we]re not substantiated’ and that for the
issues for which the company did find a violation, ‘the
Company ha[d] already taken corrective action.’” Id. ¶ 79 (J.A.

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34) (alterations in original) (quoting J.A. 220). TCS fired Kini
on August 9, 2018, citing a “lack of matching roles for [his]
skillset.” Compl., Ex. 45, Kini, 2024 WL 474260 (No. 1:17-
cv-02526), Dkt. No. 39-46 at 2.
C.
Nearly fifty-seven months after Kini filed his qui tam
complaint, the government filed a notice of election to decline
intervention in the suit on August 24, 2022, pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).3 The district court then unsealed the
complaint. On October 14, 2022, Kini amended the complaint
to enrich his allegations. TCS moved to dismiss the claims in
the first amended complaint.
The district court granted TCS’s motion to dismiss the
reverse false claim, holding that Kini failed to state a claim for
relief because TCS “was not obligated, within the meaning of
the FCA, to pay higher payroll taxes for its employees or pay
application fees for applications it never sought.” Kini, 2024
WL 474260, at *1. The district court also dismissed Kini’s
retaliation claim, concluding that he had not engaged in FCA-
protected activity. Id. In doing so, the district court reasoned
that Kini’s reports concerned only “potential statutory and
regulatory violations, which do not give rise to a FCA action,”
id. at *6, and therefore, did not reflect an effort to prevent TCS
from violating the FCA.
Kini timely appealed the dismissal of his claims.
3 “The FCA permits a private party—a ‘relator’—to initiate a qui tam
action on behalf of the government.” Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 422.
“The government has the option of taking over the suit or leaving it
to the relator to prosecute.” Id. “In either case, the relator is entitled
to a percentage of any recovery resulting from a successful suit.” Id.

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II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“We review the district court’s dismissal de novo and may
affirm its judgment on any basis supported by the record.”
Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. IRS, 910 F.3d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
III.
Kini contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
first amended complaint on two grounds. He maintains that he
adequately pleaded a reverse false claim by alleging that TCS
had an obligation to pay higher payroll taxes based on higher
H-1B wages and an obligation to pay higher H-1B application
fees. He also asserts that his allegations are sufficient to show
that he engaged in protected whistleblower activity to support
a retaliation claim. We address each claim in turn.
A.
For his reverse false claim, Kini alleges that TCS
fraudulently applied for cheaper L-1 and B-1 visas for work it
knew required H-1B visas, underpaying H-1B visa employees,
decreasing its payroll tax obligation, and fraudulently directing
employees without H-1B visas to perform work that required
an H-1B visa. To adequately plead a reverse false claim, Kini

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must allege that TCS’s actions “knowingly and improperly
avoid[ed] or decreas[ed] an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the [g]overnment.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(G). Because we subject reverse false claims to a
heightened pleading standard, Kini must allege the fraud “with
particularity,” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), by “plead[ing] the time,
place, and content of the fraud and . . . identify the individuals
allegedly involved.” U.S. ex rel. Shea v. Cellco P’ship, 863
F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Kini presents two theories of TCS’s “obligation” under
§ 3729(a)(1)(G): (1) a Department of Labor regulation
requiring employers to pay H-1B workers a particular wage
rate and file an application with the department attesting to do
so, combined with the tax code’s payroll tax requirement
necessitating the payment of higher payroll taxes based on the
H-1B required wage, and (2) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) regulations requiring a higher application fee
for H-1B visas. Neither is sufficient in connection with Kini’s
allegations to create a cognizable obligation for purposes of the
FCA. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Kini’s reverse false claim.
1.
Kini first argues that TCS failed to adhere to an obligation
to remunerate H-1B employees their “required wage rate,”
Appellant’s Br. 6, and paid them “substantially less – e.g., 30%
less – than non-visa-reliant workers,” 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 41
(J.A. 19). The failure to pay the required wage rate in turn
resulted in TCS not satisfying its “regulatory obligation under
20 C.F.R. § 655.731” and its LCA “to pay higher withholding
taxes” to the government based on the higher H-1B required
wage. Appellant’s Br. 20–21. According to Kini, “by
fraudulently certifying and failing to pay its H-1B employees

