Peo in Interest of MT

24CA0482 Peo in Interest of MT 09-05-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0482

Adams County District Court No. 22JV153

Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.T., a Child,

and Concerning T.T.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN

J. Jones and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 5, 2024

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Lisa Vigil, Assistant County Attorney,

Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for

Appellant

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¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.T. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for M.T. (the child) to her maternal grandparents.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 In August 2022, the Adams County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

then-six-year-old child. The Department alleged concerns regarding

mother’s mental health, noting that she had been placed on at least

two mental health holds during the previous month. The

Department was also concerned that the child was beyond mother’s

control because the child had physically attacked mother

repeatedly, run away in the middle of the night, and been placed on

a mental health hold.

¶ 3 The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to

her maternal grandparents. The court later adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected, and it adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶ 4 Although mother was engaged in treatment and attending

family time at the beginning of the summer of 2023, by the late

summer mother had stopped taking certain of her medications, her

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mental health had declined again, and she stopped engaging in

services or attending family time. Around that time, the guardian

ad litem moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

for the child to the grandparents. The court held a contested

hearing, at which mother argued that it would be in the child’s best

interests to be placed in foster care instead of allocating parental

responsibilities to the grandparents. After considering the evidence

and taking the matter under advisement, the court granted an APR

for the child to the grandparents.

II. Discussion

¶ 5 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

applied the wrong legal standards. She argues that the juvenile

court improperly made findings based on the factors in the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024,

while failing to properly make findings based on the factors in the

Children’s Code, § 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2024. Mother also asserts that

the court failed to make findings regarding the Department’s

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her family. We

disagree.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 6 When a juvenile court adjudicates a child dependent or

neglected, the court is vested with “extensive and flexible

dispositional remedies.” People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625,

639 (Colo. 1982); see § 19-3-508(1), C.R.S. 2024. These remedies

include placing the child in the legal custody of a relative “under

such conditions as the court deems necessary and

appropriate.” § 19-3-508(1)(b).

¶ 7 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative

purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 12. The overriding purpose of

the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by

providing procedures through which the child’s best interests can

be served. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 19. Thus,

while the Children’s Code doesn’t prescribe any specific factors a

court must consider in making an APR decision in a dependency

and neglect proceeding, a court must allocate parental

responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. See

§ 19-1-102; A.S.L., ¶ 12; see also People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d

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1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011). In doing so, a court may consider

the UDMA best interest factors so long as the court doesn’t rely on

them exclusively and its focus remains on the protection and safety

of the child, not on the parents’ “custodial interests.” People in

Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13; see also L.A.G. v. People in

Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 8 Whether a juvenile court applied the correct legal standard in

allocating parental responsibilities presents a question of law that

we review de novo. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D.,

2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.

B. Analysis

¶ 9 We reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court was

required to “apply the factors set [forth] in the Children’s Code and

not the UDMA.” As stated above, the Children’s Code doesn’t

prescribe any specific factors for allocating parental responsibilities,

and a court may consider the UDMA factors in allocating parental

responsibilities in a dependency and neglect case. See H.K.W.,

¶ 13.

¶ 10 Here, the juvenile court’s judgment indicates that it applied

the correct legal standards for allocating parental responsibilities in

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a dependency and neglect case. First, the court said that, in

making its determination, it was guided by the purposes of the

Children’s Code and was required to resolve the issues in a manner

that furthered the child’s best interests. The court then noted that

it was allowed to consider the UDMA factors, so long as it focused

on the protection and safety of the child. The court went on to

make extensive findings under each UDMA factor, and, in general,

focused on the child’s best interests. The court found, for example,

that “it would require a significant amount of therapeutic

intervention for . . . mother to curate an appropriate parental

relationship with [the child]”; the child felt “safe and supported by

her grandparents”; the child had “improved with the structure and

consistency of routine implemented by her grandparents”; “mother’s

mental health remain[ed] unstable . . . without recognition of the

needs of the child”; that “mother [had] not sufficiently progressed in

her treatment plan to resolve the child protection concerns”; and

mother remained unfit to parent. The court then found, by clear

and convincing evidence, that an APR to the grandparents was in

the child’s best interests. And the court allocated parenting time

and decision-making authority based on “the totality of [its]

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findings” and “in view of the broad purposes of the Children’s Code

and its primary purpose of securing a custodial setting that will

further the safety and best interests of the child.”

¶ 11 We agree with mother’s contention that the Department was

required to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite

her family, but we disagree with her assertion that the court failed

to make findings regarding the Department’s reasonable efforts.

See A.S.L., ¶ 20 (a department’s obligation to provide reasonable

efforts exists “even when the juvenile court, in lieu of terminating a

parent's rights, enters an APR to a nonparent”). To the contrary,

the court specifically found that the Department “made reasonable

efforts by partnering with [mother’s service] providers, actively

coordinat[ing] services, and obtaining releases of information for

these providers.” The court also found that the Department made

reasonable efforts by providing transportation assistance, active

case management, repeated outreach, and in-person family time.

¶ 12 Notably, mother doesn’t challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence or claim that the court’s findings were unsupported by the

record. Thus, we needn’t address those issues. See Compos v.

People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (noting that, under the party presentation

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principle, parties “are responsible for advancing the facts and

arguments entitling them to relief”) (citation omitted). Accordingly,

because the court applied the correct legal standards in granting an

APR to the grandparents, we discern no basis for reversal.

III. Disposition

¶ 13 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.