United States of America v. Jeffrey Henry Williamson

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 4, 2025 Decided December 12, 2025
No. 24-3014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cr-00195-1)
A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for appellant.
Allaya Lloyd, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was William
Gullotta, Trial Attorney.
Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
RANDOLPH.

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Dissenting opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge
RAO.
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal
from an Order of the district court issued on February 5, 2024.
The full text of the Order, signed by District Judge Walton, is
set forth in an Addendum to this opinion.
The appellant, Jeffrey Henry Williamson, is a prisoner
at the Federal Correctional Complex in Butner, North
Carolina. While nearing the end of his eight-year sentence for
threatening to murder an agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Williamson mailed a series of letters threatening
not only the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted him but
also the prosecutor’s family and an FBI agent.
In his letters, Williamson recounted dreams of
murdering the prosecutor and his family, and asked “How
does that make you feel? There will be justice/you made a
terrible mistake.” App. 3. As to the FBI agent, Williamson
wrote: “the following BOP staff gang stalking + harassment as
well as Butner FCI #1 has caused me nightmares of shooting
FBI agent [X] in his head with a 300 mag sniper rifle at 300
yards like a deer”. App. 3.
A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted
Williamson in September 2020 for those threats, and Judge
Walton denied Williamson’s motion to be released pending
his trial. App. 227. He has not yet been tried on those charges.
During pretrial proceedings, Williamson finished
serving his eight-year sentence for his earlier offenses. The
pretrial detention order has continued his confinement at FCI
Butner. The validity of that order is not a subject in this
appeal.
I.

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The history leading to the Order on appeal—Judge
Walton’s Order of February 2024—is as follows.
In June 2021, after several pretrial proceedings
conducted via teleconferences, with Williamson representing
himself, Judge Walton expressed reluctance to schedule a trial
“without some input from [a] mental health expert who
[could] assist [him] in assessing whether there [was] a viable
issue regarding [Williamson’s] mens rea in this case.” App.1
141.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b), 4242(a), and
4247(b), Judge Walton ordered the Medical Center at Butner
to conduct a psychological examination of Williamson to
determine whether he was competent to stand trial, whether
his beliefs in FBI “gang-stalking” were delusional, whether he
had the capacity to appreciate that threatening people violated
the law, and whether he had the capacity to conform his
conduct to the law. App. 158–60.
A forensic psychologist at Butner, Dr. Ross, reported
that Williamson suffered from a “delusional disorder,
In opposing Williamson’s release from pretrial1
detention, the government informed Judge Walton of the
following history. In 2008, Williamson sent emails to FBI
headquarters stating that he would kill FBI agents if they did not
stop harassing him. App. 162. The same year he called and left
voicemails at FBI Headquarters threatening to kill federal
officials in Washington, D.C., and Houston, Texas. Id. For
these actions he was imprisoned for forty-two months. App.
163. One week after he was let out on supervised release, he
pointed a fake gun at a real estate agent in Texas and threatened
to kill her, for which he was sentenced to nine months in state
prison and another twenty-four in federal prison. App. 163–64.
It was after his release from those sentences that he committed
the crimes that earned him the eight-year sentence he was
serving at FCI Butner.

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persecutory type, multiple episodes, currently in acute
episode.” Although Williamson’s condition did not impair2
his ability to represent himself or to understand the illegality
of his conduct, Dr. Ross concluded that Williamson was
unable to conform his conduct to the law. App. 270.
Representing himself at a later pretrial hearing
Williamson insisted that he did not suffer from a mental
illness and stated that he did not intend to raise an insanity
defense. App. 237–38. He asked Judge Walton to let him stay
at FCI Butner because he was seeking a new examination to
prove he was not mentally ill and because he feared that files
he had accumulated while representing himself would not be
available to him if he were transferred to the District of
Columbia to await trial. App. 240.
In December 2021, the government moved to dismiss
the 2020 Indictment against Williamson without prejudice in
light of his mental condition and the prospect of a valid
insanity defense. App. 279. The government also asked
Judge Walton to provide that Williamson should “be
evaluated for dangerousness and for a decision by the Director
of the facility whether to file a dangerousness certification
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) . . ..” App. 283.
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,2
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(5th ed. Text Revision 2022): “In persecutory type the central
theme of the delusion involves the individual’s belief of being
conspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned,
maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of
long-term goals. Small slights may be exaggerated and become
the focus of a delusional system. The affected individual may
engage in repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction by legal or
legislative action. Individuals with persecutory delusions are
often resentful and angry and may resort to violence against
those they believe are hurting them.”

