Saad Bin Khalid v. Transportation Security Administration

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 10, 2025 Decided April 14, 2026
No. 23-1150
S AAD B IN KHALID,
P ETITIONER
v.
TRANSPORTATION S ECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND DAVID P.
P EKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR , TRANSPORTATION S ECURITY
ADMINISTRATION , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ,
R ESPONDENTS
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Transportation Security Administration
Gadeir I. Abbas argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the brief was Lena F. Masri. Justin Sadowsky entered an
appearance.
Joshua P. Waldman, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
brief were Sharon Swingle and Catherine Padhi, Attorneys.
Ashley C. Honold, Attorney, entered an appearance.
Before: HENDERSON, P ILLARD and C HILDS , Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge P ILLARD.

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P ILLARD, Circuit Judge: Saad bin Khalid, a United
States citizen, is on the No Fly List. As a result, he is barred
from boarding any planes that fly in U.S. airspace. Believing
that placement to be in error, Khalid sought redress through an
administrative appeal process run by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA). The TSA Administrator, after
reviewing Khalid’s submissions and the nonpublic
recommendations of the government’s Threat Screening
Center, determined by order that Khalid should remain on the
list.
Khalid now petitions for review of the TSA
Administrator’s order. He raises statutory and constitutional
challenges to his placement on the No Fly List and the
adequacy of the redress process. We dismiss one of Khalid’s
challenges for lack of standing and deny the rest on their
merits.
I.
A.
Congress has charged the Transportation Security
Administration to “use information from government agencies
to identify individuals on [airline] passenger lists who may be
a threat to civil aviation or national security” and, if
appropriate, require air carriers to “prevent [such] individual[s]
from boarding an aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(A)-(B). In
addition, Congress instructed TSA to “establish a procedure to
enable airline passengers” who are “prohibited from boarding
a flight” because “they might pose a security threat” to “appeal
[that threat] determination.” Id. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I).
To carry out those responsibilities, TSA draws on the work
of the Threat Screening Center (the Center), a multi-agency
body administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

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(FBI). The Center maintains a centralized database of known
and suspected terrorists, collecting and screening nominations
from other agencies of individuals to include. That database is
commonly known as the terrorist watchlist. The No Fly List is
a subset of the terrorist watchlist: The Center adds a No Fly
List designation to individuals on the terrorist watchlist if it
determines that they meet one of four additional criteria, such
as posing “a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act
of terrorism and [being] operationally capable of doing so.”
See Overview of the U.S. Government’s Terrorist Watchlisting
Process and Procedures as of April 2024 (D.A. 142); McQueen
Decl. ¶ 9 (D.A. 116). People included on the No Fly List are
prohibited from boarding U.S. commercial aircraft or flying
through U.S. airspace.
TSA can remove individuals’ No Fly List designations
through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). TSA administers DHS
TRIP to respond to individuals’ claims that they experienced
travel difficulties because they are erroneously treated as No
Fly listees. For U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents,
the redress process has several stages. First, TSA seeks
confirmation from the Center whether the traveler requesting
redress in fact has a No Fly List designation (rather than being
stopped for some other reason, such as being mistaken for
someone else who has a designation). TSA then sends a letter
informing the traveler of his status and offering to provide
additional information. Second, if the traveler is on the list and
requests more information, TSA works with the Center to
prepare an unclassified summary of the evidence supporting
his placement. TSA shares the summary with the traveler and
invites a response. Third, the Center reviews the response. The
Center may remove the traveler’s No Fly List designation if it
determines that he no longer meets the listing criteria. If,
however, the Center determines that the traveler should remain

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on the No Fly List, it prepares a recommendation for the TSA
Administrator’s review. Taking account of the Center’s
recommendation, the TSA Administrator issues a final order
determining whether the person’s No Fly List designation
should be maintained or removed. [Id.]
B.
Saad bin Khalid is a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent who
moved between the United States and Pakistan as a child. He
alleges that he was first subjected to enhanced screening in
2012, when he was 16 or 17 years old and sought to board a
flight from Pakistan to the United States. After that flight, FBI
agents met with Khalid to question him about his activities and
contacts in Pakistan. In 2019, when Khalid again made plans
to fly from Pakistan to the United States, he was prohibited
from boarding his flight and told he could file a redress claim
through the DHS TRIP process. He did so. While awaiting a
response, he filed suit in the district court challenging, among
other things, his maintenance on the No Fly List.
Through DHS TRIP, Khalid received a letter providing an
unclassified summary of the FBI’s reasons for placing him on
the No Fly List. The letter described Khalid as “an individual
who represents a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent
act of terrorism and [is] operationally capable of doing so.”
Letter from Stanley Mungaray, Acting Director, DHS TRIP, to
Saad bin Khalid (Jan. 25, 2022) (TSA A.R. 64-65).1 The
unclassified summary informed Khalid that “the U.S.
Government continue[d] to have concerns about [Khalid’s]
association with a known terrorist organization” and his
1 Citations to TSA A.R. refer to the material available in the public,
redacted version of the TSA Administrative Record. See infra II.C.

