Spokane Airport Board v. Transportation Security Administration

23-1155Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitJan 20, 2026

Full text

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 11, 2025 Decided January 20, 2026
No. 23-1155
S POKANE AIRPORT B OARD ,
P ETITIONER
v.
TRANSPORTATION S ECURITY ADMINISTRATION ,
R ESPONDENT
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Transportation Security Administration
James A. McPhee argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Brian M. Werst and Jon T. Burtard.
Ben Lewis, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Brett A.
Shumate, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, and Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice.
Before: S RINIVASAN, Chief Judge, R AO and P AN , Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge R AO .

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R AO , Circuit Judge: Facing increased cybersecurity
threats to the aviation sector, the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”) issued an emergency amendment
requiring airport security programs to include certain
cybersecurity measures and controls. Spokane Airport Board
(“Spokane”) petitions for review, arguing that TSA’s
amendment was without statutory authority, inconsistent with
regulatory requirements, and arbitrary and capricious. Several
of Spokane’s arguments were not raised below, so we cannot
consider them, and the remaining arguments fail on the merits.
We therefore deny Spokane’s petition.
I.
A.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress established TSA and vested it with responsibility for
“civil aviation security.” Aviation & Transportation Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597, 597 (2001).
TSA is required to “assess threats to transportation” and to
“develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats
to transportation security.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)–(3).
As relevant to this case, TSA is specifically required to
“oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of
security measures at airports.” Id. § 114(f)(11). By regulation,
airports must adopt and implement “airport security programs”
to provide for “the safety and security of persons and property
on an aircraft operating in air transportation.” 49 C.F.R.
§ 1542.101(a)(1). Once an airport security program has been
approved by TSA, it may be amended upon approval of an
airport operator’s request or by TSA through notice and
comment procedures. Id. § 1542.105(b)–(c).

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If, however, TSA finds that “an emergency requiring
immediate action with respect to safety and security in air
transportation” makes the ordinary procedural requirements
“contrary to the public interest,” TSA may issue an amendment
to airport security programs without providing opportunity for
public comment. Id. § 1542.105(d). For an emergency
amendment, TSA must issue a notice that includes a “brief
statement of the reasons and findings” justifying the
amendment. Id. An emergency amendment is immediately
effective and is not stayed by the filing of a petition for
reconsideration. Id.
B.
In recent years, the federal government has become
concerned about the aviation sector’s vulnerability to
cyberattacks. For instance, cybercriminals have repeatedly
launched ransomware attacks that disrupt aviation supply
chains; a foreign state affiliated actor conducted a
cyberespionage campaign against multiple U.S. airports,
airlines, and aviation support organizations; and a set of pro-
Russia hacktivist groups launched cyberattacks against airport
websites. Still other unidentified cyber actors have targeted
individual airports and airlines.1
In August 2022, TSA responded to this emergent threat by
proposing an amendment to the security programs of certain
large airports. See Proposed Requirement to Amend TSA-
Approved Airport Security Program, TSA-PNA-22-03 (Aug.
11, 2022). The proposed amendment would have required
covered airports to implement cybersecurity measures to
1 The government cites classified materials for additional evidence
of cybersecurity threats to aviation. We have reviewed this material,
but rely only on materials from the public record in this opinion.

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protect against foreign adversaries and other malicious actors.
The proposed amendment received hundreds of comments
from industry participants and other interested parties. Seeking
“further discussion,” TSA rescinded the proposed amendment
in November 2022 and held “additional industry engagement
calls.” J.A. 73.
A few months later, TSA promulgated an emergency
amendment that substantially incorporated the previously
proposed amendment. See Joint Emergency Amendment to
TSA-Approved Security Program, 23-01 (Mar. 7, 2023) (the
“Amendment”) (relying in relevant part on emergency
authority in 49 C.F.R. § 1542.105(d)). The Amendment
requires certain airport and aircraft operators to add
cybersecurity measures and controls to their security programs.
Airport operators must identify a list of critical systems within
30 days of the Amendment’s effective date, submit to TSA a
Cybersecurity Implementation Plan containing a set of
cybersecurity measures and controls for those systems within
90 days of the effective date, and annually assess the
effectiveness of their cybersecurity plans. TSA issued the
Amendment without notice and comment because it
determined that “there is an emergency requiring immediate
action” to protect “national and transportation security” from
the impact of cybersecurity threats.
Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane
International Airport in eastern Washington, petitioned TSA
for reconsideration. Spokane raised several procedural and
substantive objections to the Amendment. TSA rejected the
reconsideration petitions of Spokane and other objectors.
Spokane filed a timely petition for review. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110(a).

