In re: Application of the United States for An Order Pursuant To 18 U.s.c. 2705(b ),… v. United States of America

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 18, 2025 Decided February 3, 2026
No. 24-5239
IN RE: APPLICATION OF THE UNITED S TATES FOR AN ORDER
P URSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 2705(B ),
EMPOWER OVERSIGHT W HISTLEBLOWERS & R ESEARCH,
APPELLANT
v.
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:24-mc-00058)
Brian J. Field argued the cause for appellant. With him on
the briefs was Joshua J. Prince.
Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris Pirro,
U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Daniel J. Lenerz, and
Gregg A. Maisel, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: S RINIVASAN, Chief Judge, C HILDS , Circuit Judge,
and R OGERS , Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge R OGERS .
R OGERS , Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an
order partially denying the unsealing of Applications for Non-
Disclosure Orders filed by the Department of Justice pursuant
to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). At
issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by
failing to further unseal the Applications because they were
judicial records subject to a right of access under the common
law or the First Amendment to the Constitution, or,
alternatively, ancillary grand jury records no longer subject to
sealing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6) due
to public disclosures. The court affirms, subject to a limited
remand for the district court to consider whether to allow
amendment to the motion to unseal in view of a December 2024
report by the Department’s Office of Inspector General.
I.
Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research
(“Empower”) “is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational
organization dedicated to enhancing independent oversight of
government and corporate wrongdoing” that was founded by
Jason Foster. Appellant Br. at ii. On May 2, 2024, Empower
filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding
and for unsealing of applications filed by the Justice
Department requesting non-disclosure orders related to
subpoena number GJ2017091241939. In re Application of the
United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)
(May 2, 2024); FED. R. C RIM. P. 24(b). The government
opposed the motion.
Attached to Empower’s motion were redacted copies of
the subpoena and the initial non-disclosure order issued by a
Magistrate Judge and the extensions of the order. The

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memorandum in support of the motion stated that in October
2023, Google, Inc. had notified Foster that in 2017 a grand jury
subpoena to testify had been issued for his Google email
address and Google Voice telephone numbers from December
2016 to May 2017. At that time, Foster was Chief Investigative
Counsel of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and his
responsibilities included directing congressional investigations
into allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct at the
Department. Google, Inc. informed Foster that a non-disclosure
order under the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), prohibited notifying
him of the subpoena, and that the non-disclosure order had
been extended for one-year periods in 2018, 2019, 2020, and
2021, and expired in 2023. Interv’r. Mem. at 4-5 (May 2,
2024).
Empower argued that unsealing was required because the
Applications were judicial records subject to a presumptive
right of access under the common law, and the Department
could show neither that denial was warranted when the
investigation was “long closed,” nor that disclosure would
impede an ongoing investigation or reveal information
impinging on personal privacy. Id. at 7-8, 12-13 (citations
omitted). Empower further argued that the public’s qualified
right under the First Amendment of access to judicial records
supported access under a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 19, 22-
23 (citation omitted). In any event, Empower urged the district
court to exercise discretionary authority to unseal the
documents. Id. at 23. Alternatively, if Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e) on grand jury secrecy applied to the
Applications, Empower claimed that disclosures by Google,
Inc., the media, and the Department had waived secrecy.
Interv’r. Reply Mem. at 17-18 (July 15, 2024).
The Department opposed unsealing. Assuming the
validity of the subpoena, the Department argued that the

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Applications were ancillary grand jury material protected
under Rule 6(e)(6), and no right of access applied; that the
public disclosures were insufficient to waive grand jury
secrecy; and that the documents could not be redacted “in any
meaningful way.” Opp’n at 8 (June 9, 2024). By sealed ex
parte addendum, the Department provided the Applications to
the court for in camera review.
The district court allowed Empower to permissively
intervene, stating that Empower sought to identify the basis
offered by the Department in support of the Applications
because of “[c]oncern[] with Justice’s possible misuse of its
subpoena power to identify confidential whistleblowers
providing information to Congress about governmental
misconduct.” M EM. OP . at 1 (Aug. 23, 2024). That decision is
not challenged on appeal.
The district granted unsealing only in part, ruling the
Applications were ancillary grand jury records subject to Rule
6(e)(6). Id. at 5, 7. The court concluded that there was no right
of access to the Applications under the common law or the First
Amendment, and therefore most of the documents could not be
unsealed. Id. at 4-5. The exception was “a typical
jurisdictional discussion and a setting out of the legal standards
that govern” non-disclosure orders in the Applications, which
the court ordered unsealed. Id. at 5. Finding “the grand-jury
proceeding at issue here has not been broadly or publicly
disclosed by the Government or the witnesses who appeared,”
the court concluded that there had been no waiver of grand jury
secrecy by disclosure. Id. at 7. Empower appeals.
II.
On appeal, Empower renews the arguments it made in the
district court, while proffering additional evidence of waiver of

