Foad Farahi v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 4, 2025 Decided September 30, 2025
No. 23-5243
FOAD FARAHI,
APPELLANT
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:15-cv-02122)
Christina A. Jump argued the cause for appellant. With
her on the briefs were Charles Swift, Chelsea G. Glover, and
Samira Elhosary.
Christopher C. Hair, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew
Graves, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Brian
P. Hudak and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: PILLARD, KATSAS, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Foad Farahi filed a
Freedom of Information Act request for his FBI file. The FBI
withheld most of the records in it, and Farahi sued. After
requiring the FBI to update potentially stale declarations that it
had submitted, the court concluded that release of the requested
records could interfere with enforcement proceedings that were
pending or reasonably anticipated. The court therefore held
that the records were protected against disclosure by FOIA’s
Exemption 7(A). We agree.
I
The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies
to release records to members of the public upon request,
unless an enumerated statutory exemption applies. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3), (b). Exemption 7(A) covers records “compiled for
law enforcement purposes” if their disclosure “could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(A). We have held that such
proceedings must be “pending or reasonably anticipated.”
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082,
1096 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“CREW”) (quoting Mapother v. DOJ,
3 F.3d 1533, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
When withholding information under a FOIA exemption,
agencies must take “reasonable steps” to “segregate and release
nonexempt information.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(ii); see also
id. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record
shall be provided to any person requesting such record after
deletion of the portions which are exempt.”).
II
Foad Farahi is an Iranian national who has lived in the
United States since 1993. In 2002, the Department of
Homeland Security placed him in removal proceedings due to

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a visa overstay. At various times during his immigration
proceedings, Farahi has applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and
voluntary departure. Opposing relief, DHS presented
documents and live testimony from an FBI agent who
“documented Farahi’s connections to high-level terrorists.”
Farahi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-10339, 2024 WL 483601, at
*1–2 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024).
Farahi submitted a FOIA request for his FBI file. The
agency located some 10,750 pages and 80 CDs with potentially
responsive information. Farahi sued after the FBI missed the
statutory deadline for responding. Over the next several years,
the agency reviewed potentially responsive records, disclosed
some to Farahi, and withheld most of them. Upon completing
its review, the FBI moved for summary judgment in October
2019. In support, it submitted a declaration from David Hardy,
the Section Chief of its Record/Information Dissemination
Section (RIDS). Among other things, the Hardy declaration
asserted that the withheld records were compiled for law
enforcement proceedings and that their release could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings that were then pending or reasonably anticipated.
The FBI moved to file a supplemental Hardy declaration under
seal and ex parte. Farahi did not oppose the motion, which the
district court granted in October 2020.
In November 2022, the district court addressed the
summary-judgment motion. It concluded that the records were
compiled for law enforcement purposes and that the FBI had
“seemingly” met its burden to show that their release could
interfere with pending or reasonably anticipated enforcement
proceedings. J.A. 121–22. However, given the significant
passage of time, the court ordered the FBI to update its
assessment of whether enforcement proceedings were still

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pending or reasonably anticipated. The court also concluded
that it needed more information to address segregability, for
reasons it could not state on the public record. For these
reasons, the court denied summary judgment without
prejudice.
The FBI submitted updated declarations and renewed its
motion. This time, the agency submitted public and ex parte
declarations from Joseph Bender, who was then the Acting
Section Chief of RIDS. In his public declaration, Bender
explained that RIDS had contacted the agent responsible for
overseeing Farahi’s file, who confirmed that investigations
remained ongoing. Bender’s ex parte declaration provided
more details. Bender also provided more information
addressing the district court’s concerns regarding segregability.
The district court granted the renewed motion. The court
credited the FBI’s confirmation “that the relevant proceedings
remain ongoing.” J.A. 138–39. And based on its review of the
ex parte submission, the court concluded that the FBI had
adequately explained why exempt material was not reasonably
segregable. Id. at 139–40.
Farahi appealed.
III
In FOIA cases, as in all others, we review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the
Press v. FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The
government bears the burden of showing that a FOIA
exemption applies. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). To carry that
burden, the FBI here must show that the withheld records were
compiled for law enforcement purposes and that their
disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings that are pending or reasonably

