Peo v. Pitre

23CA0022 Peo v Pitre 07-18-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0022

Mesa County District Court No. 17CR820

Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Larry Detrell Pitre,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 18, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Larry Detrell Pitre, Pro Se

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¶ 1 Defendant, Larry Detrell Pitre, appeals the postconviction

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction

relief without a hearing. We affirm.

¶ 2 A jury found Pitre guilty of four counts of sexual assault on a

child by one in a position of trust committed as part of a pattern of

abuse, four counts of aggravated incest, patronizing a prostituted

child, attempted sexual assault on a child, attempted aggravated

incest, and attempted sexual assault. The trial court imposed an

aggregate prison sentence of seventy-eight years to life, plus a

consecutive one-year jail sentence. A division of this court affirmed

the judgment of conviction. See People v. Pitre, (Colo. App. No.

18CA0709, Aug. 5, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶ 3 Thereafter, Pitre filed a timely Crim. P. 35(c) motion, in which

he generally alleged constitutional violations, a violation of his

speedy trial rights, pretrial procedural errors, trial errors, ineffective

assistance of counsel, and lack of jurisdiction. The postconviction

court summarily denied the motion, finding that that some of Pitre’s

arguments had been raised on direct appeal or related to matters

other than defense counsel’s representation. With regard to

counsel’s representation, the court found that “there [we]re no

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factual assertions or specific details concerning counsel’s

performance,” that the record belied Pitre’s conclusory challenge to

counsel’s representation on the speedy trial issue, and that Pitre

“fail[ed] to explain, with any detail, what actions or statements . . .

should have been made or what actions could have been taken by

counsel or how counsel’s performance was deficient.”

¶ 4 First, we conclude that the postconviction court properly

denied the claims that were, or could have been, raised and

resolved in Pitre’s direct appeal. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII); see

also People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494 (Colo. App. 2010)

(applying Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) on appeal to preclude a successive

claim even though the postconviction court did not rely on that

provision). In particular, we note that the speedy trial issue was

raised and resolved in the prior appeal.

¶ 5 We acknowledge that Pitre’s jurisdictional challenge would be

an exception to the successiveness procedural bar. See Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VII)(d); see also People v. Market, 2020 COA 90, ¶ 13

(“Issues of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for

the first time on appeal.”). However, he doesn’t sufficiently develop

this argument. See People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (we won’t

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consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or

development).

¶ 6 With regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we

agree with the postconviction court that Pitre’s allegations are bare

and conclusory. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VIII) (ineffective assistance

claims shall not be denied on the ground that the claims could have

been raised on direct appeal); see also People v. Delgado, 2019 COA

55, ¶ 8 (“[A] court may deny [a Crim. P. 35(c)] motion without a

hearing . . . if the claims are bare and conclusory in nature and

lack supporting factual allegations.”).

¶ 7 Lastly, we don’t address any claim or argument asserted on

appeal that Pitre didn’t raise in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See

People v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996)

(“Allegations not raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion or during the

hearing on that motion and thus not ruled on by the trial court are

not properly before this court for review.”). This includes Pitre’s

additional arguments in support of his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. See People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251 (Colo.

1996) (rejecting the defendant’s “attempts to use his brief

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on . . . appeal to fortify a number of issues inadequately raised or

supported by his [postconviction] motion”).

¶ 8 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.