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grand jury secrecy by disclosure, viz., a December 2024 report
by the Department’s Office of Inspector General.
This court reviews the decision of the district court to seal
or unseal for abuse of discretion. In re Leopold to Unseal
Certain Elec. Surveillance Applications & Ords., 964 F.3d
1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2020). That standard of review leaves
considered discretion to the district court. See Kickapoo Tribe
of Indians of the Kickapoo Rsrv. in Kansas v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d
1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S.
531, 541 (1930); then citing Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion of the Trial Court: Viewed from
Above, 22 S YRACUSE. L. R EV. 635 (1971)). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a district court “did not apply the
correct legal standard or if it misapprehended the underlying
substantive law.” Id. (citation and ellipsis omitted). Whether
the district court applied the proper legal standard in exercising
discretion “is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Leopold,
964 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted).
A.
The Stored Communications Act (“the Act”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et seq., was enacted as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Responding to the
development of new telecommunications and computer
technology, “including electronic mail, voice mail, electronic
bulletin boards, computer storage, cellular telephones, video
teleconferencing, and computer-to-computer links,” the Act
was designed to address “legitimate law enforcement needs
while minimizing intrusions on the privacy of system users as
well as the business needs of electronic communications
system providers.” 132 C ONG. R EC . 27633 (1986) (statement
of Sen. Leahy, co-sponsor with Sen. Mathias, chairman).

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The Act makes it a felony to intentionally access “without
authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided” or intentionally exceed
“an authorization to access that facility,” and thereby obtain,
alter, or prevent “authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(a). Electronic service providers are prohibited from
voluntarily divulging the contents of communications
exchanged or stored on their platforms, and user records. Id.
§ 2702 (a)(1)–(3). Most relevant, the Act establishes
procedural requirements for law enforcement to obtain
information from electronic service providers about their
subscribers or customers, again distinguishing between the
content of communications and non-content data (such as a
user’s name or address). Id. § 2703(a)–(d). Sections 2704,
2706, and 2708-13, covering a miscellany of subjects such as
backup preservation, cost reimbursement, exclusivity of
remedies, and civil actions against the United States, are not at
issue.
Section 2703, Required Disclosure, provides, as relevant,
that a “governmental entity” may seek, by subpoena or court
order, limited types of non-content information from an
electronic service provider about a subscriber or customer
without notice: “(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long
distance telephone connection records, or records of session
times and durations; (D) length of service (including start date)
and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument
number or other subscriber number or identity, including any
temporarily assigned network address; and (F) means and
source of payment for such service (including any credit card
or bank account number).” Id. § 2703(c)(2). This was the
information sought by the grand jury subpoena that Google,
Inc. received in September 2017. Interv’r. Mem. at 2 & Ex. B.

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Section 2705, Delayed Notice, provides, as relevant, that
“a governmental entity” may apply for a court order to require
a service provider “not to notify any other person of the
existence” of the subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). To obtain a
non-disclosure order, the government must show “that there is
reason to believe that notification” would result in at least one
of five harms: “(1) endangering the life or physical safety of an
individual; (2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or
tampering with evidence; (4) intimidation of potential
witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation or unduly delaying a trial.” Id. The non-
disclosure order lasts “for such period as the court deems
appropriate.” Id. This was the type of order that Google, Inc.
received in 2017, and that was extended multiple times, thereby
prohibiting Google, Inc. from informing Foster about the
subpoena until 2023. Interv’r. Mem. at 4 & Ex. A.
B.
Rule 6 (e)(6), Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings:
Sealed Records, of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: “Records, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand
jury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as
long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a
matter occurring before a grand jury.” FED. R. C RIM. P. 6 (e)
(6). This provision governs ancillary grand jury records
concerning, for instance, material “relating to” motions to
quash a subpoena for a witness’s testimony or to invoke a
privilege. In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496,
498 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Materials related to grand jury
proceedings are covered by Rule 6(e)(6) when they would
“tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury’s
investigation,” such as information about grand jury witnesses,
testimony, or investigative strategy. Senate of Puerto Rico v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation