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“candor” during the 2012 FBI interview concerning his
“contacts and activities in Pakistan from 2008 to 2012.” Id.
Khalid responded through counsel, stating that he was a
minor in 2012 and had been truthful to the best of his
recollection in the FBI interview. Letter from Gadeir Abbas to
DHS TRIP (Mar. 25, 2022) (TSA A.R. 67-68). Khalid also
maintained that he had no association with any foreign
terrorists, no wish to harm the United States or engage in
terrorism, and no operational capability to do so. Id.
Several months later, Khalid received a final decision from
the TSA Administrator determining, “based on the totality of
available information, including the information [Khalid]
provided,” that Khalid was “properly included on the U.S.
Government’s No Fly List.” Letter from David P. Pekoske,
TSA Administrator, to Saad bin Khalid (June 9, 2022) (TSA
A.R. 230). The letter informing Khalid of the decision noted
that additional information relevant to the TSA
Administrator’s order had been withheld to protect information
the disclosure of which would risk harm to national security or
jeopardize law enforcement activities. Id. (TSA A.R. 235-36).
The TSA Administrator then moved to dismiss Khalid’s
No Fly List claims in district court. The district court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims
because the order maintaining Khalid’s No Fly List designation
was reviewable exclusively in this court. The district court
transferred Khalid’s No Fly List claims to this court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

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II.
A.
We have jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) to
review the TSA Administrator’s order maintaining Khalid on
the No Fly List. Busic v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 62 F.4th 547,
549 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (per curiam). When reviewing an order
of the TSA Administrator, we ask whether the order is
“‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law,’ or unsupported by ‘substantial
evidence.’” Suburban Air Freight, Inc. v. Transp. Sec. Admin.,
716 F.3d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (first quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(a); and then quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c)). We
review constitutional challenges de novo. Jifry v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
B.
The government contests Khalid’s standing in one respect:
It argues that Khalid lacks an injury in fact for purposes of his
claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4). We agree.
To show an injury in fact based on a prospect of future
harm, a petitioner must demonstrate that “the threatened injury
is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the
harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013)). “Allegations of possible future
injury do not satisfy the requirements of [Article] III.”
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
Khalid, a practicing Muslim, asserts that his placement on
the No Fly List injures him by burdening his ability to perform

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Hajj, an obligatory religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, at
some unspecified future time. We do not doubt the sincerity of
Khalid’s religious beliefs or intention to make Hajj. But Khalid
currently resides in Pakistan, Oral Arg. 31:19-31:26, and
asserts his RFRA claim “without any description of concrete
plans” to travel to Saudi Arabia via U.S. airspace. Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). And he raises no
more than a speculative possibility that Saudi Arabia will
refuse him entry based on the United States’ intelligence.
Khalid thus has not shown that he faces an “‘actual or
imminent’ injury” related to his religious exercise. Id. He fails
to satisfy the minimum constitutional requirement of standing
to invoke federal court jurisdiction over his RFRA claim.
C.
The government filed a redacted version of the
administrative record on the public docket. It filed the
remainder of the administrative record under seal and ex parte
and moved to maintain it under seal and ex parte. Khalid
opposed the ex parte motion, seeking access to the portion of
the administrative record that remains under seal. We deferred
decision on that motion to consider it alongside the merits of
Khalid’s petition.
“Only in the most extraordinary circumstances does our
precedent countenance court reliance upon ex parte evidence
to decide the merits of a dispute.” Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). We
have relied on ex parte evidence in merits appeals “upon proper
invocation of [a] privilege; a demonstration of compelling
national security concerns; and public disclosure by the
government, prior to any in camera examination, of as much
of the material as it could divulge without compromising the
privilege,” id., including in cases related to aviation safety, e.g.,

