National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. National Park Service , Et Al .

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued June 5, 2026 Decided August 7, 2026
No. 26-5123
NATIONAL T RUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE
UNITED STATES ,
APPELLEE
v.
NATIONAL P ARK SERVICE , ET AL .,
APPELLANTS
Consolidated with 26-5134
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:25-cv-04316)
Yaakov M. Roth, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for
appellants/cross-appellees. With him on the briefs were Brett
A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Brantley T. Mayers,
Attorney, and Adam R.F. Gustafson, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural

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Resources Division. Steven A. Myers and Michael S. Raab,
Attorneys, entered appearances.
Richard Jaffe was on the brief for amicus curiae American
Conservative Union in support of appellants/cross-appellees.
Thaddeus A. Heuer argued the cause for appellee/cross-
appellant. With him on the brief were Matthew F. Casassa,
Kevin Y. Chen, Jack C. Smith, and Gregory B. Craig.
Philip Allen Lacovara, Andrea C. Ferster, and Paul W.
Edmondson were on the brief for amici curiae Various
Organizations Advancing Protection of National Parks,
Historic Preservation, and National Capital Planning in support
of appellee/cross-appellant.
Nikhel S. Sus, Christina Wentworth, and Daniel S. Lenz
were on the brief for amici curiae Campaign Legal Center and
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington in
support of appellee/cross-appellant.
Elizabeth Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod were on the brief
for amici curiae Members of Congress in support of
appellee/cross-appellant.
Aditi Shah and Scott Michelman were on the brief for
amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of the District
of Columbia in support of appellee/cross-appellant.
Before: MILLETT , RAO, and GARCIA , Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judges MILLETT and
GARCIA.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

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M ILLETT and GARCIA, Circuit Judges: The White House
is the People’s House, and under the Constitution’s Property
Clause, Congress exercises plenary control over the building
and its surrounding land. The White House is also the
centerpiece of President’s Park, a National Park stewarded by
the National Park Service. According to the government, as
the oldest public building in the District of Columbia, the
White House is the crown jewel not just of President’s Park,
but also of the Lafayette Square National Historic Landmark
District, a site listed for preservation in the National Register
of Historic Places. See Finding of No Significant Impact,
White House East Wing Modernization & State Ballroom
Environmental Assessment (“FONSI”), ECF No. 14-2, at 5.
The founding architect of the Nation’s capital, Pierre L’Enfant,
designed the capital city’s layout to focus on the towering
Capitol building—the gleaming palace of the people in the new
democracy—and to contrast it with the simple humility of the
White House. See SCOTT W. BERG, GRAND AVENUES : THE
STORY OF PIERRE CHARLES L’ENFANT 112 (2008) (“Where the
king’s bedroom was placed on the central axis of Versailles,
enshrining the rule of divine right transferred via
primogeniture, here in L’Enfant’s plan the home of Congress
took center stage.”); FONSI at 5 (“Situated on a high point
within the city, the White House is a focal point on the principal
north-south axis of L’Enfant’s plan.”).0 F
1
Each President is a temporary tenant, not the owner, of the
White House and its Executive Residence. The President has
no—and claims no—constitutionally assigned authority over
that property, which is designed and maintained for the use of
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to ECF numbers are
to the district court docket in this case, 25-CV-4316 (D.D.C., filed
Dec. 12, 2025). Citations to page numbers are to the electronically
generated numbers at the top of the page.

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all Presidents, current and future, and for the American people.
As the defendant National Park Service has explained, “[t]he
White House is owned by the American people and stewarded
by the National Park Service. It is more than the President’s
residence; it is a site for protests and national discourse about
what it means to be American.” The White House and
President’s Park, NAT ’ L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/MJ7A-
2JSG.
Throughout history, Congress has appropriated funds both
for the White House’s maintenance and for necessary physical
improvements and additions. Congress, for example,
authorized the repair and reconstruction of the White House
after the British attempted to burn it down during the War of
1812. Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205, 205. Congress
also specifically appropriated the funds that were used to build
the original East and West Wings of the White House. Act of
June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32 Stat. 419, 460.
We are aware of no instance in American history in which
a President unilaterally and using privately collected funds
demolished substantial portions of the White House that
Congress authorized to be built and American taxpayers paid
for. Until now.
Over just three days in October 2025, without undertaking
promised consultations or obtaining Congress’s permission,
President Trump bulldozed the entire East Wing in order to
construct a massive, 90,000 square-foot ballroom paid for by
private funds with no congressional oversight. There is no
factual dispute at this juncture—in fact, the Defendants
admit—that the erection of this enormous ballroom will “have
permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape” of
President’s Park. White House East Wing Modernization &
State Ballroom Environmental Assessment (“Env’t

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Assessment”), ECF No. 14-3, at 11. The ballroom construction
also will “disrupt the historical continuity of the White House
grounds[,]” and will “adversely alter the design, setting, and
feeling of the White House and the grounds over the long-
term.” FONSI at 6–7.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation brought suit
challenging the planned construction. The district court
preliminarily enjoined the above-ground construction of the
ballroom. At the same time, the injunction expressly excepts
from its scope all below-ground construction, including
construction of bunkers, bomb-shelters, and military and
medical infrastructure, as well as above-ground construction
“strictly necessary to cover, secure, and protect” such facilities,
“to provide for the personal safety of the President and his
staff[,]” and “to ensure the safety, security, and structural
integrity of the White House, the White House grounds, and
the below-ground construction site[.]” Am. P.I. Order, ECF
No. 73, at 2–3.
The Defendants have appealed that preliminary injunction
and requested a stay pending appeal. We affirm the grant of
the preliminary injunction, with its safety-and-security
exception, and deny the motion for a stay as moot. The
Defendants disclaim any explicit or implicit constitutional
authority for their actions. And they very likely lack statutory
authority to construct the ballroom given (i) Congress’s full
constitutional control over federal property and the funding of
its maintenance and development, (ii) the absence of any
express or implied authorization for the ballroom construction,
and (iii) express statutory limitations that the ballroom
construction violates. Absent the injunction, construction of
the ballroom will inflict permanent and irreversible harm to the
historic, architectural, and aesthetic interests of the National
Trust’s members, as well as the design of President’s Park, the

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White House, and the surrounding area. The Defendants
themselves agree those irreversible harms will occur. As for
the Defendants’ safety and security concerns, the district
court’s modified preliminary injunction will protect them
during the pendency of litigation. In addition, the Constitution
assigns Congress—not the Executive—the responsibility to
decide whether proposed changes to the physical design of the
White House may proceed, even where those changes are said
to serve security interests. The Defendants have not shown that
Congress delegated that authority to either the President or the
National Park Service. Whether or not a massive ballroom
should be constructed is for Congress to decide and is not a
matter for Executive self-help.
This holding has nothing at all to do with whether the
proposed ballroom is desirable, or not, as a matter of policy.
This ruling does not even necessarily mean that the Defendants
may not ultimately construct the ballroom. What it does mean
is that the Defendants may not do so during the district court’s
expeditious litigation without securing Congress’s
authorization, as the Constitution and laws require. At this
preliminary stage, the National Trust has shown, compellingly,
that Congress has not ceded unfettered authority to the
Executive Branch to dramatically redesign, reshape, and
reconstruct the White House—the People’s House—to fit a
particular President’s desires.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
issuing the modified preliminary injunction and vacate this
court’s administrative stay entered on April 17, 2026. We will
stay this decision for fourteen days to allow the Defendants, if
they choose, to seek Supreme Court review.

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I
A
1
Congress has exclusive authority to regulate the
construction and demolition of White House structures. The
Constitution’s Property Clause vests Congress with plenary
control over all real property that belongs to the United States.
U.S. CONST . Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States[.]”); see Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936) (The
Clause’s “broad terms” encompass “the due regulation of all
* * * personal and real property rightfully belonging to the
United States.”) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, the
Constitution’s District Clause confers on Congress
comprehensive legislative authority over the District of
Columbia as “the Seat of Government of the United States[.]”
U.S. CONST . Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
In 1912, Congress placed a statutory exclamation point on
its exclusive powers by providing that “there shall not be
erected on any reservation, park, or public grounds[] of the
United States within the District of Columbia, any building or
structure without express authority of Congress.” Act of Aug.
24, 1912, ch. 355, 37 Stat. 417, 444. More than a hundred years
later, that prohibition remains in effect: “A building or
structure shall not be erected on any reservation, park, or public
grounds of the Federal Government in the District of Columbia
without express authority of Congress.” 40 U.S.C. § 8106.

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As long as the White House has existed, Congress has
authorized and funded its upkeep, maintenance, updates, and
renovations large and small. See, e.g., Residence Act, ch. 28,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 130, 130 (1790) (creating a commission to “provide
suitable buildings for the accommodation * * * of the
President”); Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205, 205
(authorizing the President to borrow up to $500,000 to “cause
to be repaired or rebuilt forthwith, the President’s House”
following its destruction in the War of 1812); An Act making
appropriations for the public buildings, ch. 62, § 1, 3 Stat. 784,
784 (1823) (appropriating $19,000 to “finish[] the south
portico to the President’s house”); An Act making
appropriations for the public buildings, and for other purposes,
ch. 51, § 1, 4 Stat. 362, 362 (1829) (appropriating $24,769.25
to “complete the north front of the President’s house, according
to the original plan, by erecting a portico”); Act of March 3,
1853, ch. 97, § 1, 10 Stat. 189, 207 (providing $6,250 for
“cleaning, painting, and whitewashing inside of the house;
extending east wing of offices for carriage-house, blinds for the
west front of the house, flooring large room in basement,
purchasing trees and plants for garden, and for making hot-beds
therein”); Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32 Stat. 419, 460
(providing $65,196 for the building of the West Wing,
“constructed with sufficient foundation and walls suitable for a
durable, permanent building,” and $475,445 “[f]or
extraordinary repairs and refurnishing of the Executive
Mansion * * * including all necessary alterations and
additions”); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 299, § 1, 35 Stat. 945,
995 (providing $40,000 for construction of the Oval Office as
“additional accommodations to the building erected for the
offices of the President”); Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 771, § 1, 44
Stat. 841, 844 (“For reconstructing the roof, attic, and ceilings
of the second story of the Executive Mansion, including all
necessary work in connection therewith, to be prosecuted, by
contract or otherwise as the President may determine, under the

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supervision of the Director of Public Buildings and Public
Parks of the National Capital, fiscal years 1927 and 1928,
$375,000[.]”); Act of April 28, 1942, ch. 247, 56 Stat. 226, 236
(“For an additional amount for salaries and expenses, public
buildings and grounds in the District of Columbia and adjacent
area, fiscal year 1942, including the objects specified under this
head in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1942,
$3,413,394[.]”); Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 589, 59 Stat. 632,
634 (providing $1.65 million “[f]or an addition to the
Executive Mansion” and “for alterations, improvements, and
furnishings”); An Act To provide for a Commission on
Renovation of the Executive Mansion, ch. 51, §§ 1–5, 63 Stat.
45, 45–47 (1949) (creating a Commission on Renovation of the
Executive Mansion to oversee President Truman’s
renovations); Act of June 23, 1949, ch. 236, 63 Stat. 231, 235
(providing $2 million “[f]or all expenses necessary for and
incident to the renovation, repair, and modernization * * * of
the Executive Mansion”).
Congress also has separately authorized the President to
make discretionary expenditures to pay for needed staff within
the White House. In 1948, Congress passed a modest provision
setting the annual compensation for the President’s personal
secretary at $10,000. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, § 105, 62
Stat. 672, 678. Over the next thirty years, Congress
occasionally tweaked that provision, codified at 3 U.S.C.
§ 105, to create new salaried positions for a growing cadre of
administrative aides.1F
2
2 See Act of Oct. 15, 1949, ch. 695, § 2(a), 63 Stat. 880, 880
(adding positions for “six administrative assistants[,]” an “Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council,” and “five other
secretaries or other immediate staff assistants”); Act of July 31, 1956,
ch. 804, § 109, 70 Stat. 736, 740 (adjusting salaries and adding three
more secretaries and staff assistants); Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L.

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In 1978, Congress reorganized Section 105 into its current
form. See Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-570, 92 Stat.
2445, 2445–2446. As amended, Section 105 provides for
“Assistance and [S]ervices for the President” in five
subsections. 3 U.S.C. § 105. Sections 105(a) and (b) provide
that “the President is authorized” to hire and pay employees “in
the White House Office” and “in the Executive Residence at
the White House” under the General Schedule pay-grade
system. Id. § 105(a)–(b). Section 105(c) provides that the
“President is authorized” to procure, “as provided in
appropriation Acts, temporary or intermittent services of
experts and consultants” for the White House Office and the
Executive Residence. Id. § 105(c). And Section 105(e) allows
the President’s spouse to enjoy the assistance and services of
the employees and consultants authorized above. Id. § 105(e).
This case concerns Section 105(d), which amid those staff
funding authorizations provides:
(d) There are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal
year to the President such sums as may be necessary
for—
(1) the care, maintenance, repair, alteration,
refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning,
heating, and lighting (including electric power
fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White
House;
No. 87-367, § 303(h), 75 Stat. 785, 794 (adjusting salaries); Act of
Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-426, § 304(b), 78 Stat. 400, 422
(adding position for an “Executive Secretary of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council”); Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-222, § 111(c), 81 Stat. 672, 726 (adding position for an
“Executive Secretary of the Economic Opportunity Council”).

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(2) the official expenses of the White House
Office;
(3) the official entertainment expenses of the
President;
(4) the official entertainment expenses for
allocation within the Executive Office of the
President; and
(5) the subsistence expenses of persons in the
Government service while traveling on official
business in connection with the travel of the
President.
3 U.S.C. § 105(d).
The phrase “[t]here are authorized to be appropriated” in
Section 105(d) sharply distinguishes that provision from the
rest of Section 105, which speaks in terms of what “the
President is authorized” to do. 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)–(c)
(emphasis added). Section 105(d), in contrast, is an
appropriation “authorization act” that Congress can choose to
fund or not going forward. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL ,
GOV’ T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF ., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-56 (“GAO REDBOOK”) (4th ed. 2016);
see also id. at 2-54. “The expression ‘authorized to be
appropriated’ * * * clearly indicates that no appropriation is
made or intended to be made, but the bill when enacted
becomes the authority of law for an expected appropriation in
the future[.]” Id. at 2-54–2-55 (quoting 27 Comp. Dec. 923
(1921)).

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Said more simply, an “authorization act is basically a
directive to Congress itself, which Congress is free to follow or
alter * * * in the subsequent appropriation act.” GAO
REDBOOK 2-56; cf. CFPB v. Community Fin. Servs. Ass’n of
America, Ltd., 144 S. Ct. 1474, 1481 (2024) (“[T]o satisfy the
Appropriations Clause,” an appropriation “need only identify a
source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those
funds for designated purposes[.]”).
Congress has regularly exercised its appropriation
authority under Section 105(d), often continuing its historical
pattern of regulating the President’s use of the funds. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447,
118 Stat. 2809, 3246 (2004) (appropriating $12.76 million
“[f]or the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, refurnishing,
improvement, heating, and lighting, including electric power
and fixtures, of the Executive Residence at the White House
and official entertainment expenses of the President * * * to be
expended and accounted for as provided by 3 U.S.C. 105, 109,
110, and 112–114”); id. at 3247 (appropriating $1.9 million
“[f]or the repair, alteration, and improvement of the Executive
Residence at the White House * * * to remain available until
expended, for required maintenance, safety and health issues,
and continued preventative maintenance”); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182,
1392 (2020) (appropriating $2.5 million “[f]or the repair,
alteration, and improvement of the Executive Residence at the
White House pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 105(d) * * * to remain
available until expended, for required maintenance, resolution
of safety and health issues, and continued preventative
maintenance”).
In 2024, 2025, and 2026, Congress appropriated $2.475
million under Section 105(d) to be used for “required
maintenance, resolution of safety and health issues, and

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continued preventative maintenance.” Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 460,
532 (under the heading “White House Repair and
Restoration”); Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and
Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-4, §§ 1101(a)(5), 1102,
139 Stat. 9, 11–12 (continuing 2024 funding levels);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Pub. L. No. 119-75,
140 Stat. 173, 451 (same as 2024).
When Congress appropriates funds for the purposes
described in Subsections 105(d)(1), (3), or (5), such sums “may
be expended as the President may determine, notwithstanding
the provisions of any other law,” as long as the expenditures
remain within the confines of the appropriation act’s
denominated purposes. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). At the same time,
those expenditures are expressly subject to oversight by the
Comptroller General, who “may inspect all necessary * * *
records” to verify that the President’s spending was confined
to “expenses in paragraph (1), (3), or (5).” Id. The Comptroller
General must “certify to Congress the fact of such verification,
and shall report any such expenses not expended for such
purpose.” Id.
Section 105’s statutory neighbors similarly reflect
Congress’s close control over and provision for maintenance of
the White House on legislatively specified terms. For example,
Congress closely regulates the acquisition of furniture for the
Executive Residence, 3 U.S.C. §§ 109–110, requiring that
purchased furniture be, “as far as practicable, of domestic
manufacture” and that any donated furniture “maintain[] the
interior of the Executive Residence at the White House in
keeping with its original design,” id. § 110. Congress further
required the Director of the National Park Service to establish
a committee that includes representatives of the American
Federation of Arts, the National Commission of Fine Arts, the

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National Academy of Design, and the American Institute of
Architects to “select” and “recommend” the acceptance or not
of any donated furniture pieces. Id.; see id. § 109 (requiring
annually a “complete inventory, in proper books” of “all the
public property in and belonging to the Executive Residence at
the White House”).
2
The 1916 National Park Service Organic Act established
the Park Service and charged it with
promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of the National
Park System by means and measures that conform to
the fundamental purpose of the System units, which
purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and
historic objects, and wild life in the System units and
to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural
and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and
by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.
54 U.S.C. § 100101(a); Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39
Stat. 535, 535.
Later, in the 1978 Redwood Amendment, Congress
doubled down on its requirement that the “protection,
management, and administration” of the National Park System
“shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes
for which the System units have been established” and
requiring that any authority to depart from those purposes be
“directly and specifically provided by Congress.” 54 U.S.C.
§ 100101(b)(2) (emphasis added); Act of March 27, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166.

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The Organic Act separately authorizes the Park Service to
accept “money that may be donated for the purposes of the
System.” 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2). The congressionally
chartered National Park Foundation “accept[s] and
administer[s] those gifts” to “further the conservation of
natural, scenic, historic, scientific, educational, inspirational,
or recreational resources for future generations of
Americans[.]” Id. § 101111. All donations to the Park Service
must be placed in a federal trust. See 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17),
(b)(1). Congress has appropriated those funds to be used only
“for the benefit of, or in connection with,” the Park Service,
“its activities, or its services.” 54 U.S.C. § 101113; see 31
U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17), (b)(1).
3
Under the Economy Act, the “head of an agency or major
organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a
major organizational unit within the same agency or another
agency for goods or services if”:
(1) amounts are available;
(2) the head of the ordering agency or unit [that is, the
agency making the request] decides the order is in
the best interest of the United States Government;
(3) the agency or unit to fill the order is able to
provide or get by contract the ordered goods or
services; and
(4) the head of the agency decides ordered goods or
services cannot be provided by contract as
conveniently or cheaply by a commercial
enterprise.

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31 U.S.C. § 1535(a).2F
3
Importantly, “the Economy Act does not authorize an
agency to use another agency to do anything it could not
lawfully do itself.” GAO REDBOOK 12-26 (3d ed. 2008); see
also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (“Appropriations shall be applied
only to the objects for which the appropriations were made
except as otherwise provided by law.”); cf. Department of Navy
v. Federal Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“[A]n agency cannot use the device of a contract, grant,
or agreement to accomplish a purpose it could not do by direct
expenditure[.]”) (quoting GAO REDBOOK 4-9 (3d ed. 2004)).
The Defendants agree. Oral Arg. Tr. 32:18–19 (The ordering
agency “has to be able to do the project.”); id. at 35:6–9
(agreeing that the ordering agency must “have the legal
authority so that they could * * * do th[e] job themselves”).
B
1
The White House sits at the heart of President’s Park.
President’s Park began as “Federal Reservation 1” in Pierre
L’Enfant’s 1791 plan for the nascent capital city. See Nat’l
Park Serv., Comprehensive Design Plan: The White House &
President’s Park 143 (2000) (“2000 Design Plan”). The
National Park Service assumed responsibility for the property
in 1933. Id. at 40; see also Exec. Order No. 6166 § 2 (1933).
Congress later formally directed that the White House building
3 Title 31 broadly defines “agency” as “a department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 101.

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complex itself be administered as a national park. See Act of
Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-286, § 1, 75 Stat. 586, 586.
Today, President’s Park extends north from Constitution
Avenue, across Pennsylvania Avenue, to H Street Northwest.
The White House and President’s Park: Explore President’s
Park, Nat’l Park Serv., https://perma.cc/3CB3-VSDD. It
comprises about 82 acres, including the Ellipse, the White
House complex and its grounds, and Lafayette Square. Id.;
2000 Design Plan at 6; FONSI at 5. The Park’s northern edge
is embraced by the Lafayette Square Historic District, which
itself boasts paradigms of 19th century American architecture
like St. John’s Church, the Blair House, the Dolley Madison
House, and the Stephen Decatur House. See The White House
and President’s Park: Explore President’s Park. The White
House is the centerpiece of President’s Park. FONSI at 5.
2
On July 31, 2025, the White House announced plans to
build a 90,000 square-foot ballroom in President’s Park using
privately donated funds. Press Release, The White House, The
White House Announces White House Ballroom Construction
to Begin (July 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/6N2H-RLE9. The
announcement explained that the ballroom would be
“substantially separated from the main building of the White
House” and constructed where the “East Wing currently sits.”
Id. The press release represented that the President was “fully
committed to working with the appropriate organizations to
preserv[e] the special history of the White House[.]” Id.
In August 2025, the National Park Service conducted an
environmental assessment of the proposed construction. The
Park Service determined that the project “would have
permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape” of

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President’s Park because the proposed ballroom would
“depart[] from the traditional aesthetic values and architectural
integrity” of the White House complex. Env’t Assessment at
11.
The government’s Environmental Assessment also found
that the ballroom “would disrupt the historical continuity of the
White House grounds” because the “new building’s larger
footprint and height would dominate the eastern portion of the
site, creating a visual imbalance with the more modestly scaled
West Wing and Executive Mansion.” Env’t Assessment at 14.
The planned second-story addition to the East Colonnade
would exacerbate the asymmetry. Id. According to the
assessment, this discrepancy would “chang[e] the traditional
spatial organization and sightlines of the grounds[.]” Id. In
combination, the proposed construction would “adversely alter
the design, setting, and feeling of the White House and the
grounds over the long-term.” FONSI at 7.
The Environmental Assessment further concluded that the
proposed ballroom’s size would permanently alter the views of
President’s Park for visitors in “certain locations, particularly
Lafayette Square and portions of the Ellipse[.]” Env’t
Assessment at 19. The Park Service added that “[t]he removal
of the current East Wing” to build the ballroom “will result in
a permanent adverse impact for those who value the experience
of this specific space.” FONSI at 8.
Nevertheless, the Park Service found that the ballroom
project would have no “significant” impact on the White House
complex because the White House would retain
“photograph[s]” of what the East Wing previously looked like
and would “salvage and stor[e] * * * select historic building
materials[.]” FONSI at 6, 16. In the Park Service’s view, those
two steps sufficed to “preserve important elements of the

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historic fabric” of the East Wing and the formerly cohesive
White House complex. Id. at 16. In so finding, the Park
Service briefly considered “a no action alternative[,]” but the
ballroom project “was selected for implementation[] because
the Executive Office of the President identified the selected
action as the only alternative that meets its functional goals and
operational needs.” Id. at 13.
The Park Service chose, without any explanation, not to
publish either its Environmental Assessment or its Finding of
No Significant Impact. Contrast 42 U.S.C. § 4336(b)(2)
(“[An] environmental assessment shall be a concise public
document prepared by a Federal agency[.]”) (emphasis added);
NAT ’ L PARK SERV., NPS NEPA HANDBOOK 69 (2015) (“The
NPS must notify the public of the availability of a FONSI once
it is signed. The standard NPS practice to meet this
requirement is to announce its availability on [the NPS’s online
platform for public comment] and through a press release,
direct or electronic mailings, or other effective means of
communication.”) (citations omitted).
Two months later, “without advance notice” and without
first undertaking the promised consultations, President Trump
posted on social media that “ground ha[d] been broken on the
White House grounds to build the new, big, beautiful White
House Ballroom.” National Trust for Historic Pres. in the U.S.
v. National Park Serv., 827 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2026)
(“National Trust III”). Within three days, “the East Wing had
been demolished in its entirety.” Id.