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After still more proceedings unnecessary to recount,
Judge Walton orally granted the government’s motion on
January 30, 2024. App. 416. On February 5, 2024, he issued
a written Order dismissing the charges against Williamson,
staying the dismissal, and requiring Williamson to remain at
FCI Butner for “a reasonable period not to exceed 45 days, to
be examined to determine whether the director of FCI Butner
should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” App.
425.
Judge Walton stayed his Order pending this appeal.
II.
Since 1949, § 4246 has authorized the detention of
mentally ill, dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the
prisoners would otherwise be released. United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129, 140 (2010). Under the current
version of the statute, if the director of the facility where the3
The version of § 4246 in effect from 1949 to 1984 (then3
18 U.S.C. § 4247) required civil commitment proceedings to be
held “[w]henever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall
certify that a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire has been
examined by the board of examiners referred to in [18 U.S.C. §
4241], and that in the judgment of the Director and the board of
examiners the prisoner is insane or mentally incompetent, and
that if released he will probably endanger the safety of the
officers, the property, or other interests of the United States. . .
.” Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88. A separate statute
enacted the previous year, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, established a Board
of Examiners, consisting of two medical officers appointed by
the warden and Attorney General and one mental health expert
appointed by the Surgeon General, at every federal penal and
correctional institution. Act of June 25, 1948. 62 Stat. 855.
These boards examined prisoners alleged to be insane; the
boards then reported their findings to the Attorney General. Id.

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inmate is hospitalized determines that he “is presently4
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which
his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another, and
that suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the
person are not available” then the director shall file a
certificate in the district court nearest to the facility. The
filing of the certificate “shall stay the release of the person
pending completion of procedures contained in this section.”
18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The filing also begins civil commitment
proceedings, including a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§
4246(b) & (d), 4247(d).
Section 4246 applies to three categories of prisoners:
(1) those whose sentences are about to expire, (2) those who
were committed to the custody of the Attorney General under
18 U.S.C. § 4241(b), and (3) those “against whom all criminal
charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the
mental condition of the person.” Judge Walton’s Order placed
In general the statute applies to “a person [who] is4
hospitalized.” The Butner Federal Correctional Complex
consists of four facilities: three “Correctional Institutions,” and
one “Medical Center.” Presumably carrying out Judge Walton’s
Order would involve transferring Williamson to the Medical
Center, a hospital and one of the few facilities in the United
States capable of making § 4246 judgments. See United States
v. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2025); see also United
States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“because the Bureau of Prisons operates only five Federal
Medical Centers, defendants in 89 of the 94 judicial districts are
often sent to institutions outside of the district for
hospitalization.”) Judge Walton knew this. His June 2021 order
required Williamson’s psychiatric analysis to “be performed at
a federal medical center or another facility at FCI Butner that is
suitable for the psychiatric or psychological examination.” App.
158. Williamson has not mounted any argument dealing with
this aspect of § 4246(a).

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Williamson in the third “dismissed charges” category of §
4246(a), and thus made him eligible for a dangerousness
determination by the facility director at Butner.
We interpret “all criminal charges have been
dismissed” in § 4246(a) not to mean that the prisoner must
have been released from custody. That interpretation would
be senseless. It would mean that a prisoner must be released
before he may be evaluated to determine whether he should be
released. It would also contradict § 4246(a)’s directive that
the issuance of a dangerousness certificate stays the prisoner’s
release—which necessarily contemplates the prisoner’s
remaining in custody while the director considers the danger
of releasing him. Williamson does not argue otherwise.
Appellate counsel for Williamson nevertheless
contends that the Order exceeded the district court’s authority.
As he now sees it, the Order required the facility director to
subject his client to a § 4246(b) examination even though no
examination can occur until after the director issues a
dangerousness certificate. The government counters that5
Judge Walton’s Order merely ensured that the facility director
at Butner would have the opportunity to decide whether to
issue that certificate.
We say “as he now sees it” because Williamson’s5
“stand-by”counsel, at the hearing preceding this Order, agreed
with Judge Walton’s disposition. Counsel told the court: “Well,
I think you can do what the government just said, which is to
dismiss the charge – the government has a motion pending to
dismiss the charge. I think you can do that, and I think you can
stay the order for some minimal period of time to allow the
government to file the 4246 certificate down in Butner, which is
exactly what happened in Godinez-Ortiz [563 F. 3d 1022, 1026
(9th Cir. 2009)].” App. 411.