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anticipated. See id. § 552(b)(7)(A); CREW, 746 F.3d at 1096.
“Because the FBI specializes in law enforcement, its decision
to invoke exemption 7 is entitled to deference.” Campbell v.
DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Such deference is
particularly appropriate for records implicating national
security. This Court has “consistently reiterated the principle
of deference to the executive in the FOIA context when
national security concerns are implicated”—including
specifically in Exemption 7(A) cases seeking records related to
counterterrorism investigations. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v.
DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (CNSS).
The government may withhold records in their entirety
“when nonexempt portions ‘are inextricably intertwined with
exempt portions.’” Juarez v. DOJ, 518 F.3d 54, 61 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). “A court may rely
on government affidavits that show with reasonable specificity
why documents withheld pursuant to a valid exemption cannot
be further segregated.” Id.
IV
The district court correctly concluded that Exemption 7(A)
protects the records withheld by the FBI.
A
Exemption 7(A) applies only to records “compiled for law
enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). Because the
FBI is a law-enforcement agency, its determination on this
point is entitled to a fair measure of deference. See, e.g.,
Clemente v. FBI, 867 F.3d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32. Still, its declarations must “establish
a rational ‘nexus between the investigation and one of the
agency’s law enforcement duties,’” as well as a “connection

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between an ‘individual or incident and a possible security risk
or violation of federal law.’” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32
(quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420–21 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
We agree with the district court that the FBI carried its
burden here. The public Hardy declaration explained that the
withheld records were compiled “in furtherance of
investigations of violations of national security and
international terrorism to include pending law enforcement
proceedings and the subject’s association with individuals
directly involved in such violations.” J.A. 42. The ex parte
Hardy declaration supplied considerable detail about the nature
of that investigation. And broader context confirms that
assertion. In the district court, Farahi himself conceded that the
FBI has investigated him for ties to one or more organizations
designated by the State Department as foreign terrorist
organizations as well as ties to an individual later detained as
an enemy combatant and eventually convicted in federal court
on charges related to terrorism. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. Summ. J.,
ECF Doc. 39, at 3–5. We have no doubt that the FBI carried
its burden to show that Farahi’s file was compiled for law-
enforcement purposes.
B
Exemption 7(A) also requires that release of the withheld
records “could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B). We have
held that this provision requires the proceedings to be “pending
or reasonably anticipated.” CREW, 746 F.3d at 1096. Ongoing
criminal investigations count as “proceedings” for these
purposes, id. at 1097–98, and the government may show such
proceedings simply by attesting to their “existence,” id. at
1099. “[S]o long as the investigation continues to gather

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evidence for a possible future criminal case, and that case
would be jeopardized by the premature release of that evidence,
Exemption 7(A) applies.” Juarez, 518 F.3d at 59.
The district court correctly concluded that disclosure could
be reasonably expected to interfere with pending or reasonably
anticipated enforcement proceedings. The public Hardy
declaration explained that disclosure of information regarding
an ongoing investigation could reasonably be expected to
interfere with it by tipping off the targets about the scope of the
investigation—a widely accepted justification in Exemption
7(A) cases. J.A. 49; see CNSS, 331 F.3d at 929. Moreover, the
declaration attested that the relevant investigation remained
“ongoing.” J.A. 49. Hardy’s ex parte declaration elaborated
on the investigation. And the Bender declaration confirmed
that the investigation remained ongoing as of March 2023.
Farahi argues that the passage of time casts doubt on
whether enforcement proceedings remained pending or
reasonably anticipated. He invokes our statement in CREW
that the “vague nature” of an assertion that investigations
remain ongoing may not suffice to support the invocation of
Exemption 7(A). See 746 F.3d at 1098. And he contends that
the Bender declaration, in asserting that the relevant
investigations “remain ongoing,” J.A. 131, was similarly
conclusory. We agree with Farahi that the Bender declaration,
considered in isolation, appears surprisingly terse. But context
counsels against considering the Bender declaration in
isolation. As explained above, the government established the
pendency of enforcement proceedings in the public Hardy
declaration, which attested to their existence, and the ex parte
Hardy declaration, which gave considerable detail about the
nature and scope of the investigation. The government
submitted the Bender declaration not to establish the pendency
of enforcement proceedings from scratch, but only to confirm