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the required wage rate,” TCS “reduced the amount of federal
payroll tax it otherwise would have been required to pay the
federal government.” 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 89 (J.A. 38).
H-1B visas cover “occupations that require the theoretical
and practical application of a body of highly specialized
knowledge and a bachelor’s degree or higher in a directly
related specific specialty (or its equivalent).” H-1B Cap
Season, USCIS, https://perma.cc/6FCZ-MEGK. To procure
H–1B visas for their employees, an employer files a labor
condition application (LCA) with the Department of Labor
using the procedures laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n). As part of
the LCA, the employer must state that it will offer “wages that
are at least—(I) the actual wage level paid by the employer to
all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications
for the specific employment in question, or (II) the prevailing
wage level for the occupational classification in the area of
employment, whichever is greater.” Id. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i).
The LCA requires employers to pay an H–1B employee this
“required wage rate” “for the entire period of authorized
employment,” 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a) (2024), as soon as the H-
1B worker “enters into employment,” id. § 655.731(c)(6).
Kini requests that we find that any reduction in the
payment of required wages to H-1B workers under 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.731(a) and the associated taxes to the government creates
an obligation that can support a reverse fraud claim. See, e.g.,
Appellant’s Br. 18. Section 655.731(a) alone does not appear
to support Kini’s interpretation because the regulation
generally creates a duty to pay H-1B visa employees. U.S. ex
rel. Billington v. HCL Techs. Ltd., 126 F.4th 799, 804 (2d Cir.
2025) (“Although relators focus on . . . 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a),
that is not the obligation at issue for purposes of the FCA. That
regulation . . . obligates HCL ‘to pay H-1B visa employees’ a
certain wage.”). In this regard, the FCA requires relators to

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show an obligation “to pay or transmit money or property to
the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). While
§ 655.731(a) compels an employer to pay H-1B employees
specified wages, it does not force an employer to pay or
transmit money or property to the government. Because
§ 655.731(a) does not reference money owed to the
government, the regulation does not create the requisite
obligation for a reverse false claim under the plain meaning of
the provision.
However, even if Kini is correct that § 655.731(a)
combines with the payroll tax requirement to create an
obligation under the FCA, his claim still fails. Kini fails to
plausibly plead a payroll tax obligation to the government
because he does not allege “time, place, and content” of the
circumstance demonstrating TCS’s failure to pay the
government taxes due for the wages it paid to its H-1B
employees. At most, he alleges that TCS underpaid one or
more H-1B visa employees with unknown profiles as compared
to unidentified people in unnamed “similar roles,” 1st Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 42–43 (J.A. 19–20), and precisely underpaid H-1B
employees “on the order of 30% of their salaries,” id. ¶ 89 (J.A.
38–39). Additionally, the tax code only mandates an employer
to pay taxes on wages it actually paid to its employees. See 26
U.S.C. § 3111(a). The requirement in 20 C.F.R. § 655.731 and
the LCA to pay H-1B visa workers a particular required wage
rate does not modify the tax code’s requirement to pay payroll
taxes only on wages actually paid.
Therefore, because Kini does not sufficiently plead TCS’s
failure to adhere to an obligation to pay higher payroll taxes for
certain H-1B employees, the district court did not err in

