Peo v. Archuleta

21CA2097 Peo v Archuleta 09-05-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA2097

Adams County District Court No. 19CR5125

Honorable Sean Finn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher Archuleta,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER AFFIRMED,

AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division A

Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN

Martinez* and Richman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 5, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lane Towery, Assistant Attorney General

Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrea R. Gammell, Deputy

State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Christopher Archuleta, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts

of vehicular homicide, four counts of vehicular assault, one count

each of third degree assault and careless driving resulting in death,

and two counts of careless driving resulting in injury. Archuleta

also appeals a restitution order related solely to restitution awarded

to Sentry Insurance. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the

restitution order related to Sentry Insurance, but remand for

correction of the mittimus to remove a sum of restitution that was

withdrawn by the prosecution.

I. Background

¶ 2 During the early morning hours of August 25, 2019, Archuleta

was driving his friend home after a night out drinking. While he

was attempting to pass another car, a collision occurred, and both

cars then collided with an oncoming semitruck. Archuleta, his

friend, and the driver of the other car he was attempting to pass

were seriously injured; however, the other car’s passenger was

killed. The semitruck driver sustained minor injuries.

¶ 3 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that before the

collision, Archuleta and his friend drove to a liquor store where

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Archuleta purchased a bottle of liquor, which they drank out of the

bottle in the parking lot before they went to an arcade. At the

arcade, Archuleta and his friend continued to drink until their

server, who was trained to recognize the signs of intoxication,

refused to continue serving them based on their perceived

intoxication level. The server offered to pay for a ride home, which

Archuleta refused. Approximately ten minutes later, the collision

occurred.

¶ 4 A police-initiated blood test, conducted seven hours after the

crash, registered Archuleta’s blood alcohol content (BAC) at .051.

However, an expert who conducted a retrograde extrapolation

estimated that Archuleta’s BAC at the time of the accident would

have been between .124 and .233. And an emergency room

physician testified that Archuleta’s BAC was .186 when he arrived

at the hospital.

¶ 5 Archuleta defended against the charges on the grounds that

he was neither intoxicated nor the proximate cause of the accident.

After a four-day jury trial, the jury convicted Archuleta as charged.

The district court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.

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II. Discussion

¶ 6 Archuleta contends that the district court erred by (1)

admitting inadmissible hearsay under CRE 703; (2) ordering

restitution where the prosecution failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was the proximate cause of

the losses sought by Sentry Insurance; and (3) failing to correct a

portion of the restitution order that had been withdrawn by the

prosecution. We disagree with Archuleta’s first two contentions but

agree with his third. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of

conviction and the restitution order related to Sentry Insurance, but

remand for correction of the mittimus to remove the portion of

restitution that was withdrawn.

A. Hospital BAC Evidence

¶ 7 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Archuleta’s

BAC, which had been obtained at the hospital, and testified to by

the emergency room physician who treated his injuries. Archuleta

contends that the district court erred by admitting this evidence

because it was inadmissible hearsay under CRE 703, and the court

failed to conduct the appropriate balancing test required under the

rule. We need not address this contention because the record

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reveals that the alleged error was harmless. The hospital BAC

evidence was merely cumulative of other, overwhelming evidence of

Archuleta’s intoxication.

1. Standard for Reversal and Preservation

¶ 8 If a claim of error was preserved in the district court, we review

for harmless error. Under this standard, we may reverse only if the

error substantially influenced the verdict or impaired the fairness of

the trial. See Crim. P. 52(a); Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. A

reviewing court considers the importance of the evidence to the

proponent’s case, whether the evidence was cumulative, the

presence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the point

for which the evidence was offered, and the overall strength of the

proponent’s case. People v Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 64.

¶ 9 The parties dispute whether Archuleta preserved this issue for

appeal. However, we need not resolve this dispute because even

assuming the harmless error standard applies, we conclude that

reversal is not warranted. Cf. Hagos, ¶ 14 (noting that plain error

“must impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a

greater degree than under harmless error to warrant reversal”).

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2. Analysis

¶ 10 As relevant here, a conviction for vehicular homicide requires

that the prosecution prove that the defendant drove a motor vehicle

while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and that

such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another.