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C
1
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States is a congressionally chartered membership organization
that seeks to preserve and promote the United States’
architectural and cultural heritage. See Decl. of Elizabeth S.
Merritt, ECF No. 2-2, at ¶¶ 2–4. The National Trust was
created in 1949 to, among other things, “facilitate public
participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and objects
of national significance or interest[.]” 54 U.S.C. § 312102(a).
The National Trust has a long history of involvement in
President’s Park. Since 1956, the National Trust has owned the
historic home of Commodore Stephen Decatur, the first private
residence built in the Lafayette Square Historic District. See
Merritt Decl. ¶ 9. The Decatur House, which the famed Naval
Commodore enjoyed only briefly before his death in an honor
duel, sits on the northwest corner of Lafayette Square and looks
out onto President’s Park. Id.; Decl. of Alison K. Hoagland,
ECF No. 2-3, at ¶ 12. The National Trust “frequently” holds
board meetings at the Decatur House, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, since
the District of Columbia is the National Trust’s “principal”
location, 54 U.S.C. § 312103.
When the National Trust learned about the sudden
demolition of the East Wing, it warned the Park Service that
the “massing and height of the proposed new construction”
would “permanently disrupt the carefully balanced classical
design of the White House[.]” Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 51.
The National Trust urged the National Park Service to “pause”
demolition and construction until the proposal for the ballroom
could be publicly reviewed. Id. ¶ 52. The Park Service did not
respond. Id. ¶ 53.

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In December 2025, the National Trust filed this suit and
moved for a temporary restraining order halting further
construction. See Compl.; TRO Mot., ECF No. 2-1. As
relevant here, the National Trust argued that the Park Service
and its officers had acted contrary to law by starting the
ballroom project without Congress’s express authorization and
without statutorily required consultations, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). See Compl.
¶¶ 105–134, 154–160; TRO Mot. at 25–32. The National Trust
contended that if the Park Service continued with the ballroom
project, the National Trust and its members would suffer
“aesthetic, cultural, and historic harms” because “the historical
significance of [the White House’s] design will be physically
overcome” by the proposed ballroom. TRO Mot. at 45.
On the merits, the Defendants responded that the National
Trust’s claims were misdirected “[b]ecause [the Executive
Office of the President (EOP)] is managing this project” and
the relevant consultation statutes have “no application to the
President.” TRO Opp’n, ECF No. 14, at 22–26. At a hearing
on the National Trust’s motion, the Defendants doubled down:
Because the project “is being planned, directed, and executed
by the Executive Office of the President” and the Office of the
Executive Residence (EXR), and because neither of those
entities is an agency within the meaning of the APA, “there is
no agency action for [the] Court to enjoin[,]” so the Trust’s
APA claims necessarily fail. TRO Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 18, 22:2–
6, 24:17–20. In addition, the Defendants argued that EOP and
EXR have independent statutory authority to construct the
ballroom under Section 105(d)(1). TRO Opp’n at 23.
The Defendants further argued that the National Trust’s
claims were “unripe” because EOP and EXR would
“commence the statutory consultation process” shortly,
“architectural design for the above-grade elements is still in

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progress[,]” and “above-grade structural work will not occur
until April 2026, at the earliest.” TRO Opp’n at 18–19. When
pressed by the district court on whether the below-ground
work, which had already begun, would “dictate the height and
the width” of the ballroom itself, the Defendants assured the
district court that “[t]here’s nothing here to suggest” that
changes to the ballroom “would be impossible” or that
“anything irreversible” would occur during underground
construction. TRO Hr’g Tr. 21:9–20; see also id. 20:22–24
(“[T]he below-ground work that’s occurring now has nothing
to do with Plaintiff’s asserted aesthetic injury” from above-
ground construction of the ballroom.); Decl. of Professional
Engineer, ECF No. 30-4, at ¶ 9 (Defendants’ submission of a
declaration from a professional engineer stating that the
“primary foundation system for the structure can accommodate
potential design changes to the configuration of the above-
grade structure”).
The district court denied the National Trust’s request for a
temporary restraining order on the ground that there was “no
sufficiently imminent risk of irreparable aesthetic harm” tied to
above-ground construction that required immediate relief.
National Trust for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park
Serv., 813 F. Supp. 3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2025) (“National
Trust I”). The court expressly rested its ruling on “the
Government’s representations” that the above-ground designs
were not yet finalized, and added that “[i]f there is any below-
grade construction that dictates the size or scale of the proposed
ballroom * * *, then the Government should be prepared to
take it down” if required by a future ruling. Id.; see also id.
(“The Court will hold the Government to its word.”).
Two weeks later, the National Trust amended its complaint
and sought a preliminary injunction. See Am. Compl., ECF
No. 19; P.I. Mot., ECF No. 20. As relevant here, the National

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Trust added EOP and EXR as defendants based on the
Defendants’ representation that those entities were in charge of
the project. See P.I. Mot. at 10. The National Trust argued that
EXR was an agency for purposes of its APA claims and that
both EOP and EXR could be enjoined from constructing the
ballroom under the APA. Id. at 26–30. Alternatively, the
National Trust argued that EOP’s and EXR’s unilateral
direction of the project would violate the constitutional
separation of powers by usurping Congress’s authority under
the Property Clause. Id. at 32–35.
In January 2026, the Defendants opposed the National
Trust’s preliminary injunction motion. P.I. Opp’n, ECF
No. 30. The Defendants argued the National Trust was not
likely to succeed on the merits of its APA claim because “the
entity directing the project”—EXR—“is not subject to the
APA.” Id. at 22 (capitalization altered). The Defendants added
that an APA claim could not lie against the Park Service
because the Park Service “is indisputably not directing” the
project and that there was “no [Park Service] action that the
Court could set aside under the APA[.]” Id. at 26 n.7.
In February, the district court denied the National Trust’s
request for a preliminary injunction. National Trust for
Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park Serv., 821 F. Supp.
3d 62, 65 (D.D.C. 2026) (“National Trust II”). The district
court concluded that the National Trust had shown a substantial
likelihood of associational standing to vindicate cognizable
harms to its members’ aesthetic, historic, and cultural interests
in the White House and President’s Park. Id. at 68–71. But, in
reliance on the Defendants’ representation that EXR was “the
entity managing the East Wing project[,]” the district court
concluded that the Trust’s APA claims were unlikely to
succeed because “EXR is likely not an ‘agency’ under the
APA.” Id. at 71. The court further ruled that the National

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Trust’s claims were “properly characterized as statutory,” so it
lacked “a freestanding constitutional claim for injunctive
relief.” Id. at 73–74 (first quoting Global Health Council v.
Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2025)). The district court
noted that the National Trust had not pleaded a statutory ultra
vires claim. Id. at 76.
A week later, the National Trust amended its complaint to
add the claims that the Park Service, EOP, and EXR had acted
ultra vires and without statutory (or other) authority to erect a
ballroom on the White House grounds. 2d Am. Compl., ECF
No. 50, ¶¶ 197–224. The National Trust also repeated its
allegation that the Park Service had acted contrary to law in
violation of the APA and 40 U.S.C. § 8106 by beginning
construction of a whole new building on the White House
grounds without Congress’s express authorization. 2d Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 172–178. The National Trust then renewed its
request for a preliminary injunction. See generally 2d P.I.
Mot., ECF No. 51-1.
In response, the Defendants added a new defense that the
project was lawful because the Park Service had independent
authority to construct the ballroom on White House grounds
under its organic statute. 2d P.I. Opp’n, ECF No. 52, at 21–27
(citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101). That argument “came as a
surprise” to the district court, National Trust III, 827 F. Supp.
3d at 113, because the Defendants had previously argued—and
won the denial of a preliminary injunction by arguing—that the
Park Service had “no role” in the project and had taken no
action reviewable under the APA, P.I. Opp’n at 26 n.7, 32.
On March 31st, the district court preliminarily enjoined the
above-ground construction of the ballroom. See National Trust
III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 99. The district court concluded that, to
the extent EXR or EOP had ordered the construction, that

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action was likely ultra vires because (i) Congress has exclusive
constitutional authority over federal property like the White
House, (ii) 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1) does not authorize the
President to demolish an entire publicly funded Wing of the
White House and replace it with a privately funded ballroom,
and (iii) 40 U.S.C. § 8106 separately requires Congress’s
express approval for such an endeavor. See National Trust III,
827 F. Supp. 3d at 104–112. In addition, to the extent the Park
Service had a role in directing and funding the construction, the
district court concluded that such action was likely contrary to
law in violation of the APA because nothing in the Park
Service’s organic statute overrode the requirement of
congressional approval in 40 U.S.C. § 8106. See National
Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 112–114.
The district court enjoined the Park Service, EXR, EOP,
and related entities, officers, and agents “from taking any
action in furtherance of the physical development of the
proposed ballroom * * *, including but not limited to any
further demolition, site preparation work, landscape alteration,
excavation, foundation work, or other construction or related
work[.]” P.I. Order, ECF No. 61, at 1–2. The injunction did
not extend to the President himself. See generally id. At the
same time, the court exempted from the preliminary injunction
those “actions strictly necessary to ensure the safety and
security of the White House and its grounds, including the
ballroom construction site, and provide for the personal safety
of the President and his staff[.]” Id. at 2.
At the Defendants’ request, the district court stayed the
effect of its order for fourteen days to allow them time to seek
a stay pending appeal from this court. See P.I. Order at 2. The
Defendants noticed their appeal and moved this court for a stay
pending appeal.

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2
On April 11th, we extended the stay for an additional
week, remanded the case to the district court, and dismissed the
Defendants’ motion as moot. Per Curiam Order, No. 26-5101,
Dkt. 2168165 (April 11, 2026) (“Remand Order”). We did so
because the Defendants’ claimed irreparable harms—a
prerequisite for the issuance of a stay pending appeal—were
difficult to square with the limited record. See id. at 3 (citing
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).
The Defendants argued that the district court’s preliminary
injunction interfered with the construction of security fixtures
beneath the proposed ballroom. See Remand Order at 3. But
the injunction’s language prohibited only “physical
development of the proposed ballroom[.]” P.I. Order at 2
(emphasis added). It expressly exempted those “actions strictly
necessary to ensure the safety and security of the White House
and its grounds[.]” Id.
The Defendants also argued that the injunction would
jeopardize national security by delaying the realization of
security upgrades and the closure of the open construction site
on White House grounds. See Remand Order at 3–4. But the
Defendants had not explained how, if at all, the injunction
interfered with their plans to secure the grounds during a
project their own planning documents showed would not be
completed for more than two years at the earliest. See id.
(citing FONSI at 8).
We remanded the case to give the Defendants an
opportunity to develop a record of their claimed irreparable
harms and to allow the district court to resolve a then-pending
motion to clarify the injunction given the parties’ sharp

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disagreement over the scope of the injunction’s safety-and-
security exception. Remand Order at 4.
3
On remand, the Defendants told the district court that their
plans for below-ground security upgrades were “inseparable”
from the original ballroom design itself and that the two
“cannot exist in isolation.” See Resp. to Mot. to Clarify, ECF
No. 69, at 2–3. On that basis, the Defendants reasoned that the
court’s preliminary injunction had no effect and all
construction could proceed under the “‘safety-and-security’
exception” because “the entire project advances critical
national-security objectives as an integrated whole.” Id. at 1.
The district court strongly disagreed. See National Trust
for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park Serv., No. 25-
CV-4316, 2026 WL 1027744, at *1 (D.D.C. April 16, 2026)
(“National Trust IV”).
The court first pointed out that, through all previous stages
of the litigation, the Defendants had repeatedly represented that
the project’s “underground elements”—not anything above
ground—impacted national security, National Trust IV, 2026
WL 1027744, at *2, and that construction of the security
bunker below ground and the ballroom above were
“independent” of each other, id. at *3 (quoting P.I. Opp’n at
48). Further, the Defendants had assured the district court in
January that “the project’s below-ground elements do not ‘lock
in’ the design of the above-ground ballroom.” Id. at *2
(quoting P.I. Opp’n at 13). The district court found that the
Defendants’ current claim that the ballroom and below-ground
bunker construction have been an inseparable and integral
whole all along is “in direct conflict with Defendants’ prior
representations” to the court. Id. at *3.

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With that procedural background in mind, the district court
explained that its order enjoined “the above-ground, visible
construction of the ballroom,” but not below-ground
construction. National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744, at *2. In
the court’s judgment, that division both prevented the National
Trust’s threatened irreparable harms and respected the
“discrete national security concerns about construction of
underground elements” that the Defendants had raised
“throughout this case[.]” Id. The court further clarified that its
order did not affect the Secret Service’s plans to implement
“measures to ensure the security and safety of the President, the
First Family, and the White House complex[,]” id. at *3
(quotation marks omitted), or the Defendants’ plans “to
preserve and protect the structural integrity of the White House
and to protect the construction site itself from deterioration due
to the elements[,]” id. at *4. “Both categories of construction
activities may proceed.” Id.
The district court then modified its earlier preliminary
injunction to clarify that the order prohibits the Park Service,
EOP, EXR, and related officers, entities, and agents “from
taking any action in furtherance of the above-ground physical
construction of the proposed ballroom[.]” Am. P.I. Order, ECF
No. 73, at 1–2. At the same time—as long as the actions “will
not lock in the above-ground size and scale of the ballroom”—
the preliminary injunction “does not prohibit”:
 “[B]elow-ground construction, including below-
ground construction of national security
facilities”;
 “[A]bove-ground construction * * * that is strictly
necessary to cover, secure, and protect such
national security facilities”;

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 “[M]easures strictly necessary to provide for the
personal safety of the President and his staff short
of constructing the proposed above-ground
ballroom”; or
 “[C]onstruction strictly necessary to ensure the
safety, security, and structural integrity of the
White House, the White House grounds, and the
below-ground construction site—including
waterproofing, water management, structural
reinforcement, and sealing off exposed
construction areas—short of constructing the
proposed above-ground ballroom[.]”
Id. at 2–3.
The district court crafted each of those exceptions in
response to the specific national-security concerns the
Defendants had raised. National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744,
at *4. The court added that, having demarcated the lines
between prohibited and permissible construction, it would not
require the Defendants “to request and receive written approval
before proceeding” under those exceptions. Id. at *5 (quotation
marks omitted); see also id. (“I have no desire or intention to
be dragooned into the role of construction manager.”).
The district court stayed the effect of its amended
preliminary injunction until April 23, 2026, to allow the
Defendants to seek appellate relief. See Am. P.I. Order at 3;
National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744, at *5.
On the Defendants’ renewed motion for a stay pending
appeal, this court issued an administrative stay, consolidated
the stay motion and merits appeal from the preliminary

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injunction, and ordered highly expedited briefing and oral
argument.
II
Before reaching the merits, we must, as always, assure
ourselves of our jurisdiction, including Article III standing. At
the preliminary injunction stage, the National Trust needs to
“clear[ly]” show that it is “likely to establish each element of
standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024)
(quotation marks omitted).
An association like the National Trust has standing to sue
on behalf of its membership when (A) at least one of its
members would have standing independently, (B) the interests
the association is suing to protect “are germane to the
organization’s purpose[,]” and (C) the claim the association
asserts and the relief it requests do not require “the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College,
143 S. Ct. 2141, 2157 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).
At this preliminary stage, the National Trust clears those
hurdles.
A
1
With respect to the first prong of the associational standing
test, the National Trust has clearly shown that one of its
members likely has standing to sue in her own right.
Specifically, the Trust has shown that (i) its long-term member,
Professor Alison Hoagland, has suffered a concrete and
particularized “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent”; (ii)

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her injury “is fairly traceable to the challenged action”; and (iii)
her injury will likely be redressed by a ruling in the National
Trust’s favor. Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior, 152
F.4th 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Center for
Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir.
2015)); see Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S. Ct. at 2157.
The National Trust identified Professor Hoagland as a
representative “example” of its “thousands of members” who
would be injured by the ballroom project. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
Professor Hoagland is an architectural historian, author,
consultant, and professor emerita in historic preservation.
Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, 16. She has been a member of the
National Trust for over 40 years. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She is currently
a Trustee of the National Trust and serves on its Executive
Committee. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She previously worked for fifteen
years as the senior historian at the National Park Service’s
Historic American Buildings Survey, which documents
historic aspects of national sites, including the White House.
Id. ¶ 5.
Professor Hoagland routinely recreates by walking in front
of the White House and in Lafayette Square directly across
from the White House, and she “intend[s] to continue” doing
so. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. She “regularly walk[s] through
portions of President’s Park, including Lafayette Square, in
order to enjoy the historic buildings” in the area, the carefully
preserved historic architecture, and “the beauty of the L’Enfant
Plan[.]” Id. ¶ 9. She routinely “use[s], enjoy[s],” and
“derive[s] benefit from” President’s Park, “including the White
House[.]” Id. ¶ 3. A particular focus of Professor Hoagland’s

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tours is the “iconic” White House complex, which “continue[d]
to * * * impress[]” her after years of visits. Id. ¶ 12.3 F
4
In addition, as a Trustee and Executive Committee
member of the National Trust, Professor Hoagland attends
Board meetings that are “frequently” held at the Decatur
House, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, a historic property “on the northwest
corner of Lafayette Square,” across the quadrangle from the
White House. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. She plans to attend those
meetings, which happen “at least annually,” at the Decatur
House in 2026. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12. To get to the meetings,
Professor Hoagland, who lives just two miles away on Capitol
Hill, commonly walks along Lafayette Square in front of the
White House to enjoy its architectural simplicity and historical
significance. See id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
Professor Hoagland also is a professional academic who
continues to study and relies on the architectural design of the
White House and President’s Park in her work. See Hoagland
Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14. Specifically, she is a historian who publishes
works on historical architecture in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 4.
She has a special interest in vernacular architecture and the
District’s unique architectural history, and she has authored
several books and scholarly articles on those topics. See id.
¶¶ 4, 8. The structural appearance of the White House “affects
[Professor Hoagland’s] research” on “locally focused
architecture” because, throughout the Nation’s history, the
4 The dissenting opinion’s standing argument rests on a
misconstruction of Professor Hoagland’s declaration. It claims that
Professor Hoagland intends to travel to the area about once a month
only to “attend functions in neighboring buildings.” Dissenting Op.
14. The declaration actually states that she “intend[s] to continue to
travel to the area around the White House, to walk through Lafayette
Square, to attend functions in neighboring buildings, and to continue
to be impressed by this iconic building.” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12.

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White House has “help[ed] to define” development in the
surrounding area, “while also serving as a landmark defining
L’Enfant’s plan for the city[.]” Id. ¶ 11. Indeed, as Professor
Hoagland notes, the White House sits at an important central
axis on the L’Enfant Plan, thus influencing the urban design of
the rest of the city. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Because of that, Professor
Hoagland uses “the White House as a reference point” for her
studies of D.C.’s architecture, given its role as “one of the first
prominent government buildings” in the early days of our new
Nation, and presently “as the most important house in the
city[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 11; see also id. at ¶ 16. For Professor
Hoagland, the White House—designed to reflect “republican
simplicity”—“is one of the clearest examples of a building
constructed with the explicit intention of imparting meaning
with its style, size, and scale[,]” the message being that the
home of the elected United States President is designedly a
“modest building[.]” Id. ¶ 10.
Professor Hoagland further attests that building the 90,000
square-foot ballroom “would cause permanent and irreparable
harm to the White House and President’s Park” because it
would “overshadow[] the White House, exceeding it in height
and massing, [and] would diminish the primacy of the White
House[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 13. She explains that “[n]o longer
would the eye be drawn to the jewel of the building in the
center,” which was designed to “declar[e] to viewers that our
president lives in a house[,]” and “not a palace.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.
Those changes, Professor Hoagland explains, will cause her to
“suffer both professional and personal injuries” to her
“aesthetic, cultural, and historic interests[.]” Id. ¶ 14. Her
“use” and “enjoy[ment]” of the White House, which have
already “been impaired by the destruction of the East Wing of
the White House[,] * * * will be impaired further by the
construction on the East Wing’s former site of a ballroom

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substantially similar” in size and design “to that which the
defendants propose to build.” Id. ¶ 3.
In addition, Professor Hoagland’s work as a Trustee and
member of the National Trust “will be impaired” by the
construction of the ballroom as the Trust focuses on
“preserving and protecting historic and cultural resources in
Washington, D.C.,” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3, including the Trust-
owned Decatur House, id. ¶ 12, a historic residence hugging
the corner of Lafayette Square, Merritt Decl. ¶ 9, and its
environs and neighboring historic structures that make up the
historic district.
Further, like many National Trust members, Professor
Hoagland “use[s], enjoy[s], derive[s] benefit from, and ha[s] a
substantial interest in preserving and protecting historic and
cultural resources in Washington, D.C., including the White
House and President’s Park[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3. She
“intend[s] to continue to travel to the area around the White
House, to walk through Lafayette Square, [and] to attend
functions in neighboring buildings * * * about once a
month[.]” Id. ¶ 12. With the construction of the ballroom, her
walks through President’s Park would no longer permit her to
“enjoy” the “innovative preservation project concerning the
buildings surrounding Lafayette Square[,]” if that historical
coherence is destroyed by such an ahistoric and asymmetrical
change to the most important building in the Square. Id. ¶¶ 9,
10, 14. Construction of the ballroom, in short, will cause
Professor Hoagland personal and professional “injuries,
including to [her] aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests[.]”
Id. ¶ 14.
In those ways, Professor Hoagland has adequately alleged,
at this stage of the litigation, concrete and imminent
“professional and personal[,]” historical-preservation, and

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aesthetic injuries that “[she] would suffer[.]” Hoagland Decl.
¶ 14. For her, the historical and architectural coherence of
President’s Park and the White House that she routinely enjoys
studying, viewing, and spending time with would be
permanently lost by the construction of a structure that
“overshadow[s] the White House,” “exceeding it in height and
massing[.]” Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.
Professor Hoagland’s specific, here-and-now, and
frequently recurring injuries qualify as an Article III injury. A
plaintiff like Professor Hoagland who “aver[s] that [she] use[s]
the affected area” and is an individual “‘for whom the aesthetic
and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the
challenged activity” has “adequately allege[d]” an injury in
fact. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); see also Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) (“[I]f [the alleged] harm in fact
affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the
plaintiff, that will suffice.”).
Numerous cases from the Supreme Court and this court
have recognized Article III injuries in similar circumstances.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181–183 (holding
that individuals who lived within driving distance of a river and
who fished in it and picnicked along its banks had standing to
challenge water pollution); Center for Biological Diversity v.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 146 F.4th 1144, 1157–1158 (D.C. Cir.
2025) (holding that an amateur photographer and entomophile
who went on annual vacations to view the American Burying
Beetle had standing to challenge a change in its protected
status); International Dark-Sky Ass’n v. FCC, 106 F.4th 1206,
1217 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (holding that amateur stargazers and
astronomers who look at the sky for recreation had standing to
challenge an environmental assessment of a license permitting

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satellites that caused light pollution); Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764
F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the National Trust’s
members who “view and enjoy” the historic battlefield site of
Blair Mountain “for purposes of studying and appreciating its
history” had standing to challenge governmental action
affecting the historical status of the Mountain); see also
Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (recognizing government admission
that a plaintiff who had repeatedly visited a national forest to
view flora and fauna, and who had imminent plans to do so
again, suffered a cognizable aesthetic injury for purposes of
standing from a planned sale of felled logs).4F
5
5 The dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish these cases by
pointing out that “stargazers” “use the sky” when looking at
constellations and history buffs “view and enjoy” a battlefield when
they visit it to study and appreciate its historical significance.
Dissenting Op. 13 (first quoting International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106
F.4th at 1217, and second quoting Sierra Club, 764 F.3d at 5).
Professor Hoagland alleges the same. She has attested that she
“use[s] * * * the White House and President’s Park” when she
“regularly walk[s]” there “in order to enjoy the historic buildings, the
beauty of the L’Enfant Plan * * *, and the innovative preservation
project concerning the buildings surrounding Lafayette Square[.]”
Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 3, 9. The dissenting opinion offers no principled
distinction between the injury in fact of disrupted star gazing,
battlefield gazing, animal viewing, and Professor Hoagland’s
disrupted historic architecture viewing (and studying).
The dissenting opinion also claims that Professor Hoagland’s
injuries are not sufficiently “imminent.” Dissenting Op. 13–14. That
is wrong. Her concrete plans to “travel to the area around the White
House” to see the “iconic [White House] building * * * about once a
month” plainly are imminent under established precedent. Hoagland
Decl. ¶ 12. The Supreme Court, moreover, has found an imminent
injury when the defendant was likely to award a relevant contract “at
least once per year,” and the plaintiff was “very likely to bid on each
such contract[.]” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,

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Before both the district court and this court, the
Defendants insisted that Professor Hoagland and members of
the public will not be able to see the massive ballroom from
various angles around Lafayette Square. See 2d P.I. Opp’n at
37 (“Dr. Hoagland could scarcely see the old East Wing from
public view, and the new East Wing will be equally
obscured.”); Oral Arg. Tr. 7:3–8 (“[A]t least in the classic
locations where people come to view the White House from the
south, you will not be able to see the east wing. * * * If you
come to the front from the north view, the classic view, the
trees are designed to shield the view.”); id. at 9:3–5 (“I think
[Professor Hoagland] would have to intentionally put herself in
the very narrow locations where you can actually view [the
ballroom].”).
“[P]ure fiction” was the district court’s response to that
factual argument. National Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 114
n.18. The district court found as fact that “Defendants’ own
renderings show that the proposed ballroom will be clearly
visible from Lafayette Park, and even from the steps of the U.S.
Capitol[.]” Id. (citing Executive Director’s Recommendation,
National Cap. Planning Comm’n 17–18 (March 5, 2026),
https://perma.cc/4LFC-YDEJ). The Defendants have not
argued those findings were clear error. See Doe v. Blanche,
172 F.4th 901, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2026). Nor could they given that
the National Park Service itself found that the ballroom will
“permanently alter[]” “views of the White House from
Lafayette Park[,]” and will cause “visual imbalance” in the
White House’s historic appearance. FONSI at 6, 7; Env’t
212 (1995). This court likewise has found aesthetic standing where
a plaintiff “plan[ned] to” observe beetles in the habitat at issue “[i]n
the coming years * * * during his annual summer vacation.” Center
for Biological Diversity, 146 F.4th at 1158 (quotation marks
omitted).