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dismissing his reverse false claim.4
2.
Kini’s second theory is that TCS fraudulently applied for
cheaper L-1 or B-1 visas and, thus, avoided its obligation to
pay the government higher H-1B visa fees. 5 USCIS
“manage[s] the process that allows individuals from other
countries to work in the United States.” What We Do: Working
in the U.S., USCIS, https://perma.cc/SS7Q-FDXH. USCIS
requires employers to pay the correct fee(s) for submission of
an “application, petition, or request.” U.S. C ITIZEN & I MMIGR.
SERVS ., F ORM G-1055, at 1 (Apr. 15, 2025),
https://perma.cc/PRB4-325P. However, this requirement to
pay the correct fee for the visa application submitted does not
create an FCA obligation. Kini relies on immigration
regulations that only oblige employers to pay fees on the visas
for which they applied. Per Kini’s pleadings, TCS applied for
L-1 and B-1 visas and paid the fees those applications require.
Because TCS never applied for the H-1B visas that require the
higher fees, it had no such obligation within the meaning of the
FCA to pay for visas it never sought.
4 The FCA contains a “tax bar” in that it “does not apply to claims,
records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code.” 31
U.S.C. § 3729(d). Because Kini has not sufficiently alleged TCS’s
obligation to pay higher payroll taxes, we decline to address its
argument that the FCA tax bar also warrants dismissal of the payroll
tax claim.
5 Kini describes four FCA reverse false claim obligations TCS
avoided with this scheme: (1) an obligation to pay H-1B visa
application fees that TCS knew required H-1B visas and obtained L-
1 and B-1 visas instead, Appellant’s Br. 30–34; (2) an obligation to
pay H-1B application fees arising from 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E)
and § 214.2(l)(7)(i)(C) and to submit an H-1B petition with fees

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In reaching this outcome, we join our sister circuits.
Billington, 126 F.4th at 805 (“[A]n obligation to pay higher
visa application fees does not exist by the mere fact of a
violation of immigration laws because that violation does not
trigger an immediate and self-executing duty to pay the
government those fees. . . . [T]he penalties . . . would not
include fees for visa applications HCL never submitted.”
(cleaned up)); U.S. ex rel. Lesnik v. ISM Vuzem d.o.o., 112
F.4th 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[I]t is not sufficient that
defendants applied for the wrong visas . . . . They had no
established duty to pay for visas for which they did not apply.
. . . [T]he only specific, legal obligation . . . for the B-1 visas
was to pay the application fees for those visas.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the authority Kini relies on the most to
support his arguments—Franchitti v. Cognizant Technology
Solutions Corp., 555 F.Supp.3d 63 (D.N.J. 2021), and U.S. ex
rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir.
2006)—lack persuasive value. See Lesnik, 112 F.4th at 820
(declining to follow “Franchitti . . . , the sole district court
decision holding that in similar factual circumstances, a
defendant had an ‘obligation’ to pay application fees for visas
for which it did not apply[,] . . . [because] the court never
when TCS instructed L-1 and B-1 workers to perform H-1B work,
Appellant’s Br. 34–35; (3) an obligation to pay H-1B application fees
arising from fee-based relationships due to the benefit of the visas
received by TCS to perform H-1B work, even if it did not initially
apply for H-1B visas, Appellant’s Br. 35–38; and (4) an obligation
to pay H-1B application fees arising from a contractual/implied
contractual relationship with the government when certifying its visa
applications are true and correct and receiving the benefits of the
visas from the government in exchange for complying with the
regulatory and statutory visa requirements, including paying fees,
Appellant’s Br. 38–39.

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identified any legal authority that would establish such an
obligation”); U.S. ex rel. Barrick v. Parker-Migliorini Int’l,
LLC, 878 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding Conagra,
unlike this case, involved “a legally established duty to pay the
USDA to issue new certificates . . . . [which was] a necessary
and a sufficient condition for a monetary obligation”).
TCS never applied for the H-1B visas that would have
obligated it to pay the higher application fee of $6,460. Thus,
it had no such obligation—at least not within the meaning of
the FCA—to pay for visas it never sought. We accordingly
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Kini’s visa fee claim
because TCS did not have a duty to pay fees for applications it
never submitted.
B.
As to his retaliation claim, Kini sufficiently pleaded that
he engaged in protected conduct about which TCS was aware
and retaliated against him.6 As such, the district court erred in
dismissing Kini’s retaliation claim.
1.
“For the first requirement—engaging in protected
activity—it is sufficient that a plaintiff be investigating matters
that reasonably could lead to a viable FCA case.” Hoyte v. Am.
Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
This protected conduct element “requires only that the plaintiff
have engaged in ‘acts . . . in furtherance of an action under this
section.’” Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 739 (alteration in Yesudian)
6 We reiterate that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard is
inapplicable to retaliation claims, even those alleging conduct
protected by the FCA. Singletary, 939 F.3d at 303.