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omitted). Noting the Advisory Committee opinion that the
rules “did ‘not violate any constitutional right of the public or
media to attend’ such ancillary proceedings because no such
constitutional right exists,” this court considered the Supreme
Court and Congress to have agreed when they approved the
rules. Dow Jones, 142 F.3d at 500 (quoting FED. R. C RIM. P.
6(e)(5) advisory committee note).
The Applications at issue are “records . . . relating to
grand-jury proceedings” because they concern the protocols for
disclosing a grand-jury subpoena. An application for a non-
disclosure order regarding a grand jury subpoena is similar, in
relevant respects, to a hearing on a motion to compel a grand
jury witness’s testimony that “will nearly always” include
detail that poses “a danger of revealing grand jury matters.” Id.
at 501. Because these Applications are ancillary to a grand jury
proceeding subject to Rule 6(e), Empower’s claims to access
under the common law and the First Amendment fail. Id. at
500, 504. The district court therefore correctly found the
Applications for which Empower seeks unsealing were
ancillary to a grand jury proceeding and applied the standard of
Rule 6(e)(6) in restricting unsealing. M EM. OP . at 3-4.
On appeal, Empower principally relies on In re Leopold,
964 F.3d 1121, in maintaining that the district court applied the
wrong standard under Rule 6(e) in ruling the Applications are
judicial records not subject to the common law right of access.
Appellant Br. at 17-22. Leopold involved three types of
disclosure orders, 964 F.3d at 1123-24, one of which is relevant
here: court orders to compel disclosure of specific records upon
a showing of “reasonable grounds” to believe the records are
“relevant and material to an ongoing investigation” under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d). This court reexamined the origins and logic
of the common law right of access, observing that the right
“antedates the Constitution” and “reflects the antipathy of a

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democratic country to the notion of ‘secret law,’ inaccessible
to those who are governed by that law.” Id. at 1127 (quoting
MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661,
674 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The court held that the applications for
court orders and their supporting documents were judicial
records because they “are ‘intended to influence’ the court and
the court ‘ma[kes] decisions about them,’” id. at 1128 (quoting
MetLife, 865 F.3d at 663) (alteration in original), and that the
common-law right of access applied to the applications,
because the Stored Communication Act, which does not
mention sealing, did not displace the right of access by
requiring the Applications or related documents to be sealed.
Id. at 1129.
Unlike in Leopold, Empower is seeking the unsealing of
Applications for Non-Disclosure Orders relating to a grand jury
subpoena. True, as Empower emphasizes, Leopold reaffirmed
that the common law right of access is based on the “‘strong
presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings,’
including judicial records.” Id. at 1127 (quoting MetLife, 865
F.3d at 663). Further, in Leopold the court recognized, as
Empower urges here, that United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d
293 (D.C. Cir. 1980), provides the standard for ruling on the
motion to unseal applications. Id. But, in Leopold the court
was clear that standard must yield where Congress has spoken
directly to the issue. Id. at 1129. Although the Applications
that Empower seeks to have unsealed may be judicial records,
they are not subject to a common law right of access because
Rule 6(e)(6) applies and displaces any such right. See id. at
1130 (citing Dow Jones, 142 F.3d at 504).
Empower’s claim to a right of access to the Applications
under the First Amendment, Appellant Br. at 40-48, fares no
better. Empower relies principally on Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). There, the Supreme Court

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described the First Amendment right of access as providing the
public with a qualified right to observe certain judicial
proceedings where the proceedings have “a tradition of
accessibility” and “public access plays a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”
Id. at 8-9 (citation omitted). These characteristics are absent
here as the materials Empower seeks were attendant to a grand
jury subpoena. Although this court has acknowledged that
“public access plays an important role in other aspects of the
judicial process,” it has held that “there is no First Amendment
right of access to grand jury proceedings, nor do First
Amendment protections extend to ancillary materials dealing
with grand jury matters.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith
Miller, 493 F.3d 152, 154 (2007) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). As the court explained in Dow
Jones, “the purported First Amendment right” claimed by the
press in ancillary grand jury proceedings is limited to access to
“motions, applications, and orders” as prescribed under D.D.C.
Local Rule 302 (now Local Criminal Rule 6.1) and such
“papers, orders, and transcripts” before the grand jury where
the court finds “continued secrecy is not necessary to prevent
disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury.” 142
F.3d at 500 & n.6. Empower has not shown this precedent does
not apply here.
Similarly unavailing, Empower claims that the
Applications may now be unprotected by grand jury secrecy
because the investigation of the Department is closed.
Appellant Br. at 26. The Supreme Court has instructed that
grand jury secrecy serves to “assure that persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to
public ridicule.” Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw.,
441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979). A closed grand jury investigation
that investigated but did not charge individuals criminally may
still be subject to grand jury secrecy to protect their reputations

