EWU v Matthews

25CA1283 EWU v Matthews 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1283
Pitkin County District Court No. 25CV30024
Honorable Denise Lynch, Judge
EWU Media, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charlie Matthews, in his official capacity as the Records Manager and the
custodian of the requested records for the Pitkin County Sheriff’s Office,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Schock, J., concurs
J. Jones, J., dissents
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Frank Law Office LLC, William Fairhurst, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant
Richard Y. Neiley III, County Attorney, Ryan L. Scheidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Aspen, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

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¶ 1 In this action under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act
(CCJRA), sections 24-72-301 to -309, C.R.S. 2026, plaintiff, EWU
Media LLC, appeals the district court’s order upholding the denial of
its records request by defendant, Charlie Matthews, the records
custodian for the Pitkin County Sheriff’s Office.
¶ 2 The custodian denied EWU Media’s request under the at-risk
adult reporting statute, section 26-3.1-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2026,
which prohibits disclosing “reports of the . . . self-neglect of an at-
risk adult.” Applying the statutory language to the facts of this
case, we agree with the district court that the custodian didn’t
abuse his discretion by determining that the statute prohibits
disclosure of the sheriff’s investigation records related to the death
of an elderly hiker with dementia symptoms who departed on a trail
without water or adequate clothing. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment upholding the custodian’s denial of EWU Media’s
records request.
I. Background
¶ 3 In December 2024, EWU Media requested that the sheriff’s
office provide records related to its investigation of an October 2024
incident in which an elderly male hiker was found dead on the

2
Conundrum Creek Trail. The records custodian for the sheriff’s
office denied the request, concluding that the records weren’t
releasable under the at-risk adult reporting statute, section
26-3.1-102, which prohibits disclosing reports of the self-neglect of
an at-risk adult.
¶ 4 EWU Media petitioned the district court under the CCJRA,
requesting that the court order the records custodian to show cause
why he shouldn’t be required to release the requested records. See
§ 24-72-305(7), C.R.S. 2026. According to EWU Media, the at-risk
adult reporting statute doesn’t forbid disclosure of the requested
records.
¶ 5 The district court held a hearing at which the custodian and a
sheriff’s office investigator testified. The custodian testified that the
hiker was seventy-seven or seventy-eight years old and had
experienced symptoms of dementia. The custodian further
explained that, even though the hiker had hiked this particular trail
several years earlier, he didn’t take water or adequate clothing on
his latest outing. The investigator added that, according to the
hiker’s friend who reported him missing, the hiker wasn’t in good
shape and didn’t possess the physical stamina needed to complete

3
this specific hike. Additionally, the hiker’s sister reported that he
had “pre-dementia.” Armed with this information, the custodian
determined that the sheriff’s investigation records related to the
self-neglect of an at-risk adult, requiring that he deny EWU Media’s
records request.
¶ 6 In a detailed written order, the district court concluded that
the custodian properly denied EWU Media’s request. See id.
(“Unless the court finds that the denial of inspection was proper, it
shall order the custodian to permit such inspection . . . .”). The
court reasoned that the at-risk adult reporting statute prohibits
disclosure because the hiker’s elderly age, dementia symptoms, and
failure to take adequate provisions on a strenuous hike in October
demonstrated that the hiker lacked the capacity to make a
responsible decision to go hiking.
II. Discussion
¶ 7 EWU Media contends that the district court erred by
concluding that the custodian properly denied its records request
under the at-risk adult reporting statute, section 26-3.1-102(7).

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 8 The CCJRA governs the public’s access to “criminal justice
records.” Madrigal v. City of Aurora, 2014 COA 67, ¶ 9. Criminal
justice records include
all books, papers, cards, photographs, tapes,
recordings, or other documentary materials,
regardless of form or characteristics, that are
made, maintained, or kept by any criminal
justice agency in the state for use in the
exercise of functions required or authorized by
law or administrative rule, including, but not
limited to, the results of chemical biological
substance testing to determine genetic
markers conducted pursuant to sections
16-11-102.4 and 16-23-104[, C.R.S. 2026], or
risk assessment outputs.
§ 24-72-302(4), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 9 While the CCJRA generally favors broad disclosure of criminal
justice records, that preference is “tempered by the privacy interests
and dangers of adverse consequences involved in the inspection
request.” Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
196 P.3d 892, 899 (Colo. 2008). Among other exceptions to
inspection, a records custodian must deny a request for criminal
justice records when “[s]uch inspection would be contrary to any