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that nothing had changed while its initial summary-judgment
motion was pending. Moreover, in denying the government’s
initial motion for summary judgment without prejudice, the
district court had already concluded the FBI “seemingly” met
its burden to show pending enforcement proceedings. J.A. 122.
So, the Bender declaration can reasonably be understood as an
update to the Hardy declarations, not as a standalone document.
The breadth of the FBI’s underlying investigation also
makes plausible its representation that the investigation
remains ongoing. We cannot disclose the contents of Hardy’s
ex parte declaration, but we note what the FBI publicly alleged
about Farahi in his immigration proceedings: He was “a
recruiter for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.” Farahi, 2024
WL 483601, at *2. He was “connected to Khaled Sheikh
Mohamed and other known Al Qaeda members.” Id. He was
“linked to multiple convicted or indicted terrorists,” including
Jose Padilla. Id. And he supported “charities that financed
terrorism,” including the Holy Land Foundation and the Global
Relief Foundation. Id. Based on the FBI’s public and sealed
declarations, we conclude that the FBI has met its burden under
Exemption 7(A) to show that a “concrete prospective law
enforcement proceeding” continues to exist. CREW, 746 F.3d
at 1097 (quoting Juarez, 518 F.3d at 58).
C
Farahi briefly objects that the government did not
adequately justify how it defined the categories of documents
used to explain its withholding decisions. When an agency
withholds documents on a category-by-category basis, it must
use categories that are “sufficiently distinct to allow a court to
determine whether the specific claimed exemptions are
properly applied” to each category. CREW, 746 F.4th at 1088
(quoting Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

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But Farahi provides no specific explanation for why the various
categories identified by the FBI were overbroad. Farahi
accordingly forfeited his arguments on this score. Khine v.
DHS, 943 F.3d 959, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
V
Even if a FOIA request encompasses protected records, the
agency still must take “reasonable steps” to “segregate and
release nonexempt information.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(ii);
see also id. § 552(b) (agency must disclose “[a]ny reasonably
segregable portion of a record”). In its second order, the district
court explained that the FBI had provided a “detailed
justification” for why the protected records were not
reasonably segregable in Bender’s supplemental ex parte
submission. J.A. 139 (cleaned up). And it found that this
submission satisfied the agency’s burden on this point. Id.
Farahi objects that there must be some segregable and
releasable information in the vast volume of responsive
records. But if a small amount of non-exempt material is
randomly “interspersed line-by-line throughout the document,”
that material is not likely to be “reasonably segregable.” Mead,
566 F.2d at 261; see also Perioperative Servs. & Logistics LLC
v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 57 F.4th 1061, 1069 (D.C. Cir.
2023). After all, “the focus of the FOIA is information, … not
simply words which the Government has written down.”
Mead, 566 F.2d at 261 n.55. So, while Farahi is correct that
individual words or phrases in the requested records might be
disclosed without harming the FBI’s interests, that is neither
here nor there. The district court correctly concluded that no
meaningful information was reasonably segregable.
Finally, Farahi complains that the district court relied too
much on Bender’s ex parte declaration in its segregability
analysis. But nothing required the court to put on the public

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record its analysis of that declaration. For one thing, Farahi did
not oppose the district court’s acceptance of ex parte
declarations, so he cannot challenge the district court’s reliance
on them. For another, while ex parte declarations no doubt
handicap FOIA plaintiffs, that problem “is inherent in those
FOIA cases where, as here, an ex parte declaration is the only
way to decide the dispute without disclosing the very material
sought to be kept secret.” Perioperative Servs., 57 F.4th at
1067 (cleaned up).
VI
For these reasons, we affirm the district court.
So ordered.

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