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II.
We have authority to “affirm, amend, modify, or set aside
any part of” a TSA order. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c). Section 46110
is silent as to the standard of review, and so we apply the
standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. Cf.
Carus Chem. Co. v. EPA, 395 F.3d 434, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
TSA’s decision will be upheld “unless it is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’” Ramsingh v. TSA, 40 F.4th 625, 631
(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
An objection to TSA’s order may be considered “only if
the objection was made in the proceeding” below or there was
a “reasonable ground” for failing to raise it. 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110(d). We have held that an objection not raised or
excused is “jurisdictionally barred.”2 City of Olmsted Falls v.
FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Wallaesa v.
FAA, 824 F.3d 1071, 1077 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that
section 46110(d)’s bar applies even when not invoked by the
government).
III.
Spokane argues the Amendment should be set aside
because: (1) TSA lacks statutory authority to regulate
cybersecurity; (2) the Amendment is inconsistent with TSA
2 The Supreme Court has indicated that most exhaustion
requirements are “claim-processing rule[s]” and “ordinarily … not
jurisdictional.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1112
(2023) (cleaned up); see also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation,
LP, 572 U.S. 489, 511–12 (2014) (holding the Clean Air Act’s
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional). But this court has
squarely held that section 46110(d) is jurisdictional, and we follow
this controlling precedent.

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regulations; (3) the Amendment was required to be, but never
was, ratified by the Transportation Security Oversight Board;
and (4) the Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. We hold
that these arguments either were not properly raised before
TSA or fail on the merits.
A.
We begin with Spokane’s argument that the Amendment
exceeds TSA’s statutory authority because the agency is not
explicitly empowered to regulate cybersecurity and other
statutes address cybersecurity without granting regulatory
authority to TSA.
TSA has statutory authority to regulate cybersecurity.
Congress has conferred on TSA “broad statutory authority to
protect civil aviation security.” Bonacci v. TSA, 909 F.3d 1155,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1). TSA must
“assess threats to transportation” and “develop policies,
strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation
security.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)–(3). Spokane does not dispute
that cyberattacks increasingly pose a threat to transportation
security, especially in the aviation sector. And TSA’s
regulatory mandate allows it to assess and address such “risks
to aviation and national security.” Olivares v. TSA, 819 F.3d
454, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Further, as Spokane acknowledges,
Congress has evinced a specific concern for the impact of
cyberattacks on aviation, explicitly instructing TSA to
“periodically review threats to civil aviation” including the
“disruption of civil aviation service” caused by “cyber attack.”3
3 Spokane also argues that other statutes referencing cybersecurity
foreclose TSA’s authority, but none of these statutes specifically
implicate aviation security. See Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, Tit. III, §§ 301–05,
116 Stat. 2899, 2946–61; Federal Information Security

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49 U.S.C. § 44912(b)(1)(A)(ii). These overlapping statutory
authorities clearly demonstrate that TSA’s regulatory mandate
to protect aviation security encompasses cyberattacks.
B.
Spokane next argues the Amendment is inconsistent with
TSA regulations because cybersecurity plans are not listed as
one of the required elements for an airport security program in
49 C.F.R. § 1542.103.
Spokane’s argument fails because the regulatory
requirements for an airport security program are not exclusive.
Rather, an airport security program must “[i]nclude[] the
applicable items listed in § 1542.103.” 49 C.F.R.
§ 1542.101(a)(3). If there were any doubt, the term “includes”
is defined in the same chapter to mean “includes but is not
limited to.” Id. § 1500.5(b)(3). By the plain meaning of the
regulation, an airport security program may be required to
include more than the items detailed in section 1542.103.
Moreover, TSA has the authority to amend the content of an
airport security program when safety and the public interest so
require. Id. § 1542.105(c)–(d). The Amendment adds
cybersecurity plans to airport security programs, which is
squarely within TSA’s regulatory authority.
Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073;
Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. N, §§ 101–
407, 129 Stat. 2242, 2935–85; Cybersecurity & Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-278, 132 Stat. 4168;
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, Div. Y, §§ 101–07, 136 Stat. 49, 1038–59.
These statutes reference cybersecurity but say nothing about TSA’s
authority to regulate aviation security and to protect against
cybersecurity threats.

