Andi Gjoci , Et Al . v. United States Department of State and Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 20, 2025 Decided April 3, 2026
No. 24-5261
ANDI GJOCI , ET AL .,
APPELLANTS
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND M ARCO RUBIO,
THE SECRETARY OF STATE ,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-00294)
Nicolette Glazer argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants.
Cara E. Alsterberg, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With
her on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney
General, Glenn M. Girdharry, Acting Deputy Director, and
William Weiland, Acting Assistant Director.
Before: C HILDS , Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS .

-- 1 of 12 --

2
CHILDS , Circuit Judge: Coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) significantly impacted United States immigration
policy. To contain the spread of the virus, the federal
government closed borders, enacted travel bans, and relevant
here, paused processing of visas during the pandemic. The
cessation of visa processing affected Appellants’ applications.
As a result, they filed an action challenging how the State
Department and the Secretary of State (together Appellees)
administered the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV
Program) for the fiscal-year (FY) 2021. The district court
dismissed Appellants’ claims on mootness and standing
grounds and denied their request to submit supplemental
briefing. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
I.
Having affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’
motion for injunctive relief seeking “to extend diversity-visa
eligibility or reserve visas past the end of the fiscal year,” Gjoci
v. DOS (Gjoci II), No. 21-5256, 2024 WL 3159878, at *3 (D.C.
Cir. June 25, 2024), we are familiar with the issues, the parties,
their positions, and the background of this matter.
Additionally, in four separate matters that the D.C. Circuit
eventually consolidated on appeal, the district court concluded
that because the State Department “unreasonably delayed and
unlawfully withheld adjudication” of diversity visas for
FY2020 and FY2021, it must reserve the pending applications
and then actually adjudicate them. See, e.g., Gomez v. Biden,
2021 WL 3663535, at *24 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2021). This court
reversed, holding that “district courts ha[ve] no authority to
order the State Department to keep processing applications for
diversity visas and issuing the visas beyond the end of the
relevant fiscal years.” Goodluck v. Biden, 104 F.4th 920, 926
(D.C. Cir. 2024). The court further explained that “it does not

-- 2 of 12 --

3
matter whether a selectee has submitted the required
documents, filed a lawsuit, obtained some form of preliminary
relief, or done anything else short of receiving the visa; at the
end of the fiscal year, ‘those applicants without visas are out of
luck.’” Id. at 927 (quoting Yung-Kai Lu v. Tillerson, 292 F.
Supp. 3d 276, 282 (D.D.C. 2018)). We incorporate by
reference these prior decisions, restate only essential
information, and forego a full, comprehensive recitation of the
history of this dispute.
A.
Appellants1 are selectees and derivative beneficiaries of
the FY2021 DV Program, which began on October 1, 2020,
1 Appellants are Andi Gjoci, Nevisa Patoshi, Armando Topi, Sidorela
Manaj, Atit Pokharel, Bipana Kumari Chaudhary, Denis Kurepin,
Jamuna Sharma Neupane, Dilli Raj Neupane, Engjell Vertopi, Enkel
Xhaferi, Emel Xhaferi, E.X., Ed. X., Furkat Abdukhalilov, Gentian
Shega, Erinda Shega, A.S., Ar. S., Harka Bahadur Chalaune, Nirmala
Budha, H.C., Hayam Aldeeb, Moustafa Eissa, M.E., A.E., H.E., S.E.,
Ahmeed Khedr, Juger Hasanllari, Romelda Hasanllari, A.H. , Junu
Koirala, Bishal Silwal B K, Koffi Doumegno, Mariia Shevchik,
Dmitrii Shevchik, M.S., G.S., Martin Wamiti, Mohammad Saeed,
Nahil Almusaddar, Al. S., Z.S., Mohammed Mohammed Ali
Ghanem, Mona Abdo Mostafa Abdo Elshelek, O.M.M.A.G.,
A.M.M.A.G., Ah. M.M.A.G., Anastasiia Nemanova, Maksim
Gorbunov, Tank Prasad Siwakoti, Nezar Mehri, Oleg Sukhorukov,
Antonina Sukhorukova, Alba Firaj, Klajdi Xhepexhiu, Eraldi
Dervishllari, A.D., Anduela Lecini, Alban Lecini, A.L., Kamlesh
Kumar Das, Om Prakash Dangi, Yamuna Basnet Dangi, A.D., Aa.
D., Rabin Sitoula, Nabina Adhikari Sitoula, R.S., Rh. S., Radhika
Subba, Purnachandra Limbu, Madina Usserbayeva, Ildar Galiyev,
AG., Nabin Thapa Magar, Subodh Pokharel, Monika Ghimire, S.P.,
K.P., Pukan KC, Sophiya Khadka KC, Roshi Cota, Albana Kurti,
R.C., Rudina Hoxha, Fation Pasholli, E.P., R.P., Shynar Smagulova,
Nurzhan Shamshin, M.S., A.S., Sudip Karki, Tulsi Khatri,