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This is a “quarrel in a straw.” The contested portion of6
Judge Walton’s Order required only that the facility director
perform the duty § 4246(a) assigned to him—namely,
determine whether releasing Williamson would pose a danger
to the public. The effect of the Order would have been the
same if, instead, it read: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that
Mr. Director shall do what 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) requires of
him with respect to inmate J.H. Williamson, No. ____, now
that the court has ordered dismissal of the charges against this
inmate for reasons solely related to his mental condition.”7
Judge Walton’s Order, although perhaps unnecessary,
is appropriate. Any facility director, to comply with §
4246(a), must issue a certificate if he finds that the prisoner
would pose a danger if released. But what if the director
determines that the prisoner would not pose a danger?
Nothing in § 4246(a) requires the director to publish—let
alone explain—that outcome. Thus, if no certificate issues
there might be some doubt whether the director even exercised
the judgment demanded of him. An order such as the one
Judge Walton wisely issued made sure that the director
performed his duty under § 4246(a).
There is nothing to Williamson’s related argument that
Judge Walton’s Order is invalid because it required a
“psychiatric examination,” which—the argument goes—can
only be ordered after a certificate is filed and only by the court
closest to the facility.
Judge Walton’s Order did not prescribe a “psychiatric
examination”—under § 4246(b) or otherwise. The operative
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 4, sc. 4, l. 53–56.6
The early versions of this statute made the director’s7
duty more explicit, requiring the director have the inmate
examined by a resident Board of Examiners before they could
issue a certificate. Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88.

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paragraph of the Order describes the director’s decision-
making responsibility as “conduct[ing] the evaluation” or8
“examin[ing]” Williamson to decide whether to issue a
certificate. To accomplish this the director necessarily must
exercise judgment. It is of no moment whether a court calls
this exercise an “assessment,”9 or an “evaluation,” or an10
“examination,” or a “determination.”11 12
Williamson also contends that there was no need for
the court to order any new evaluation or examination of him.
He puts it this way: “Mr. Williamson had been at Butner for
years, serving his prior sentence and in pretrial custody in the
present case, and, thus, the director had ample opportunity and
information upon which to ‘assess’ whether to issue a
certificate.” Reply Brief, at 6. The assumption is that records
from Williamson’s many years at Butner provide sufficient
material to satisfy the director’s obligation under §4246(a).
But §4246(a) is concerned with the present and what it
predicts about the future. The director must determine whether
the prisoner is “presently suffering from a mental disease” and
would be a danger to the public if released. It follows that the
director must evaluate Williamson’s current condition—that
Quoting United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022,8
1032 (9th Cir. 2009).
As the Eighth Circuit did in United States v. Payen, 1449
F.4th 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2025).
As the Fifth Circuit did in Sealed Appellee v. Sealed10
Appellant, 83 F.4th 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2023).
As the district court did in United States v. Guzman-11
Montesino, No. CR 24-106(GMM), 2025 WL 2374770, at *3
(D.P.R. Aug. 14, 2025).
As the Supreme Court did in Greenwood v. United12
States, 350 U.S. 366, 370 (1956).