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state statute.” § 24-72-305(1)(a); see, e.g., Harris v. Denv. Post
Corp., 123 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 10 The at-risk adult reporting statute, in turn, provides that a
report of “mistreatment or self-neglect of an at-risk adult” is
confidential and “not public information.” § 26-3.1-102(7)(a).
Subject to certain exceptions, disclosure of such a report “is
permitted only when authorized by a court for good cause.”
§ 26-3.1-102(7)(b).
¶ 11 An adult qualifies as “at-risk” if they are “susceptible to
mistreatment or self-neglect because the individual is unable to
perform or obtain services necessary for his or her health, safety, or
welfare, or lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his or her person or
affairs.” § 26-3.1-101(1.5), C.R.S. 2026. “Self-neglect” means an
“act or failure to act whereby an at-risk adult substantially
endangers his or her health, safety, welfare, or life by not seeking or
obtaining services necessary to meet his or her essential human
needs.” § 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 12 In reviewing whether a custodian properly denied a records
request under the CCJRA, we stand in the same position as the

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district court and review whether the custodian abused their
discretion. Madrigal, ¶ 13. “The custodian’s determination
constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair; it reflects a misapplication of the law; or it
is not reasonably supported by competent evidence in the record.”
Id. at ¶ 14.
¶ 13 But we review de novo questions of law concerning the correct
construction of statutes. Freedom Colo., 196 P.3d at 897. In doing
so, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings.
Doe 1 v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2019 CO 92, ¶ 15. Our
primary duty is to ascertain and give effect to the General
Assembly’s intent. Ferguson Enters., Inc. v. Keybuild Sols., Inc., 275
P.3d 741, 747-48 (Colo. App. 2011). If the statute’s meaning is
clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written unless
doing so would lead to an absurd result. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth.
v. Kortum Inv. Co., LLLP, 121 P.3d 331, 333 (Colo. App. 2005).
B. Analysis
¶ 14 EWU Media contends that the custodian abused his discretion
by denying its record request, arguing that the hiker wasn’t an

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at-risk adult and didn’t experience self-neglect as those terms are
defined in the at-risk adult reporting statute.
¶ 15 We discern no abuse of discretion in the custodian’s denial.
The custodian testified that, based on the reports law enforcement
had received, the hiker (1) lacked sufficient understanding to make
responsible decisions concerning his person, thus satisfying the
definition of “[a]t-risk adult,” § 26-3.1-101(1.5); and (2) endangered
his health, safety, welfare, or life by not obtaining services that were
necessary for his survival, thus satisfying the definition of “[s]elf-
neglect,” § 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 16 The record evidence supports the custodian’s determination.
As to the “at-risk adult” definition, the evidence showed that the
hiker was of advanced age, experienced dementia symptoms, and
embarked on a difficult hike even though he lacked adequate
physical stamina. Because the hiker had prior experience with this
particular trail, investigators could have reasonably concluded that
his dementia symptoms had caused him to lack sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person. § 26-3.1-101(1.5).

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¶ 17 As to the “self-neglect” definition, the evidence showed that the
hiker departed without water or adequate clothing, despite it being
October and despite the hike being physically demanding. While
departing on a hike underprepared wouldn’t suffice by itself, when
coupled with the evidence of the hiker’s dementia symptoms and
his previous experience on this trail, the custodian could have
reasonably concluded that the hiker’s combined actions had
substantially endangered his health, safety, welfare, or life.
§ 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 18 But what about the additional statutory requirement that the
hiker caused this endangerment by “not seeking or obtaining
services necessary to meet his . . . essential human needs”? Id.
(emphasis added). EWU Media asserts that the custodian didn’t
show that the hiker failed to seek or obtain such services. While
“services” isn’t defined in the statute, the term’s ordinary meaning
is “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another,” or
“action or use that furthers some end or purpose,” such as the
“supply of needs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
2075 (2002). We can also glean clues to the term’s meaning by
looking to the company it keeps in the remainder of the self-neglect

