Peo v. Leon-Caballero

23CA2045 Peo v Leon-Caballero 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2045
Arapahoe County District Court No. 17CR3556
Honorable Eric B. White, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Miguel Angel Leon-Caballero,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*
Welling and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Robin M. Lerg, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado for Defendant-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Miguel Angel Leon-Caballero, appeals the trial

court’s order denying his Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence

Under Crim. P. 35(b). We affirm.

¶2 A jury convicted Leon-Caballero of aggravated robbery, second

degree assault, second degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, and

criminal mischief. The trial court imposed prison sentences of

twenty years on the aggravated robbery count, a concurrent sixteen

years on the assault count, a consecutive three years on the motor

vehicle theft count, and a consecutive three years on the criminal

mischief count. A division of this court affirmed the judgment of

conviction and remanded the case to the district court to correct the

mittimus. See People v. Leon-Caballero, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1658,

Sept. 29, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶3 Later, Leon-Caballero filed his Crim. P. 35(b) motion and a

supporting “Social History Report.” In it, he detailed his troubled

upbringing, his alcohol and drug use, his mental health issues

before the underlying incident, and his worsening mental health

condition after incarceration. While incarcerated, Leon-Caballero

has held jobs as a kitchen worker, a dishwasher, a porter, and a

floor shiner. He also represented that he has supportive family

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members and that, upon his prison release, he would like to open a

barber shop and start a family with his wife.

¶4 In its order denying the motion without a hearing, the

postconviction court stated that it reviewed the court file, the

motion, the details of the Social History Report, and the applicable

legal authority. The court noted that Leon-Caballero was serving an

aggregate twenty-six-year prison sentence but could have received a

prison sentence of up to thirty-two years on the robbery conviction

alone. The court also acknowledged that the information contained

in Leon-Caballero’s motion and Social History Report, on which

Leon-Caballero “relie[d] almost entirely,” was included in the Adult

Presentence Report (PSR) that was available to the court at the time

of sentencing. Finally, the court noted that the PSR reflected Leon-

Caballero’s “belief that ‘[p]rison makes [him] stronger, physically

and mentally’” and that, at the age of twenty-three, Leon-Caballero

“had three prior adjudications as a juvenile delinquent for

[c]onspiracy to [p]ossess a [c]ontrolled [s]ubstance, [r]obbery, and

[a]ggravated [r]obbery” and “one prior felony conviction for [e]scape.”

¶5 The postconviction court then determined that, based on the

following findings, the original sentences remained proper:

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Having thus considered both the old and new
information available to it, the [c]ourt
concludes that there is little that [Leon-
Caballero] has presented that would change its
mind as to the propriety of the sentences
previously imposed. The [c]ourt was aware of
[Leon-Caballero’s] background, albeit in a
more abbreviated form, when it sentenced him
in 2019. Although it appears that the
intervening years have colored [Leon-
Caballero’s] perception of the value of
incarceration and that he has a hope for a life
once out of custody, his violent actions on the
night of the incident at issue and his
delinquent and criminal history justify the
[c]ourt’s original concerns about recidivism
and community safety.

¶6 Crim. P. 35(b) authorizes a trial court to review a sentence to

ensure that it is proper before making it final. People v. Dunlap, 36

P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001). “The court may, after considering the

motion and supporting documents, if any, deny the motion without

a hearing.” Crim. P. 35(b).

¶7 “Any decision to reduce a sentence based on a Crim. P. 35(b)

motion remains within the sound discretion of the trial court.”

Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 780. A trial court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v.

Vigil, 2024 COA 72, ¶ 19.

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¶8 In resolving a Crim. P. 35(b) motion, a trial court must

“consider all relevant and material factors, including new evidence

as well as facts known at the time the original sentence was

pronounced.” People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App.

1992). A court is not required to make factual findings but should

“provide a statement of the basic reasons in support of its ruling”

on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion. People v. Olivas, 911 P.2d 675, 677

(Colo. App. 1995). “Only if the trial court has refused to consider

any information in mitigation and fails to make findings in support

of its decision is there a failure by the trial court to exercise its

judicial discretion.” Busch, 835 P.2d at 583.

¶9 Based on the record, we conclude that the postconviction

court did not abuse its discretion because its ruling denying Leon-

Caballero’s Crim. P. 35(b) motion is not manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. See Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 783 (affirming the

court’s order denying the defendant’s Crim. P. 35(b) motion because

it “adequately demonstrate[d] that the trial judge considered the

mitigating factors presented in the motion and determined that they

did not warrant a sentence reduction,” and, thus, the court

sufficiently explained its reasoning); People v. Barnett, 2020 COA

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167, ¶ 33 (affirming the court’s order denying the defendant’s Crim.

P. 35(b) motion because it “noted that [the court] had reviewed the

motion, concluding that ‘the court is well familiar with this case and

finds that the original sentence imposed is appropriate to the

circumstances of this case’” and, “[i]n doing so, the court provided

its ‘basic reasons in support of its ruling’”); Olivas, 911 P.2d at 677

(affirming the order denying a Crim. P. 35(b) motion because the

court, in its order, “noted the matters it considered prior to the

denial of the defendant’s motion” and provided an adequately

detailed statement for its denial); see also People v. Morrow, 591

P.2d 1026, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (relevant factors in a sentence

reconsideration proceeding include the underlying crime’s nature

and the defendant’s prior criminal history).

¶ 10 Contrary to Leon-Caballero’s assertion, we are convinced that

the postconviction court sufficiently detailed in its order its basic

reasons for denying the Crim. P. 35(b) motion. See Dunlap, 36 P.3d

at 782; see also Barnett, ¶¶ 33, 35-36 (“We will neither fault the

court for its short order nor construe such brevity as a failure to

exercise discretion in its denial of [the defendant’s] Crim. P. 35(b)

motion.”).

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¶ 11 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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