United States of America v. Michael Lawrence Rosebar

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 1, 2025 Decided November 18, 2025
No. 24-3173
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
APPELLEE
v.
M ICHAEL LAWRENCE R OSEBAR,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:16-cr-00018-1)
Isra Bhatty, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J. Kramer,
Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal
Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Mark Hobel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for
appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb and
Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: KATSAS and CHILDS , Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .
CHILDS , Circuit Judge: Michael Lawrence Rosebar
appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to reduce
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Amendment 821, and USSG
§ 1B1.10. We affirm the district court’s denial of Rosebar’s
motion to reduce his sentence.
I.
A.
For approximately seven years, Rosebar fraudulently
misrepresented to homeowners that he was a licensed home
improvement contractor and misappropriated funds meant for
real property improvements. On October 4, 2016, a federal
grand jury returned a second superseding indictment charging
Rosebar with the following twenty-nine bankruptcy crimes and
sixteen non-bankruptcy crimes: twenty-six counts of
concealment of bankruptcy assets in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 152(1) and aiding and abetting that concealment in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2; two counts of making a false declaration and
statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) and aiding and
abetting; one count of making a false oath and account in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(2); two counts of conspiracy to
commit first degree fraud in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-
1805a, 3221(a), 3222(a)(1); ten counts of first degree fraud in
violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-3221(a), 3222(a)(1), 3601; three
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and one
count of first degree fraud in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-
3221(a), 3222(a)(1). After the government filed a notice that it
was only proceeding on sixteen of the counts, the district court
conducted the criminal trial regarding those charges in June
2017.

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On June 20, 2017, the jury found Rosebar guilty of six
counts of concealment of bankruptcy assets, two counts of false
declaration and statement, one count of false oath or account,
four counts of first-degree fraud, and three counts of wire fraud.
On October 16, 2017, at Rosebar’s sentencing, the district court
announced a total offense level of 29, a criminal history
category of II, and an advisory guidelines range of 97–121
months of imprisonment.1 The district court overruled
Rosebar’s objection to his criminal history category being a II
instead of a I, which resulted from the addition of two status
points to his one total criminal history point because Rosebar
committed the crimes at issue while he was on probation. At a
criminal history category of I, Rosebar’s advisory guidelines
range was 87–108 months of imprisonment, instead of the 97–
121 months at a criminal history category of II. Ultimately, the
district court sentenced Rosebar to a concurrent sentence of
120 months of imprisonment and thirty-six months of
supervised release. Rosebar timely appealed and this Court
affirmed the district court’s judgment. See generally United
States v. Rosebar, 800 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
B.
Section 4A1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
sets out the framework for determining a defendant’s criminal
history category. USSG § 4A1.1. A sentencing court can give
an additional criminal history “status” point to a defendant who
commits an “instant offense while under any criminal justice
sentence, including probation.” See USSG § 4A1.1(e).
1 Rosebar received criminal history points based on his prior
sentences. See USSG § 4A1.1. Rosebar’s total number of criminal
history points determined his criminal history category—between I
and VI —which was then considered with his offense level to
establish an advisory sentencing range. See USSG § 1B1.1(a) (steps
for determining a Guidelines range).

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Effective November 1, 2023, the United States Sentencing
Commission amended § 4A1.1 with Guidelines Amendment
821. Before Guidelines Amendment 821, a defendant who
committed an offense “while under any criminal justice
sentence” received two status points. See, e.g., USSG
§ 4A1.1(d) (Nov. 2021). But under Guidelines Amendment
821, a defendant with six or fewer criminal history points from
prior sentences no longer receives any status points, and a
defendant with seven or more criminal history points receives
only one status point. See USSG § 4A1.1(e) (Nov. 2023). The
Sentencing Commission has given Guidelines Amendment 821
retroactive effect, in providing that defendants (like Rosebar),
who were given two status points under the old version of
§ 4A1.1, may be eligible for a sentence reduction in light of the
Amendment. See U.S. Sent. Guidelines Manual supp. to app.
C at 260–263 (U.S. Sent. Comm’n 2023) (Amendment 825);
USSG § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d).
On February 23, 2024, Rosebar filed a motion for
sentencing reduction pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 821
and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On March 4, 2024, Rosebar, aided
by the Federal Public Defender, filed a supplemental motion to
reduce his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) and USSG
§ 1B1.10 and specifically requested that the district court
reduce his sentence to 107 months.2 The district court denied
Rosebar’s motion on November 19, 2024. Rosebar timely
appealed.
2 Section 1B1.10 is the “the policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2)
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 722 F.3d 361, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
It provides that “[i]n a case in which a defendant is serving a term of
imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant
has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the
Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (d) below, the court may
reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” USSG § 1B1.10(a)(1).