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definition. See Berges v. Cnty. Ct., 2016 COA 146, ¶ 10 (courts
don’t read statutory language in isolation from its context). In
particular, services under the statute must be necessary to meet
the putative at-risk adult’s “essential human needs.”
§ 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 19 Against this backdrop, we conclude that “services” as used in
section 26-3.1-101(10) encompasses all acts that aid in securing a
person’s essential human needs. This includes but isn’t limited to
the provision of life-sustaining goods such as food, water, and
clothing, whether from oneself or a third party such as a delivery
service, retailer, or other provider. Cf. § 26-3.1-101(1.5) (adult may
qualify as at-risk if they’re unable to “perform or obtain services”
(emphasis added)). Because the evidence showed that the hiker
failed to secure water or adequate clothing before departing on a
strenuous hike in October, we conclude the custodian didn’t err by
determining that the hiker failed to seek or obtain services
necessary to meet his essential human needs. See
§ 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 20 Given all this, we agree with the district court that, on this
record, the custodian didn’t abuse his discretion by treating the

10
sheriff’s investigation records regarding the deceased hiker as
confidential “reports of the . . . self-neglect of an at-risk adult.”1
§ 26-3.1-102(7)(a).
¶ 21 We aren’t convinced otherwise by EWU Media’s arguments to
the contrary. First, EWU Media argues that the hiker had sufficient
mental acuity as demonstrated by his decision to inform a friend
about his hiking plans. While we agree that the hiker made a
responsible decision by notifying a friend of his hiking plans, that
doesn’t necessarily mean that he had sufficient decision-making
capacity more generally. The friend told investigators, for example,
that the hiker wasn’t in good shape and that “this particular hike
required physical stamina” that the hiker didn’t possess — the very
kind of factors that an at-risk adult might be prone to overlook.
The friend’s statements, taken as a whole, are therefore consistent
with the custodian’s determination that the hiker lacked sufficient
understanding to make responsible decisions concerning his
person. See § 26-3.1-101(1.5).
1 Because no party argues it, we don’t consider whether the records
EWU Media requested constitute “reports” under section
26-3.1-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2026.

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¶ 22 Second, EWU Media argues that the at-risk adult reporting
statute doesn’t contain an “age-based definition” of at-risk adult,
unlike section 18-6.5-102(2), C.R.S. 2026, which defines every
person seventy years old or older as an at-risk adult. But nothing
in the at-risk adult reporting statute prohibits a custodian from
considering a person’s advanced age as one factor among others.
See § 26-3.1-102. And the custodian testified that the hiker’s
advanced age was only one factor he considered.
¶ 23 Finally, EWU Media asserts that the hiker’s decision to hike
underprepared was a “lifestyle choice” that doesn’t constitute
self-neglect. True, the definition of “self-neglect” says that “[c]hoice
of lifestyle . . . shall not, by itself, be evidence of self-neglect.”
§ 26-3.1-101(10). In this context, lifestyle means “an individual’s
typical way of life: his attitudes and their expression in a self-
consistent manner as developing from childhood.” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary at 1307, 2271. But EWU Media
hasn’t identified any evidence suggesting that the hiker’s “typical
way of life” included embarking on hikes without water or adequate
clothing. Moreover, even if the hiker’s lifestyle may have included
underprepared hiking, the custodian didn’t rely on that fact alone

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to deny EWU Media’s request. The custodian also leaned on the
hiker’s dementia symptoms and advanced age when determining
that he experienced self-neglect.
¶ 24 In sum, we conclude that the custodian didn’t err by
determining that an elderly hiker suffering dementia symptoms who
died after neglecting to bring water or adequate clothing on a
strenuous hike that he had previously completed qualified as an at-
risk adult engaged in self-neglect under section 26-3.1-101(1.5) and
(10), rendering the requested records confidential under section
26-3.1-102(7)(a).
¶ 25 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err by upholding the
custodian’s denial of EWU Media’s records request under the
CCJRA.
III. Costs and Attorney Fees
¶ 26 EWU Media requests an award of its costs and reasonable
attorney fees, citing section 24-72-305(7). That provision permits a
court to order the custodian to pay the applicant’s costs and
attorney fees “upon a finding that the denial [of inspection] was
arbitrary or capricious.” § 24-72-305(7). Because we’ve concluded

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that the custodian’s denial was proper, we deny EWU Media’s
request for costs and attorney fees. See Madrigal, ¶ 29.
IV. Disposition
¶ 27 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE SCHOCK concurs.
JUDGE J. JONES dissents.