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Assessment at 19 (“[V]iews from certain locations, particularly
Lafayette Square and portions of the Ellipse, would be altered
[by ballroom construction].”).
Nor can the Defendants claim that Professor Hoagland is
misguided in asserting those injuries. The Defendants
themselves have admitted that constructing the ballroom will
cause the same substantial, adverse, and irreparable visual,
aesthetic, historical-preservation, and architectural
consequences to which Professor Hoagland gives voice and
which “thousands” of National Trust members share, 2d Am.
Compl. ¶ 22. In its August 2025 Environmental Assessment
and Finding of No Significant Impact, the National Park
Service concluded that “views of the White House from
Lafayette Park and the Ellipse will be permanently altered due
to the modifications to the East Wing.” FONSI at 6 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 5 (Park Service explaining that
“[s]ituated on a high point within the city, the White House is
a focal point on the principal north-south axis of L’Enfant’s
plan[,]” in which “[v]iews and vistas were among the most
essential features”).
The report also found that the ballroom “will disrupt the
historical continuity of the White House grounds and alter the
architectural integrity of the east side[.]” FONSI at 7. That is
because the addition of the ballroom “will dominate the eastern
portion of the site, creating a visual imbalance with the more
modestly scaled West Wing and Executive Mansion.” Id.
The Defendants’ own admission of the extensive and
permanent architectural, historical-preservation, and other
aesthetic harms that the ballroom construction will cause
underscores the concreteness, imminence, and substantiality of
Professor Hoagland’s individualized injuries, which arise from
her routine recreational, volunteer, and professional activities

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in President’s Park. At the same time, such official
concurrence, after in-depth and formal review by the Executive
Branch, certainly belies the Defendants’ effort to paint
Professor Hoagland’s injuries as the idiosyncratic grousing of
“a single pedestrian[]” who “occasionally walks near
President’s Park[.]” Defs.’ Opening Br. 4.
Nor is it accurate for the Defendants to categorize
Professor Hoagland’s injury as a mere “psychological
consequence” that similarly impacts everyone across the
country. Defs.’ Opening Br. 24 (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)). Professor Hoagland
has identified concrete ways she is personally and routinely
impacted by the ballroom construction in her professional
commitments that require her to meet in Lafayette Square, her
recreational time walking through President’s Park to enjoy its
historic architecture, and her professional research and writing
that focus on D.C. architecture and its connection to the
L’Enfant Plan, of which the White House serves as a critical
focal point. See Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11–14; see also BERG,
GRAND AVENUES at 102 (In the L’Enfant Plan, “[t]he Congress
House and President’s House were set on the two highest points
in the territory, providing a pair of geometrical and
geographical anchors for the city’s road map.”); Alison K.
Hoagland, Nineteenth-Century Building Regulations in
Washington, D.C., 52 R ECS . COLUMBIA HIST . SOC’ Y 57, 58
(1989) (“[President] Washington’s regulations, primarily
concerned with aesthetics, were intended to produce buildings
which complemented L’Enfant’s plan[.]”).
In those ways, Professor Hoagland is a far cry from the
doctors alleging harm when thinking about or witnessing others
use abortion drugs. Defs.’ Opening Br. 10 (quoting Food &
Drug Admin. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540,

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1561 n.3 (2024)). She has alleged direct harm to her personal
“aesthetic, cultural, and historic” interests that she fulfills
through her regular visits to President’s Park, Hoagland Decl.
¶¶ 11–14, not mere “distress at or disagreement with the
activities of others[,]” divorced from the governmental action’s
direct effect on her, Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct.
at 1561 n.3.
The Defendants maintain that Professor Hoagland can
easily avert her gaze to avoid viewing the new ballroom and so
she is “[u]nlike” the plaintiffs in cases in which we have found
standing when plaintiffs are “deprived of [the] opportunity” to
view something they wish to observe. Defs.’ Opening Br. 27.
That is wrong. Professor Hoagland will no longer be able to
“use[ and] derive benefit from” seeing and studying a White
House with historic and intentionally designed “republican
simplicity,” and that permanent loss will injure her “aesthetic,
cultural, and historical interests[.]” Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 3, 10,
14. She will also lose forever the opportunity to view Lafayette
Square with the intentional architectural symmetry of the 235-
year-old L’Enfant Plan—an experience she greatly values—if
the ballroom is constructed as planned. See id. at ¶¶ 9, 13. The
proposed ballroom would so alter the symmetry of the White
House complex that it would no longer remain in harmony with
the symmetry of Major L’Enfant’s axial plan of the capital city,
in which the President’s House and the Capitol building sit
symmetrically on perpendicular axes. See FONSI at 6–7 (“This
change will disrupt the historical continuity of the White House
grounds and alter the architectural integrity of the east side of
the property.”); Env’t Assessment at 10 (noting that the
symmetrically designed “axial relationship” that had
previously existed between the Capitol and the White House
had been “one of the defining attributes for the entirety of
Washington, DC’s monumental core”).

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The Defendants nonetheless insist that aesthetic harm from
the permanent visual destruction of part of the Nation’s history
is insufficient unless it also changes the plaintiff’s conduct.
Defs.’ Opening Br. 28–29. That makes no sense. The whole
point of preserving historic buildings and sites, monuments,
and memorials is for members of the public to be able to visit
them, view them, and appreciate them, even though they cannot
use them in the tangible ways the Defendants would require.
Some people visit particular national sites—like the Mormon
Pioneer Trail, the First Baptist Meeting House in America,
Ebenezer Baptist Church, and Zion and Bryce Canyon National
Parks—because of their religious significance and inspiration,
and the loss of the ability to have that religious experience has
long been acknowledged to be an Article III injury. See, e.g.,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.
439, 442 (1988) (adjudicating the merits of a case when the
alleged injury was that the construction of a road would
damage “the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary
part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California
Indian peoples”); Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres.
Off. v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that “the
destruction of the ceremonial landscapes” used by the
Narragansett Tribe for cultural and religious purposes
“certainly qualifies as an injury in fact”); Arizona Mining
Reform Coal. v. Forest Serv., 172 F.4th 641, 655 (9th Cir.
2026) (finding standing for Apache Tribe members challenging
a copper mine’s construction when the Forest Service’s
assessment identified “physical and visual impacts on
traditional cultural places” that the Apache used for religious
ceremonies) (formatting modified); South Texas Env’t Just.
Network v. Texas Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 165 F.4th 356, 366
(5th Cir. 2026) (holding that the Carrizo Comecrudo Tribe had
standing to challenge the construction of a natural gas pipeline
when the Tribe alleged that its members’ “recreational,

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aesthetic, and religious experiences in the area surrounding the
site will be harmed”).
In that same way, others seek aesthetic, familial, cultural,
historical, or educational connection and enrichment from
visiting national sites and parks and culturally significant
places. See Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1314–1315 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (finding standing for plaintiffs alleging harm due to
“the closure and redevelopment of Fort Ritchie[,]” “an historic
site they visit and enjoy”); Sierra Club v. Department of
Transportation, 125 F.4th 1170, 1181–1182 (D.C. Cir. 2025)
(finding standing for a native Tribe challenging the shipping of
natural gas through tribal land, which affects “the Tribe’s
heritage, its land, its people, and its resources”) (quotation
marks omitted).
The Defendants’ cramped standing theory would deem no
one injured by a decision to raze the Statue of Liberty, to
obscure the names on the Vietnam War Memorial, or to install
a political billboard atop Mount Rushmore. People wounded
by the lost historical view could just “shift [their] gaze[.]”
Defs.’ Opening Br. 25. Yet the harm would remain from being
unable to look upon, learn from, or commune in a location
where, for example, a personal hero was born, an ancestor first
arrived in the United States, a relative died on September 11th,
or the battle for the individual’s equal rights and dignity first
started. The Defendants’ argument, in other words, simply
brushes off the signification, emotion, meaning, and
particularized value to individuals of witnessing certain places
where their history happened, looking upon architectural
marvels, reveling in sweeping landscapes, and viewing
buildings, memorials, and monuments that tell the American
story.

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The Defendants’ and the dissenting opinion’s resort to
Environmental Defense Fund v. FERC, 2 F.4th 953 (D.C. Cir.
2021), is of no help. In that case, the plaintiff complained that
a metering station she would drive by and incidentally view
was an “eyesore,” but “she never indicate[d] how she derived
aesthetic value from the land as it had existed before the
construction[,]” “that she intended to use the land in the
future[,]” or “that her planned future uses of the land have been
foreclosed by the construction[.]” Id. at 969; see also Gardner
v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1342–1343 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding
no aesthetic injury for individuals opposing the move of a
Confederate statue because the plaintiffs failed to allege that
they “routinely visited the monument [in the prior location] or,
alternatively, that they won’t be able to visit the monument at
its new location”). Professor Hoagland, by contrast, has
detailed (i) her aesthetic and professional interests in
appreciating and studying the historic design of the White
House, the architectural significance it embodies, and the
political statement it makes about her value as a citizen,
Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 10–14; (ii) her regular visits to enjoy and
take in the views, id. ¶¶ 9–10, and intent to continue to do so
on a routine basis, id. ¶ 12; and (iii) how the proposed ballroom
would materially injure her personal and professional
enjoyment of the historic site, id. ¶¶ 13–14.
Further, Professor Hoagland has alleged a “particularized
connection” to the Lafayette Square historic district. As a
Trustee of the National Trust, Professor Hoagland has a
professional interest in the historic nature of Lafayette Square,
which houses the Trust’s meetings. See Section II.B., infra.
Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Environmental Defense Fund,
Professor Hoagland’s individualized harm goes beyond just
passing distaste. She chooses routes through President’s Park
that provide her with views of the White House for personal
recreation, enjoyment, and aesthetic pleasure, both as an

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individual and as someone with a keen appreciation for the
architecture. Further, her academic work using the unique
architecture of “the most important house in the city” as a
central “landmark defining L’Enfant’s plan for the city” will be
hampered by the construction of the looming ballroom as part
of the White House. Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11.
2
The National Trust has also clearly shown a likelihood of
establishing that the Defendants have caused Professor
Hoagland’s injuries and that court-ordered relief can redress
them. Indeed, the Defendants have not challenged the National
Trust’s standing on these grounds. For good reason. The
National Trust, as voiced by its member Professor Hoagland,
has explained—and the district court found as fact—that
constructing a ballroom of the looming size the Defendants
intend on the East Wing’s former site will cause the very harms
identified by Professor Hoagland. Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 13–14;
National Trust II, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 70–71; see Diamond Alt.
Energy, LLC v. EPA, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 2135 (2025); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
77–78 (1978); see also P.I. Hr’g, ECF No. 57, 11:12–14
(“Once above-grade construction proceeds, those adverse
aesthetic impacts and the adverse cultural impacts will be
locked in.”); Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1799 (2021)
(noting that the traceability inquiry asks “whether the
plaintiffs’ injury can be traced to allegedly unlawful conduct of
the defendant, not to the provision of law that is challenged”)
(quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the Defendants do not dispute that an
injunction from the district court preventing ballroom
construction will remediate that injury. See Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 185–186 (“It can scarcely be doubted that,

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for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury
due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction
that effectively abates that conduct * * * provides a form of
redress.”).
B
Having clearly shown that an individual member of the
Trust likely has standing, the National Trust also is likely to
establish the second prong of associational standing—
germaneness—because the historical and architectural injuries
asserted fall squarely within its area of expertise and concern.
Germaneness requires “pertinence” between the object of
the litigation and the plaintiff’s “organizational purpose.”
Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 597 (quotation marks
omitted); see International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218.
The point of the inquiry is to prevent organizations from
litigating “issues as to which the organizations themselves
enjoy little expertise and about which few of their members
demonstrably care.” Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at
597 (quotation marks omitted). In that way, the germaneness
requirement guards against an association “alleging injury
from governmental action wholly unrelated” to its own
interests; otherwise, an association could become akin to a law
firm “seeking to sue in its own name on behalf of a client * * *
alleging injury from governmental action wholly unrelated to
the firm.” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45,
57–58 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted).
That concern has no purchase here. The National Trust
was chartered by Congress in 1949 as a nonprofit corporation,
“to facilitate public participation in the preservation of sites,
buildings, and objects of national significance or interest[.]” 54
U.S.C. § 312102(a); Merritt Decl. ¶ 2. Its “self-described

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mission[,]” International Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218, is
to “protect[] America’s historic sites through stewardship,
advocacy, and direct assistance[,]” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 21.
The National Trust also has unquestioned “expertise” in
historic sites and the preservation of historic buildings and
land, and its members are “demonstrably” invested in that
cause. See Center for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 597
(quoting Humane Soc’y of the U.S., 840 F.2d at 57); see also
2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (“Members of the National Trust use,
enjoy, derive personal and professional benefit from, and have
a substantial interest in preserving and protecting historic and
cultural resources in Washington, D.C., including the White
House and President’s Park.”); Letter from Nat’l Trust to Defs.,
ECF No. 2-16, at 2 (“[The National Trust’s] mission is to
protect America’s significant historic sites and to advocate for
historic preservation as a core public value.”); International
Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at 1218 (holding that the mission of
an association of “stargazers” that “exists primarily to provide
information and education to the public” was germane to a
lawsuit challenging the environmental assessment of a license
for satellites emitting light pollution).
The Defendants contend that the National Trust’s purpose
is limited to just two of its enumerated statutory authorities—
that is, to “receive donations of sites, buildings, and objects
significant in American history and culture” and to “preserve
and administer” those sites “for public benefit.” Defs.’
Opening Br. 32 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(1), (2)).
Because the Trust cannot acquire property within a National
Park, 54 U.S.C. § 312105(g), the Defendants assert that the
National Trust lacks any “role to play” in regard to the White
House. Defs.’ Opening Br. 33; see also Dissenting Op. 7–8.

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At the outset, we are skeptical that the germaneness
inquiry is limited to the National Trust’s statutorily delineated
functions. We have specifically rejected the idea that an
association fails to satisfy the germaneness requirement
because there is “no specific reference in its certificate of
incorporation” to the “litigation subject[.]” Humane Soc’y of
the U.S., 840 F.2d at 58–59; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he
[Supreme] Court nowhere has suggested that mention of a
given purpose in an organization’s organic papers is
talismanic[.]”). True, the National Trust is differently situated
from some other associational plaintiffs because its purposes
are statutorily defined. But neither the Defendants nor the
dissenting opinion offer a good reason that difference should
matter.
The dissenting opinion argues that a congressionally
chartered nonprofit corporation may sue “only to vindicate its
statutory authority.” Dissenting Op. 7. None of the cases cited
for that proposition are relevant to the National Trust’s
challenge. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, 241 U.S. 295, 302–303 (1916) (Railroad foreclosure
case interpreting a 1915 law that stripped federal courts of
jurisdiction over cases against railroads where the federal
question jurisdiction was based only on the railroad being
incorporated by federal statute); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n
v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (Telecommunications case
holding that agency action does not preempt state law when the
agency has acted outside its statutory scope of authority);
Department of Transportation v. Association of American
Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 54–55 (2015) (holding that separation
of powers claims could be brought against Amtrak because
“[t]he political branches created Amtrak, control its Board,
define its mission, specify many of its day-to-day operations,
have imposed substantial transparency and accountability
mechanisms, and, for all practical purposes, set and supervise

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its annual budget”). These cases have nothing to say about
congressionally chartered nonprofits or the germaneness
requirement of associational standing.
Anyhow, even if the National Trust’s associational
interests to which litigation could be pertinent were tied tightly
to the mast of its charter, the Defendants’ argument would still
fail in multiple respects.
To start, the Defendants and dissenting opinion ignore that
the National Trust’s charter also charges it with “carrying out
[a] preservation program” that goes beyond just receiving
pieces of property. 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(3). Specifically, the
National Trust is directed to work with agencies at all levels of
government, “corporations, associations, [and] individuals” to
promote the “protection, preservation, maintenance, or
operation of any historic site, building, object, or property used
in connection with the site, * * * regardless of whether the
National Trust has acquired title to the property, or any
interest in the property.” Id. § 312105(h) (emphasis added).
The National Trust’s interest in preserving the architectural
history of the White House and President’s Park accordingly
falls squarely within its congressionally chartered role and
concern.
Indeed, the National Trust’s ability to preserve the
architectural and historic environment of property it owns—
including the Decatur House in President’s Park—is directly
affected by the ballroom construction. See Nat’l Trust Br. 27–
28; Env’t Assessment at 11 (The new ballroom “would have
permanent adverse impacts on the cultural landscape [of
President’s Park], particularly the White House Grounds
cultural landscape.”). The Decatur House was the first private
home built in the area near the White House and sits on the
northwest corner of President’s Park, looking out onto the

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future ballroom site. See Merritt Decl. ¶ 9; FONSI at 15
(“[V]iews of the White House from Lafayette Park and the
Ellipse will be permanently altered due to the modifications to
the East Wing.”). Lafayette Square is home not only to the
Decatur House, but also to other historic buildings that have
played a key role in American history, like the Dolley Madison
House and the President’s Guest House. Matthew R. Costello,
Lafayette Square: The People’s Park, 32 W ASH. HIST . Fall
2020, at 10; see also Merritt Decl. ¶ 9.
Protecting the nature of its own historic neighborhood is
certainly pertinent to the National Trust’s mission. Congress
has charged the National Trust to “preserve * * * for public
benefit” the Decatur House, 54 U.S.C. § 312102(b)(2), and to
“facilitate public participation in the preservation of sites,
buildings, and objects of national significance” more broadly,
id. § 312102(a). After all, the significance of the Decatur
House is dependent, in part, on its location in one of the most
architecturally historic areas in the District of Columbia.
Tearing a hole in the architectural cohesion of President’s Park
and the Lafayette Square historic district diminishes the
historic significance of the Decatur House itself and threatens
the legacy of the oldest residence in the area. See Merritt Decl.
¶ 9. By bringing this lawsuit on behalf of its thousands of
members who share “a substantial interest in preserving and
protecting historic and cultural resources in Washington,
D.C.,” the National Trust is facilitating just such participation
and fulfilling its “advocacy” mission. See Hoagland Decl. ¶ 3;
2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22; see also International Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America v.
Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 286 (1986) (reasoning that “there is little
question that the interests” of a union advocating for its
members’ unemployment benefits were “germane to the
organization’s purpose” when one of the goals enumerated in

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the union’s constitution was to advocate “on a national scale”
for benefits).
Further, the National Trust was established “to facilitate
public participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and
objects of national significance or interest[,]” 54 U.S.C.
§ 312102(a), as well as to “further” the “national policy” of
preserving such sites, buildings, and objects “for the inspiration
and benefit of the people of the United States[,]” id.; id.
§ 320101. Such a mission is certainly pertinent to the National
Trust’s aim of ensuring a historically integrated and cohesive
design for whatever is built where the East Wing used to stand.
See id. § 312105(k) (“The National Trust may generally do any
and all lawful acts necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes for which the National Trust is created.”).
In that regard, we note that this court has previously held
that the National Trust has associational standing to challenge
the spoliation of historic sites over which it has no ownership
or legal interests. In Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014), we held that a group of “environmental and historic
preservation organizations,” including the National Trust, had
associational standing to challenge the delisting of Blair
Mountain battlefield from the National Register of Historic
Places. Id. at 3. This court so held even though “the Battlefield
area [was] privately owned” and there was no evidence that any
member “possess[ed] any legal entitlement to set foot” on it.
Id. at 6. We explained that “there is no reason that the
cognizability of aesthetic and associated interests in a particular
site could turn on owning a legal right to enter or view the
property.” Id.
The dissenting opinion insists that Sierra Club amounts to
nothing more than a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling[.]”
Dissenting Op. 10. Hardly. Sierra Club did not “silently

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assume[] jurisdiction or merely state[] without analysis that it
existed[.]” United States v. Jones, 846 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (citation omitted). Quite the opposite, Sierra Club’s
only holding was that the plaintiffs there—the National Trust
included—had standing. See 764 F.3d at 3. And Sierra Club
did so in express reliance on declarations from the National
Trust’s members. See id. at 5; Decl. of Barbara Rasmussen,
Sierra Club v. Salazar, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (No.
10-1513), ECF No. 23-6, at ¶ 1; Decl. of Nell Ziehl, Sierra
Club, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97, ECF No. 23-8, at ¶ 1. See also
National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite, 925 F.3d 500,
501 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (National Trust participation
in suit challenging a utility’s erection of electrical transmission
towers across the James River); National Trust for Historic
Pres. in the U.S. v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (challenging construction barriers on the Duke
Ellington Bridge).
C
Finally, there is no serious question that the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought by the National Trust does not require
the participation of an individual plaintiff. Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977)
(holding that a “request for declaratory and injunctive relief”
does not mandate “individualized proof[,]” and so it is
“properly resolved in a group context”); Animal Legal Def.
Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack, 111 F.4th 1219, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(holding that animal rights group seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against an agency did not require “personal
participation” by individual members).