-- 3 of 12 --

4
and concluded on September 30, 2021. See 31 U.S.C. § 1102.
They wanted to receive one of the DV Program’s 55,000 visas
that are awarded each fiscal year to natives of foreign countries
that have historically low rates of immigration to the United
States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(e), 1153(c).
Diversity immigrant visas “allow recipients who are
granted admission to enter the country as lawful permanent
residents [the opportunity to] live and work here indefinitely.”
Almaqrami v. Pompeo, 933 F.3d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Applicants participate in a random lottery where they submit
online petitions during a registration window that is “not less
than thirty days.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.33(b)(3). Applicants hope
the State Department selects their petitions, awards them
ranked visa numbers for a geographic region, and approves
them as lottery winners for visa consideration. See 9 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS M ANUAL (FAM) 502.6-4(c).
As winners or selectees, Appellants anticipated the
adjudication of their petitions. This involves the submission of
a full, written application—to include a Form DS-260—and,
upon completion of said paperwork, an interview conducted by
a State Department consular officer. See 22 C.F.R.
§§ 40.1(l)(2), 42.33(g); 9 FAM 502.6-4(d). Once again, time
is of the essence because selectees must complete the
application process and receive a visa before “the end of the
specific fiscal year for which they were selected.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II).
However, due to several factors, including the COVID-19
Khagendra Kshetri, Vadym Kovalenko, Olena Pizhurina, D.K., Yub
Raj Shrestha, Shrijana Shrestha, Y.S., Yu. S., Ioannis Nanitsos, Eleni
Imeri, T.N., Arsen Avdulla, Anxhela Avdulla, Sanjita B. Khati,
Bhabi Sunar, P.S., Rohit Shrestha, Shanta Shrestha, Puja Tamrakar,
Majlinda Selimi, Achraf Elgdani, and Aarati Bhurtel.

-- 4 of 12 --

5
pandemic, the State Department, on March 20, 2020, stopped
processing diversity immigrant visa applications. Then, on
April 22, 2020, President Trump issued Presidential
Proclamation 10014, which effectively suspended the entry of
aliens into the United States by means of diversity visas.
Proclamation 10014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441, 23,441–43 (Apr. 27,
2020). Proclamation 10014 remained in effect for ten months
until its revocation by President Biden on February 24, 2021.
Proclamation 10149, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,847, 11,847 (Mar. 1,
2021). As a result, the State Department did not begin to
schedule interviews for FY2021 DV Program selectees until
February 2021.
B.
On February 1, 2021, Appellants filed a complaint
“challenging the State Department’s policies and sought an
injunction [on April 11, 2021,] requiring the State Department
to adjudicate their diversity-visa cases.” Gjoci II, 2024 WL
3159878, at *1. “In response to this litigation, some of the
named [Appellants] were scheduled for an interview, received
their immigrant visas, entered the United States pursuant to
said visas, and are now Legal Permanent Residents” (LPR
Appellants). Appellants’ Br. 23. The remaining Appellants
received no meaningful response to their applications even
after the State Department resumed diversity visa processing
(No-Visa Appellants). Appellants amended their complaint on
June 26, 2021, and moved for injunctive relief on June 30,
2021, seeking an order requiring “the State Department either
to promptly adjudicate their pending DS-260 applications or
implement a policy expediting the processing of those
applications, or . . . preserve the visa eligibility of the
[Appellants] for the duration of this litigation.” Gjoci v. DOS,
No. 1:21-cv-0294, 2024 WL 4263775, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 23,
2024) (citation modified). The district court denied the motion