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JUDGE J. JONES, dissenting.
¶ 28 Did the elderly hiker who tragically perished on the
Conundrum Creek Trail in October 2024 fail to “seek[] or obtain[]
services necessary to meet his . . . essential human needs,”
§ 26-3.1-101(10), C.R.S. 2026, when he left his house and went on
the hike without bringing water or dressing in sufficiently warm
clothing? I don’t think so, and therefore I respectfully dissent.
¶ 29 To show that the records requested by EWU Media are exempt
from disclosure under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act
(CCJRA), the records custodian was required to prove that they are
“reports of the . . . self-neglect of an at-risk adult.”
§ 26-3.1-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2026. “Self-neglect” and “[a]t-risk adult”
are statutorily defined terms. § 26-3.1-101(1.5), (10).
¶ 30 Whether the custodian proved that the hiker was an at-risk
adult as statutorily defined is a question on which I don’t express
any opinion. I don’t need to because it is clear to me that the
custodian didn’t prove that the hiker engaged in that type of self-
neglect on which the custodian relied — that is, that the hiker
engaged in self-neglect “by not seeking or obtaining services

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necessary to meet his . . . essential human needs.”
§ 26-3.1-101(10).
¶ 31 At the hearing on EWU Media’s petition seeking an order
requiring the custodian to provide EWU Media with records of the
sheriff’s office’s investigation, the custodian expressly conceded that
there was no evidence that the hiker failed “to seek out any kind of
help or care” and counsel for the custodian admitted as much as
well. The custodian relied solely on the hiker’s failure to bring
adequate water or dress sufficiently warmly (or, I suppose, bring
more clothing with him) when leaving to go on the hike.
¶ 32 So the issue comes down to this: When a person brings water
and dresses for an excursion outside the home, is that person
obtaining a service by doing so? I think to ask the question is to
answer it “no.” Water is a thing. Clothing is a thing. (And in this
case, both are things the hiker had available to him in his home.)
Neither thing is a “service” within the commonly understood
meaning of the term. To be sure, if someone provides such things
to another person, that someone may be providing a service to the
other person: The service is the doing of something for another’s
benefit. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075

16
(2002) (defining “service” as “an act done for the benefit or at the
command of another”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1647 (12th ed. 2024)
(“Service,” when used as a noun, is “[l]abor performed in the
interest or under the direction of others; specif., the performance of
some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another . . . . In
this sense, service denotes an intangible commodity in the form of
human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.”). But the hiker in our
case wouldn’t have been doing anything for another’s benefit if he
had brought water and dressed in or brought warmer clothing.
¶ 33 The majority cites the Webster’s definition of service but
glosses over the “for . . . another” part.1 Supra ¶ 18. In effect, the
majority holds that a person fails to seek or obtain a “service”
whenever that person fails to do something that a reasonable
1 The majority also relies on a slightly different definition from
Webster’s: an “action or use that furthers some end or purpose.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (2002). But it
doesn’t quote the entire alternative definition. In full, it says that a
service is an “action or use that furthers some end or purpose:
conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or
something: deeds useful or instrumental toward some object (the
pioneer-baiters do the country a [service] — Russell Lord) (did me a
valuable [service]).” Id. Read as a whole, this definition also
contemplates one person doing something for another person,
group of people, or, perhaps, a cause. I don’t see how it fits this
case.

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person would have done under the circumstances to assure that his
essential human needs are met. In my view, that stretches the
reach of the statutory language beyond any reasonable limit. Had it
been the General Assembly’s intent to go that far, it could have said
as much by using clearer, more to-the-point language.2
¶ 34 In sum, I would conclude that the custodian failed to prove
that the hiker engaged in self-neglect as that term is defined in
section 26-3.1-101(10). And as a result I would reverse the district
court’s order and remand the case with instructions to grant the
petition and award EWU Media its reasonable costs and attorney
fees under section 24-72-305(7), C.R.S. 2026.
2 I also observe that when the statute pertaining to at-risk adults
mentions services elsewhere, the services are services someone or
some entity provides to an at-risk adult. See § 26-3.1-101(9),
C.R.S. 2026 (defining “[p]rotective services”); § 26-3.1-101(6)
(defining “[l]east restrictive intervention”).