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* * * * *
For all of those reasons, we affirm the district court’s
conclusion that the National Trust has clearly shown a
likelihood of associational standing.
III
We now turn to the merits of the Defendants’ appeal. For
a preliminary injunction to issue, the district court must find
that (1) the moving party is likely to “succeed on the merits”;
(2) the moving party is likely to “suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief”; (3) the equities favor the
issuance of an injunction; and (4) “an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008). We review the district court’s issuance of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Media Matters
for America v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
On this record, the Defendants have not shown that the
district court abused its discretion in enjoining above-ground
construction of the planned ballroom itself while still allowing
the below-ground construction of security features and the
above-ground construction of measures necessary to ensure
safety and security.
A
The National Trust has shown that it is likely to succeed
on the merits.
The Defendants concede that the Executive lacks any
inherent constitutional authority to construct the ballroom.
Instead, as all agree, the Constitution gives Congress exclusive
authority to regulate federal property and the District of

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Columbia. See U.S. CONST . Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; id. Art. I, § 8,
cl. 17. The only question is therefore whether Congress has
authorized the Defendants’ ballroom construction by statute.
The Defendants point to two potential sources of authority.
The first is 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), a provision of the statute
creating the National Park Service. The second is 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d), which addresses the President, and under which the
Office of the Executive Residence (EXR) is purportedly acting
to lead the construction.
Importantly, however, the Defendants have authority to
carry out the ballroom construction only if both statutes apply.
Section 100101(a) alone cannot support the project because, as
we detail below, the only statute that could supply EXR
authority to lead the project is Section 105(d). And the
Defendants conceded at oral argument that Section 105(d)
alone cannot support the project. Oral Arg. Tr. 55:4–56:19.
That is so because the project is funded by private donations
given to the National Park Service and—even on the
Defendants’ view of the case—those funds can be used to
support the ballroom construction only if the National Park
Service could use the funds under Section 100101(a) for the
identified purposes of conservation and preservation.5F
6
6 The dissenting opinion asserts that we “need not address the
Trust’s APA challenge to NPS’s construction authority[.]”
Dissenting Op. 24–25 n.8. That assertion rests on the premise that
the Park Service’s sole involvement is “collecting donations and
transferring them to EXR[.]” Id. But the Defendants themselves
claim that the Park Service can fulfill that role only “because the
[ballroom construction] is authorized by the [Park Service’s] Organic
Act.” Defs.’ Opening Br. 45. Indeed, that is why the Defendants
concede that the Organic Act must apply for them to be able to
undertake the ballroom project using donations to the Park Service.

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Regardless, the Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the
merits under either provision. If the Park Service is acting
under 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), then the Defendants violated the
Administrative Procedure Act because Section 100101(a) does
not authorize the ballroom construction. And to the extent the
project instead rests on the President’s authority under 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d), then the Defendants acted ultra vires by relying on a
patent misconstruction of that statute. Indeed, the statutory
landscape reveals that over the decades, Congress has jealously
guarded its authority over the White House and President’s
Park in multiple ways. Contrary to the Defendants’ telling,
Congress has not relinquished to the Executive Branch full
authority to reshape these iconic, historic sites.
1
The National Trust is likely to succeed on its claim,
brought under the APA, that the National Park Service Organic
Act does not authorize the ballroom project.
The starting point for the National Trust’s claim is 40
U.S.C. § 8106. That statute, first enacted in 1912, provides that
“[a] building or structure shall not be erected on any
reservation, park, or public grounds of the Federal Government
in the District of Columbia without express authority of
Congress.” The Defendants do not dispute that, by
constructing the ballroom, they would “erect[]” a “building or
structure” on a “park [or] public grounds of the Federal
Government in the District of Columbia[.]”
The plain text of Section 8106 unambiguously bars the
ballroom construction, absent another statute providing the
National Park Service with “express authority” to construct
buildings in federal parks in the District of Columbia. The
Defendants nevertheless argue that Section 8106 does not bind

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the Executive Branch at all, because “it was concerned with
stopping construction by unauthorized third parties[.]” Defs.’
Opening Br. 50–51. The statute’s text makes no such
suggestion. The Defendants’ only support for this theory is a
statement by an Executive Branch official in 1926 suggesting
that the statute was enacted to “prevent[] encroachments upon
park property by other Government offices or by the public,
and has never been construed to prevent such construction by
the park authorities within the limits of the appropriations.” Id.
at 51 (quoting District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1927:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 69th Cong. 533 (1926)). It suffices to say that
this solitary statement, made over a decade after Section 8106’s
enactment, cannot change the clear statutory text.
Because Section 8106 applies by its plain terms, the
Defendants must identify “express authority” for the Park
Service to erect structures in federal parks in the District of
Columbia, and thus to engage in the ballroom construction. As
noted, they rely upon 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), which was
enacted after Section 8106 in 1916 and today states:
The Secretary, acting through the Director of the
National Park Service, shall promote and regulate the
use of the National Park System by means and
measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of
the System units, which purpose is to conserve the
scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in
the System units and to provide for the enjoyment of
the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life
in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
54 U.S.C. § 100101(a). Because the White House is within a
National Park Service “System unit[]”—President’s Park, see

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Act of Sept. 22, 1961, § 1, 75 Stat. at 586—the Defendants
contend that this general language confers the requisite express
authority for construction on federal property in the District of
Columbia, and so the National Trust is unlikely to succeed on
its contrary-to-law claim under the Administrative Procedure
Act, see Defs.’ Opening Br. 43–45.6F
7
There are two flaws with that position. First, Section
100101(a) says nothing about construction, much less
construction in the District of Columbia. The operative
language is instead strikingly general, providing that the Park
Service “shall promote and regulate the use of the National
Park System by means and measures that conform to the
fundamental purpose of the System units[.]” 54 U.S.C.
§ 100101(a). Perhaps Section 100101(a)—by permitting
“means” and “measures” that conform to the fundamental
purpose of the Park System—authorizes certain construction in
national parks generally. But Section 8106 bars construction
on parks and other public grounds of the federal government
specifically in the District of Columbia, unless Congress
provides “express authority” to do so. Read in context, we do
not think a statute that arguably authorizes an agency to engage
in construction and other acts throughout the country—without
addressing the District of Columbia in particular—constitutes
the type of “express authority” Section 8106 demands.
Second, and independently, the Defendants’ claim that the
ballroom construction is authorized by Section 100101(a) also
contravenes the express condition the statute places on the Park
Service’s authority. The statute authorizes the Director to take
7 System units are defined as “any area of land and water
administered by the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the
Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic,
parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” 54 U.S.C. § 100501; see
id. § 100102(6).

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actions that “conform to the fundamental purpose of the
System units,” and specifies that purpose as “to conserve the
scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System
units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural
and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.” 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (emphases added).
To drive the point home, Congress in the 1978 Redwood
Amendment expressly “reaffirm[ed], declare[d], and
direct[ed]” that the Park Service’s authority “shall not be
exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which
the System units have been established, except as directly and
specifically provided by Congress.” Id. § 100101(b)(2).
Reading those provisions together, Congress has
prohibited any action that does not “conserve the scenery * * *
and historic objects” in national parks. “Conserve” means “to
keep from being damaged, lost, or wasted; save.” Conserve,
W EBSTER’ S NEW W ORLD DICTIONARY 297 (3d college ed.
1988); see also Conserve, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 313 (2d college ed. 1991) (defining “conserve” as
“[t]o protect from loss or depletion”). The East Wing is a
“historic object[]” within President’s Park. 54 U.S.C.
§ 100101(a). The Defendants do not explain how their
construction project—which will significantly and
permanently alter the historic appearance and architecture of
the entire White House campus by demolishing and replacing
the East Wing—can possibly “conserve” the East Wing, much
less the “scenery” of President’s Park, so as to “leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” Id. To
the contrary, the Defendants tout the many ways in which the
project, in their view, will “demoli[sh]” and “replac[e]” that
historic object. Defs.’ Opening Br. 12, 38; see also Env’t
Assessment at 11, 14 (observing that “[d]econstruction and
replacement of the East Wing would result in the permanent

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alteration of a component that has been integral to White House
operations since its construction in 1942[,]” and that the
ballroom “would have permanent adverse impacts on the
cultural landscape”). Section 100101(a) certainly does not
“directly and specifically” authorize that impairing
construction as the Redwood Amendment requires. 54 U.S.C.
§ 100101(b)(2).
The Defendants assert that this express statutory obstacle
amounts only to a “policy dispute” with the Park Service’s
determination that the ballroom construction generally
promotes the purposes of President’s Park. Defs.’ Reply Br.
21. The Defendants miss the point. There is no finding—and
we do not see how there could be—that the ballroom
construction “conserves” the “historic objects” in President’s
Park as the statute requires. See generally Env’t Assessment;
FONSI. In fact, the Park Service found that the ballroom’s
construction would do the opposite. Env’t Assessment at 15
(“These changes would affect elements that have shaped the
property’s character since the early 20th century.”); FONSI at
6 (“These changes will result in long-term adverse effects on
the cultural landscape.”); id. at 7 (“Adding a second story to the
East Colonnade will further modify the setting, contrasting
with the single-story design of the West Colonnade and
changing the traditional spatial organization[.]”).7F
8
8 President’s Park’s enabling legislation provides that “nothing
done under this Act shall conflict with the administration of the
Executive offices of the President or with the use and occupancy of
the buildings and grounds as the home of the President and his family
and for his official purposes.” Act of Sept. 22, 1961, § 3, 75 Stat. at
586. The plain text of this provision limits the Park Service’s
authority. And the massive destruction and construction involved in
building the ballroom does not plausibly qualify as the
“administration,” “use,” or “occupancy” of the residence or grounds.

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In urging that Section 100101(a) expressly authorizes the
ballroom construction, the Defendants’ brief is notably devoid
of any argument based on the statute’s text. Instead, the
Defendants’ position rests on three previous Park Service
projects in the District of Columbia: the construction of the
National Capital Region headquarters campus in East Potomac
Park; the construction of a tennis stadium in Rock Creek Park;
and the renovation of the U.S. Park Police Horse Stables on the
National Mall. See Defs.’ Opening Br. 44–45; see also Supp.
Decl. of Tammy Stidham, ECF No. 52-1, at ¶¶ 14–22. They
assert that none of those projects was specifically authorized
by Congress, and that the Park Service instead relied on Section
100101(a)’s general authority. Perhaps that is true. But no one
challenged those projects in court, and “the existence of a prior
administrative practice” does not “relieve us of our
responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent
with the agency’s statutory authority.” SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 118 (1978); cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 573
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[P]ast practice
does not, by itself, create power.”) (quoting Medellín v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008)). Even on the Defendants’ own
terms, moreover, those prior projects appear far more
consistent with Section 100101(a) than the ballroom project. It
is easy to see how construction of the Park Service’s regional
headquarters and renovation of Park Police stables might
enable “conserv[ation]” and safe “enjoyment” of Park sites
without meaningfully impairing any “natural and historic
objects” within the Park. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a). But it strains
credulity to think that the demolition and replacement of the
So nothing in that language empowers the Park Service to bypass its
express statutory confines just to accommodate the President’s
“longstanding need[s].” Env’t Assessment 31.

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East Wing constitute an effort “to conserve” that “historic
object[.]” Id.
At bottom, we may assume that Section 100101(a)’s
general language authorizes the Park Service to engage in some
construction projects in national parks generally—at least as
long as those projects are designed to promote conservation
and leave historic objects unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations. But it cannot constitute the “express
authority” for “erect[ion]” of “building[s] or structure[s]” on
public grounds in the District of Columbia that 40 U.S.C.
§ 8106 demands—especially when there is no argument that
the construction at issue will “conserve” historic sites in
keeping with Section 100101(a) and Congress’s express
reaffirmation of that requirement in the Redwood Amendment.
Indeed, Congress has time and again expressly authorized
construction projects on public grounds in the District of
Columbia. See, e.g., Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, § 1, 32
Stat. at 460 (East and West Wings); An Act To provide for the
construction of certain public buildings, and for other purposes,
ch. 380, § 1, 44 Stat. 630, 630–631 (1926) (buildings of Federal
Triangle); An Act To provide for the construction of a building
for the Supreme Court of the United States, ch. 9, §§ 1–3, 46
Stat. 51, 51 (1929); An Act To authorize the Board of Regents
of Gunston Hall to establish a memorial to George Mason in
the District of Columbia, Pub. L. No. 101-358, § 1, 104 Stat.
419, 419 (1990); National Museum of African American
History and Culture Act, Pub. L. No. 108-184, § 8, 117 Stat.
2676, 2680–2682 (2003) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 80r-6).
Section 100101(a) bears no resemblance to those express
authorizations.

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2
We now turn to the Defendants’ assertion that 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d)(1) grants the President himself authority to build a
towering ballroom on the former East Wing site. Before
proceeding, we note again the secondary role that Section
105(d) plays in the Defendants’ theory: The Defendants
expressly conceded that if Section 100101(a) does not
authorize the construction, then Section 105(d) cannot
independently support it because the Defendants are relying on
National Park Service funds. Oral Arg. Tr. 55:4–56:19. Our
analysis of Section 100101(a) thus resolves the likelihood of
success on the merits factor on the Defendants’ own terms. For
completeness, we nevertheless address Section 105(d).
The National Trust’s challenge to the President’s reliance
on Section 105(d) cannot proceed under the APA because the
President is not an “agency” subject to APA review. See
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). Instead,
the National Trust brings an equitable ultra vires claim. Ultra
vires review provides a critical backstop when “there is no
other means * * * to protect and enforce [a statutory] right.”
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958). It is available when
the President “has taken action entirely ‘in excess of [his]
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition’ in a
statute.” Nuclear Regul. Comm’n v. Texas, 145 S. Ct. 1762,
1776 (2025) (quoting Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Association for the Benefit of Non-Cont. Emps., 380 U.S. 650,
660 (1965)). We will thus grant ultra vires relief when the
President acts based on an “utterly unreasonable” statutory
interpretation or a “patent[] * * * misconstruction” of the law.
Federal Express Corp. v. Department of Com., 39 F.4th 756,
764–765 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).

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The baseline for this analysis is again Section 8106, the
statute providing that “[a] building or structure shall not be
erected on any reservation, park, or public grounds of the
Federal Government in the District of Columbia without
express authority of Congress.” 40 U.S.C. § 8106. This is a
“clear and mandatory” provision that leaves no discretion and
thus can support ultra vires review. Changji Esquel Textile Co.
v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation
marks omitted).
The Defendants counter that Section 8106 should play no
role in the ultra vires analysis because it does not apply to the
President. They argue that, per Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788 (1992), “generally applicable statute[s]” like Section
8106 “should not be construed as restricting the President
without a clear statement to that effect.” Defs.’ Opening Br.
51.
The Defendants overread Franklin. That case concerned
whether the President was an “agency” within the meaning of
the APA, as the APA’s definition of “agency” neither
“explicitly excluded” nor “explicitly included” the President.
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1),
551(1)). Had the Court held that Congress’s “textual silence”
was sufficient to bring the President within the APA’s purview,
then “the President’s performance of his statutory duties
[could] be reviewed for abuse of discretion[,]” which would
implicate “separation of powers and the unique constitutional
position of the President[.]” Id. at 800–801. The wide-ranging
implications of applying the APA—which could conceivably
apply to any presidential action under any of his statutory and
constitutional authorities—warranted caution without an
“express statement” that Congress intended that result. Id. at
801.

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Here, by contrast, Section 8106 concerns a limited and
defined subject over which Congress, all agree, has twofold
constitutional primacy: construction on federal property within
the District of Columbia. See Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (“Congress may * * * exercise all the
police and regulatory powers [in the District of Columbia]
which a state legislature or municipal government would have
in legislating for state or local purposes.”). Applying
Section 8106 as a limit to any presidential statutory authority
concerning construction in the District of Columbia would not
“significantly alter the balance between Congress and the
President[,]” and so there is no compelling reason to apply a
clear statement rule. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1991). Indeed, we have previously found that the
President violated a generally applicable statute that does not
expressly state that it applies to the President. See Chamber of
Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(National Labor Relations Act).
We therefore conclude that Section 8106 applies and
requires the Defendants to identify, in Section 105(d) or
elsewhere, “express authority” for the President to erect a
building or structure. We note, however, that even if Section
8106 did not apply to the President, little of what we say below
about Section 105(d) would change. Section 8106 aside, the
Defendants would still need to identify affirmative authority
for their transformative ballroom construction in Section
105(d). And as we now explain, the Defendants’ view that
Section 105(d) provides that authority violates numerous
aspects of the statute and amounts to a “patent[]
misconstruction” of the law. Federal Express Corp., 39 F.4th
at 764.

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Section 105(d)(1) states:
There are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal
year to the President such sums as may be necessary
for * * * the care, maintenance, repair, alteration,
refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning, heating,
and lighting (including electric power and fixtures) of
the Executive Residence at the White House[.]
3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1).
According to the Defendants, this provision “expressly
authorizes the President” to make “major renovations of the
White House” through its references to “alterations and
improvements.” Defs.’ Opening Br. 35 (capitalization altered).
On the Defendants’ telling, the ballroom project constitutes
such an alteration or improvement. Id. at 36–38. Indeed, as
explained below, the Defendants’ position suggests that
Section 105(d)(1) grants the President unilateral authority to
carry out any construction project—up to and including
demolishing and replacing the entire White House—with any
source of funding he can identify. There are multiple
independent obstacles to that expansive view.
a
First, Section 105(d)(1) does not confer independent
authority upon the President absent an accompanying
appropriation under that Section on which the President can
rely. Yet the Defendants are relying on privately donated
funds, not congressional appropriations.
The plain text of Section 105(d)(1) does not expressly
grant the President any independent authority. It instead
addresses Congress: “There are authorized to be appropriated

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65
each fiscal year to the President” certain sums. This
“authorized to be appropriated” formulation is prototypical of
what is referred to in appropriations law as an “appropriation
authorization.” GAO R EDBOOK 2-54 (4th ed. 2016). Such a
law confers no affirmative authority to act on the Executive
Branch. Instead, as the text indicates, it serves only as “a
directive to Congress itself, which Congress is free to follow or
alter * * * in the subsequent appropriation act.” Id. at 2-56; see
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 577 (1937) (“All
[an appropriation authorization] does is to authorize future
appropriations.”). An appropriation authorization is distinct
from “[e]nabling” or “organic” legislation that might
“establish[] a program” or “prescribe[] a function[.]” GAO
REDBOOK 2-54 (4th ed. 2016). Standalone appropriation
authorizations are not strictly necessary—a single law might
both authorize appropriations and serve as enabling legislation
providing affirmative authority to act. See Gillian E. Metzger,
Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1075,
1089–1091 (2021); see also Railroad Rehab. & Improvement
Fund, 65 Comp. Gen. 524, 527 (1986) (explaining that
freestanding authorization laws are “traditional” but “not
required”). But where freestanding authorization laws exist,
they do not, on their own, grant powers to the Executive. And
the language of Section 105(d), which has remained unchanged
since its enactment in 1978, indicates that it is just such a
standalone appropriation authorization. Indeed, the session
law clearly marked Section 105(d) (but not the immediately
preceding provisions) as an “[a]ppropriation authorization.”
See Act of Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. at 2446.
Comparing Section 105(d) with the immediately
surrounding and concurrently enacted provisions confirms the
point. Section 105(a)(1), for example, states that “the President
is authorized to appoint and fix the pay of employees in the
White House Office without regard to any other provision of

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law[.]” That language explicitly provides the President
authority to act. So too for Section 105(b)(1): “[T]he President
is authorized to appoint and fix the pay of employees in the
Executive Residence at the White House[.]” And for Section
105(c): “The President is authorized to procure for the White
House Office and the Executive Residence at the White House”
certain services. It is precisely this type of language—
authorizing the President to act, as opposed to speaking to
future Congresses—that is noticeably absent from Section
105(d).
The Defendants’ argument ignores how Congress
legislates. See West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83, 100 (1991) (explaining that courts ought to interpret
statutes in a way that “fits most logically and comfortably into
the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law”).
When Congress wishes to pair an appropriation authorization
with a conferral of substantive authority, it generally does so in
two distinct steps. Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act,
25 U.S.C. § 5108, is illustrative. That law first provides that
“[t]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion,
to acquire” property “for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.” Id. It then separately provides that “there is
authorized to be appropriated” funds “[f]or the acquisition of
such lands[.]” Id. Numerous other statutes follow a similar
pattern.8F
9 But glaringly absent from Section 105(d) is any
affirmative grant of authority to the Executive.
9 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 410ggg-1(a)(2), 410ggg-3(a)(1)
(giving the Secretary of the Interior “[s]pecific authorities” to
“conduct and maintain oral histories” of World War II, and then
authorizing appropriations of “such sums as may be necessary to
conduct” those oral histories); 8 U.S.C. § 1711(d) (instructing the
Secretary of State to “implement enhanced security measures for the
review of visa applicants[,]” and then authorizing appropriations “to

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The only language in Section 105(d) that could be
construed as a grant of substantive authority to the President
explicitly limits that authority to funds that Congress directly
appropriates for Section 105(d)’s purposes. After describing
the purposes for which “appropriat[ions]” are “authorized[,]”
the provision states that “[s]ums appropriated under this
subsection for expenses described in paragraph[] (1) * * * may
be expended as the President may determine[.]” 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d). Thus, when Congress appropriates funds “under”
Section 105(d), the President has authority to expend those
funds—but only those funds—to act under Section 105(d). Id.
Put another way, the President is authorized to act under
Section 105(d) only with funds “appropriated under [that]
subsection[.]” Id. And those appropriations can themselves
come with additional strings attached. See, e.g., Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, 138 Stat. at 532
(appropriating funds “pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 105(d) * * * for
required maintenance, resolution of safety and health issues,
and continued preventative maintenance”). So, even when
funds are appropriated under Section 105(d), the President’s
actions are limited by both the amount appropriated and any
terms and conditions accompanying the appropriation.
carry out” that directive); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(f)(1), 1071(b)(5)
(authorizing the Secretary of Education to pay certain loan
processing fees, and then authorizing appropriations of “sums as may
be necessary” for those payments); 42 U.S.C. § 18363(a), (c)
(authorizing the NASA Administrator to “decommission” “Space
Shuttle orbiter vehicles[,]” and then authorizing appropriations of
“such sums as may be necessary” to do so); 52 U.S.C. §§ 21121(a),
21123 (authorizing the Election Assistance Commission to develop
the “Help America Vote College Program[,]” and then authorizing
appropriations “to carry out” that program).

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Comparing Section 105(d) with other common statutory
formulations again underscores the point: Section 105(d) does
not authorize the President to draw on, for example, “any
available funds,” 23 U.S.C. § 132(b), or “amounts otherwise
available,” 42 U.S.C. § 7433(a)(1), or any privately donated
“gift of money,” 22 U.S.C. § 2697(b). Instead, the statute
authorizes the President to expend those funds—and only those
funds—that Congress “appropriate[s] under” Section 105(d).9F
10
That limited authority offers no basis for the demolition
and replacement of the East Wing. The only relevant Section
105(d) appropriation that the Defendants have identified
appears in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,
which states: “For the repair, alteration, and improvement of
the Executive Residence at the White House pursuant to 3
U.S.C. 105(d), $2,475,000, to remain available until expended,
for required maintenance, resolution of safety and health
issues, and continued preventative maintenance.” 138 Stat. at
532. Reading Section 105(d) and the Appropriations Act
together, the President is surely authorized to direct the
expenditure of $2.475 million “for required maintenance * * *
and continued preventative maintenance.” Id. But to assert
that Congress has authorized the construction of a $400 million
ballroom using private donations is patently unreasonable.
The Defendants have no response to this dispositive flaw
in their position, even though both the district court and the
National Trust identified it. See National Trust III, 827 F.
10 For that reason, the dissenting opinion’s contention that Park
Service “gift funds are an appropriation” under 31 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(1) is beside the point. Dissenting Op. 23 & n.7.
Regardless of whether those sums could be considered
appropriations through a daisy-chain of other statutes, they are not
“sums appropriated under” Section 105(d)(1) to be expended on the
Executive Residence. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d).

