Peo in Interest of ACG

24CA0301 Peo in Interest of ACG 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0301
Logan County District Court No. 22JV4
Honorable Justin B. Haenlein, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.C.G., a Child,

and Concerning M.J.G. and J.A.N.,

Appellants.

JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Grove and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 21, 2024

Alan Samber, County Attorney, Kimberlee R. Keleher, Assistant County
Attorney, Sterling, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant M.J.G.

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado for
Appellant J.A.N.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.J.G. (father)

and J.A.N. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-

child legal relationships with A.C.G. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2022, the then-newborn child tested positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. The juvenile court

granted emergency temporary custody to the Logan County

Department of Human Services. When the child was discharged

from the hospital, the Department placed him with his paternal

grandfather. Shortly thereafter, the Department filed a petition in

dependency and neglect alleging concerns about the parents’

substance use and the unsafe conditions of their home.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court adopted treatment plans that required the

parents to address substance abuse issues, develop a safe and

stable environment for the child, improve their relationships with

the child, cooperate with the Department, address mental health

issues, and comply with the recommendations of a psychological

evaluation.

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¶4 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ legal

relationships with the child. Beginning in June 2023, the juvenile

court held a ten-day hearing over the course of approximately five

months. In January 2024, the juvenile court granted the

termination motion.

II. Expert Witness Disclosures

¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

and violated his due process rights by allowing the Department’s

expert witnesses to offer testimony that was not properly disclosed

before the termination hearing. We are not persuaded.

a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The provisions of C.R.C.P. 26, including its expert witness

disclosure requirements, apply to juvenile proceedings when, as

here, the juvenile court orders that they govern the case. See

People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 67. C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)

limits all expert witness testimony to matters disclosed in detail in

the expert’s report or disclosure statement. C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)-

(II).

¶7 When a party fails to disclose, without substantial

justification, information required by C.R.C.P. 26(a), the party “shall

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not be permitted to present any evidence not so disclosed at trial

. . . unless such failure has not caused and will not cause

significant harm, or such preclusion is disproportionate to that

harm.” C.R.C.P. 37(c)(1). “Thus, the rule requires the preclusion of

undisclosed expert evidence only where (1) there is no substantial

justification for a party’s failure to disclose, and (2) the failure to

disclose is not harmless to the opposing party.” Saturn Sys., Inc. v.

Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 523 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶8 We review a juvenile court’s decision to admit expert testimony

for an abuse of discretion. S.L., ¶ 68. A court abuses its discretion

when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶9 An error in the admission of evidence is harmless if it doesn’t

affect a party’s substantial rights. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. An

error affects a substantial right if it can be said with fair assurance

that it substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial. People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA

109, ¶ 22.

b. Analysis

¶ 10 The day before the termination hearing started, father moved

to exclude the Department’s expert witnesses — the therapeutic

3
family time supervisor and the caseworkers — because the

Department had not disclosed the information required for

“retained experts,” specifically written reports, under C.R.C.P.

26(a)(2)(B)(I). After considering the parties’ arguments, the juvenile

court found that the therapeutic family time supervisor was not a

“retained expert” because she was hired to provide therapeutic

visitation, not to provide expert testimony. The court also found

that the Department’s caseworkers were not “retained experts”

because their primary duties were to investigate cases and provide

services, and they did not testify “regularly enough” to be

considered “retained experts” under the rule. The court then found

that the Department’s disclosures were sufficient under C.R.C.P.

26(a)(2)(B)(II) because they provided a summary of the experts’

opinions and a basis for those opinions. Nonetheless, the court

ordered that all the Department’s expert witness testimony be

limited to the opinions provided in the Department’s disclosures.

¶ 11 Even assuming, without deciding, that the Department’s

expert witness disclosures were insufficient under C.R.C.P.

26(a)(2)(B), any error is harmless. This is so because the record

does not indicate, and father does not explain, how he was

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surprised by the actual testimony or denied an adequate

opportunity to defend against it.

¶ 12 When father initially moved to exclude the expert testimony,

he broadly argued that the Department’s failure to adequately

disclose the information required under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B) put him

“at a disadvantage” and that his due process rights were being

violated because he was unable to prepare for the expert. He also

argued that the Department would use the expert witnesses as a

way to introduce “backdoor hearsay.” On appeal, he makes

similarly broad arguments — that he was “at a substantial

disadvantage” during the termination hearing because he was

“forced to respond to the testimony of multiple expert witnesses

without proper notice of the likely contents of their testimony” and

that he was subjected to a “trial by ambush” because he was

unable to fully prepare for cross-examination or respond to the

experts’ opinions.