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(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)). This means that the FCA
covers two forms of protected activity: (1) “steps taken
antecedent to a False Claims Act proceeding” and (2) “lawful
acts done in furtherance of ‘other efforts to stop 1 or more
violations of [the FCA].’” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 295 (quoting
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1)). Under the former, the plaintiff’s
investigation must concern false or fraudulent statements or
records concealing, avoiding, or decreasing an obligation to
pay the government, Hoyte, 518 F.3d at 66, whereas under the
latter the employee must show “an objectively reasonable
belief that the employer is violating, or will violate,” the FCA,
Singletary, 939 F.3d at 296.
Kini argues that he adequately pleaded allegations
covering both forms of protected activity under § 3730(h)(1).
First, Kini contends he alleged “in furtherance of” protected
activity in stating that he “investigated” and “documented” his
allegations, “assisted . . . in preparation of his amended
complaint and initial complaint” and “disclosed TCS’s
fraudulent scheme to the appropriate government officials.”
Appellant’s Br. 58–59 (quoting 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 103
(J.A. 42)) (cleaned up). Next, Kini states he plausibly alleged
efforts to stop FCA violations by reporting “allegations . . . to
TCS leadership, including sending to TCS executives and an
investigator . . . lengthy reports and other evidence complaining
about fraud, visa abuse, and illegal practices, met with an
investigator about those reports, and disclosed the fraud to
government officials.” Id. at 56 (citing 1st Am. Compl.
¶¶ 63–72, 103 (J.A. 28–31, 42)) (cleaned up).
Our dissenting colleague takes the position that Kini failed
to plausibly allege that he engaged in FCA-protected conduct.
See Partial Dissent at 1–2. We disagree. Because Kini only
must allege that he “took lawful measures to stop or avert what
[he] reasonably believed would be a violation of the False

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Claims Act,” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 297, plausible factual
allegations of protected activity are contained within Kini’s
reporting of FCA violations to TCS, particularly on May 1,
2017, June 22, 2017, and January 18, 2018. On each of these
days, Kini submitted communications to TCS—which he
described in the first amended complaint and attached to it as
exhibits—expressing concerns regarding the existence of
government fraud regarding visas and TCS’s violation of the
FCA through its failure to address it. In his initial
whistleblower report, Kini observed that, “[c]onsidering the
current mandate from USCIS under [the] Trump
administration, the implications of US Visa abuse are huge for
TCS & [the] entire Indian IT industry, as a whole.” J.A. 110.
In addition, after providing a specific description of fraudulent
L-1A visa conduct, Kini inquired whether TCS will “stop these
illegal practices and visa abuses . . . before DHS/USCIS comes
to know of it.” J.A. 120. In another example, Kini asserted
that because TCS “should be fully aware of USCIS rules with
regards to US Visas for all categories,” he should not have to
file “a Whistle Blower Complaint” for the company “to check
this fraud.” J.A. 184. Moreover, in his January 2, 2018
whistleblower report to the independent investigator, Kini
questioned whether TCS leadership was “aware of the grave
implications of US Visa Fraud?” J.A. 171.
Because we accept Kini’s factual allegations as true at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage and draw all justifiable inferences in Kini’s
favor, there are sufficient allegations of protected activity
under § 3730(h)(1) to satisfy the first element of an FCA
retaliation claim.7
7 We note that in Kini’s communications with TCS, he alerted the
company to visa fraud but did not expressly warn it about depriving
the U.S. government of the higher application fees and payroll taxes.
However, because the case is at the motion to dismiss stage, the first
amended complaint did reasonably permit an inference that TCS was