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Supp. 3d at 107; Stay Opp’n, No. 26-5101, Dkt. 2167556, at
15–17 (April 8, 2026). That is, they do not even attempt to
explain why, notwithstanding Section 105(d)’s text and the
appropriations principles discussed above, the President has
statutory authority to perform Section 105(d) projects with
funds that were not “appropriated under” Section 105(d).
The Defendants instead proceed as if it is self-evident that
the President can carry out construction under Section 105(d)
by drawing on any available source of funds. And the
Defendants purport to find such available funds in the form of
monies donated by third parties—some known, some not—to
the National Park Service under 54 U.S.C. § 101101. That
statute authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “in the
administration of the Service” to accept “money that may be
donated for the purposes of the System.” 54 U.S.C.
§ 101101(2). The Defendants insist that the Park Service can
contract with EXR to construct the ballroom under the
Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, and fund that contract using
those donations because EXR has authority to engage in the
construction.
That theory does not withstand scrutiny. Put simply, funds
donated to the Park Service by third parties under 54 U.S.C.
§ 101101 are not funds “appropriated under” Section 105(d) by
Congress. There is no plausible argument to the contrary—
again, the Defendants simply ignore the problem.
Relatedly, the Park Service’s ability to accept donations
does not mean it can use those funds however it wishes, much
less that it may then transfer those funds to other agencies (or
the President) to fund projects the Park Service has no authority
to carry out. Government funds may be spent only as Congress
directs. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291
(1851) (“However much money may be in the Treasury at any

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one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any
thing not thus previously sanctioned.”); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a) (“Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects
for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise
provided by law.”). Section 101101(2) itself provides the Park
Service only the ability to “accept” donations, not to “accept
and use” them. Compare 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2), with id.
§ 101102(a)(1). Congress has elsewhere provided that money
donated to the Park Service’s trust fund is “appropriated to be
disbursed in compliance with the terms of the trust.” See 31
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1); see also id. § 1321(a)(17). Those terms
allow expenditures only “for the benefit of, or in connection
with, the [Park] Service, its activities, or its services.” 54
U.S.C. § 101113(a)(1). The donated funds could thus likely be
used by the Park Service if the agency had statutory authority
to undertake the ballroom project (which it does not, as
explained in Section III.A.1, supra). But donations to the Park
Service cannot be redirected by the agency to fund a project
that is being carried out under statutory authority granted only
to the President or another agency, especially when that
statutory authority requires targeted appropriations.
Nor does the Defendants’ invocation of the Economy Act,
31 U.S.C. § 1535, undermine the National Trust’s likelihood of
success. The Defendants insist that the Economy Act permits
the Park Service to transfer both its statutory authority and its
private donations to EXR through an inter-agency contract.
That theory fails for three independent reasons.10F
11
11 The dissenting opinion contends that we should not address
the Economy Act because “the Trust never directly challenged the
government’s reliance on” that statute. Dissenting Op. 24. But our
colleague fundamentally misunderstands how the Economy Act fits
into the analysis. At the threshold, as we have explained, our analysis
of Section 105(d) is only an alternative holding given the

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First, the Economy Act could allow the use of the Park
Service’s donated funds for the construction only if the Park
Service also had authority to construct the ballroom. As the
Defendants concede, “the purpose of [an Economy Act]
transaction must be something the ordering agency”—here, the
Park Service—“is authorized to do.” GAO REDBOOK 12-26
(3d ed. 2008) (emphasis added); see Defs.’ Opening Br. 48
(“[F]unds transferred under the Economy Act are ‘available for
the purposes for which the appropriation from which [the funds
are] transferred [is] available[.]”) (quoting Acting Comptroller
Gen. Elliott to the Sec’y of War, 18 Comp. Gen. 489, 490–491
(1938)) (emphasis added); Oral Arg. Tr. 35:2–9 (Question:
“[I]n your view, it always has to be something [the Park
Service] o[r] Interior has the authority to do?” Answer: “Yes.”
Question: “They have to have the legal authority so that they
could sort of just do this job themselves?” Answer: “Yes.”).
The Park Service, however, likely has no authority to construct
Defendants’ express concession that they cannot construct the
ballroom unless the NPS Organic Act authorizes them to do so. See
pp. 52–53 & n.6, 61, supra. The dissenting opinion glosses over that
concession and offers no analysis at all of the National Trust’s APA
claim against the Park Service. See Dissenting Op. 24–25 n.8. That
failure alone defeats the dissenting opinion’s merits analysis. Our
alternative analysis of Section 105(d) starts by agreeing with the
district court’s holding that EXR cannot draw on funds Congress did
not appropriate under that provision. See National Trust II, 827 F.
Supp. 3d at 107. In response to that argument, advanced by the
National Trust and accepted by the district court, the Defendants
suggested that the Economy Act offers them an escape hatch from
Section 105(d)’s limiting language, and the Trust responded. See
Defs.’ Opening Br. 46, 48; see also Nat’l Trust Br. 43–44
(responding to the Defendants’ argument). The dissenting opinion’s
charge that rejecting the Defendants’ attempted response to one of
several independent flaws in their position somehow violates party
presentation principles is false.

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the ballroom. See Section III.A.1, supra. The Park Service
cannot contract its way out of the statutory constraints
Congress imposed on it by simply paying another agency to do
for it what Congress has said it cannot do. Cf. Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1867) (“[W]hat cannot
be done directly cannot be done indirectly.”).
Second, “[t]he Economy Act does not give a performing
agency”—here, EXR—“any authority which it would not
otherwise have.” GAO REDBOOK 12-28 (3d ed. 2008)
(emphasis added). That is, EXR can act in this case only with
the authority conferred by Congress under Section 105(d). And
as we have just explained, Congress has carefully calibrated
Section 105(d)’s appropriation authorization so that Congress
retains control over construction at the White House through
the recurring appropriations process. Indeed, as we detail in
the sections below, there are two additional substantive
limitations on EXR’s authority under Section 105(d) that bar
the ballroom construction. EXR cannot sidestep those limits
and authorize itself to take action at the Executive Residence at
the White House via the Economy Act just because some
agency—any agency—could take that action somewhere else.
Nor, as just discussed, have the Defendants identified such an
agency in the Park Service.
Third, the Economy Act authorizes one “agency” to
contract with another “agency” for “goods or services” under
certain conditions. 31 U.S.C. § 1535(a). Yet the Defendants
have nowhere bothered to explain why EXR is an “agency”
within the meaning of the Economy Act, even though they
argued strenuously and successfully below that EXR is not an
“agency” under the Administrative Procedure Act. P.I. Opp’n
at 22; National Trust II, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 71; cf. Sweetland v.
Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(holding that the Executive Residence is not an “agency” under

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the Freedom of Information Act). Indeed, the statutory
definitions of “agency” under the Economy Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act are both phrased generally and
do not expressly include or exclude the President or EXR. See
31 U.S.C. § 101; 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). The Defendants’ failure
even to acknowledge, let alone address, an indispensable
statutory predicate to the success of their argument reinforces
the National Trust’s likelihood of success.
Stepping back, it is easy to see why Congress has not
authorized the use of private gifts (or “any available funds”) for
major renovations at the White House. When Congress permits
an agency or the President to pursue programs with donated or
general funds, it necessarily gives up some of its own power to
check the Executive Branch. The “power of the purse,” after
all, is one of Congress’s crucial means of leverage over the
Executive. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Donation-based financing of government can thus “circumvent
or skew the normal processes of democratic decision-making.”
Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic
Philanthropy? Financing the State with Gifts to Government,
106 Calif. L. Rev. 1129, 1178 (2018). The Framers viewed
congressional control over appropriations as a means of
“preventing fraud and corruption” or the appearance thereof.
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990);
see also id. (“[Congress’s] power to control and direct the
appropriations, constitutes a most useful and salutary check
upon * * * corrupt influence and public peculation[.]”) (quoting
2 J OSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed. 1858)). Congress
accordingly does not cede its appropriations power lightly. It
stands to reason that Congress would be reluctant to relinquish
its oversight and control over the Executive by allowing the

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President to use private donations to remake the White House,
one of our Nation’s most historic and well-known sites.
Indeed, where Congress has allowed the use of donations
at the White House, it has done so for modest purposes,
accompanied by myriad procedural requirements. Most
notably, Congress has authorized the Park Service “to accept
donations of furniture and furnishings for use in the Executive
Residence[.]” 3 U.S.C. § 110. But Congress then instructed
the Director of the Park Service to “appoint a temporary
committee” with nine members to “have full power to select
and pass on the articles in question and to recommend the same
for acceptance.” Id. It is difficult to believe that Congress
would be so focused on structuring review of donated furniture
yet entirely outsource to the President authority to reshape the
White House complex itself with any funds he can obtain,
regardless of the source.
Finally, the Defendants point to four examples of
“President-directed construction at the White House[.]” Defs.’
Opening Br. 8–9. Those instances have no bearing on the
meaning of Section 105(d)(1). First, the historical record
suggests that Congress appropriated funds for two of those
projects: President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime
renovation of the East Wing, as both parties agree, and his
Depression-era renovation of the West Wing. See Defs.’
Opening Br. 8–9 (citing Act of April 28, 1942, 56 Stat. at 236);
Nat’l Trust Br. 35; see also National Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d
at 112 & n.12. Second, “there is nothing to indicate” that a
third project—President Gerald Ford’s construction of a
swimming pool—was “ever called to the attention of
Congress” when Congress enacted Section 105(d). See United
States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957). Finally, even
spotting the Defendants those four exceptions, their rarity
proves the rule. The historic practice from the Founding and

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codified in Section 105(d)(1)’s text is that Congress routinely
and vigorously exercises its authorization and appropriation
control over major construction on White House grounds. See
Section I.A.1, supra; see also Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 538
(“[W]hen considered against 200 years of settled practice, we
regard these few scattered examples as anomalies.”).
b
The Defendants’ Section 105(d)(1) argument runs into a
second textual wall. Even after Congress has appropriated
funds under Section 105(d), the plain text confines their usage
to the care, maintenance, and so forth, “of the Executive
Residence at the White House[.]” 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1). Just
as the Defendants have ignored the statutory limitations in the
National Park Service Organic Act, the Defendants likewise
breeze past the “Executive Residence at the White House”
qualifier and make no argument at all—not one word—that the
East Wing is part of the Executive Residence at the White
House. See Amicus Br. of American Inst. of Architects et al.
10.
President’s Park consists of the White House and its
surrounding grounds. See Act of Sept. 22, 1961, § 1, 75 Stat.
at 586. The White House, in turn, consists of a collection of
structures—including, most notably: (1) the West Wing, “the
part of the White House in which the Oval Office, the Cabinet
Room and the Situation Room are located”; (2) the former East
Wing, which “serve[d] as office space for the First Lady and
her staff, the Department of Defense, and the United States
Secret Service”; and (3) the main building in between, where
the President and his family live. 155 CONG. REC. H10028
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 2009). With that context, the phrase
“Executive Residence at the White House” would be a very
strange way to refer to the entire White House. Instead, it is

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most naturally read to refer only to the last structure.
“Residence,” after all, means “[t]he place in which one lives; a
dwelling[.]” Residence, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1106 (New College
ed. 1976). And that understanding comports with the duties of
“Executive Residence staff[,]” which include “general
housekeeping, prepar[ing] and serv[ing] meals, greet[ing]
visitors, and provid[ing] services as required in support of
official and ceremonial functions.” Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854
(quoting Report of Senate Appropriations Committee, S. REP .
No. 286, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1994)).
That understanding of “Executive Residence” also fits
common usage. Bills introduced in Congress have repeatedly
referred to the “Executive Residence” as separate and distinct
from the East and West Wings. See, e.g., Our Lawn Act, H.R.
6116, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021) (defining “Federal property” to
include “the White House grounds and the White House
(including the Old Executive Office Building, the West Wing,
the East Wing, the Rose Garden, and the Executive Residence,
but not including the second floor of the Executive
Residence)”) (emphasis added); Our Lawn Act, H.R. 8228,
116th Cong. § 2 (2020) (same). Compare Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat.
3034, 3187–3188 (2009) (appropriating $84.5 million for “East
Wing Infrastructure Systems Replacement” to the General
Services Administration), with id. at 3167 (appropriating $13.8
million “[f]or the care, maintenance, repair and alteration,
refurnishing, improvement, heating, and lighting, including
electric power and fixtures, of the Executive Residence at the
White House” directly to the Executive Office of the
President); compare also Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 659, 661 (appropriating $76
million for “West Wing Infrastructure Systems Replacement”
to the GSA), with id. at 638 (appropriating $13 million for “the

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Executive Residence at the White House” to the Executive
Office of the President). See generally The White House—The
Vice President—Gifts, 2 Op. O.L.C. 349, 350 (1977)
(expressing “understanding that, by arrangement with the
National Park Service, maintenance and furnishing of the East
and West Wings of the White House are the responsibility of
the General Services Administration”). Similarly, the Park
Service’s Comprehensive Design Plan for the White House,
which “provide[s] a framework for future management” of the
“White House and President’s Park,” expressly distinguishes
the “Executive Residence” from the “East and West Wings” of
the White House. 2000 Design Plan at 5, 13, 32.
The President, in promoting the ballroom, also describes
the “Residence” as distinct from the White House Wings. See
About the White House, The White House,
https://perma.cc/8F8U-YHNB (“President Theodore
Roosevelt began a major renovation of the White House,
including the relocation of the President’s offices from the
Second Floor of the Residence to the newly constructed
temporary Executive Office Building (now known as the West
Wing).”) (emphasis added); id. (“The $250 million project
includes modernized offices and bulletproof glass, upgrading
the historic 1902 structure while preserving the main
residence.”) (emphasis added); see also Blassingame v. Trump,
87 F.4th 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Katsas, J., concurring)
(“Unless speaking at some specific campaign or political event,
[the President] will thus likely be ‘clothed in the trappings’ of
his Office—whether in the West Wing [or] in the Executive
Residence[.]”) (emphasis added).
c
Finally, express statutory limits on the presidential use of
Section 105(d)(1) funds strike a third textual blow to the

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Defendants’ argument. Recall that the statute refers to “the
care, maintenance, repair, alteration, refurnishing,
improvement, air-conditioning, heating, and lighting
(including electric power and fixtures) of the Executive
Residence at the White House[.]” 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1). The
Defendants focus on the words “alteration” and
“improvement,” and argue that their remaking of the White
House qualifies as either. That argument does nothing to
undercut the National Trust’s likelihood of success on the
merits.
Start with “alteration.” That verb “alter” means “to change
some of the elements or ingredients or details without
substituting an entirely new thing or destroying the identity of
the thing affected.” Alter, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (5th
ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also Alter, 1 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 365 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “alter” as “to make
some change in character, shape, condition, position, quantity,
value, etc. without changing the thing itself for another”)
(emphasis added). The Defendants wholly ignore the
definition’s limiting language, characterizing Section 105(d) as
“capacious.” Defs.’ Opening Br. 36. In the same vein, they
have previously equated “alter” with “modify,” Defs.’ Stay
Mot. 17, failing to appreciate that the term “modify” also
“carries a connotation of increment or limitation” and “must be
read to mean to change moderately or in minor fashion[,]”
Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2023) (quotation
marks omitted); see also Modify, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY
1155 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “modify” as “to change in
incidental or subordinate features”). The Defendants do not
dispute that the ballroom is a change far from minor.
Section 105(d)(1)’s inclusion of “improvement” also does
not strengthen the Defendants’ hand. The Defendants draw
primarily on the proposition that “in the real property context,

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to ‘improve’ means to build structures on land.” Defs.’
Opening Br. 36–37 (quotation marks omitted) (citing, e.g.,
Land, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); Improved
Land, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); Brian
Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83
Temple L. Rev. 665, 666 (2011); Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16,
§ 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455 (granting “public lands” to persons “who
shall inhabit and improve the same”)). But all of the
Defendants’ citations indicate at most that “improvement”
carries that connotation in the context of improvements to land.
See id. The term “improvement,” however, can encompass
“valuable addition[s]” to either land or buildings. See
Improvement, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (4th revised ed.
1968) (defining “improvement” more broadly as a “valuable
addition made to property” that is “usually” but not always
“real estate”). And as we will next explain, the term carries a
different meaning depending on the context. To understand the
nature of the “improvement[s]” discussed in Section 105(d)(1),
we must consult the text of that provision.
Section 105(d)(1) plainly does not implicate
improvements to land. It instead concerns “improvement * * *
of the Executive Residence at the White House[.]” 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d)(1) (emphasis added). The phrase “Executive
Residence at the White House,” in turn, clearly refers to a
building. Cf. Section III.A.2.b, supra. First, the word
“residence” frequently refers to a “type of structure.” Bruno v.
Hanna, 164 A.2d 647, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960);
see also Residence, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE D ICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1106 (New College ed. 1976)
(defining “residence” as “[t]he place in which one lives; a
dwelling”) (emphasis added). Second, it would be passing
strange to say that one can “ke[ep] [furniture] in[,]”
“refurnish[,]” “air-condition[,]” or “heat[]” a parcel of land. 3
U.S.C. §§ 102, 105(d)(1) (emphasis added). Third, when

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Congress refers to the land appurtenant to the White House, it
does so explicitly. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 421(a) (ADA applies
to “White House and its appurtenant grounds”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1752(c)(1)(A) (illegal to enter “White House or its grounds”
without lawful authority).
Although the word “improvement” can carry a broader
meaning in the context of “changes to land,” “its meaning is
otherwise” when used in the “context of” “[b]uilding[s]” or
“[s]tructure[s].” Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 177 S.E.2d 273,
281 (N.C. 1970). In the latter context, courts have long
“distinguish[ed] * * * improvement of an existing structure
from construction of a new structure[.]” Hanson Assocs., P.C.
v. Gallery Plaza P’ship, 32 Va. Cir. 356, 356 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1994). That distinction is sometimes drawn by assessing
whether changes are made to the interior or exterior of a
building: “[A] mere change in a building’s purpose by virtue
of extensive interior alterations * * * constitutes improvements
to an existing building[.]” Id. But “concomitant alterations in
the building’s exterior” transform that improvement into “new”
construction. Id. (collecting cases); see also Cinelli Builders,
Inc. v. Ferris, 911 N.Y.S.2d 446, 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(Plaintiff “was not required to possess a home improvement
contractor’s license” when “the construction was for a ‘new
home’” and “not a ‘home improvement’”). Other times, the
distinction is drawn by considering the extent of changes to the
building: An “addition to [an] existing structure” that is “about
one-seventh of size of [the] existing building” has been treated
as an improvement to the existing building, id., whereas “a
substantial addition to a structure” was “treated as a new
erection or construction,” Anastasi v. Brunet, 90 A.2d 636, 637
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1952); see also id. (holding that the “erection of
a building adjoining” a “22 by 35 feet” “dwelling house”

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constituted “new construction” because the complex became “a
large rambling structure covering 2354 square feet”).11F
12
However that distinction is drawn, the proposed
ballroom—which would replace the East Wing with a new
structure dwarfing other parts of the White House—constitutes
new construction, not an improvement. Indeed, in the
construction context, courts “uniform[ly] conclu[de]” that the
verb “erect” means “[t]he creation of something new, as
distinguished from the * * * improvement of something already
existing.” State ex rel. Celebrezze v. National Lime & Stone
12 The dissenting opinion cites a pair of statutes that supposedly
“confirm[]” that the term “improvement” in Section 105(d)(1) must
“include the construction of buildings” and suggests that
“improvement” carries the same meaning whether the thing
“improved” is land or an existing structure. Dissenting Op. 19–20.
That is incorrect. One of those laws uses the statutory term of art
“construction or facility improvement project.” See 10 U.S.C.
§ 2687a(a)(3)(B)(i) (“improvement to real property”). The other
addresses improvements to land. See 16 U.S.C. § 666
(“improvements * * * of areas made available to the Secretary of
Interior under” the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act). Meanwhile,
other statutes focused on buildings distinguish new construction
from improvements to existing structures. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.
§ 2825(a)(2), (b)(2) (defining “improvement” to include
“rehabilitation of a housing unit and major maintenance or repair
work” and presenting improvement as an alternative to “a newly
constructed unit”); 15 U.S.C. § 278d(a) (separately authorizing
“construction of buildings” and “improvements to existing
buildings”); 16 U.S.C. § 215 (separately authorizing the Park Service
to provide for “the improvement of * * * buildings” and “the
construction of * * * additional * * * buildings” in a national park);
42 U.S.C. § 8628 (prohibiting use of grant funds for “the purchase,
construction, or permanent improvement * * * of any building”); 50
U.S.C. § 3303(a) (distinguishing a “project for the construction of
any facility” from “improvement to any facility”).

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Co., 627 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ohio 1994) (formatting modified)
(collecting cases); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wilkes
County, 116 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960) (similar).
Accordingly, the verb “improv[e]” in Section 105(d)(1) affords
the Defendants no “express authority of Congress” to “erect[]”
an entirely new “building or structure” in the District of
Columbia, 40 U.S.C. § 8106.
Reading “alteration” and “improvement” in context—as
we must—only further refutes the Defendants’ position. See,
e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993); Learning
Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628, 643 (2026). The terms
surrounding “improvement” and “alteration”—“care,”
“maintenance,” “repair,” “refurnishing,” “air-conditioning,”
“heating,” and “lighting”—all presuppose an already-existing
structure and indicate minor changes. See 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d)(1). The interpretive instruction that a word in such a
list is “known by the company it keeps,” Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion), applies with
straightforward logical force here: Congress is extremely
unlikely to have written a statute that says, in the same breath,
that the President may maintain the Executive Residence at the
White House, replace its light fixtures, fix the air-conditioning,
and demolish and replace the entire structure with whatever
new structure he prefers. One of those things is not like the
others.
The Defendants (and the dissenting opinion) emphasize
that the words “alteration” and “improvement” should have
some meaning independent of the other terms in the list. See
Defs.’ Opening Br. 38–39; Dissenting Op. 20 n.6. But “[t]he
anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule.” Mullin v. Al Otro
Lado, --- S. Ct. ----, 2026 WL 1825741, at *8 (U.S. June 25,
2026). Indeed, “redundancies are common in statutory
drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly

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sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack
of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings
of human communication.” Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442,
1453 (2020) (collecting cases). Recall, for instance, that
Congress authorized appropriations for “care, maintenance,
[and] repair” in the same breath. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1).
Regardless, the words “alteration” and “improvement” can
easily have independent meaning without coming anywhere
close to the Defendants’ expansive whatever-the-President-
wants view. For example, as just discussed, an “improvement”
to an existing structure often refers to renovations that update
a structure without crossing the line to construction of an
entirely new one. We need not precisely demarcate the bounds
of that authority to recognize that demolishing and replacing an
entire, major structure falls well outside of it.12F
13
The Defendants’ contrary view that Congress has
outsourced to any President full and unchecked authority to
remake the White House is impossible to reconcile with the
statutory context. As the district court explained, under the
Defendants’ view of Section 105(d)(1)—as a complete
conferral of authority to the President to engage in any
construction he sees fit—the President could bulldoze the
entire White House and replace it with a new building of his
13 It is also important to remember that the statute, properly
viewed, is structured in another way that minimizes the type of line-
drawing concerns that the Defendants conjure: Section 105(d)(1)
requires Congress to appropriate funds specifically for the purpose
of Section 105(d)(1) before the President can take any action at all
under it. See Section III.A.2.a, supra. Congress can convey or
clarify the permissible scope of work in a Section 105(d)(1)
appropriation, as it did in 2024 when it limited the use of funds
appropriated under Section 105(d)(1) to maintenance and resolution
of health and safety issues. See Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2024, 138 Stat. at 532.