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is, his condition when his release is imminent.
The Fourth Circuit adopted this interpretation when
reviewing an order similar to the Order now before us. There
too the district court’s order indicated that the facility director
at Butner would make a preliminary dangerousness
determination. See United States v. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 190
(4th Cir. 2025). The government had requested an order
“referring [Berry] to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation for
civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” Motion to
Refer Defendant for a Civil Commitment Determination,
United States v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D.
Mich. 2019). The district court granted the request stating that
“it is appropriate that Berry be evaluated for civil
commitment.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and to
Refer Defendant For a Civil Commitment Evaluation, United
States v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D. Mich.
2019). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order, reasoning that
“it would make little sense to interpret the statute [§ 4246] to
require the release of dangerous, mentally incompetent
individuals the moment their charges are dismissed without
affording the government a reasonable opportunity to seek
certification under § 4246.” Berry, 142 F. 3d at 192.
The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in upholding
a district court order identical to Judge Walton’s. The court13
The court of appeals in Godinez-Ortiz ruled that the13
district court “correctly recognized that a dangerousness
evaluation conducted pursuant to § 4246 would determine
whether [the defendant] might pose a danger to the public if
released from the facility. The court granted the government’s
motion, dismissing the charges without prejudice, but staying its
order of dismissal pending appeal and the determination

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reasoned that “[i]n authorizing the director to file a
dangerousness certification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates
the temporary commitment of that person so that the director
can conduct the evaluation necessary to make the certification
decision.” Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.
This brings us to Williamson’s remaining argument.
As we understand it, he contends that because § 4246 does not
expressly authorize a district court to order a director to
conduct a preliminary dangerousness evaluation Judge Walton
had no authority to issue an order requiring or even allowing
the director to make that judgment. E.g. Appellant Brief at 19,
23, and Reply Brief at 12–13.
It is a well-established principle that district courts
have inherent powers, including the power to stay
proceedings, which they can wield to respond to specific
problems when doing so does not contradict any express rule
or statute. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016);
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996); Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46, (1991); Link v. Wabash
R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962); United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). The Order here is a
reasonable response to the specific problem of making the
“dismissed-charges” category in § 4246(a) administratively
workable and does not contradict the statute. See Berry, 142
F. 4th at 192; see also Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.
regarding dangerousness. Additionally, the court ordered that
[the defendant] be returned to FMC-Butner for a period of 45
days to give the facility an opportunity to determine whether to
file a dangerousness certificate pursuant to § 4246.” 563 F.3d at
1026.

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We close with this response to the dissent.
To support its theory that we lack appellate
jurisdiction, the dissent relies on the same reasons we have
just given for rejecting the defendant’s appeal on the merits.
The outcome of our decision is the same as the dissent’s
preferred “jurisdictional” disposition: Judge Walton’s Order,
stayed during the pendency of this appeal, will go into effect.
The question naturally arises: should our opinion be placed
“on the merits” or instead, as the dissent prefers, should it be
labeled a “jurisdictional” determination? Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946), gives the answer: the decision should be
on the merits.
The Order dismisses the indictment against
Williamson. Williamson objects only to one aspect of the
Order: the requirement that a facility director at Butner make a
dangerousness determination. According to Williamson, this
illegally required his confinement to a hospital for a maximum
of 45 days to be subjected to a psychiatric evaluation. Under14
circuit law, an order committing a defendant to a prison
hospital “to undergo an involuntary psychiatric examination”
is immediately appealable. United States v. Weissberger, 951
F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Accord United States v.
Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Berry, 142 F.4th 184 (4th Cir. 2025). Our decision that the
Order did not do what Williamson claims is a decision on the
merits, not a ruling that we lack jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood,
supra; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
See note 4 supra and the Order.14

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Affirmed.
ADDENDUM
ORDER
In accordance with the oral rulings issued by the Court at
the status hearing held on January 30, 2024, via teleconference,
it is hereby
ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for an
Evaluation Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, to Dismiss the
Indictment without Prejudice, and to Stay the Order of Dismissal
Pending a Dangerousness Certification, ECF No. 113, is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the defendant shall remain at FCI
Butner for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed forty-five
days, to be examined to determine whether the director of FCI
Butner should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See
United States v. Godinez Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.
2009) (“In authorizing the director to file a dangerousness
certification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates the temporary
commitment of that person so that the director can conduct the
evaluation necessary to make the certification decision.”); see id.
(“The duration of such commitment[] is controlled by 18 U.S.C.