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2.
To establish the second element of his FCA retaliation
claim, Kini “must also plausibly allege (i) a qualifying
retaliatory employment action, (ii) [TCS]’s knowledge that
[he] was engaged in protected activity, and (iii) facts showing
that the employment action was caused by [his] engagement in
that activity.” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 299. Kini’s first
amended complaint satisfies these elements.8 He alleges that
TCS took multiple retaliatory actions against him because the
company was aware of his protected actions.
Based on the allegations of the first amended complaint,
TCS had notice of Kini’s protected conduct starting on May 1,
2017, when he “submitted a 57-page whistleblower report to”
TCS’s CEO and Vice President of Human Resources. 1st Am.
Compl. ¶ 63 (J.A. 28). Over the course of the following year,
Kini sent additional follow-up reports to TCS, met with an
independent investigator, who was appointed by TCS, and
provided the investigator with evidence. Id. ¶¶ 64–72
(J.A. 28–31). He pleaded causation alleging that TCS began to
retaliate immediately on May 1, 2017, which eventually
culminated in his termination on August 9, 2018. Id. ¶ 73
(J.A. 31–32). As to specific retaliatory acts, Kini alleged that
TCS reduced his pay, denied his promotion, stripped him of his
leadership role, removed him from the Western Union client
account, and then fired him. Id. ¶¶ 73-81 (J.A. 31–36). Kini
also pleaded the requisite employer’s knowledge alleging that
TCS directed retaliatory, discriminatory, and hostile conduct
on notice of potential FCA violations when Kini submitted his
whistleblower communications to the company.
8 Kini asked for an opportunity to clarify his allegations if we
determined that he failed to “adequately state second prong protected
activity.” Appellant’s Br. 59–60. Because Kini adequately pleaded
a claim for retaliation, we deem this request to amend moot.

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towards him after he raised his concerns about the alleged visa
fraud. Id. ¶¶ 71–75, 77 (J.A. 30–34).
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to
Kini, he sufficiently alleged TCS’s knowledge of his protected
activity, its commission of retaliatory conduct against him, and
a connection between the conduct and his protected activities.
As such, the district court erred in finding that Kini did not
adequately plead a retaliation claim.
*****
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Anil Kini’s FCA reverse false claim. We reverse
the dismissal of Kini’s retaliation claim and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part: Anil Kini brought this False Claims Act action against
his former employer, Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd. Kini
alleges that Tata fraudulently avoided monetary obligations to
the United States and retaliated against him for trying to stop
its FCA violations. As the Court persuasively explains, Kini
failed to state a claim for avoiding monetary obligations to the
government. In my view, Kini also failed to state a claim for
retaliation.
The False Claims Act prohibits various forms of fraud
against the United States, including the knowing avoidance of
any obligation “to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The FCA also
makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an
employee “because of lawful acts done by the employee … in
furtherance of an action under [the FCA] or other efforts to stop
1 or more violations” of the FCA. Id. § 3730(h)(1). This text
creates two distinct intent elements: The employee must act to
stop an FCA violation, and the employer must retaliate against
the employee because he is so acting. To form the prohibited
retaliatory intent, the employer therefore must know that the
employee was acting to stop an FCA violation. See, e.g.,
Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 300 (D.C. Cir.
2019); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153
F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
As my colleagues ably demonstrate, the operative
complaint alleges at length that Kini was fired soon after
repeatedly urging Tata to stop engaging in visa fraud. Ante at
16–17. But the complaint nowhere suggests that Kini raised
the further possibility that any such abuses might have created
FCA liability for avoiding visa application fees or payroll taxes
owed to the government—novel theories that the Court rightly
rejects as legally unfounded. So in my view, although the
complaint supports a more-than-plausible inference that Tata
retaliated against Kini for his efforts to stop alleged violations

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of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it does not support a
plausible inference that Tata retaliated against him for any
efforts to stop alleged FCA violations.
As to the requisite employer knowledge, the complaint
here contains much less than the operative complaint in
Singletary. In that case, this Court held that the plaintiff had
stated an FCA retaliation claim by alleging that she was fired
after complaining to her employer not only that it was
mistreating laboratory animals, but also that the alleged
mistreatment “violated funding requirements” and “conditions
under which [her employer] received grant money from NIH
and the federal government.” See 939 F.3d at 300–01. Here,
in contrast, the complaint says nothing about whether Tata was
violating obligations to pay money to the government.
In sum, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Kini’s complaint in its entirety.

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