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Abdellatif v. DHS, 109 F.4th 562, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Jifry,
370 F.3d at 1182; see Busic, 62 F.4th at 551 (holding that
petitioner lacked a statutory right of access to material that
TSA deemed sensitive security information).
Here, the government explains that each portion of the
record withheld from the public version is subject to the law
enforcement privilege, categorized as sensitive security
information by TSA, Busic, 62 F.4th at 551, or has been
properly classified. As to the first two categories, the
Administrator provides detailed declarations identifying the
rationales for record materials to remain under seal, the
government’s efforts to release information where possible,
and the national security risks of any further disclosure. See
Provencio Decl. ¶¶ 5-17 (D.A. 89-96) (law enforcement
privilege for Customs and Border Patrol information); Esteves
Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7, 12-23 (D.A. 98-100, 102-10) (sensitive security
information designation for TSA materials); McQueen Decl.
¶¶ 2, 19-44 (D.A. 113, 122-37) (law enforcement privilege for
FBI information).
The Administrator makes no specific representations
about the classified material, but we are “in a position to
determine whether [information] was properly classified”
through our own review. Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1182. We do so
with respect for the executive branch’s “control and
responsibility over access to classified information” and its
“‘compelling interest’ in withholding national security
information from unauthorized persons in the course of
executive business.” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Dep’t.
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). Having
reviewed the non-public portion of the record in camera, we
grant the government’s motion to maintain that portion of the
administrative record under seal and ex parte.

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III.
Khalid argues that the TSA Administrator’s order violates
his Fifth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due
process as well as the Administrative Procedure Act’s
proscription of agency actions that are “arbitrary,
capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). None of his arguments succeeds.
A.
Khalid first contends that the TSA Administrator’s order
violates substantive due process by illegitimately restricting his
right to free movement. That argument is foreclosed by
binding precedent.
Substantive due process protects “fundamental rights”
that are so “deeply rooted in our legal tradition” that the
government may infringe them only through actions narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997).
While Americans “enjoy[] ‘the right to travel,’” that does not
imply “a fundamental right to travel by airplane.” Busic, 62
F.4th at 550 (first quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306
(1981); and then quoting Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125,
1137 (9th Cir. 2006)). Khalid may continue to travel to, from,
and inside of the United States by means other than airplanes.
As a result, the TSA Administrator’s order maintaining Khalid
on the No Fly List does not infringe a fundamental right, and
Khalid’s substantive due process claim fails.
B.
Khalid next asserts that the TSA Administrator’s order
prevents his free movement and harms his reputation without
constitutionally required procedural due process. “The

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fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). To determine
whether the government has provided constitutionally
adequate process, we weigh (1) “the private interest” at stake,
(2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used” and the “probable value” of
alternate procedural safeguards, and (3) “the Government’s
interest” in the administrative process and any burdens of
providing alternate safeguards. Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1183
(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Applying that test, we have previously concluded that
TSA through DHS TRIP provides constitutionally adequate
process to those on the No Fly List, even considering the
significant private interest at stake when the government denies
access to air travel. Busic, 62 F.4th at 550. “[P]rotecting
national security is a government interest of the highest order,”
and “alternatives to the No Fly List cannot be 100 percent
effective against all potential threat[s].” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Given that other modes of travel
remain available to Khalid, the government’s national security
interest in restricting access to U.S. airspace “outweighs [his]
individual travel preferences.” Id.
Khalid does not tip that balance in his favor by asserting
an additional private interest in his reputation. “[I]njury to
reputation by itself [is] not a ‘liberty’ interest protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
233 (1991) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976)).
Rather, such injury must be accompanied by the loss or
alteration of some “right or status previously recognized
by . . . law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. Khalid cites that standard,
Pet’r Br. 18, but fails to argue that, in addition to his claimed

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reputational harm from the government’s instruction to airlines
to refuse him boarding, he was deprived of some recognized
right or status that tips his claim into the “stigma-plus”
category, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 121
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Paul, 424 U.S. at 708 (explaining that a due
process claim was appropriate where the government’s
stigmatizing action “deprived the individual of a right
previously held under state law . . . to purchase or obtain liquor
in common with the rest of the citizenry”). Accordingly,
Khalid makes no showing that TSA denied him additional
process he was due.
C.
Khalid also challenges the TSA Administrator’s order as
arbitrary and capricious for want of factual support. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). To assess that claim, we “consider whether
[the agency’s] actions were ‘based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.’” Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Citizens to Pres.
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). We accept
the agency’s factual determinations if supported by
“substantial evidence,” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c), which “is simply
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as
proof of a conclusion,” Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1181. Because
“[c]ourts have limited competence in the area of national
security,” our “role in reviewing factual determinations in this
context is highly deferential.” Busic, 62 F.4th at 550 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Khalid argues that the TSA Administrator’s order was
arbitrary and capricious because “there is no appropriate,
current evidence that Khalid is a threat to aviation security.”
Pet’r Br. 56. He asserts that his No Fly List designation and
the TSA Administrator’s order maintaining him on the No Fly