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§ 4247(b).”). It is further
ORDERED that the Court will dismiss the Indictment
without prejudice “solely for reasons related to the mental
condition of the [defendant.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). However,
such dismissal is STAYED pending the completion of the
evaluation of the defendant and the determination by the director
of FCI Butner regarding whether to file a dangerousness
certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See Godinez-Ortiz, 563
F.3d at 1026 (affirming the district
court’s order which “granted the motion [to dismiss],
dismiss[ed] the charges without prejudice, [and] stay[ed] [the]
order of dismissal pending . . . the determination regarding
dangerousness”); see, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, No.
12-cr-184 (DBH), 2014 WL 3378662, at *2 (D. Me. July 9,
2014) (granting “the government’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice and its motion for an order directing the United States
Bureau of Prisons, through FMC Butner, to conduct a
dangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246" and staying
the order of dismissal “pending the completion of the
dangerousness evaluation” in accordance with the procedure
approved by the Ninth Circuit in Godinez-Ortiz); United States
v. Hardy, No. 09-cr-130 (DBH), 2011 WL 997288, at *1 (D. Me.
Mar. 18, 2011) (citing Godinez-Ortiz in granting the
government’s motion for a dangerousness evaluation, to dismiss
without prejudice, and stay the order of dismissal). It is further1
The Court acknowledges that, if the director of FCI1
Butner files a certificate of dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246, the certificate must be “transmit[ted] . . . to the clerk of
the court for the district in which the [defendant] is confined[,]”
18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), and, thus, any dangerousness proceedings
under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 would procced [sic] in that district rather
than in this Court, see United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-191

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ORDERED that the time from January 30, 2024, until
the date on which the director of FCI Butner makes the
determination regarding whether to file a certificate pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 4246, is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, to
allow time for the defendant to be examined for the purposes of
this determination. It is further
ORDERED that, upon the filing of a notice of appeal
challenging this Order, which the defendant represents he
intends to file, the proceedings before this Court will be
STAYED pending a ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit.
It is further
ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the Court
within seven days of the resolution of his forthcoming appeal
that will challenge this Order. It is further
ORDERED that the execution of this Order shall be
STAYED for five days to allow the defendant to file a notice of
appeal. It is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forthwith
mail a copy of this Order to the defendant s address on record.
SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2024.
(JMF), 1999 WL 1062139, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1999) (stating
that “[t]he only natural reading of [18 U.S.C. § 4246(a)] is that
the court of confinement, where the certificate was filed, has
jurisdiction to determine dangerousness” and that “exclusive
jurisdiction to commit the defendant under 18 U.S.C.[] § 4246
lies in the court where he is presently confined”).

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RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: It is highly unusual for this
court to review an interlocutory order in a criminal case. We
may hear such appeals only if the order conclusively
determines rights “too important to be denied review” and
meets the strict requirements of the collateral order doctrine.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949). Jeffrey Williamson was already committed to pre-trial
detention. The order under review merely provides up to 45
days for the director of the facility detaining Williamson to
determine whether to initiate civil commitment proceedings, a
task assigned to the director by statute. The order does not
resolve the type of important question amenable to
interlocutory review. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction,
and the appeal should be dismissed.
I.
Jeffrey Williamson was indicted for mailing letters
threatening an FBI agent and a federal prosecutor while serving
a sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in
Butner, North Carolina. In June 2021, when his sentence
expired, Williamson was committed to pretrial detention. After
a court-ordered psychiatric examination concluded that he met
the standard for insanity, the government moved to dismiss his
indictment without prejudice “solely for reasons related to [his]
mental condition.” J.A. 268.
The government also asked the district court to stay the
dismissal order and commit Williamson to FCI Butner for 45
days so he could be evaluated for dangerousness under 18
U.S.C. § 4246. That provision authorizes civil commitment of
individuals whose release poses a danger to the public. As
applicable here, it applies to persons “in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons” whose charges “have been dismissed solely
for reasons related to the[ir] mental condition.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(a). If the director of the facility where the person is held
determines he meets the statute’s standard for dangerousness,