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own design, including a “skyscraper.” National Trust III, 827
F. Supp. 3d at 107.
Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001). If Congress, acting against the backdrop of other
statutes that strictly limit construction within Park System units
in the District of Columbia, and which require the government
to jump through significant procedural hoops to accept even
donations of furniture at the White House, wanted to convey to
the President unchecked construction authority over the White
House, we would expect it to do so with language saying just
that. We would not expect Congress to do so by turning to a
provision titled “Assistance and services for the President,”
adding a fourth subsection framed as a mere appropriation
authorization, and inserting the words “alteration” and
“improvement” alongside other statutory terms speaking to
such anodyne matters as the President’s ability to use
congressional appropriations to maintain power outlets and
keep the building warm. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1).
Even through the demanding lens of ultra vires review, the
Defendants have identified no remotely plausible basis for their
sweeping claim of authority to reshape one of our Nation’s
most historic sites without express authorization by Congress.
B
The National Trust and its members have shown that they
will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.
Concrete and extensive architectural, historic-
preservation, professional, and visual injuries of the types
claimed by Professor Hoagland—and factually found by the
National Park Service itself to be material and permanent

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results of the ballroom’s planned size and scale—demonstrate
irreparable harm. In National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,
835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), for example, this court affirmed
a finding of irreparable harm where a conservation
organization showed that “its members’ interests in conserving
natural resources for their aesthetic * * * use and enjoyment
[would] be irreparably injured” absent preliminary relief,
because those resources would be imminently sold or opened
to mining operations, and thus “permanently lost[,]” id. at 324.
Other appellate courts have upheld findings of irreparable harm
in similar contexts. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed’n v.
National Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803, 822 (9th Cir.
2018) (“[P]laintiffs have shown irreparable harm to their own
interests stemming from the irreparable harm to the listed
species[,]” upon which Plaintiffs depended for “recreational
and aesthetic pursuits[.]”); Sierra Club v. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978, 995 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]rreparable harm
to the environment necessarily means harm to the plaintiffs’
specific aesthetic, educational and ecological interests.”);
Valley Cmty. Pres. Comm’n v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 1078, 1086
(10th Cir. 2004) (finding irreparable harm where plaintiffs’
“enjoyment of their land” would suffer due to the “greater
proximity of a major highway” being constructed nearby).
Like the plaintiffs in those cases, Professor Hoagland has
“delineated specific ways[,]” Burford, 835 F.2d at 324, in
which the construction of a ballroom of the planned size and
scale would irreparably and harmfully alter her use, experience,
and enjoyment of the archaeological, historical, visual, and
aesthetic appearance of the White House and President’s Park.
The ballroom would “overshadow[] the White House,
exceeding it in height and massing, [and] would diminish the
primacy of the White House, which makes [an] architectural
statement through its singularity on the landscape.” Hoagland
Decl. ¶ 13; see National Trust III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 115–116.

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This would permanently impair the White House’s ability to
“serv[e] as a landmark defining L’Enfant’s plan for the city”
and to embody George Washington’s intent for a “modest”
residence that reflects “republican simplicity[.]” Hoagland
Decl. ¶¶ 10–11, 13.
Professor Hoagland also has identified specific reasons
why this dramatic change to the architecture of the White
House, Lafayette Square, and President’s Park would
irreparably harm her. Professor Hoagland crosses through
Lafayette Square monthly “to attend functions in neighboring
buildings” to the White House, on walks to enjoy the
architecture, and on other occasions. Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12.
Further, as a current Trustee of the National Trust, Professor
Hoagland attends the National Trust’s Board meetings in the
District of Columbia and intends to do so in 2026. Id. ¶¶ 2, 12.
Those meetings are “usually” held at the Decatur House. Id.
¶ 12. Because the Decatur House is located on the corner of
Lafayette Square and kitty-corner to the eastern side of the
White House, that means Professor Hoagland will have to face
whatever is erected in place of the old East Wing every time
she attends these Decatur House Board meetings.
Professor Hoagland’s professional injuries are also
irreparable. She is an architectural historian and the author of
six books “on various aspects of American vernacular
architecture[,]” including her most recent book about D.C.’s
historic Row Houses. Hoagland Decl. ¶ 4. Professor Hoagland
has attested that the changes to the White House and the careful
layout of the L’Enfant Plan adversely “affect[] [her] own
research” on Washington’s architecture. Id. ¶ 11.
Defendant National Park Service agrees that the ballroom
construction will cause irreversible historical-preservation,
architectural, and visual damage. After careful review, the

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Park Service concluded that constructing a ballroom “that is
approximately 90,000 square feet and 55 feet tall would have
permanent adverse impacts” on “the White House Grounds
cultural landscape.” Env’t Assessment at 11. The Park Service
found that the project will “disrupt the historical continuity of
the White House grounds” and “alter the architectural integrity
of the east side of the property[,]” because the ballroom’s
“larger footprint and height will dominate” and “creat[e] a
visual imbalance with the more modestly scaled West Wing
and Executive Mansion.” FONSI at 7; see also National Trust
III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 115–116 (crediting that finding).
Additionally, building a second story to the ballroom will
contrast with the single story of the West Colonnade “and
chang[e] the traditional spatial organization and sightlines of
the grounds.” FONSI at 7. In the words of the Park Service:
“These changes will adversely alter the design, setting, and
feeling of the White House and the grounds over the long-
term.” Id.
The National Trust has also shown that this harm is
sufficiently “imminen[t]” to support the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel
Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(emphasis omitted). The Defendants insist that construction
needs to start right away. See Defs.’ Opening Br. 56; see also
Decl. of John Stanwich, ECF No. 14-6, at ¶ 20; National Trust
III, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 115. And, as the National Trust points
out and Defendants do not dispute, the above-ground
construction of the ground floor of the ballroom has begun,
including portions of the pillars that will support additional
floors. See Nat’l Trust Br. 47 & n.12.
The Defendants have made no argument that the harms
that will be imposed by a towering ballroom could be redressed
at the end of this litigation, absent preliminary injunctive relief.

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They have not said anywhere that they will still be able to make
material changes to the ballroom’s planned size and scale
(rather than its minor design features) further down the road.
The Defendants’ nascent construction of the supporting
structure and their continued insistence that the ballroom is one
“unified[] and cohesive” whole say quite the opposite. Defs.’
Opening Br. 54.
Nor have the Defendants represented that, if they were to
lose on the merits of the case, they would remove any
unlawfully built structures to remedy the injuries. To the
contrary, the Defendants insist that, once built, the ballroom
must remain intact permanently for national security and safety
reasons, making it harder for the district court to fashion any
relevant remedy. See, e.g., National Parks Conservation Ass’n,
925 F.3d at 502 (remanding case for determination of a proper
remedy where petitioners had defeated conservation groups’
preliminary-injunction motion by arguing that petitioners’
electrical transmission towers, if unlawfully built, could be
removed, and then opposed the towers’ removal as wasteful
and disruptive after construction was completed); id. (“Had the
[petitioners] said all along what they say now, either the district
court or this court might have enjoined tower construction[.]”).
C
The relevant equitable considerations also favor the
National Trust.
1
The Defendants argue that the district court’s preliminary
injunction inequitably injures their safety and security
interests. In considering those arguments, the bottom-line
question is whether the district court abused its discretion in

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concluding that the harms to the National Trust outweigh the
Defendants’ asserted harms and that an injunction is in the
public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 25–26.
We note, at the outset, that the Defendants, including the
President, have disclaimed any constitutional authority,
whether explicit or implicit, to build the ballroom. P.I. Opp’n
at 39 (“The President is not claiming inherent constitutional
authority to undertake the East Wing project[.]”). They assert
only statutory authority. Id. (“[H]e rests on statutory
authority[.]”). But, as discussed, the only statute they rely on
that arguably assigns some authority over White House
alterations or repairs to the President is Section 105(d), which
does not apply on these facts and which the Defendants admit
does not by itself authorize the ballroom project. Oral Arg. Tr.
55:6–11; Section III.A.2, supra. And the statutory assignment
of authority over national parks and historic sites to the
National Park Service is to “conserve” and maintain such sites
and to “leave them unimpaired[.]” 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a).
Congress has not given the Park Service authority, specifically
and expressly, or otherwise, to raze protected historic sites in
the name of presidential functions or national security. As the
Defendants are very likely without statutory authority to act,
those interests cannot carry the weight that the Defendants
claim in the balancing of interests. See Huisha-Huisha v.
Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (court’s
determination that the movant is likely to succeed on the merits
and will suffer irreparable harm during the litigation absent an
injunction—the two most critical factors in the preliminary
injunction analysis—“lightens the Executive’s stated
interests”).13F
14
14 The dissenting opinion objects to “collapsing * * * the merits
and the equities[.]” Dissenting Op. 32. Of course those two factors

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Said another way, the district court’s exercise of equitable
judgment falls more firmly within the scope of its discretion
when the Defendants claim no Article II power for their action
and likely lack any statutory basis for it too. Cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952)
(affirming preliminary injunction over a wartime President’s
objection that “his action was necessary to avert a national
catastrophe”); NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666–667 (2022)
(per curiam) (staying a regulation over the government’s
objection that it would “save over 6,500 lives and prevent
hundreds of thousands of hospitalizations” in the midst of a
global pandemic).
Turning specifically to the Defendants’ three claims of
harm, none of them hold up. Each is either fully addressed by
the injunction’s safety-and-security exception or unsustainable
on this record. Likewise, none shows that the balance of
equities tilts decisively in the Defendants’ favor.
do separate work. But as the dissenting opinion recognizes, id., the
Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly held that a likelihood
of success on the merits or lack thereof can bear on the balancing of
the equities. See, e.g., Huisha-Huisha, 27 F.4th at 734; Karem v.
Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Alabama Ass’n of
Realtors v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485,
2490 (2021) (per curiam) (“But our system does not permit agencies
to act unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends” such as
“combating the spread of * * * COVID-19[.]”). The dissenting
opinion’s authorities agree. See, e.g., Hanson v. District of
Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (stating in case
involving allegedly unconstitutional law that “the public interest
* * * rises and falls with the strength of the moving party’s showing
on the merits”) (formatting modified), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2778
(2025); id. (“[The] equities might balance differently if the plaintiffs
had established a likelihood of success on the merits of their
constitutional claim[.]”).

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First, as the district court found, much of the Defendants’
equitable argument concerns security features that would be
installed beneath the planned ballroom. See National Trust IV,
2026 WL 1027744, at *2. The district court’s preliminary
injunction allows construction of those underground features to
go forward. Am. P.I. Order at 2. It halts only the above-ground
“physical construction of the proposed ballroom” itself. Id.
(emphasis added). So no harm shown there.
The Defendants object that the subterranean security
features, as well as the exposed side of the Executive Mansion,
need to be covered to protect them. Defs.’ Opening Br. 55–56.
The preliminary injunction allows that too. The district court’s
order modifying the injunction is explicit that the Defendants
can put a fully protective covering over the underground
construction and other exposed portions of the construction
site. Am. P.I. Order at 2–3.
The Defendants next contend that only the completed
ballroom, with its large size and mass, can sufficiently protect
the White House complex—that is, the entire project is a
“unified whole” that is essential to security and safety. Defs.’
Opening Br. 18; see also id. at 54.
As an initial matter, the district court found that this
argument contradicts what the Defendants told the district court
throughout months of litigation—that is, that the above-ground
and below-ground portions of the project were “independent
of” one another. National Trust IV, 2026 WL 1027744, at *3
(formatting modified); see Section I.C.3, supra. Nowhere do
the Defendants explain how this newly asserted national
security requirement that either did not exist or was withheld
from the district court in February materialized in April with
such force that it should have tilted the district court’s balance

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of equities in the Defendants’ favor. Such shifting and
contradictory positions are a frail reed on which to rest
equitable arguments.14F
15
In any event, the Defendants’ argument essentially boils
down to the position that the ballroom, once completed two or
more years from now, will be more secure than the now-
demolished East Wing and an active construction site. Defs.’
Opening Br. 54–55.
Of course a completed, fortified building fitted with
modern security features will be more secure than an active
15 Undeterred by the district court’s finding, the Defendants
have taken to asserting more brand-new security justifications for the
first time on appeal. For example, in a declaration submitted only to
this court, the Secretary of the Army relays that the ballroom is an
advanced “sacrificial” structure designed to protect the bunkers
underneath. See Decl. of Daniel P. Driscoll, No. 26-5123, Dkt.
2169274, at Add. 21–22 ¶¶ 8–9 (April 17, 2026). The Defendants’
reply brief (with no citation or declaration) also advances the new
factual assertion that the ballroom’s rooftop will feature a “highly
sophisticated Drone Port[.]” Defs.’ Reply Br. 2. Of course,
“declarations that were not part of the record before the district court
at the time of a judgment or order are not part of the record on appeal
of that judgment or order.” Public Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. Zeldin,
174 F.4th 183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (quoting Swanson Group Mfg.
LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Especially
when, as here, no reason at all is given as to why that same
information could not have been provided to the district court over a
month earlier, either in camera or on the public record. In addition,
the district court could not have abused its discretion by failing to
consider factual arguments the Defendants never put before it. See
Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, 480 F.3d 1153, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But
because of the singular importance of safety and security, we have
considered the information and it does not alter our analysis for the
reasons explained.

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construction site. But the existence of both a construction site
and an unfinished project on top of the underground security
features are the fully expected and necessarily planned-for side
effects of this multi-year building project. The Defendants’
own construction schedule means that no completed ballroom
would be in place as the top structure for roughly two years at
the earliest. See FONSI at 8 (estimating that construction is
“anticipated” to be complete in “summer 2028”); Defs.’
Opening Br. 3 (stating that the ballroom will be completed “a
few months prior to the expiration of [President Trump’s]
term”). So whether or not the injunction remains in place, the
Defendants’ need for interim security measures will continue
for the near future while the litigation proceeds.
Second, the Defendants argue that any delay to the multi-
year construction timeline inflicts intolerable harm because
“they will have no way to recoup that lost time, the added costs
associated with delay, or the benefits” from a completed
ballroom. Defs.’ Opening Br. 58. On the record the
Defendants have created, that argument carries little weight.
To start, the Defendants—quite unusually in a case
involving national-security arguments—did not seek to
expedite either the district court’s proceedings or this appeal.
This court acted on its own to do so.
In addition, any risk caused by the construction project and
its multi-year timetable is overwhelmingly a problem of the
Defendants’ own creation. The Defendants unilaterally and
likely without lawful authority destroyed a large portion of the
White House structure and dug an open pit in its place. Then,
after commencing a lengthy construction project, they publicly
announced to the world the vulnerabilities that self-chosen
endeavor has created.

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More importantly, the Defendants’ arguments avoid
discussion of the comprehensive and fully protective security
plan for the President and the White House that necessarily
would have been put in place before destroying the East Wing.
The presumption of regularity requires us to take as given that
such plans were made, and it is not for this court to question
the rigor and full sufficiency of those measures in ruling on a
preliminary injunction record. The Defendants’ arguments and
declarations, in other words, do not speak to the relevant
question, which is what unplanned-for harm to their multi-year
security plans will occur pending the resolution of this case.
That silence is telling.15F
16
Similarly, the Defendants have made no showing that any
“added costs associated with delay” amount to a serious
burden. Defs.’ Opening Br. 58. The project, after all, is not
being funded by the government itself or by the taxpayers. Nor
has the Defendants’ conclusory assertion of harm been
factually substantiated in any way that would demonstrate the
type of irretrievable losses that might equitably weigh in their
favor.
Third, the Defendants assert that the East Wing was in
poor shape, that the President lacks an adequate space to host
16 The dissenting opinion devotes pages to the Defendants’
declarations about whether a completed ballroom is more secure than
a construction site. Dissenting Op. 27–30. In doing so, the
dissenting opinion sets the construction site as the baseline for its
equities inquiry. Given the construction site, the dissenting opinion
reasons, safety and security considerations favor continued
construction. Id. at 30–31. That framing jumps right over how the
construction site got there in the first place—through the Defendants’
likely unlawful actions and intentional plans—and assumes that no
sufficient security plan was made and is in place for the construction
period.

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important guests, and that the temporary tents used to host
events on White House grounds are both costly and unsightly.
See Defs.’ Opening Br. 57–58.
That may well be. Yet nowhere have the Defendants
argued that they could not have done what every other
President has done to obtain improvements to the White House:
Ask Congress, which is the branch the Constitution tasks with
making such decisions about federal property.
Further, as the National Park Service pointed out in its
Finding of No Significant Impact, the erection of temporary
tents is no new feature at the White House. See FONSI at 5,
10; see also Stanwich Decl. ¶ 7 (“To accommodate [large]
events, large tents are typically erected on the South Lawn of
the White House.”); Decl. of Matthew C. Quinn, ECF No. 30-
2, at ¶ 10 (“[T]ents were often set up on the South Grounds of
the White House Complex to host larger events.”). The
preliminary injunction does nothing more than maintain the
status quo temporarily while this litigation resolves. To the
extent the injunction harms the Defendants by potentially
forcing them to continue hosting official events in formal tents
on White House grounds for a few extra months, that harm
would not alter the equities balance.
At bottom, the Defendants’ position is that, once the
district court credited their argument that the independent
underground construction alone could go forward, the court
surrendered all power to stop the ballroom’s construction at all.
No matter how unlawful that construction likely is and no
matter that the construction will, by the Defendants’ own
admission, cause permanent and irremediable harm, the
Defendants insist that the ballroom project must be fait
accompli and no injunction at all can or ever could issue.

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Worse still, the Defendants argue that even if they are
acting entirely without authority and lawlessly, no court—not
the district court, this court, or the Supreme Court—has the
power to stop them since the East Wing has already been
destroyed. When asked “[w]hen * * * it bec[a]me impossible
for courts to stop this project,” the Defendants stated point-
blank: “[I]t would have been improper to enjoin it even on day
one.” Oral Arg. Tr. 77:2–5; see id. at 74:18–75:20 (Question:
“And so your position is [that] this can’t be stopped by a court?
* * * That [the district] court, this [c]ourt, the Supreme Court,
no court could stop the building of this today?” Answer:
“Yes.”); id. at 76:3–17 (Question: “[I]magine [that] you are
wrong on the law. * * * [Imagine the] statutes were as clear
as could be * * * [that] you have no authority to do this, and
you’ve done it. There’s nothing to be done.” Answer: “That
is our position.”); id. at 77:7–15 (Question: “So if this were
complete lawlessness by the [g]overnment * * *, [it] couldn’t
be stopped?” Answer: “On these theories, I think that’s
right.”); id. at 78:10–12 (Question: “So this is really something
that can’t be stopped in courts.” Answer: “I think that’s
right.”).
That is wrong. The bold assertion that the Executive can
act with utter lawlessness, destroying treasured national
landmarks and harming the interests of individuals, and that no
court can stop it flouts our constitutional order. And it is no
basis on which to claim the favor of courts’ equitable judgment.
While this court accords great weight and deference to
invocations of national security and the safety of the President,
such arguments are not an automatic get-out-of-law-free card.
Nor do they require courts to stand by while the Executive acts
without authority. That is especially true when (i) the
Defendants’ security claims have repeatedly and materially
shifted in their content throughout this litigation, (ii) some of
those claims were never even shared with the district court, (iii)

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the Defendants have failed to substantiate the asserted security
harms on this record given the district court’s safety-and-
security exception and the other identified gaps in the
Defendants’ arguments, and (iv) the preliminary injunction
includes a safety-and-security exception that the Defendants
largely ignore.
The Defendants’ invocation of Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), does not
help them. See Defs.’ Opening Br. 59. In Winter, the Supreme
Court held that the district court had abused its discretion by
issuing a preliminary injunction restricting the use of certain
sonar technology in Navy training exercises. 555 U.S. at 32–
33. But that was because “the ultimate legal claim [was] that
the Navy must prepare an [Environmental Impact Statement],
not that it must cease sonar training[.]” Id. at 32.
Here the injury is not procedural; it is substantive: The
Defendants likely lacked any statutory or constitutional
authority to act at all. Also, in Winter the challenged “training
ha[d] been going on for 40 years with no documented episode
of harm[.]” 555 U.S. at 33. Here, the Defendants have taken
unprecedented action without any claim of constitutional or
likely showing of statutory authority.
No matter, say the Defendants. In their telling, the policy
goals of having a ballroom are so imperative that construction
must continue regardless of its legality. See Defs.’ Opening Br.
57–59. But it “is not our role to weigh such” policy arguments
when the Executive exceeds the limits Congress has imposed
upon it. NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 666. The Constitution expressly
assigns authority over federal property to the Congress, not the
President. U.S. CONST . Art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
So the only thing standing between the Executive and its
ballroom is congressional authorization.

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Since the Nation’s founding, Congress has regularly
exercised its powers over federal property and the purse to
authorize and fund improvements to the White House at the
Executive’s request. See Section I.A.1, supra. The Defendants
make no argument that, if a massive ballroom is indispensable
to national and presidential security, Congress would refuse to
allow it. And the equities do not swing in the Defendants’ favor
merely because end-running the Constitution’s allocation of
powers apparently seemed a more expedient route to their
desired goal. Cf. Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Department of
Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (per
curiam) (“[O]ur system does not permit agencies to act
unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends.”); Huisha-
Huisha, 27 F.4th at 734 (same).
For all those reasons, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the Defendants have not demonstrated
harm sufficient to outweigh the permanent and irreparable
injuries that construction of the ballroom will cause.
2
The district court appropriately concluded that the public
interest weighs strongly in favor of the injunction.
To start, Congress has inscribed into law the weighty
public interest in the preservation and conservation of historic
sites on federal property. National parklands in the District are
“unique resources that the Federal Government holds in trust
for the American people.” Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290 (1984). Congress established
the National Park system to “conserve” our Nation’s
“scenery[ and] natural and historic objects” in order “to
provide for the enjoyment * * * in such manner and by such

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means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.” 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (emphases added).
Congress later added that National Parks are to be “preserved
and managed for the benefit and inspiration of all the people of
the United States[.]” Id. § 100101(b)(1)(C).
The Defendants’ own Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact show, with extensive factual
findings, that far from conserving and preventing impairment,
construction of the proposed ballroom on the East Wing site
will permanently and irreparably harm the public interest in
preserving the historic appearance of the White House, its
architectural symmetry, and its Founding-Era role in anchoring
the architectural layout of the District. FONSI at 6–7. As the
Park Service summarized, “[t]hese changes would affect
elements that have shaped the property’s character since the
early 20th century[,]” Env’t Assessment at 15, and “depart[]
from the traditional aesthetic values and architectural integrity”
that have persisted throughout the White House’s history, id. at
11.
The Defendants also emphasize that the ballroom project’s
nearly half-a-billion-dollar price tag is being privately funded
by “American patriots.” Defs.’ Opening Br. 3. The United
States is blessed to be filled with many patriots. But in this
case, the Executive Branch’s self-help trenches not only on
Congress’s control over federal property and historic sites, but
also on Congress’s power of the purse. The amount of private
donations is unprecedented. See Press Release, Nat’l Park
Serv., National Park Foundation Receives Historic $100
Million Grant from Lilly Endowment Inc. (Aug. 26, 2024)
(celebrating a $100 million grant as “the largest ever received
by [National Park Foundation] and the largest grant benefitting
national parks”). By way of comparison, the $400 million
projected cost of the ballroom project amounts to

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approximately 8% of the Park Service’s budget for Fiscal Year
2026, see NAT ’ L PARK SERV., B UDGET J USTIFICATIONS AND
PERFORMANCE I NFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2027, at 4 (2026),
and exceeds 1,500 times the level requiring special scrutiny by
the Department of Interior for conflicts of interest, see
DEPARTMENT OF THE I NTERIOR, 374 DM 6.10.E(2)(b).
In bypassing Congress’s control at two levels, the
ballroom project short-circuits congressional oversight,
veteran preferences for work on federal properties, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4212(a)(1), and rules favoring the use of American sources
for construction materials, especially at national sites and
where national security is involved, see, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 110;
41 U.S.C. §§ 8302(a)(1), 8303(a).
Congress, after all, has its own expertise and constitutional
role in matters of national security and safety, especially where
public lands and properties are involved. U.S. C ONST . Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To * * * provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States[.]”); see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561
U.S. 1, 33–34, 36 (2010) (affording Congress “deference”
when an issue “implicates sensitive and weighty interests of
national security and foreign affairs”). It is Congress’s job to
ensure that any major construction and security projects at the
White House will protect the safety of all Presidents, present
and future, while preserving the historical and architectural
significance of that unique location. Congress cannot perform
its constitutional function when the Executive chooses to
proceed wholly unilaterally.
The separation of powers, after all, exists not to protect the
Branches qua Branches, but to ensure and preserve the liberty
of the people of the United States. See Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (The separation of powers “serves

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not only to make Government accountable but also to secure
individual liberty.”); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of this separation of
powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands * * * may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct.
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (“The separation
of powers does not depend on * * * whether the encroached-
upon branch approves the encroachment.”) (formatting
modified).
That is why, throughout history, Presidents have lived in
the house the people built. Executive actions that take control
of that property out of the hands of the people’s representatives
while irreparably harming the historical and visual architecture
of perhaps the most prominent public building in the United
States seriously intrude on the public interest.
Given all of those considerations, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in entering its carefully tailored preliminary
injunction with its safety-and-security exception.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment issuing the modified preliminary injunction. The
administrative stay entered by this court on April 17, 2026, is
vacated. We hereby stay this ruling for fourteen days to allow
the Defendants, if they choose, to seek Supreme Court review.
So ordered.