§ 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024. “Driving under the influence”

means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or

drugs, or both, to a degree that the person is substantially

incapable, mentally or physically, or both, of exercising clear

judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe

operation of a vehicle. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(IV). There is a per se

presumption that the defendant is under the influence if at the time

of the crime, or within a reasonable time thereafter, their BAC is

0.08 or more or the content of their blood is five nanograms of THC

or more. §§ 18-3-106(2)(c); 18-3-106(2)(d). However, even a BAC

between 0.05 and 0.08 “may be considered with other competent

evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was under

the influence of alcohol.” § 18-3-106(2)(b).

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¶ 11 We conclude that any alleged error by the district court in

admitting the hospital BAC evidence was harmless because the

evidence of Archuleta’s intoxication was overwhelming.

¶ 12 The prosecution presented the following evidence that

Archuleta was intoxicated at the time of the collision:

• Archuleta’s friend testified that they took shots of liquor

in the parking lot before entering the arcade.

• Archuleta’s friend and the arcade server testified that

while at the arcade Archuleta ordered and drank two

twenty-three-ounce beers and a double shot of hard

liquor.

• The arcade server, who was trained to identify intoxicated

individuals, refused to continue to serve Archuleta based

on her observation that he was intoxicated. She testified

that he had slurred speech, was repeating himself, was

fidgety, and while “he could stand up okay,” he was

“starting to wobble around a little bit” and was “not okay

to drive.”

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• Seven hours after the collision, Archuleta’s BAC was

0.051, and he tested positive for cannabinoids with a

THC content of 4.6 nanograms.

• An expert testified that Archuleta’s BAC at the time of the

crash, based on retrograde expulsion, was likely between

0.124 and 0.233.

• An expert testified that THC usually reaches its peak

absorption in the body while a user is still smoking and

then drops “relatively quickly after the fact” such that an

infrequent user will drop below five nanograms after

about one hour and a frequent user will drop below five

nanograms after about three and a half hours —

permitting a reasonable inference that Archuleta had well

over five nanograms in his system near the time of the

accident.

• An expert testified that the consumption of alcohol and

THC together has an additive effect and the combination

of the two substances will cause more impairment than

either of the two substances alone.

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• Archuleta admitted to law enforcement officers that he

had been drinking and smoked marijuana that evening.

• Several empty alcohol and marijuana containers were

found in Archuleta’s car.

• Law enforcement officers observed indicia of intoxication

including an odor of alcohol on Archuleta’s breath and

bloodshot eyes.

¶ 13 In our view, the foregoing evidence overwhelmingly supported

the jury’s determination that Archuleta was intoxicated, and

therefore, we conclude that any error was harmless. See Campbell

v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶¶ 34-43 (concluding that error in allowing

an officer to testify about the horizontal gaze nystagmus test was

harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s

intoxication including defendant’s admissions, indicia of

intoxication, and BAC); Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo.

1986) (concluding the district court’s erroneous admission of

certain expert testimony was harmless “[i]n light of the

overwhelming evidence of guilt”).

¶ 14 In so concluding, we are unpersuaded by Archuleta’s

argument that the hospital BAC evidence was not harmless because

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the other evidence of intoxication was “weak,” and the hospital BAC

evidence alone allowed the jury to permissibly infer that he was

under the influence of alcohol. First, we disagree that the other

evidence of intoxication was “weak.” The intoxication evidence

outlined above was overwhelming and we can see no reasonable

possibility that any error pertaining to the hospital BAC evidence

substantially contributed to Archuleta’s convictions. Second, the

prosecution presented other competent evidence at trial that

overwhelmingly demonstrates that Archuleta was under the

influence of alcohol or drugs or both. Namely, expert testimony was

presented that (1) Archuleta’s BAC at the time of the crash was

likely between 0.124 and 0.233; (2) seven hours after the crash the

content of his blood contained 4.6 nanograms of THC; and (3) the

consumption of alcohol and THC together has an “additive” effect.

¶ 15 Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged error by the district

court in allowing the emergency room physician to testify about

Archuleta’s hospital BAC evidence was harmless and does not

warrant reversal.

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B. Restitution

¶ 16 The prosecution filed a motion requesting restitution for the

crime victim compensation board’s costs associated with the

victim’s funeral expenses, medical expenses incurred by Jose

Castro (who was the driver of the other car), and reimbursement to

Sentry Insurance for the losses they paid on behalf of the semitruck

driver. Archuleta stipulated to the requested restitution for the

crime victim compensation board and Castro, but objected to the

requested amount for Sentry Insurance and requested a hearing.