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List “likely” relied on “inherently unreliable statements made
by Khalid’s estranged mother.” Id. Khalid also asserts that the
No Fly List placement standards themselves are arbitrary
insofar as they allow consideration of race, ethnicity, and
religion, as well as First Amendment–protected “beliefs and
activities.” Id. at 53. Finally, he contends that the lack of
additional process renders the DHS TRIP process arbitrary and
capricious. See id. at 55.
Given our lack of jurisdiction over the Center when we
review a TSA final order resulting from DHS TRIP, see 49
U.S.C. § 46110(c), our review is limited to the administrative
record before TSA. After reviewing the public and ex parte
record, we conclude that the TSA Administrator acted with
adequate justification when he retained Khalid on the No Fly
List. The Administrator’s factfinding and analysis closely
tracked the Center’s recommendation. “Agencies can be
expected to ‘respect [the] views of such other agencies as to
those problems’ for which those ‘other agencies are more
directly responsible and more competent.’” City of Bos.
Delegation v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 897 F.3d 241, 255
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Pittsburgh v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). Nothing in
Khalid’s submission rendered it unreasonable for the TSA
Administrator to credit the factual analysis of the Center—the
entity that oversees a centralized repository of intelligence
information, maintains the terrorist watchlist, and makes all No
Fly List determinations in the first instance. Cf. Tarhuni v.
Lynch, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1057 (D. Or. 2015) (describing
plaintiff who received notice that he was on the No Fly List due
to the government’s “concerns about the nature and purpose of
[his] travel to Libya in 2011 and 2012,” responded with a
detailed description of his activities during that time period,
and was then “removed from the No-Fly List” based on
information “including [his] submissions to DHS TRIP”),

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rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Tarhuni v.
Sessions, 692 F. App’x 477 (9th Cir. 2017). Nor did our review
of the ex parte record otherwise suggest that the TSA
Administrator’s decision making was arbitrary and capricious
or unsupported by substantial evidence. See City of Kansas
City v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 194 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (“Agency action based on a factual premise that is
flatly contradicted by the agency’s own record does not
constitute reasoned administrative decisionmaking, and cannot
survive review under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”).
In the unclassified portion of his final order, the TSA
Administrator agrees that placing Khalid on the No Fly List
“based upon his status as a young Muslim male with Pakistani
roots” would be improper and denies that the order rests on
such grounds. David P. Pekoske, TSA Administrator, Notice
of Final Order and Decision of the TSA Administrator at 4-5
(June 9, 2022) (TSA A.R. 234-35). And the ex parte record
confirms that, at least as to Khalid, TSA’s actions were based
on consideration of relevant, permissible factors.
D.
Khalid lastly argues that the No Fly List involves an
agency decision of a “major question” without express
congressional authorization. Pet’r Br. 45-49. The major
questions doctrine does not apply here. Congress has expressly
authorized TSA to prevent persons who may pose risks to
aviation safety from boarding aircraft.
The Supreme Court has applied the “major questions
doctrine,” requiring “clear congressional authorization” for an
agency to act, in certain “extraordinary cases.” West Virginia
v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Such cases, the Court instructs, occur when
an agency “claim[s] to discover in a long-extant statute an

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unheralded power,” asserts a “transformative expansion in [the
agency’s] regulatory authority,” addresses an issue of “vast
economic and political significance,” and adopts a program
that “Congress had conspicuously and repeatedly declined to
enact itself,” among other factors. Id. at 716, 724 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Under those
circumstances, “the history and the breadth of the authority that
[the agency] has asserted, and the economic and political
significance of that assertion, provide a reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress meant to confer such
authority.” Id. at 721 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Khalid primarily appeals to the major questions doctrine
to contest the statutory basis for the broader terrorist watchlist.
But this petition, brought under our Section 46110(a)
jurisdiction, provides no basis to review the actions of the FBI
or the Center, which administer the terrorist watchlist. See
Abdellatif, 109 F.4th at 567-68 (emphasizing that “this court
cannot order [the Screening Center] to do anything in the
exercise of its § 46110(a) jurisdiction”). As to Khalid’s No Fly
List challenge, although the No Fly List undoubtedly places a
large burden on designated individuals, Khalid fails to show
either a major question or a lack of statutory authorization.
Congress has authorized TSA to “use information from
government agencies to identify individuals . . . who may be a
threat to civil aviation or national security” and “prevent [such]
individual[s] from boarding an aircraft.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(h)(3)(A)-(B). As Khalid acknowledges, Pet’r Br. 48, 52,
that provides statutory authority for TSA’s use and
maintenance of the No Fly List.

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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition for
review to the extent it raises a claim under RFRA and in all
other respects we deny it.
So ordered.

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