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RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Construction is underway
at the White House to build underground security facilities
covered by a large ballroom. The President has determined the
ballroom is necessary for the overall security of the White
House as well as to provide a secure space for hosting large
presidential events.
Objecting to the design of the ballroom, the National Trust
for Historic Preservation sued. The district court issued an
extraordinary injunction halting all construction of the
ballroom. This was a blatant abuse of discretion.
To begin with, the district court had no jurisdiction
because the Trust has no standing to stop construction at the
White House. The ballroom is also likely within the President’s
authority to make improvements to the Executive Residence at
the White House. Finally, the balance of equities
overwhelmingly favors the government. The district court
elevated the aesthetic displeasure of a single passerby over the
government’s security interests in the ballroom and the security
risks of leaving an open construction site at the President’s
home and office. These errors in equitable judgment require
vacating the injunction.
The district court seized supervision of construction at the
White House, and my colleagues affirm this judicial overreach.
Because the injunction is beyond the proper province of the
federal courts, construction should be allowed to continue. I
respectfully dissent.
I.
Last summer, President Trump announced plans to
renovate the East Wing of the White House, a project that will
include updated underground national security facilities, new
offices, and a large ballroom for hosting official events. The
project broke ground in October 2025. Because the White

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House is situated within President’s Park, a unit of the National
Park System, the Office of the Executive Residence (“EXR”)
is managing the project in coordination with the National Park
Service (“NPS”). The project is funded primarily with private
donations to the NPS gift fund.
The Trust, a congressionally chartered nonprofit
corporation, filed this lawsuit in December 2025 asserting
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and
the Constitution. The district court concluded the Trust had
associational standing based on the alleged aesthetic injury of
one of its members, Alison Hoagland, who claims the sight of
the ballroom will harm her during monthly walks past the
White House. See Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. NPS
(“National Trust I”), 821 F. Supp. 3d 62, 68–71 (D.D.C. 2026).
The district court denied the Trust’s initial request for a
preliminary injunction, however, because EXR was not an
“agency” whose actions are reviewable under the APA and
because the Trust failed to state a constitutional claim under
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
The Trust then amended its complaint to assert ultra vires
claims that EXR lacked authority for the ballroom project. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction. It held the Trust
was likely to succeed in showing the ballroom project was not
authorized by any statute and therefore barred by 40 U.S.C.
§ 8106, which requires the “express authority of Congress” to
build on federal land in the District of Columbia. The district
court also held the Trust had shown irreparable harm to
Hoagland’s aesthetic interests. Finally, the court concluded the
balance of equities favored the Trust because the ballroom
would “overshadow the White House and disrupt the
appearance of a historic and cultural icon” and because “the
White House does not belong to any one man—not even a
president!” Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. NPS

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3
(“National Trust II”), 827 F. Supp. 3d 93, 116 (D.D.C. 2026)
(cleaned up). The injunction barred further “physical
development of the proposed ballroom,” with an exception for
actions “strictly necessary” to ensure the “security of the White
House and … the personal safety of the President and his
staff.” J.A. 497.
The government appealed and sought a stay. Meanwhile,
the Trust asked the district court to clarify that the injunction’s
security exception did not permit construction of the ballroom.
My colleagues dismissed the government’s emergency stay
motion over my dissent and remanded for the district court to
decide the motion for clarification. See Nat’l Tr. for Historic
Pres. in the U.S. v. NPS, 2026 WL 980554, at *3 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 11, 2026); id. (Rao, J., dissenting).
On remand, the district court modified the injunction. The
current injunction bars any “above-ground, physical
construction of the proposed ballroom.” J.A. 513. The
injunction also contains a similar exception for measures
“strictly necessary” for White House security and the
President’s safety as well as new exceptions for “below-ground
construction of national security facilities” and “above-ground
construction … that is strictly necessary to cover, secure, and
protect such national security facilities.” Id. These exceptions
do not allow construction of the proposed ballroom. Id.
The government appealed and moved for a stay. We issued
an administrative stay and expedited briefing to consider the
merits of the government’s challenge to the preliminary
injunction.
II.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a
clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he

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is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Starbucks Corp. v.
McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024) (cleaned up). A
“preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy” that is
“never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). We review the grant of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, which includes
review for errors of law.
The district court’s preliminary injunction halting
construction of the ballroom is an abuse of discretion for three
independent reasons. First, the Trust lacks standing to seek an
injunction against the ballroom construction because it has
failed to make the “clear showing” that it can bring this lawsuit.
Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024) (cleaned up).
Second, the Trust cannot prevail on its ultra vires “Hail Mary
pass” because EXR likely has statutory authority to construct
the ballroom. NRC v. Texas, 145 S. Ct. 1762, 1776 (2025)
(cleaned up). And third, the balance of equities
overwhelmingly favors the safety and security of the President
over the aesthetic interests of a single passerby.
A.
To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a
plaintiff must first make a “clear showing” of Article III
standing. Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at 1986. The Trust’s attempt to
show associational standing falls well short of this standard. A
lawsuit to halt construction of the ballroom is not germane to
the Trust’s statutory purposes. Moreover, the Trust rests its
standing on a single member whose aesthetic harm is
insufficient to make out an injury in fact.

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5
1.
Article III of the Constitution vests the Judiciary with the
power to resolve specific “‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies,’” not
abstract “questions and issues.” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition
Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011) (quoting U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2). The federal courts are not an “open forum” for
“general complaints” from citizens who “roam the country in
search of governmental wrongdoing.” FDA v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Med., 144 S. Ct. 1540, 1554–55 (2024) (cleaned
up). Plaintiffs must therefore demonstrate standing to sue,
which requires an injury in fact caused by the defendant and
redressable by the court. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992). This “irreducible constitutional
minimum” ensures a proper party is seeking relief that may be
properly issued by a federal court. Id. at 560.
As an association, the Trust must show that “(1) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to [its]
purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.” SSM Litig. Grp. v. EPA, 150 F.4th 593, 596 (D.C.
Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Because the Trust seeks a preliminary
injunction, it must present evidence of specific facts clearly
showing a substantial likelihood of standing. Elec. Priv. Info.
Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity,
878 F.3d 371, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Murthy, 144 S. Ct.
at 1986, 1990; Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 568 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (Op. of Williams, J.) (explaining the burden to show
standing for a preliminary injunction is more demanding than
the burden to survive summary judgment because the latter
merely “preserve[s] the question of standing”).

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6
The Trust is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a
preliminary injunction because it has failed to make a clear
showing of associational standing.
2.
The fundamental problem for the Trust’s standing is that
this lawsuit is not germane to its purposes because Congress
did not provide the Trust with any statutory authority or interest
pertinent to the White House.
“The germaneness requirement mandates pertinence
between litigation subject and organizational purpose.” Int’l
Dark-Sky Ass’n, Inc. v. FCC, 106 F.4th 1206, 1218 (D.C. Cir.
2024) (cleaned up). This requirement is “modest yet
important.” Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588,
597 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). When assessing standing,
courts normally require a litigant to assert “his or her own legal
rights and interests,” and prohibit claims based on the “legal
rights or interests of third parties.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (cleaned up). The germaneness
requirement ensures that an association has, if not a concrete
and particularized injury in fact, then at least a “stake in the
resolution of the dispute.”1 United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
1 “Despite its continued reliance on associational standing, the
[Supreme] Court has yet to explain how the doctrine comports with
Article III.” Alliance, 144 S. Ct. at 1569 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Associational standing deviates from the ordinary rule that plaintiffs
must assert claims based on their own injuries. Moreover,
associational standing arguably lacks a basis in “historical practice
[or] traditional equitable principles” and provides an end run around
limitations on universal injunctions. Michael T. Morley & F.
Andrew Hessick, Against Associational Standing, 91 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1539, 1545, 1593 (2024).

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7
555–56 (1996). Private associations are generally afforded
leeway to define their purposes, and germaneness is often
easily established. See, e.g., Int’l Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at
1218; Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 59–60
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding germaneness in a lawsuit by a private
nonprofit organization “despite the absence of an explicit
reference to aesthetic interests in [its] certification of
incorporation”).
The Trust, however, is not a private association. It is a
congressionally chartered nonprofit corporation that “owes its
creation to an act of Congress” and “derives all of its capacities,
faculties and powers” from statute. Bankers Tr. Co. v.
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 308 (1916); see 54 U.S.C.
§ 312102(a). Government entities may exercise only those
powers conferred by Congress. Cf. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (explaining that an agency
“literally has no power to act … unless and until Congress
confers power upon it”). Congress has vested the Trust with
certain statutory powers and has specified the actions it is
authorized to pursue. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 312102(b), 312105(a);
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 46,
53–54 (2015) (explaining how Amtrak, a federally chartered
corporation, “is required to pursue … goals defined by statute”
instead of “its own private … interests”). As a congressionally
chartered nonprofit, the Trust can sue only to vindicate its
statutory authority.
The Trust’s lawsuit is not germane to its statutory purposes
and powers. Congress empowered the Trust to serve four
enumerated “purposes”: (1) receiving donations of historic
sites, buildings, and objects; (2) preserving and administering
those sites, buildings, and objects; (3) accepting and
administering gifts to carry out its preservation efforts; and
(4) executing other specified statutory functions. 54 U.S.C.

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8
§ 312102(b). The list notably does not include any sweeping
purposes and simply states the principal actions the Trust is
authorized to take. Congress also provided more detail about
the “powers” of the Trust, all of which may be exercised only
“[t]o the extent necessary to enable it to carry out the functions
vested in it by this chapter.” Id. § 312105(a). Of particular
relevance here, the Trust may acquire real property for
preservation but is prohibited from acquiring property within
the National Park System. See id. § 312105(g).
The White House is located within President’s Park, which
is part of the National Park System. The Trust therefore has no
statutory authority related to the White House: it cannot acquire
donations of real property within President’s Park, and it
cannot preserve or administer such property.2 This limitation is
reinforced by the fact that Congress has elsewhere provided
special legislation regarding President’s Park, which tasks NPS
with administering the Park but preserves “the use and
occupancy of the buildings and grounds as the home of the
President and his family and for his official purposes.” Pub. L.
No. 87-286, 75 Stat. 586 (1961). Congress has specifically
defined the Trust’s powers, none of which are germane to a
lawsuit challenging the building of a ballroom and updated
security facilities on White House grounds.
The district court’s contrary conclusions about
germaneness are critically flawed. For evidence of the Trust’s
purposes, the district court relied on the association’s amended
2 Nor does this suit have anything to do with a cooperative
agreement. Contra Majority Op. 48. That the Trust is authorized to
execute cooperative agreements with other federal entities only
underscores the inappropriateness of its current lawsuit seeking
coercive injunctive relief against NPS and EXR. See 54 U.S.C.
§ 312105(h).

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9
complaint. National Trust I, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 71; see also
Majority Op. 45–46, 49 (similarly relying on the complaint and
an October 2025 letter). Mere assertions, however, cannot
establish germaneness because the Trust is a federal entity
whose purposes and powers are defined by law.
Unable to rely on the Trust’s statutory authority, the
district court next invoked hortatory language about why
Congress established the Trust. National Trust I, 821 F. Supp.
3d at 71 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 312102(a)); see also Majority Op.
45, 50 (same). But such generalities cannot expand the Trust’s
purposes and powers, which are specifically enumerated in
other provisions. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 312102(b), 312105(a).
My colleagues offer new germaneness arguments not
raised by the Trust. But these arguments in support of
jurisdiction have been forfeited. See Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 53 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also
Clark v. Sweeney, 146 S. Ct. 410, 412 (2025) (per curiam)
(admonishing that “courts call balls and strikes; they don’t get
a turn at bat”) (cleaned up). In any event, the majority’s
attempts to shore up the district court’s deficient reasoning are
unpersuasive.
The majority first concedes that the National Trust is
“differently situated from some other associational plaintiffs
because its purposes are statutorily defined.” Majority Op. 47.
But then, without explanation, the majority simply treats the
Trust as though it was a private organization that may set its
own mission. That equivalency is unjustified.
Although we have not squarely addressed the germaneness
inquiry for public entities, it is fundamental to our
constitutional order that creatures of federal law are limited by
their statutory grants. The Trust is a congressionally chartered
nonprofit and therefore has no authority to sue the federal

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government to pursue unstated goals that may seem obvious to
some federal judges but are found nowhere in the Trust’s
charter.
The majority next attempts to rely on the Trust’s
ownership of the Decatur House, a historic building off the
northwest corner of Lafayette Park near the White House. But
ownership of the Decatur House does not manufacture
germaneness to challenge construction projects in President’s
Park, over which the Trust has no statutory authority. Congress
explicitly conferred control over President’s Park to NPS,
subject to the President’s use and occupancy, and specifically
excluded the Trust from all land in the National Park System.
The Trust may not circumvent these explicit statutory
limitations simply by owning property near President’s Park
and then seeking an injunction against NPS and EXR. The
majority’s florid criticisms of the ballroom’s design and its
impact on the Lafayette Park area cannot make up for the lack
of germaneness to the Trust’s statutory interests.
Finally, the majority claims that our precedents establish
the Trust has standing to pursue lawsuits for purposes
unconnected to its statutory grant. See Majority Op. 50–51. But
this is really grasping at straws. The majority cites three
decisions: the first held that a large coalition of plaintiffs had
standing but did not specifically consider the Trust’s standing
or discuss germaneness, and the other two cases did not
mention standing at all.3 The majority’s authorities are thus
worthy of no more precedential effect than a drive-by
jurisdictional ruling, which is to say: none. See Pennhurst State
3 See Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite, 925 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam); Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. in the U.S. v. Dole, 828 F.2d
776 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) (“When
questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions
sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when
a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before
us.”) (cleaned up).
Our associational standing precedents allow private
entities some latitude to define their purposes. The Trust,
however, is a federal entity limited to exercising the powers
conferred by Congress. It cannot generate standing by
redefining its purposes to include aesthetic oversight of the
White House, property that Congress has explicitly withheld
from the Trust’s purview. This lawsuit is not germane to the
Trust’s statutory authority, and therefore the Trust lacks
standing to challenge the building of the ballroom.
3.
In addition, the Trust identifies no member with standing
to sue. The Trust rests its standing on a single member, Alison
Hoagland, who alleges aesthetic harm that might arise from
completion of the ballroom. The district court’s standing
analysis rests on an embellished account of Hoagland’s
declaration, filling in claims of harm that she perhaps could
have made but did not. Looking at Hoagland’s actual
statements, she has failed to demonstrate an imminent and
particularized injury in fact.
a.
An injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct.
2190, 2203 (2021). The Supreme Court has recognized that
harm to aesthetic interests can be an injury in fact that confers
standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). In
the typical aesthetic injury case, however, the plaintiff is not

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directly regulated by government action, but instead complains
about actions that cause harm elsewhere, for instance to the
natural beauty of a national park or to the continued existence
of wildlife. Standing is therefore “‘substantially more difficult’
to establish.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
493–94 (2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). As the Court
recently explained, “distress at or disagreement with the
activities of others is not a basis under Article III for a plaintiff
to bring a federal lawsuit.” Alliance, 144 S. Ct. at 1561 n.3.
When assessing aesthetic injuries, courts must especially
scrutinize whether a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of
imminence and particularization.
An aesthetic injury must be actual or imminent, and
standing predicated on future aesthetic injury requires evidence
detailing future plans. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (finding no
standing based on vague “‘some day’ intentions”); Summers,
555 U.S. at 494 (finding standing based on “imminent plans”
to visit the affected land). For example, any person could visit
Yosemite National Park and have an aesthetic interest in
viewing its landscapes, but not every person has standing to
vindicate future aesthetic harm to the Park. By requiring that a
plaintiff have “concrete plans” to visit the affected area, the
judicial power is reserved for remedying actual or imminent
injuries. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 & n.2.
Particularization requires that an aesthetic injury “affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (cleaned up). For instance,
Yosemite is managed by the government for the benefit of all
Americans, and so every American arguably holds a common
and undifferentiated interest in its preservation. An injury to
that shared public interest, however, would constitute only a
generalized grievance that does not support Article III
standing. After all, “[v]indicating the public interest (including

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the public interest in Government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the
Chief Executive,” not the courts. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. The
adjudication of a generalized grievance violates the separation
of powers by turning the federal courts into “virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.” Id. at 577 (cleaned up).
To demonstrate an aesthetic injury is particularized, a
plaintiff must show she will “use the land” in a way that will
be impaired by the challenged action. Env’t Def. Fund v.
FERC, 2 F.4th 953, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2021). For instance,
stargazers and astronomers “‘use’ the sky” and thus have
standing to challenge government action that will result in light
pollution from satellites. Int’l Dark-Sky Ass’n, 106 F.4th at
1217; see also Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (permitting standing for individuals who “view and
enjoy” a battlefield). By contrast, someone who “incidentally
views something unpleasant” while driving by does not “use”
the relevant property and therefore lacks a particularized
injury. Env’t Def. Fund, 2 F.4th at 970. A person who merely
passes by an eyesore possesses nothing more than a generalized
grievance, which cannot support standing to sue.
b.
The Trust’s only evidence of member standing is
Hoagland’s declaration. Her asserted aesthetic injury can be
understood in two ways—as a speculative injury to her
particular use of the White House, or as an imminent but
generalized injury from incidentally viewing the ballroom.
Either way, she lacks standing to sue.
If Hoagland’s aesthetic injury is to her specific use and
enjoyment of the White House, as the district court and
majority maintain, she fails to demonstrate her harm is

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imminent. In her declaration, she does not state any concrete
plans to use and enjoy President’s Park. Hoagland details her
academic credentials, past academic work, and historical
preservation efforts around Washington, D.C., but she nowhere
states that her work or her other activities specifically require
viewing the White House without the planned ballroom. See
Hoagland Decl. ¶¶ 4–8, 10–11. Hoagland instead claims that
she expects to “travel to the area around the White
House … about once a month” to “attend functions in
neighboring buildings.” Id. ¶ 12. Her assertions about future
use of President’s Park are tenuous at best and do not satisfy
the Trust’s burden at the preliminary injunction stage to make
a clear showing of imminent aesthetic injury to a member.
If Hoagland’s aesthetic injury is instead incidentally
viewing a ballroom she finds displeasing, her harm is imminent
but not particularized. Her declaration merely states that about
once a month she will walk by the White House on her way to
other buildings. Id. On these walks, she anticipates being
“impressed” with the White House but displeased with the
planned ballroom. Id. These allegations mirror those of the
petitioner in Environmental Defense Fund, who lacked
standing because she complained only about an “eyesore” that
she occasionally passed while traveling elsewhere. 2 F.4th at
968–69. Since Hoagland’s objection to the appearance of the
ballroom could be made by anyone planning to travel by the
White House, it constitutes nothing more than a generalized
grievance insufficient for Article III standing.
Because Hoagland’s declaration is plainly insufficient on
its own terms, the district court and the majority stretch to
characterize her alleged harm as imminent and particularized.
But courts may not manufacture standing by filling in the
blanks for the plaintiff. The district court asserted that
Hoagland will “visit President’s Park ‘about once a month’ to

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enjoy the historic character of the setting.” National Trust I,
821 F. Supp. 3d at 70. The majority likewise tries to build up
Hoagland’s declaration with claims that she plans to “recreate[]
by walking in front of the White House,” “tour[]” viewpoints
of the White House, and visit Lafayette Park to “enjoy [the]
architectural simplicity and historical significance” of the
White House. Majority Op. 31–32.
Hoagland simply does not make anything like these
statements. Notably, Hoagland does not claim that taking in an
unchanged view of the White House is the object of her future
plans.4 See Hoagland Decl. ¶ 12; Env’t Def. Fund, 2 F.4th at
969 (requiring the petitioner to show her “planned future uses
of the land have been foreclosed by the construction”).
Hoagland’s ambiguous declaration does not satisfy the
demanding standard for showing standing to obtain a
preliminary injunction. When seeking the extraordinary and
coercive remedy of a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
make a “clear showing” of a substantial likelihood of standing.
Murthy, 144 S. Ct. at 1986 (cleaned up). By reading between
the lines of Hoagland’s declaration to uphold the preliminary
injunction, the majority contravenes the Supreme Court’s
admonition in Murthy. We may not “gloss[] over complexities
in the evidence” submitted by Hoagland, and courts cannot
issue preliminary injunctions based on “murky” evidence of
standing. Id. at 1988, 1992 n.8.
4 To satisfy imminence and particularization, our precedents require
relatively modest facts detailing future aesthetic use and enjoyment
of land, such as a plane ticket to view endangered species. See, e.g.,
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 & n.2. But the court should not lower the
hurdle still further by compensating for a deficient declaration in
order to open the courthouse doors to associations challenging
government action.

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By allowing standing for the Trust based only on
Hoagland’s declaration, the majority’s reasoning would permit
adjudication of any government action that a plaintiff finds
unsightly. But that contravenes the settled understanding that
“general emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how deeply felt, cannot
suffice for injury-in-fact for standing purposes.” Humane Soc.
of U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995). I would
decline the Trust’s “unprecedented and limitless” assertion of
standing, which would improperly convert the federal courts
into a “vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders.” Alliance, 144 S. Ct. at 1556, 1562
(cleaned up).
In sum, Hoagland falls short of making a clear showing of
standing for a preliminary injunction. And having failed to
demonstrate it likely has a member with standing, the Trust
lacks associational standing.
* * *
Without a clear showing of standing for the Trust, the
district court abused its discretion by halting construction of the
ballroom.
B.
The construction of the ballroom is also likely within
EXR’s statutory authority. The Trust’s ultra vires claims
therefore fail and cannot justify issuance of the preliminary
injunction. See Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agriculture, 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that
failure to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits is
sufficient to deny a preliminary injunction).
To prevail on an ultra vires claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) “the statutory preclusion of review is implied

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17
rather than express”; (2) “there is no alternative procedure for
review of the statutory claim”; and (3) “the agency plainly acts
in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific
prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.” Changji
Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C.
Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). The third element is “especially
demanding” and requires an “extreme” statutory violation. Id.
(cleaned up). For this reason, an ultra vires claim is “essentially
a Hail Mary pass—and in court as in football, the attempt rarely
succeeds.” NRC, 145 S. Ct. at 1776 (cleaned up).
1.
The district court erred in concluding that the Trust is
likely to succeed on its ultra vires claims. The Trust’s claims
hinge on 40 U.S.C. § 8106, which requires “express authority
of Congress” to erect a “building or structure … on any
reservation, park, or public grounds of the Federal Government
in the District of Columbia.” Even assuming this provision
applies to EXR, a point the government disputes, it cannot
carry the ultra vires analysis on its own. Section 8106 is not a
specific statutory prohibition against construction projects on
federal lands in the District. Rather, it requires us to determine
whether another statute expressly authorizes such construction
by EXR. Section 8106 does not eliminate the requirement that
to make out a successful ultra vires claim the Trust bears the
burden of showing that EXR has acted “plainly … in excess of
its delegated powers.”5 Changji, 40 F.4th at 722.
5 To the extent the district court placed the burden of proof on the
government, this was legal error. See National Trust II, 827 F. Supp.
3d at 104 (“[T]he President must identify some law that allows him
to demolish the East Wing and construct his planned ballroom with
private funds.”); see also Majority Op. 63. The Trust bears the
“stringent” burden of demonstrating that extraordinary preliminary

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The Trust is unlikely to complete its Hail Mary pass. At
the outset, the Trust “dress[es] up … typical statutory-authority
argument[s]” as ultra vires claims, a common but ultimately
futile maneuver. NRC, 145 S. Ct. at 1776. As the Supreme
Court has consistently maintained, ultra vires review is a
narrow exception to the rule that judicial review of executive
action requires statutory authorization. The availability of such
review rests on the principle that the statutory violation must
be “so extreme that one may view it as jurisdictional or nearly
so.” Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.) (cleaned up).
Accordingly, the ultra vires exception “does not apply simply
because an agency has arguably reached ‘a conclusion which
does not comport with the law.’” NRC, 145 S. Ct. at 1776
(quoting Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964));
see also DCH Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 503, 509 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (recognizing that ultra vires review does not extend
to “garden-variety errors of law or fact”) (cleaned up).
The Trust’s claims boil down to an assertion that EXR’s
statutory authorities are not sufficiently explicit to authorize the
ballroom construction. In support of its claims, the Trust
advances a range of typical statutory interpretation arguments
about the scope of EXR’s authority under 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)
and the meaning of specific terms in that provision. The Trust’s
arguments that EXR has stretched its statutory authority too far
are insufficient to sustain an ultra vires claim. See NRC, 145
S. Ct. at 1776.
In any event, the Trust’s statutory arguments fail, and so
the district court erred in concluding that construction of the
relief is warranted and that construction of the ballroom is an
“extreme” statutory violation. Changji, 40 F.4th at 722–25.