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Spokane also argues the Amendment is inconsistent with
TSA regulations because it does not relate to “criminal
violence” or “aircraft piracy” and does not directly amend the
content of airport security programs. See 49 C.F.R.
§§ 1542.101(a)(1) & 1542.105. These objections were not
raised by Spokane before TSA.4 Nor is there any evidence in
the record that similar objections were made by a different
participant. See Muir v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & TSA,
145 F.4th 1359, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding courts may
consider an objection if the petitioner shows “where another
party raised” it below). We cannot consider Spokane’s
objections because they were not raised in the proceeding
below. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(d).
C.
Spokane next argues the Amendment exceeds TSA’s
emergency rulemaking authority because it was not ratified by
the Transportation Security Oversight Board. Spokane
emphasizes that TSA issued the amendment without notice and
comment and maintains that TSA could have done so only
under its emergency rulemaking authority in 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(l)(2), which requires Board ratification of emergency
rules within 90 days of promulgation.
Spokane did not raise this objection before TSA, nor was
it raised by any other participant. We therefore cannot consider
it. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(d). During oral argument, counsel for
Spokane argued that a reference in the reconsideration petition
to the applicable TSA regulations was sufficient to preserve an
objection regarding the “guaranteed statutory procedure.”
4 In reply, Spokane claims it preserved the direct amendment
argument, but it cites only to a part of the reconsideration petition
that presented entirely different arguments.

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Merely gesturing at a particular regulation, however, is not
enough. To preserve an objection for judicial review under
section 46110(d), a participant must provide sufficient
specificity to put the agency on notice of the objection.
Moreover, the facts here demonstrate the importance of
exhaustion requirements for orderly administrative and judicial
proceedings. Had Spokane argued that Board ratification was
required, TSA could have sought ratification at the Board’s
April 20, 2023, meeting—which occurred after Spokane’s
petition for reconsideration was filed but before it was denied
by TSA.
D.
Finally, Spokane argues that TSA’s issuance of the
Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. Agency action must
be “reasonable and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus
Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). An agency action
is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem” or “offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Spokane raises several arguments for why the Amendment
was arbitrary and capricious. First, Spokane objects to TSA’s
requirement that airport operators submit documentation using
password-protected emails. Second, Spokane argues the
Amendment irrationally allows TSA to designate systems as
“critical” even if they have nothing to do with cybersecurity.
Third, Spokane claims that TSA’s aggregation of cybersecurity
information from many airports creates a target for malicious
actors. Fourth, Spokane asserts that compliance with the
Amendment is too costly and requires more time. Finally,
Spokane argues that, because airport security programs must

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now include cybersecurity plans, the Amendment deprives
airport operators of the flexibility to make improvements to
those plans without TSA approval.
Spokane has failed to demonstrate the Amendment was
arbitrary and capricious. As a general matter, TSA detailed the
present cybersecurity threats to aviation and the cost of
cyberattacks to affected entities. In light of these concerns,
TSA reasonably chose to require substantial and rapid
improvements in airport cybersecurity through an emergency
amendment. With regard to Spokane’s more specific concerns,
TSA explained that the option of email submission was
supported by its internal data experts and complied with federal
law, and that, in any event, TSA no longer requires email
submission of airport cybersecurity plans. TSA also explained
that its authority to designate systems as critical—even when
not so identified by airport operators—is necessary to prevent
gaps in airport cybersecurity. As for data security, TSA
explained it has implemented various measures and controls to
secure agency data and information collected from regulated
entities.
Finally, the Amendment does not unreasonably interfere
with the ability of airport operators to make improvements to
their cybersecurity plans. By mandating that airport security
programs include cybersecurity plans, the Amendment requires
operators to obtain TSA approval for changes to those plans.
See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.105(b). Spokane characterizes this loss
of flexibility as unreasonable. But given the threats to aviation,
TSA reasonably concluded that large airports like Spokane
must address cybersecurity in their security programs—even if
that decision reduces flexibility for some operators. Moreover,
the loss of flexibility is not as great as Spokane claims, since
airport operators need not secure TSA approval for
improvements that do not conflict with their existing security

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programs. TSA also indicated that, to the extent the process for
securing TSA approval impedes necessary cybersecurity
improvements, it would consider changes to the amendment
process in the future.
Congress has conferred substantial authority upon TSA to
regulate aviation security, and we decline to disturb the
agency’s reasonable judgments about how to best carry out its
statutory mandate. Cf. Bonacci, 909 F.3d at 1161–62.
* * *
TSA’s broad authority over civil aviation security enables
it to address cybersecurity threats to U.S. airports. Spokane
failed to exhaust several of its objections before TSA, and the
remaining arguments we reject on the merits. The petition for
review is denied.
So ordered.

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