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II.
We have appellate jurisdiction to review “final decisions
of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“Denials of sentence reductions are unquestionably ‘final
decisions of a district court’ because they close the criminal
cases.” United States v. Jones, 846 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). We review the decision to
deny a motion for a sentence reduction filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) under an abuse of discretion standard. See
United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see
also United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir.
1947) (explaining that a district court commits an abuse of
discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly
unreasonable”). “A district court by definition abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (citing Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
III.
A.
“Once a federal criminal sentence is imposed, it is
generally considered final.” United States v. Lawrence, 1 F.4th
40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2021). However, a district court may reduce
a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the sentencing range
“has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section “3582(c)(2)
authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence
that is based on the amended provision.” Dillon v. United
States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). “The statute . . . establishes
a two-step inquiry.” Id. at 826. “A court must first determine
that a reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it may
consider whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either

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in whole or in part, according to the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a).” Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) states:
The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider–(1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)
the need for the sentence imposed–(A) to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of
sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range established for–(A)
the applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant as set forth
in the guidelines . . . (5) any pertinent policy
statement–(A) issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need
to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.
B.
In resolving Rosebar’s motion to reduce his sentence, the
district court agreed with the parties that at the first step of the
Dillon analysis, Rosebar was eligible for a sentence reduction

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based on Guidelines Amendment 821. The district court then
turned to step two of the Dillon inquiry, weighed the factors set
forth in § 3553(a), and found that a reduction was unwarranted
after its consideration of the seriousness of Rosebar’s
fraudulent acts, their impact on the victims, and his lack of
remorse: (1) “the extensive negative impact on [Rosebar]’s
victims attributable to his actions . . . weighs against
resentencing,” A087; (2) “Rosebar’s post-conviction conduct
[to include the filing of meritless motions and inconsistent
payment of restitution], with a focus on his failure to take
responsibility for his actions . . . weighs against resentencing,”
A088; and (3) “the type of behavior [Rosebar] engaged in–
when coupled with his lack of remorse and his refusal to
acknowledge the harm he caused–creates a significant
likelihood that . . . Rosebar will continue to engage in
fraudulent endeavors when released from prison, and that the
public needs protection,” A089.
On appeal, Rosebar argues that the district court made an
error of law and also abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to reduce sentence. The issue before the district court,
in his view, was not whether a “generalized resentencing” was
appropriate, but whether a “reduction authorized by . . .
amendment [821] was warranted in whole or in part.”
Appellant’s Br. 9 (citing Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827). Rosebar
insists that the district court only analyzed his motion to reduce
sentence as a request for a “generalized resentencing.” Reply
Br. 1. He also argues that it “relied on two overarching
factors—seriousness of the crime and victim impact—that
were wholly unchanged from the original sentencing” and “one
factor—a perceived lack of remorse and associated recidivism
risk—that arose following sentencing.” Appellant’s Br. 10
(citing A085–A088). In this regard, Rosebar argues that the
district court “failed to fully address the profoundly mitigating
effects of [his] family life and responsibilities as well as his

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rehabilitative efforts and spotless disciplinary record over
seven years of incarceration that, at a minimum, mitigated
against any perceived recidivism risk.” Id. at 7.
Rosebar’s arguments do not persuade us that the district
court abused its discretion. First, he cites no authority barring
a district court from denying a motion for sentence reduction
and, in doing so, maintaining the original sentence after
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. See Jones, 846 F.3d at
372 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion
when it “considered the § 3553(a) factors at length (including
the nature and seriousness of the offenses) and decided that
nothing less than the original sentence[] would be enough”).
Second, the district court did not treat Rosebar’s sentence
reduction hearing as a generalized or “plenary resentencing
proceeding.” Cf. United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223,
232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (defining a “plenary resentencing
hearing” as one that “carries with it all of the procedural
trappings and collateral effects of the original sentencing[.]
[I]n addition to mandatory application of § 3553(a) factors to
new facts, a full resentencing would allow the parties to raise
or re-raise arguments that are unrelated to the issue(s) that
precipitated the resentencing, including any non-retroactive
changes in the law” (citing Shabazz v. United States, 923 F.3d
82, 83 (2d Cir. 2019)), aff’d, 841 F. App’x 328 (2d Cir. 2021)).
Here, the district court followed Dillon’s two-step inquiry,
as required, and considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Rosebar laid out the same mitigating effects to this Court that
he did to the district court. And it considered them when it
weighed the § 3553(a) factors. It was perfectly within the
court’s discretion to find that the seriousness of Rosebar’s
fraudulent acts, the impact on the victims, and lack of remorse
outweighed either a full or partial reduction. E.g., Jones, 846
F.3d at 372; cf. United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089,

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1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It will be the unusual case when an
appeals court can plausibly say that a sentence is so
unreasonably high or low as to constitute an abuse of discretion
by the district court.”). Rosebar merely disagrees with the
district court’s weighing of these factors, which is not the same
as showing that the district court’s decision was “arbitrary,
fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.” McWilliams, 163 F.2d at
697; see also United States v. Miller, 35 F.4th 807, 819 (D.C.
Cir. 2022) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district
court failed to give rehabilitative conduct the weight a
defendant contends it deserves). Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
*****
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order
denying Rosebar’s motion for a sentence reduction.
So ordered.

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