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from unwarranted aspersions, and to ensure that future grand
jury witnesses are not dissuaded from testifying fully and
frankly. Id. & n. 10. Like reasoning would apply when a non-
disclosure order has expired. See Appellant Br. at 37. Even if
Google, Inc., as a grand jury witness, may not be subject to the
secrecy obligation imposed on individuals by Rule 6(e)(2), In
re Subpoena 2018R00776, 947 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2020),
the Department is bound by the secrecy obligations imposed by
Rule 6(e) and the court is required by Rule 6(e)(6) to maintain
such Applications “under seal to the extent and as long as
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter
occurring before a grand jury.”
Empower points to several public interests that may be
implicated by the Applications, whether sealed or not.
Appellant Br. at 27-30. It posits that the Department sought
the personal communications records of two Members of
Congress and 43 congressional staff members. Id. at 7.
Further, it posits, the subpoena compelled Google, Inc. to
provide information that “would easily enable [the
Department] to identify confidential whistleblowers who were
providing Congress with information about government
misconduct,” thereby raising “serious concerns” about
intrusion into the separation of powers. Id. at 9. In Miller, this
court held that even “a compelling public interest” of the press
in obtaining records about a significant criminal investigation
did not warrant disclosure when Rule 6(e) protected “still-
secret grand jury matters.” 493 F.3d at 154. Empower fails to
offer a persuasive reason why this precedent would not apply
here.

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C.
Empower’s challenges to the ruling on the merits of
unsealing also fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the
district court.
The redacted material in the Applications was protected by
Rule 6(e)(6) as information that would reveal “matter[s]
occurring before a grand jury.” M EM. OP . at 4-5 (quoting FED.
R. C RIM. P. 6 (e) (6)). Such matters include “the identities of
witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony as well as actual
transcripts, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the
deliberations or questions of jurors, and the like.” Dow Jones,
142 F.3d at 500 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Department’s ex parte addendum supports the district
court’s conclusion that only limited unsealing was permissible
and appropriate. M EM. OP . at 5; ORDER at 1 (Aug. 23, 2024);
Sealed Suppl. App. 2, 17-28 (June 23, 2025); see In re Sealed
Case, 77 F.4th 815, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Empower maintains
that it “has consistently stated that ‘it has no objection to the
redaction of specific names’” in the Applications, Reply Br. at
25, pointing only to the redacted subpoena in Exhibit B, not to
an argument presented in the district court. Appellant Br. at 32
(citing Interv’r. Mem. at 1 n.1). Even assuming that argument
is not forfeit, see Iowaska Church of Healing v. Werfel, 105
F.4th 402, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing Gov’t of Manitoba v.
Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (2019)), it is insufficient to show
an abuse of discretion by the district court in view of Supreme
Court instruction to maintain such documents under seal when
they implicate the considerations underlying grand jury
secrecy. See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218-19.
Lastly, Empower contends that the district court erred in
rejecting waiver based on prior disclosures. Appellant Br. at
36-40. “Information widely known is not secret,” and grand

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jury secrecy is lost when a disclosure is sufficiently significant
so that “the cat is out of the bag.” In re North, 16 F.3d 1234,
1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Charlotte Observer, 921
F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.1990)). In North, grand jury secrecy had
been waived when Rule 6(e) material was released to
individuals with access to an unredacted version of an
independent counsel’s report and “ultimately became part of
the media accounts.” Id. at 1244. Similarly, in Miller, grand
jury secrecy had been waived when a grand jury witness made
a “broadly publicized admission” on national television of
being the source of the leak under investigation and
cooperating with the investigation from the beginning. 493
F.3d at 153, 155.
The district court reasonably concluded, in view of circuit
precedent, that the “publicity concerning the grand-jury
materials here is dramatically less than that in other cases
where the Court has held that any expectation of secrecy no
longer existed,” and the disclosures were not enough to
conclude that “the cat is out of the bag.” M EM. OP . at 7. In the
district court, Empower identified disclosures in (1) media
outlet reports that other congressional staff members had
received notices that their communication records had been
subpoenaed; (2) Google, Inc.’s sharing of the subpoena with
Foster, Empower’s founder; (3) the Department’s
acknowledgment that it was investigating the unauthorized
disclosure of classified national security information in press
releases following indictment and sentencing of a former
congressional staff member; and (4) the OIG statement that it
was reviewing the Department’s use of subpoenas for
communications records of Members of Congress and
affiliated individuals in connection with alleged unauthorized
disclosures of information to the media. Interv’r. Mem. at 3-4;
Interv’r. Reply Mem. at 17-18.