-- 5 of 12 --

6
for a preliminary injunction, Gjoci v. DOS, No. 1:21-cv-0294,
2021 WL 3912143, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2021), and we
affirmed that decision, Gjoci II, 2024 WL 3159878, at *1.
While Appellants’ preliminary injunction motion was
pending, the State Department moved to dismiss the complaint
or for summary judgment. Several months later, Appellants
moved for leave to file supplemental briefing. In a September
23, 2024 Memorandum Order, the district court dismissed as
moot No-Visa Appellants’ equitable claims seeking
preservation of their visa eligibility beyond the fiscal year
2021. Gjoci, 2024 WL 4263775, at *4 (citing Gjoci II and
Goodluck). The district court then addressed ad seriatim
Appellants’ remaining claims for relief—“1) a declaration that
the defendants have acted in bad faith and that their alleged
plan to ‘run out the clock’ on the 2021 fiscal year was unlawful,
ultra vires, arbitrary, and capricious; 2) nominal damages; and
3) an injunction ordering the defendants to adjudicate their
pending DS-260 applications,” id.—and concluded that
Appellants lacked standing to pursue these “non-Goodluck”
claims because the relief was “beyond the Court’s power to
grant, would not redress the [Appellants]’ injuries, or rest[ed]
on an alleged violation of a ‘right’ that does not exist.” Id. at
*6. The district court also denied Appellants’ motion for leave
to file supplemental briefing because granting it “would merely
prolong the inevitable.” Id. at *4. Appellants timely appealed
the dismissal of their claims.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as
the district court here dismissed Appellants’ claims for “lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d
620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2017). We review de novo a dismissal of
a complaint for lack of standing. Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v.

-- 6 of 12 --

7
Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (citing Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Rumsfeld, 321
F.3d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). For purposes of the standing
analysis, we assume that the plaintiff states “a valid legal
claim” and accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.
Id. We also review de novo a district court’s decision to
dismiss a claim as moot. Zukerman v. USPS, 961 F.3d 431,
441 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Finally, “[w]e review the district court’s
denial of supplemental briefing for abuse of discretion.”
Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing
Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262, 1266
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
III.
A.
We first address whether No-Visa Appellants’ equitable
claims—seeking preservation of their visa eligibility beyond
the fiscal year 2021—are moot. Mootness is a “threshold
jurisdictional issue.” S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 416 F.3d 39,
43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Coal. of Airline Pilots Ass’ns v.
FAA, 370 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). It “limits federal
courts to deciding ‘actual, ongoing controversies,’” Clarke v.
United States, 915 F.2d 699, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988)). The mootness
doctrine “requires a federal court to refrain from deciding [the
controversy] if ‘events have so transpired that the decision will
neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-
than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.’” Id.
at 701 (quoting Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 897 F.2d
570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
In their briefing, No-Visa Appellants acknowledge that
“Goodluck conclusively resolves their claims and requests for

-- 7 of 12 --

8
relief in the form of visa preservation and issuance of diversity
visas.” Appellants’ Br. 29. Because we agree that Goodluck
renders No-Visa Appellants’ claims for equitable relief moot,
we affirm their dismissal by the district court. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (explaining that a case is no
longer justiciable “when the question sought to be adjudicated
has been mooted by subsequent developments”).
B.
We next address whether Appellants have standing to
press their non-Goodluck claims. Both LPR Appellants and
No-Visa Appellants seek “a declaration that the [State
Department] . . . acted in bad faith,” that its administration of
diversity immigrant visas for FY2021 was “unlawful, ultra
vires, arbitrary, and capricious,” and an award of “nominal
damages.” Gjoci, 2024 WL 4263775, at *4. In addition, No-
Visa Appellants seek “an injunction ordering the [State
Department] to adjudicate their pending DS-260[s].” Id.
“It is well established that a federal court cannot act in the
absence of jurisdiction,” and “[i]t is equally well established
that Article III standing is a prerequisite to federal court
jurisdiction.” Am. Libr. Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). An appellant has standing if he
has (1) “an ‘injury in fact,’” (2) “fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant,” (3) that will “likely . . . be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citation modified).
Appellants contend that “[t]he Goodluck decision did not
address the issue of whether the [LPR Appellants][,] who were
issued immigrant visas and are now Legal Permanent
Residents[,] can state a claim for discrimination, bad faith, [or]
violation of substantive due process[,] or whether all

-- 8 of 12 --

9
[Appellants] have pleaded a non-statutory ultra vires claim.”
Appellants’ Br. 30. Appellants further assert that Goodluck did
not address whether “No-[V]isa [Appellants]” have any
remedies “in light of the continuing and ongoing harm caused
by [Appellees’] action.” Id. In this regard, Appellants argue
that they have standing to pursue their remaining claims
because Appellees’ actions caused Appellants “imminent,
concrete, and irreparable injuries-in-fact . . . as DV2021
selectees,” id. at 33; and the suspension of the DV Program
deprived Appellants of “vested statutory benefit conferred to
them as approved” diversity immigrant visa petitioners,
“caus[ing] harm to all [Appellants],” id. at 33–34.
Despite these vigorous arguments, Appellants cannot
establish standing to pursue their non-Goodluck claims. First,
as to all Appellants’ request for declaratory relief, “past injuries
alone are insufficient to establish standing.” Dearth v. Holder,
641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Appellants have not
pleaded facts establishing they are “suffering an ongoing injury
or face[] an immediate threat of injury,” id. (citing Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 495–96 (1974)), because of how the State Department
processed FY2021 diversity immigrant visas. Next, all
Appellants’ claims for nominal damages are not redressable
because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity
from nominal damages for their claims. Seed v. EPA, 100 F.4th
257, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“When a plaintiff seeks monetary
damages, ‘the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend
unambiguously to such monetary claims.’”) (quoting Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Particularly, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), nominal damages are
unavailable because the APA only waives the government’s
sovereign immunity for claims “seeking relief other than
money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. See Jibril v. Mayorkas, 101
F.4th 857, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (holding that the district court