The district court ordered the stipulated amounts and set the

matter for a hearing. Prior to the hearing, the prosecution filed an

amended motion withdrawing the request for restitution for Castro

because he had received a civil judgment against Archuleta that

compensated his losses. After the hearing, the district court

ordered restitution for Sentry Insurance, but never addressed the

withdrawn restitution request for Castro.

1. Proximate Cause

¶ 17 Archuleta contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he

was the proximate cause of the $134,931.06 in losses sustained by

Sentry Insurance. We disagree.

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2. Standard of Review

¶ 18 A challenge to the district court’s proximate cause finding is

reviewed for clear error. Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 32.

Applying this standard, we must affirm the court’s findings unless

they are without record support. Id. at ¶ 34.

3. Analysis

¶ 19 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .

[that was] proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that

can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”

§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution bears the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim’s

losses were proximately caused by the defendant. People v. Stone,

2020 COA 24, ¶ 6. Proximate cause in the context of restitution is

“any cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the

claimed injury.” Martinez, ¶ 13. A district court may impose

restitution against a defendant only for losses proximately caused

by his conduct. See Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶¶ 16-21; see

also People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54, 60 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 20 The prosecution sought restitution for Sentry Insurance for

the losses they paid on the semitruck driver’s behalf for the injuries

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the driver suffered as a result of the accident as well as indemnity

benefits and a settlement agreement. The losses totaled

$134,931.06.

¶ 21 At the hearing, the prosecution presented evidence from the

Sentry Insurance claims adjuster who handled the workers’

compensation claim on behalf of the semitruck driver. The claims

adjuster testified that Sentry Insurance made payments to the

medical providers for the semitruck driver’s injuries, as well as

indemnity benefits and a settlement agreement, which were both

paid directly to the semitruck driver. The adjuster testified that the

insurance company investigated and confirmed that all the

payments requested, and ultimately paid out, were from the

accident involving Archuleta.

¶ 22 Based on this testimony, the district court found that

Archuleta was the proximate cause of Sentry Insurance’s losses

because “but for [Archuleta’s] criminal conduct . . . [the semitruck

driver] would not have been injured while on the job” and therefore,

would not have “needed to file a claim for workers’ compensation

benefits.”

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¶ 23 Archuleta contends that the district court’s findings lacked

record support because they were based, in part, on the court’s

“personal understanding of the workers’ compensation process.” In

particular, he points to the court’s findings that the claims adjuster

(1) “process[ed] every single payment request;” (2) had “specific

[payment] schedules” to abide by; and (3) only recorded a claim

when “the medical treatment was causally related to the covered

injury, reasonable, and necessary.”

¶ 24 But even discounting the district court’s personal observations

and findings relating to the court’s “past life with [workers’

compensation claims],” the evidence nevertheless supports the

restitution award. The claims adjuster testified that the payments

Sentry Insurance made were for injuries the semitruck driver

sustained as a result of the accident with Archuleta. The adjuster

testified that she reached this conclusion based on her own

investigation where she reviewed the semitruck driver’s written

statements, the police reports, and the medical reports. Further,

she testified that she had no reason to believe that there was any

other possible cause of the semitruck driver’s injuries besides the

accident with Archuleta. And the district court found the claims

14

adjuster’s testimony was credible. We therefore conclude that the

record supports the district court’s proximate cause determination.

4. Withdrawn Restitution

¶ 25 The parties agree, as do we, that the mittimus should be

corrected to remove the portion of restitution award that was

awarded to Jose Castro. See Crim. P. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in

judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors in the

record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the

court at any time . . . .”); People v. McLain, 2016 COA 74, ¶ 27 (Rule

36 applies to “uncontroversial errors” that “should not require

clarification from the parties or lead to further adversarial

proceedings.”), overruled on other grounds by People v. Weeks, 2021

CO 75, ¶ 27. The record reflects that the prosecution withdrew its

request for restitution for Castro when he received a civil judgment

against Archuleta that compensated his losses; however, the district

court’s restitution order never addressed the prosecution’s request.

Accordingly, we remand for the court to amend the mittimus and

remove the $18,682.62 of restitution awarded to Jose Castro.

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III. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment of conviction and restitution order are affirmed,

and the case is remanded to the district court to correct the

mittimus.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.