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ballroom plainly exceeds EXR’s authority under section
105(d).
Section 105(d) authorizes appropriations for the President
to undertake certain actions, including for the “care,
maintenance, repair, alteration, refurnishing, improvement, air-
conditioning, heating, and lighting (including electric power
and fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White House.”
3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1). Section 105(d) provides authority for
EXR to build the ballroom because the ballroom qualifies as an
“improvement” of the Executive Residence.
Because “improvement” has multiple definitions, we must
determine which definition best comports with the “statutory
scheme.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845 (2018).
Section 105(d)(1) enumerates modifications that can be made
to real property, and so the provision is best read as
incorporating the real property definition of “improvement.”
See Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013) (“It is a
settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication,
Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the
common-law terms it uses.”) (cleaned up). In the context of real
property, “improvement” means a “valuable addition made to
property (usually real estate)” that “amount[s] to more than
mere repairs or replacement.” Improvement, Black’s Law
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). The prototypical example is a
“building[],” but the definition also includes “any permanent
structure.” Id.
Federal law confirms this understanding of
“improvement.” In numerous statutes dealing with real
property, Congress has used “improvement” to include the
construction of buildings. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.
§ 2687a(a)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “construction … or extension
of a building, structure, or other improvement to real

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property”); 16 U.S.C. § 666 (authorizing appropriations for the
“construction of such facilities, buildings, and other
improvements”). The district court never addressed the real
property definition of “improvement,” and my colleagues
attempt to limit the meaning of “improvement” in a manner that
is not supported by the common law.6
6 The district court relied on the noscitur a sociis canon and adopted
a more colloquial interpretation of “improvement” as akin to
ordinary maintenance and upkeep. But limiting the scope of
“improvement” to maintenance and upkeep creates a surplusage
problem by rendering “improvement” wholly redundant with the
terms “maintenance” and “repair,” which are also listed in section
105(d)(1). See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202,
209 (1997) (“Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each
word some operative effect.”). These competing canons reinforce
how the Trust raises at most garden variety legal errors insufficient
to support an ultra vires action.
My colleagues suggest that, at common law, an “improvement” of
a building is a narrower concept than an “improvement” to land. See
Majority Op. 80–81 & n.12. Yet the cases they cite show that even a
“substantial addition[]” to a building qualifies as an “improvement”
while the replacement of that building with a new one does not.
Anastasi v. Brunet, 90 A.2d 636, 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952); see also
Hanson Assoc., P.C. v. Gallery Plaza P’ship, 32 Va. Cir. 356, at *3
(Feb. 9, 1994) (describing a sizeable “addition to [an] existing
structure” and a “new back building” as “improvements to an
existing building”); Cinelli Builders, Inc. v. Ferris, 78 A.D.3d 881,
882 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (concluding the “construction of [a] new
home” was not “home improvement”). Consistent with this principle,
courts often refer to new wings or extensions of existing buildings as
“improvements” of those buildings. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J. W.
Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 900 (N.Y. 1971) (referring to the
“addition of a full wing” as an “improvement[]”). These cases and
common law principles confirm the ballroom is an “improvement”
because it is an addition to the Executive Residence.

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The planned ballroom is a lawful improvement of the
Executive Residence at the White House because it is a
building or structure extending from and supporting the
Residence. Even accepting the majority’s premise that the
Residence is limited to the central structure of the White
House, the Residence is a multifunctional building with living
spaces for the President and his family, as well as office space.
The Residence also includes historic spaces, like the State
Dining Room and the East Room, which are used for receiving
and hosting foreign dignitaries and guests.
The ballroom is intended to increase capacity for official
functions and events beyond what can be provided by existing
facilities. To that end, the ballroom will be integrated with the
Executive Residence, enabling both “direct ceremonial
procession from the East Room” and “secure second-story
access from” the Residence into the ballroom. NPS, White
House East Wing Modernization & State Ballroom Env’t
Assessment 2 (Aug. 2025). Because the ballroom will adjoin
the Executive Residence and expand its hosting capacity, it
qualifies as an “improvement” under section 105(d)(1).
The best reading of section 105(d) is that it authorizes
EXR’s construction of the ballroom. Although my colleagues
disagree, at a minimum the real property meaning of
“improvement” demonstrates that EXR has not exceeded its
authority in a manner “clearly in defiance of” section 105(d).
Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (cleaned
up). The Trust’s ultra vires claims are therefore likely to fail.
2.
The district court also asserted in passing that the funding
for the ballroom does not comport with section 105(d). But this
argument misreads the statute. And the majority’s efforts to
weave together a wholly new rationale under the Economy

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22
Act—neither raised by the Trust nor relied upon by the district
court—cannot support the preliminary injunction.
The district court determined, with little analysis, that any
funding for actions under section 105(d) must be appropriated
explicitly under section 105(d). Since Congress appropriated
only about $2.5 million explicitly for section 105(d) expenses,
EXR lacks the funds to build the ballroom. To support this
conclusion, the district court pointed to language in the statute
addressing the President’s authority to spend “[s]ums
appropriated under” section 105(d). See National Trust II, 827
F. Supp. 3d at 107. When an appropriation is made under
section 105(d), authorized actions may be undertaken “as the
President may determine” with only limited oversight by the
Comptroller General. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). Read in context, this
bookkeeping language simply expands the President’s
discretion to use these particular appropriations. Nothing in
section 105(d) limits available appropriations to those made
explicitly pursuant to section 105(d).
Therefore, improvements to the Residence may be funded
with other available appropriations, and it is well established
that NPS gift funds may qualify as an appropriation. An
appropriation is “simply a law that authorizes expenditures
from a specified source of public money for designated
purposes.” CFPB v. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd., 144
S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2024). Appropriations are found not only in
line-item spending bills, but also in statutes that identify a
government revenue stream and authorize its expenditure for
specified ends. See id. at 1486. Thus, when Congress
authorizes the Executive to collect and spend private donations,
such funds generally “constitute appropriated funds unless
Congress provides otherwise.” Gov’t Accountability Off.,
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 6-226 (3d ed. 2006).

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Here, the NPS gift statute authorizes the collection of
donations “for the purposes of” the National Park System,
which includes President’s Park and the White House. 54
U.S.C. § 101101(2). These donations are held in the NPS trust
fund, and Congress has explicitly provided that those donations
are “appropriated to be disbursed in compliance with the
terms” of the trust. 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17), (b)(1). Congress
could not have been clearer that NPS gift funds are an
appropriation. The donations the government claims it is using
here are therefore an “appropriation” that can fund the
ballroom.7 The only legal argument supporting the district
court’s injunction with regard to the ballroom’s funding is that
gift funds cannot qualify as an appropriation capable of funding
actions under section 105(d). But that argument contravenes
the best reading of the statute as well as longstanding principles
of appropriations law.
I recognize there is another step to this funding
mechanism, namely that the NPS gift funds are being made
available for use by EXR through an agreement with NPS
under the Economy Act. Whether that particular transaction is
lawful and comports with the Economy Act, however, is a
question the district court did not reach because it was “not
squarely at issue.” National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 108.
Any claims about the Economy Act or the funding structure for
EXR’s use of the gift funds were not decided or relied upon by
the district court in issuing the preliminary injunction.
My colleagues again try to fill in the gaps by arguing that
the Economy Act does not permit EXR to use NPS gift funds
to construct the ballroom. But in general, this court does not
7 Because the NPS gift funds are an appropriation, the majority
incorrectly assumes that the “privately donated funds” involved here
are “not congressional appropriations.” Majority Op. 64.

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reach issues that were “neither raised nor decided below.”
Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up). Before the district court, the Trust never directly
challenged the government’s reliance on the Economy Act to
finance EXR’s construction under section 105(d) with NPS gift
funds. The majority’s reliance on the Economy Act goes
beyond the issues (not just the arguments) presented by the
Trust. But respect for party presentation should apply with
special force to a motion for a preliminary injunction, where
the plaintiff’s burden is demanding and the requested relief is
“a matter of discretion, not a question of right.” Sherley v.
Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Furthermore, this court has declined to uphold a
preliminary injunction “based upon a legal theory not
embraced by the district court.” Id. Here, the district court
made clear that whether the NPS-EXR agreement complied
with the Economy Act was “not squarely at issue” and
therefore did not serve as a basis for the preliminary injunction.
National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 108. The majority spins
out a series of original Economy Act arguments. But we cannot
make up for the district court’s errors and the Trust’s forfeiture
to save the preliminary injunction.8
8 My colleagues also rely on a phantom concession to assert that the
Trust’s APA claims against NPS can independently support the
injunction. See Majority Op. 70 n.11. Below, the Trust challenged
only the authority of NPS to construct the ballroom, not its authority
to fund EXR’s construction under the NPS gift statute and the
Economy Act. At oral argument, the government maintained that,
regardless of NPS’s construction authority, the NPS gift statute and
EXR’s authority under section 105(d) permit EXR to build the
ballroom. See Oral Arg. Tr. 55:21–56:6 (acknowledging that “to use
the gift funds,” the ballroom project must satisfy the requirement of
the “gift statute” that it “advance the purposes of the park system”);

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25
In sum, EXR’s construction of the ballroom is likely
authorized by section 105(d), and so it is neither prohibited
under section 8106 nor ultra vires. Because the Trust’s ultra
vires claims are likely to fail, they cannot support the
preliminary injunction.
C.
Because the government’s interest in the security of the
White House far outweighs any alleged harm to the Trust, the
equitable balance favors the government and requires vacating
the preliminary injunction.
“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does
not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.”
Winter, 555 U.S. at 32. The balance of equities and public
interest factors may foreclose injunctive relief even if the
plaintiff has a meritorious claim. See id. at 31–32; see also
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–31 (1944) (describing
the “long tradition” of courts’ discretion to deny injunctive
relief based on the public interest, irrespective of the merits).
“In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of
injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting
or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24
see also Gov’t Br. 5 (arguing that section 105(d) “independently
authorize[s] the Project”).
I therefore need not address the Trust’s APA challenge to NPS’s
construction authority, which the district court considered only “to
the extent that NPS is directing or otherwise involved” in
constructing the ballroom. National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 113.
Because EXR is managing the project and the role of NPS is limited
to collecting donations and transferring them to EXR, the claims
challenging the construction authority of NPS cannot independently
support the preliminary injunction.

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26
(cleaned up). The balance of equities and public interest factors
merge here because the government opposes the injunction.
See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
Because an injunction is a prospective remedy, we balance
the equities in relation to the current state of the case, including
the ongoing ballroom construction. Cf. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of
Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 466 (1943)
(explaining that “an appeal in an equity suit …. must be
decided on the basis of the circumstances that exist now”).
The district court found the equities favor the Trust
because the ballroom will “overshadow the White House and
disrupt [its] appearance” and because the “government’s
concerns regarding the safety and security of the White
House … [are] a problem of the President’s own making!”
National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (cleaned up). Putting
to one side the district court’s aesthetic judgments and general
outrage, the Trust’s equitable interest boils down to the
aesthetic preferences of a single individual.
The district court abused its discretion in concluding that
the Trust’s minimal harm outweighs the government’s interest
in the security and safety of the President, the First Family, and
White House staff and visitors. First, the district court
improperly glossed over, ignored, or discounted the
government’s evidence demonstrating the security harms from
halting construction of the ballroom. Second, the district court
cannot compensate for the slight aesthetic harm to a passerby
by resorting to hyperbole and its view of the legal merits.
1.
Neither the district court nor the majority assign proper
weight to the credible and detailed evidence—from the Secret
Service, the Secretary of the Army, and the Army Corps of

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Engineers—that halting construction of the ballroom impairs
White House security. Weighed against aesthetic harm to a
single passerby, this evidence compels the conclusion that the
equities overwhelmingly favor the government.
To begin with, we must “give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest.” Winter,
555 U.S. at 24 (cleaned up); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2422 (2018) (holding courts must give
“appropriate weight” to “the Executive’s evaluation of the
underlying facts” in the context of national security). In matters
involving White House security, we have emphasized that
“reviewing courts [must] be appropriately deferential to the
Secret Service’s determination of what … constitutes a
potential risk to the physical security of the President or his
family.” Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Deferential review starts by fully considering the evidence put
forward by the government.
The Deputy Director of the Secret Service has explained
how the ongoing construction impairs the ability of the Service
to “provide a secure 360-degree perimeter to safely protect the
President, First Family, and residence.” Quinn Decl. ¶ 4; see
also id. (explaining “the current unfinished construction site
compromises the ability of Secret Service personnel” to
undertake “protective security operations”). The “current
construction debris and large holes” also impair the ability of
the Secret Service to “effectively secure[] the east side of the
White House Building.” Id. ¶ 5. The construction delay
imposed by the preliminary injunction inevitably extends the
time during which the President’s residence remains less
secure. “Every day added to the Project is another day
impairing full security.” Id. ¶ 9.

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In addition to the security threat posed by the construction
delay, the government has provided declarations from senior
military and Secret Service officials thoroughly detailing the
security benefits of the ballroom. These declarations explain
how the ballroom will alleviate security vulnerabilities that
currently impact large events involving the President, which
must be hosted offsite or in soft tents.9 Id. The ballroom is also
uniquely designed to fortify the underground national security
facilities beneath it. The ballroom “will provide a fixed
structure equipped with … modern protective security
measures, including threat-resistant building materials,” and
will “serve as a fortified structural buffer.” Id. ¶ 10.
The Secretary of the Army has further explained why the
underground national security facilities cannot be adequately
protected by the concrete slab and modest topping structure
allowed by the district court’s injunction. Driscoll Decl. ¶ 4.
The ballroom’s dimensions and structure are essential for
security. According to the Secretary, “[t]o provide adequate
subterranean protection without” the “height and mass” of the
ballroom, “engineers would need to dig impractically deep.”
Id. ¶ 6. The ballroom provides a critical “dual-layered system”
of protection for the national security facilities, “comprising a
sacrificial outer cover coupled with a hardened inner structural
element.” Id. ¶ 8; see also id. ¶¶ 8–12.
Corroborating the Secretary’s account, the Commanding
General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has similarly
described how the “height and mass” of the ballroom “provide
crucial, physical layers to shield” the national security facilities
9 The security risks presented by large offsite events involving the
President were unfortunately confirmed by the assassination attempt
against President Trump at the Washington Hilton during the White
House Correspondents’ Dinner. See Gov’t Br. 1, 58–59.

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29
beneath it. Graham Memorandum ¶ 4; see also id. ¶¶ 5–9. The
height of the ballroom will also provide an “essential elevated
platform to engage and neutralize aerial systems,” such as
drones, that pose an increasingly serious threat to White House
security. Id. ¶ 4; accord Driscoll Decl. ¶ 6. There is no dispute
that the Secretary’s declaration and the Army Corps
memorandum are authentic, credible, and “go[] to the heart of
the contested issue,” so it would be “inconsistent with this
court’s own equitable obligations to pretend that [they] do[] not
exist.”10 Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up).
10 My colleagues simply assert they have “considered” these
documents but say nothing about how the government’s interests
weigh in the equitable balance. See Majority Op. 92 n.15. They also
maintain that no consideration is necessary because the government
submitted the materials only on appeal when seeking a stay. But this
court regularly considers additional evidence in assessing the
asserted harms underlying a stay motion. See Fed. R. App. P.
27(a)(2)(B)(i) (allowing the submission of “[a]ny affidavit or other
paper necessary to support a motion”). The new declarations
specifically address the security deficiencies of the alternatives to the
ballroom (such as a concrete slab) allowed by the district court’s
modified injunction.
Furthermore, the government preserved the argument that the
ballroom is necessary to protect the national security facilities
beneath it, an argument merely amplified by the additional factual
evidence. We should not fault the government for limiting prior
disclosure of sensitive information regarding White House security
plans and vulnerabilities. The government has appropriately
provided additional details in seeking a stay of the injunction, which
the district court issued despite the declarations the government
provided below about White House security and the President’s
safety.

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The equities in this case turn on complex architectural and
security determinations best made by the Secret Service and the
military—not judges. Despite the evidence and technical
analysis submitted by the government, the district court
brushed off these security concerns as “problem[s] of the
President’s own making!” National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at
116. And the majority merely assumes that because there must
be a “fully protective security plan” for the White House during
construction, the injunction extending construction has no
consequence for the President’s security.11 Majority Op.
94 & n.16. But that armchair judicial assumption directly
contradicts the Secret Service’s assessment that the ongoing
construction impairs full security at the White House. Quinn
Decl. ¶ 9.
The district court and the majority have “failed properly to
defer to senior [Secret Service and Army] officers’ specific,
predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction
would reduce the effectiveness” of current efforts to secure the
White House. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 27; cf. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
at 2421 (“[W]e cannot substitute our own assessment for the
Executive’s predictive judgments on [national security]
matters.”). A judges-know-best approach to presidential
security cannot support the preliminary injunction.
At bottom, the balance of equities turns on the “relative
harms” incurred by the Trust and the government. Trump v.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017) (per
11 Like the district court, the majority wrongly criticizes the
government for asserting the security benefits of the ballroom after
previously representing that below ground construction would not
lock in the above ground design. There is nothing contradictory
about stating the ballroom is designed to serve critical security
functions while also recognizing that some design changes may be
feasible.

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31
curiam) (cleaned up). In this case, the current safety of the
President, as well as his family, staff, and guests, clearly
outweighs future aesthetic harm to Hoagland. The
circumstances here parallel those in Winter, in which the
Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction because the
plaintiffs’ “ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in
marine mammals” were “plainly outweighed by the Navy’s
need” to adequately train its antisubmarine forces. 555 U.S. at
25–26, 33.
The government’s serious and substantiated security
interests in completing the ballroom plainly trump what the
Trust has placed on the other side of the scale—the aesthetic
preferences of one individual who walks by the White House
about once a month. This minimal harm cannot justify a
preliminary injunction that threatens the security and safety of
the President of the United States.
2.
The district court’s conclusion that the equitable balance
favors the Trust was an abuse of discretion.
First, as already explained, the district court failed to
properly balance the relative harms because it conspicuously
disregarded the full extent of the security risks posed by halting
construction of the ballroom. The majority doubles down on
this error, even when faced with additional credible evidence
from the government.
Second, perhaps because the actual harms
overwhelmingly favor the government, the district court let the
merits drive the equitable analysis by leaning on the
government’s alleged lack of statutory authority. See National
Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (claiming the government
“cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an

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unlawful practice”) (cleaned up); see also Majority Op. 95–96
(similar). The district court also repeatedly exclaimed that the
government lacks constitutional authority, even though the
government has never claimed such authority. See National
Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 116; see also Majority Op. 89, 97,
100.
This collapsing of the merits and the equities was an abuse
of the district court’s equitable discretion. While the merits
may bear on the equities, the merits are not dispositive of the
equities. On this, the Supreme Court has been clear: “As a
matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction does
not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff’s showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585
U.S. 155, 158 (2018) (per curiam). Rather, because an
injunction is an equitable remedy, courts must exercise their
“traditional equitable discretion” in deciding whether to grant
such relief. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
311–13, 319 (1982). “Crafting a preliminary injunction is an
exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much
on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal
issues it presents.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S.
at 579.
The importance of exercising equitable judgment beyond
the merits is reflected in the fact that an injunction may be
vacated solely for failing to strike the right equitable balance.
See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24, 31 (vacating an injunction based
only on the equities). Indeed, this court must “balance the
equities of the parties and the public even when a party seeks
to restrain the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
law.” Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 247 (D.C.
Cir. 2024) (per curiam); see also Benisek, 585 U.S. at 158
(affirming denial of an injunction only on the equities despite
claims asserting a constitutional injury). Contra Majority Op.

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97 (attempting to limit Winter’s reliance on the balance of
equities to procedural harms). The district court’s double
reliance on the merits cannot compensate for deficiencies in the
Trust’s equitable position.
Third, the district court emphasized the injunction’s
exception for construction strictly necessary for White House
security. But this exception does not undermine the
government’s equitable interests. The exception does not
permit construction of the ballroom despite the unique and
essential security benefits it provides. Moreover, even if the
exception could mitigate some safety concerns, its scope will
ultimately be determined by the district court, not by those
managing construction or overseeing the security of the White
House. As in Winter, the fact the government “may return to
the district court to request relief” if the injunction “actually
results” in security harms provides “cold comfort.” 555 U.S. at
31 (cleaned up). The government should not be forced to rely
on the district court’s architectural approval to secure the
President’s home and office.
Fourth, the equitable balance was heavily influenced by
the district court’s aesthetic judgments and failure to account
for the benefits of the ballroom. For example, the district court
assumed the proposed ballroom will “disrupt the appearance”
of the White House. National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 116.
The majority also relies on its disapproval of the ballroom’s
design, commenting that the project is “destroying [a] treasured
national landmark[].” Majority Op. 96. Putting aside that the
old East Wing was treasured by few if any visitors, a judge’s
aesthetic opinions cannot compensate for the limited harm
incurred by the Trust.
Moreover, if this injunction turns on choosing between the
district court’s assessment of the ballroom and the President’s,

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Congress has already made that choice. Congress expressly
preserved the President’s authority over President’s Park. The
statute creating the Park states, “nothing done under this Act
shall conflict … with the use and occupancy of the buildings
and grounds as the home of the President and his family and
for his official purposes.” 75 Stat. at 586.
Among the President’s official uses for the Park is the
hosting of state events that welcome foreign dignitaries. See
Dep’t of the Interior, Comprehensive Design Plan: The White
House & President’s Park 28, 51 (2000) (explaining that a
central function of the White House and President’s Park is to
serve as the “setting for state events”); cf. U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 3 (providing the President “shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers”). As presidential administrations of
both parties have recognized, current facilities are “inadequate”
for large White House events. Comprehensive Design Plan,
supra, at 102–03, 115, 121–22.
The ballroom serves the purposes of President’s Park by
fulfilling the longstanding need to accommodate large events.
NPS determined that any effect of the ballroom on the
architectural balance of the White House was outweighed by
various benefits the ballroom provides President’s Park and the
public that enjoys it. Such benefits include “enhanced tour
features,” “upgraded visitor amenities,” and “a permanent,
secure event space … that provides increased capacity for
official state functions … consistent with essential functional
requirements of the Executive Office of the President” and with
the “historic integrity and cultural landscape of the White
House and its grounds.” Env’t Assessment, supra, at 2, 17.
Importantly, the ballroom will alleviate the need for large
events to rely on “huge, unsightly tents” that damage the Park,
and unlike those tents, the ballroom will not disrupt the “long

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vista linking the White House, Washington Monument, and
Jefferson Memorial.” Id. at 1–2, 8, 10.
Finally, this case is not about tearing down the White
House and building a skyscraper or razing the Statue of
Liberty. Contra National Trust II, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 107;
Majority Op. 42. The equitable balance is between the asserted
aesthetic harm to a single passerby and the safety and security
of the President as well as his family, staff, and guests at the
White House. In this case, the equities are squarely with the
government, and therefore the district court abused its
discretion in seizing control of construction at the President’s
home and office.
* * *
In deciding the ballroom construction “has to stop!” the
district court transgressed the equitable authority of the federal
courts. The preliminary injunction is a clear abuse of discretion
and must be vacated. I respectfully dissent.

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