-- 9 of 12 --

10
did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend a
complaint to add a claim for nominal damages because “the
APA does not authorize suits seeking ‘money damages’ against
the Government”). Finally, consistent with their equitable
claims, Goodluck is dispositive of No-Visa Appellants’ request
for injunctive relief and prevents the court from ordering the
State Department to process expired applications.
Accordingly, because Appellants cannot establish standing
regarding their non-Goodluck claims, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal.
C.
Appellants assert that the district court should have
allowed them to submit supplemental briefing to address the
status of their allegations after Gjoci II and Goodluck.
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to provide any reason for denying Appellants’ motion
“such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive.’”
Appellants’ Br. 63 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). Appellants further argue that they suffered prejudice
because they had to “present arguments for the first time on
appeal and without a developed record.” Id. at 64.
When evaluating whether a district court abused its
discretion in denying supplemental briefing, we “review
whether the district court exceeded its ‘range of choice’ or
made a ‘mistake of law.’” Tatneft, 21 F.4th at 836 (quoting
United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., 758 F.3d 330, 345
(D.C. Cir. 2014)). Contrary to Appellants’ claims, the district
court in this case provided reasoning for its decision, stating
that, because of Goodluck, supplemental briefing would only
“prolong the inevitable,” Gjoci, 2024 WL 4263775, at *4, by
covering “factual and legal developments the relevance of
which have long since passed,” id. at *6. In our review, there

-- 10 of 12 --

11
was sufficient support in the record for the district court to
conclude that Appellants’ claims fail on mootness grounds or
for lack of standing considering Gjoci II and Goodluck.
Appellants’ supplemental information would not have changed
that status. Therefore, the district court’s decision to deny
supplemental briefing was well within its broad discretion.
D.
Finally, during oral argument, counsel conveyed to the
court No-Visa Appellants’ concerns regarding their
unadjudicated DS-260s. Specifically, counsel illustrated how
the still pending DS-260s would create impediments for No-
Visa Appellants if, for example, they applied for a non-
immigrant visa and had to appear for an interview at a
consulate. In this regard, counsel elaborated that a pending DS-
260 would automatically result in the denial of the non-
immigrant visa application based on the doctrine of
preconceived intent to immigrate and the presumption of status
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1184. 2 Moreover, No-Visa Appellants
with their unadjudicated DS-260s would have difficulty
answering questions regarding the status of their applications.
Accordingly, counsel requested that the court instruct the State
Department to post a notice announcing that all pending DS-
260s for the FY2021 DV Program are expired, because all that
No-Visa Appellants sought at this point was assurance that
their pending DS-260s would not affect their ability to apply
for visas in the future.
2 Preconceived intent is a term used to describe a non-immigrant who
enters the United States on a temporary basis but has the intent to
remain permanently. See, e.g., Choe v. INS, 11 F.3d 925, 928–30
(9th Cir. 1993). Section 1184(b) “provides that every alien shall be
presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes that he is a non[-]
immigrant.” Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b)).

-- 11 of 12 --

12
Between Gjoci II, Goodluck, and the relevant statutory
law, diversity immigrant visa eligibility terminates at the end
of the fiscal year. Thus, for applicants submitting DS-260s for
the FY2021 DV Program, their visa eligibility terminated on
September 30, 2021. We do not believe there is anything that
we can do regarding the unadjudicated DS-260s from FY2021.
Simply, an unadjudicated DS-260 does not create a justiciable
issue for this court. Nevertheless, based on the representations
of counsel for the government, there is nothing preventing an
individual with an unadjudicated DS-260 from applying for a
diversity immigrant visa or another type of visa in a subsequent
year. Therefore, No-Visa Appellants’ unadjudicated DS-260s
should not impede them from filing visa applications in the
future.
*****
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment
dismissing all Appellants’ claims and denying their motion for
leave to file supplemental briefing.
So ordered.

-- 12 of 12 --