¶ 13 However, father does not point us to any specific testimony or

opinions that surprised him during the hearing. Nor does he point

to any alleged “backdoor hearsay” that was admitted through the

Department’s experts. And he does not articulate what additional

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information he could have elicited on cross-examination if the

Department’s disclosures had been more thorough. To the

contrary, the record shows that father had the opportunity to

conduct extensive cross-examination of the Department’s expert

witnesses, make numerous objections to their testimony, and

present his own expert witness.

¶ 14 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any insufficiencies in

the Department’s disclosures, and any errors in admitting the

expert testimony, were harmless because father had an adequate

opportunity to defend against the evidence. See Saturn Sys., 252

P.3d at 524–25 (any error in permitting undisclosed expert

testimony was harmless where the party claiming surprise by the

testimony does not specify how he was prejudiced or what

additional information he could have elicited on cross-examination).

And, although father argues that the juvenile court’s discretion over

evidentiary issues does not supersede his due process right to

fundamentally fair proceedings, a parent may not obtain relief on a

due process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice. See

People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007). As

explained above, father has not established, and we do not discern,

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any prejudice based on the court’s admission of the Department’s

expert witness testimony.

¶ 15 Finally, we decline father’s invitation to determine whether a

department’s caseworkers are considered “retained experts” subject

to the disclosure requirements of C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I). See

C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I)-(II) (explaining what “retained experts” versus

“other experts” must disclose). Having concluded that father has

not demonstrated any harm or prejudice, we need not make such a

determination in this case.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 16 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and

reunite his family. We are not persuaded.

a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

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or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 18 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services

provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 19 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). And, if funding is available, section 19-3-208

requires a department to provide services such as transportation;

diagnostic and mental health services; and drug and alcohol

services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). However, services must be provided only

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if they are determined to be necessary and appropriate based on the

individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).

¶ 20 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

obtain the assistance needed to comply with their treatment plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 21 Whether the Department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent. Id.

¶ 22 The credibility of the witnesses, as well as the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are within the province

of the juvenile court. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-

50 (Colo. 2010). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the court. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021

COA 56, ¶ 62.

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b. Analysis

¶ 23 The juvenile court found, with record support, that the

Department provided father with numerous services, which

included outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment,

substance abuse monitoring, in-home services through Safecare,

supervised and therapeutic family time, parenting intervention and

coaching, a psychological evaluation, a parent-child interactional

assessment, and assistance with access to a cell phone and

transportation. Thus, the court determined that the Department

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and also found that

father’s choice not to utilize the majority of the services ultimately

led to his treatment plan being unsuccessful. We agree with the

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts.

¶ 24 First, we reject father’s argument that the Department’s

referral to Centennial Mental Health was inadequate because the

treatment he received was not the type of dual diagnosis or trauma-

specific treatment he needed. It is true that father was assigned to

at least two different treatment providers at Centennial. But the

record does not support his assertion that because he had two

providers, he must not have been receiving dual diagnosis

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treatment from a single provider. To the contrary, the caseworker

testified that she did not refer father to separate providers for

mental health and substance abuse treatment but instead referred

him for dual diagnosis treatment. And she believed that one of the

providers at Centennial was “geared toward his DUI classes,” not

the treatment required for this case. Notably, father’s own expert

admitted that he was just speculating, based on reviewing

Centennial’s records, that a single therapist was not providing

father with dual diagnosis or trauma-specific treatment. Thus,

nothing in the record indicates that father was not given the

opportunity to attend dual diagnosis, trauma-specific treatment.

¶ 25 The record also does not support father’s argument that he

could not attend treatment because he had an outstanding bill at

Centennial, and the Department failed to alleviate that barrier.

When father told the caseworker he received a bill from Centennial,

she called Centennial to determine whether the balance needed to

be paid before he could go back to therapy. The caseworker found

out that the outstanding bill was related to father’s DUI classes and

a lapse in his Medicaid benefits. The caseworker confirmed that

father’s Medicaid benefits were recertified and let him know that

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although he had an unpaid bill for his DUI classes, he was able to

start attending therapy again. After that, father called Centennial

and scheduled some appointments. Nonetheless, even though

father had access to treatment at Centennial throughout the case,

he attended only seven therapy sessions and was discharged from

treatment for lack of engagement on two occasions.

¶ 26 Next, we are not persuaded that the psychologist’s

recommendations prevented father from receiving appropriate

treatment. In his evaluation, the psychologist noted that it is

“difficult to complete an accurate mental health diagnosis when a

parent is actively abusing substances” and stated that “until

[father] is sober for at least six months, it will be difficult to

separate” whether father’s symptoms are the result of substance

abuse or mental health issues. Contrary to father’s assertion, the

psychologist did not recommend that father should receive no

mental health treatment until he had been sober for at least six

months. Rather, the psychologist recommended, as his report

indicates, that father engage in dual diagnosis treatment for

substance abuse and mental health. Nothing in the record reveals

that the Department waited to provide a referral for dual diagnosis

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treatment until father showed sobriety. In fact, the record shows

that the caseworker had already referred father to Centennial for

dual diagnosis treatment before the psychological evaluation

occurred and that the treatment was available to father throughout

the case.