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2
the director must file a so-called dangerousness certificate. Id.
This certificate stays the person’s release pending civil
commitment proceedings provided for in the statute. Id.
The district court granted the government’s motion. The
order required that he “remain at FCI Butner” for up to 45 days
“to be examined to determine whether the director” should file
a dangerousness certificate. But the order did not expressly
commit Williamson under section 4246. The order also stated
that the court will dismiss the indictment once the director
determines whether to file a certificate. The court stayed its
order pending this appeal.
II.
The district court’s limited order is not a final judgment,
nor does it satisfy the strict requirements of the collateral order
doctrine. Because the order does not decide the type of
important issue subject to interlocutory review, we lack
jurisdiction to review it.
A.
Appellate jurisdiction is generally limited by statute to
“final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “In
criminal cases, this prohibits appellate review until after
conviction and imposition of sentence.” Midland Asphalt Corp.
v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). Williamson has not
been convicted, and his indictment has not yet been dismissed,
so the order under review is not a final judgment. Accordingly,
we have jurisdiction only if the order fits within the “‘small
class’ of collateral rulings that … are appropriately deemed
‘final.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106
(2009) (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545–46). An order qualifies
for interlocutory review if it: (1) “conclusively determines the
disputed question”; (2) “resolves an important issue

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3
completely separate from the merits of the action”; and (3) “is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (cleaned up).
The Supreme Court has stressed the need to apply this
standard stringently and explained that the second and third
prongs embody a “judgment about the value of the interests” at
stake. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (cleaned up); see Will v.
Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–52 (2006). Only if deferring
review “imperil[s] a substantial public interest or some
particular value of a high order” does the collateral order
involve “important questions” that are “effectively
unreviewable” after final judgment. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107
(cleaned up). The standard is designed to respect the statutory
limits of section 1291 and to prevent “piecemeal” appeals from
“undermin[ing] efficient judicial administration.” Id. at 106.
In criminal cases, the Court applies the collateral order
doctrine “with the utmost strictness.” Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984). “[T]he delays and disruptions
attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to
the effective and fair administration of the criminal law.” Di
Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). Interlocutory
appeals undermine the defendant’s and society’s “strong
interest in the speedy resolution” of criminal cases. Flanagan,
465 U.S. at 264; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme
Court has recognized only four issues that justify immediate
appellate review of a criminal order: the denial of a motion to
reduce bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); the denial of
a motion asserting Double Jeopardy, Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); the denial of a motion asserting
Speech and Debate immunity, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S.
500, 507–08 (1979); and the authorization of involuntary
medication, Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. The Court has resisted
extending interlocutory review beyond matters that are

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substantially similar to these four types. See Flanagan, 465
U.S. at 267; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857
(1978). This circuit has similarly adhered to a “restrictive
approach” and declined to extend the doctrine “[b]eyond the
penumbras of Abney … and Helstoski.” United States v.
Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 747–49
(2016).
B.
The district court’s order does not meet the requirements
for an immediately appealable collateral order.
As the majority explains, the brief order here does not
decide an important question. It simply permits the director at
FCI Butner to evaluate Williamson and determine whether to
file a dangerousness certificate. See Majority Op. 7–9. The
district court held that it will dismiss the charges against
Williamson for reasons of mental defect, so he was subject to
a dangerousness evaluation under section 4246(a). The order
appropriately provides time for the facility director to
undertake the evaluation and to determine whether Williamson
would pose a danger if released.
Williamson argues the order is immediately appealable
because it commits him to a new term of custody and subjects
him to an involuntary psychiatric examination. But properly
understood, this order does neither. It simply leaves
Williamson in pretrial detention, which was previously
authorized in the June 2021 order, an order not challenged
here.1 The order under review also does not mandate a
1 Williamson already appealed the June 2021 pretrial detention order
without success. See Per Curiam Judgment, No. 21-3042 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 25, 2022). Had Williamson filed a new motion for the district

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psychiatric examination; it simply permits the section 4246(a)
evaluation for dangerousness.
As such, the order has little consequence and cannot
satisfy the stringent requirements of the collateral order
doctrine. Specifically, the order fails the second and third
prongs because it does not resolve an “important question[]”
that is “effectively unreviewable” after final judgment.
Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106–07 (cleaned up). As explained above,
the second and third prongs apply only to those orders that
decide important issues such that deferring review “imperil[s]
a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high
order.” Id. at 107 (cleaned up). The order here only indicates
that Williamson, who is already detained, should be evaluated
for dangerousness under section 4246(a). This dangerousness
evaluation is the process by which the director determines
whether to file a certificate of dangerousness now that
Williamson’s charges will be dismissed for reasons of mental
defect. The order merely confirms how the (stayed) dismissal
interacts with section 4246(a) to permit the dangerousness
evaluation and provides the director with up to 45 days to
perform that evaluation. The order thus “does not cause or
compound [Williamson’s] deprivation.” MacDonald, 435 U.S.
at 861.
The order does not decide the sort of important question
recognized as warranting immediate review. For instance, the
order does not commit Williamson to involuntary
hospitalization. Cf. United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392,
396–97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that commitment orders
court to revoke its pretrial detention order, he would be statutorily
entitled to appeal an order denying it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); In re
Stone, 940 F.3d 1332, 1338–39 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But this appeal
involves no such order.