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Grand jury secrecy was not lost when “the media reports
information alleged to be grand jury material.” North, 16 F.3d
at 1245. That Google, Inc. in 2023, after the last extension had
expired, shared with Foster the redacted subpoena for his
Google accounts and the non-disclosure orders, Interv’r. Mem.
at 2, 4 & Exs. A-B, does not establish that Google, Inc. obtained
or “widely” disclosed the redacted content in the Applications.
Similarly, the Department’s press releases of June 7, 2018,
“Former U.S. Senate Employee Indicted on False Statements
Charges,” and December 20, 2018, “Former U.S. Senate
Employee Sentenced to Prison Term on False Statements
Charge,” referred to public proceedings and events, not details
about further investigation or action by the grand jury that had
returned the indictment. See Press Releases, U.S. Att’y’s Off.,
D.C. (June 7, 2018, and Dec. 20, 2018).
Nor did OIG’s acknowledgement of a pending review of
the Department’s “use of subpoenas and other legal authorities
to obtain communication records of Members of Congress and
affiliated persons” identify a particular subpoena or provide
detail about a grand jury investigation. OIG, Ongoing Work,
https://perma.cc/J6TJ-VW3M; Reply Mem. at 17. Contrary to
the implication of Empower’s argument, Appellant Br. at 23,
36, the district court did not treat Rule 6(e)(6) as drawing “a
veil of secrecy . . . over all matters occurring in the world that
happen to be investigated by a grand jury,” Senate of Puerto
Rico, 823 F.2d at 582 (citation omitted). Rather, the district
court’s assessment of the nature and effect of the identified
public disclosures rested on this circuit’s precedent, implicitly
rejecting Empower’s view that “the publicity in other cases
differed from the publicity here only in degree, not kind,”
Appellant Br. at 36.
On appeal, Empower maintains that virtually any grand
jury secrecy was waived in December 2024 when OIG issued

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“A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance of
Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of
Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News
Media.” Appellant Br. at 39-40; Reply Br. at 25. Claiming this
Report “acknowledged details about the leak investigation and
[the Department]’s seeking subpoenas for records about
[M]embers of Congress and their staff[],” Appellant Br. at 39,
Empower asks the court to consider the Report and reverse the
district court’s decision on unsealing. Appellant Reply Br. at
21 (citing In re Cheney, 2024 WL 1739096, *4-*5 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 23, 2024) (unpubl.)). But see In re Grant, 635 F.2d 1227,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The OIG Report became public after
the district court entered the August 23, 2024, Order that
Empower appeals.
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
record on appeal consists of “(1) the original papers and
exhibits filed in the district court; (2) the transcript of
proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified copy of the docket
entries prepared by the district clerk.” F ED. R. APP . P. 10(a).
An appellant must prepare and file an appendix containing the
relevant portions of the record. FED. R. APP . P. 30(a).
Although there are “rarely used exceptions,” Oviedo v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 948 F.3d 386, 392 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 2020), “an appellate court ordinarily has no
factfinding function. It cannot receive new evidence from the
parties, determine where the truth actually lies, and base its
decision on that determination.” Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v.
Exec. Comm. of President’s Priv. Sector Surv. on Cost Control,
711 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Goland v. CIA,
607 F.2d 339, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Where, as here, the
decision whether to unseal grand jury material is record-
intensive and Empower does not invoke a “rarely used
exception,” the court declines to address the OIG Report in the
first instance. See Oviedo, 948 at 392 n.3.

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Accordingly, the court affirms the district court Order of
August 23, 2024, subject to a limited remand of the case for the
district court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend
the motion for unsealing and supplement the district court
record with the OIG Report of December 2024.

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