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under section 4241 are immediately appealable). The order
plainly involves no claimed immunity from trial. See United
States v. Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 767–69 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(dismissing interlocutory appeal in part because “[n]othing
Cisneros argues amounts to a right not to be tried”). Nor does
the order mandate a severe infringement of Williamson’s
liberty similar to an order requiring involuntary psychiatric
medication. Cf. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176–77. The district court’s
order cannot be analogized to any of the issues important
enough for interlocutory review. Asserting jurisdiction over
this appeal would therefore require recognizing a new category
of collateral orders, a consequence that the majority neither
acknowledges nor explains.
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in a similar appeal
involving section 4246 further highlights why review under the
collateral order doctrine is unavailable here. See United States
v. Carrington, 91 F.4th 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2024). There, the
court dismissed an appeal of an order that, among other things,
stated the defendant was “subject to” section 4246. Id. at 264.
The defendant had been in custody under section 4241, which
expressly provides that upon the expiration of such custody the
individual “is subject to the provisions of section 4246.” Id. at
257–58, 262–63; 8 U.S.C. § 4241(d). The order at issue merely
confirmed what the statute already provided. Consequently, it
“decided nothing” and was “not an appealable collateral
order.” Id. at 270. The order under review here, which merely
recognizes that Williamson is subject to a dangerousness
evaluation under section 4246, is similarly not appropriate for
interlocutory review.
My colleagues’ assertion that the proper interpretation of
the district court’s order is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional

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one,2 turns the collateral order doctrine on its head. Section
1291 requires us to determine whether there is a “final
decision.” That assessment is not a merits question, but a
prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s standard for
whether a collateral order is appealable as a “final decision”
requires us to determine whether the order “conclusively
determines the disputed question” and “resolves an important
issue.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (cleaned up). Interpreting the
district court’s order is thus a necessary step before deciding
whether we have jurisdiction. See Summers v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just., 925 F.2d 450, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding collateral
order doctrine inapplicable to district court’s stay in a FOIA
case after interpreting the stay as “subject to revision” given it
required “periodic status reports” from the defendant);
Carrington, 91 F.4th at 266–70 (holding collateral order
doctrine inapplicable to district court’s order that the defendant
was “subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246” after
rejecting the argument that the order “conclusively resolved the
question of the applicability of” section 4246); cf. Robinson-
2 For this proposition, the majority relies on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946), which held that a nonfrivolous argument that a claim
arises under federal law will be sufficient for jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. But the Supreme Court has recognized that the
“nonfrivolous argument” standard does not apply universally and
that it “has interpreted other jurisdictional statutes differently.”
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l
Drilling Co., 581 U.S. 170, 183–84 (2017). For example, when
assessing diversity jurisdiction courts must determine whether “in
fact” the parties are diverse, “not simply whether they are arguably
so.” Id. at 184. Similarly, for appellate jurisdiction under section
1291, the Court has never suggested that a nonfrivolous argument is
enough. Rather, courts must consider whether there is in fact a “final
decision.” See, e.g., Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 798, 800–02
(affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under section 1291
because order was not a final judgment and did not qualify under the
collateral order doctrine).

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Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1338 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction after
rejecting appellant’s “misread[ing]” of the district court’s order
as a final judgment). Because the district court’s order,
properly understood, does not qualify under the collateral order
doctrine, we must dismiss Williamson’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
* * *
The majority affirms the district court’s order in part
because Williamson’s appeal is merely a “quarrel in a straw.”
Majority Op. 7. That observation, however, is precisely why
the order is not immediately appealable. Because this court
lacks jurisdiction, Williamson’s appeal should be dismissed. I
respectfully dissent.

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