¶ 27 We also disagree with father’s contention that the Department

failed to make reasonable efforts to address his domestic violence

issues. Contrary to father’s assertions, although he contested the

treatment plan objective requiring him to complete a psychological

evaluation and comply with its recommendations, the juvenile court

eventually adopted that objective as part of his treatment plan.

Father did the evaluation, and one of the recommendations in the

psychological evaluation was for father to “complete a domestic

violence assessment and follow any recommendations for treatment

or classes.” The caseworker testified that she offered to refer father

for a domestic violence assessment, but he declined. In fact, father

testified that he was unwilling to do domestic violence treatment

because he “didn’t feel like [he] was guilty of doing domestic

violence.” See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (a

juvenile court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate

13
in treatment as a factor in determining whether a department made

reasonable efforts).

¶ 28 Further, we reject father’s argument that the Department did

not make reasonable efforts because it did not provide an

opportunity for him to attend family therapy with grandfather. The

juvenile court found, and we agree, that it was “unclear” how family

therapy with grandfather was necessary to render father fit. See

People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶¶ 13, 16 (treatment plan

objectives, which are “inextricably linked” to the services that

should ultimately be provided, must be reasonably calculated to

render a parent fit); see also § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d) (services must

only be provided if they are determined to be “necessary and

appropriate”). True, the psychologist recommended family therapy

with grandfather if father was engaging with an individual therapist

who could then determine when and if family therapy would be

beneficial. But father’s therapist had never recommended family

therapy with grandfather. And the caseworker opined that family

therapy with grandfather may have been beneficial, but only after

father had “maintained” his own therapy and worked through some

of “his own personal struggles.” As noted above, father’s

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engagement in individual treatment throughout the case was

minimal.

¶ 29 Last, we are not persuaded by father’s argument that the

Department’s efforts were lacking because the caseworker did not

visit and inspect father’s home after he made safety improvements

to it. The caseworker admitted that she only visited father’s home

one time and had informed both parents that the safety concerns

would warrant a code inspector to determine what needed to be

fixed to render the home safe. She also told the parents that the

Department would pay for the code inspector. Instead, the parents

decided to look for alternate housing, and the caseworker provided

them with “many” housing resources. The parents did not utilize

those resources. Nonetheless, the caseworker and the psychologist

confirmed that addressing father’s substance abuse, not the safety

of the home, was the priority throughout the case. Therefore, the

Department’s prioritization of services related to substance abuse

over services related to the safety of the home did not amount to a

lack of reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v.

V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33 (the department “retain[s] discretion to

prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most

15
pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall

completion of the treatment plan).

¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate father and reunite him with the child.

IV. Reasonable Accommodations

¶ 31 Mother contends that the Department knew she had a

disability but failed to provide reasonable accommodations under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). We are not persuaded.

a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 32 The ADA requires a public entity, such as a county

department of human services, to make reasonable

accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 11; see also 42 U.S.C. §

12102 (defining “disability” under the ADA); 42 U.S.C. §

12111(8) (defining “qualified individual” under the ADA). Whether a

parent is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA

requires a case-by-case determination. People in Interest of S.K.,

2019 COA 36, ¶ 21. Although a department must provide

appropriate screening and assessments of a parent, the parent is

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responsible for disclosing information regarding their disability. Id.

And the parent should also identify any modifications that they

believe are necessary to accommodate the disability. Id.

¶ 33 As relevant here, the ADA requires a department and the

juvenile court to account for and, if possible, make reasonable

accommodations for a parent’s disability when providing

rehabilitative services. Id. at ¶ 34. As a result, a juvenile court

must consider whether a department made reasonable

accommodations in determining if it made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent. Id.

¶ 34 As noted above, we review the juvenile court’s factual findings

for clear error but review de novo its legal determination that a

department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent.

A.S.L., ¶ 8.

b. Analysis

¶ 35 At the termination hearing, the question of whether mother

had a disability was disputed, and the juvenile court found that the

“record [fell] short . . . of demonstrating that [mother] was a

qualified individual with a disability as required by law.” Still, the

court found that when the Department identified mother as being

17
“lower functioning,” the caseworker referred her for a psychological

evaluation and then followed the psychologist’s recommendations

by providing “significant hands-on support” to her. The court also

found that the Department provided numerous services to mother

and that even if she had a disability, she had not identified any

accommodations that she was “left wanting.” Thus, the court

concluded that the Department had made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child.

¶ 36 The record supports the court’s finding that mother did not

establish that she had a qualifying disability. While both expert

witnesses identified mother as either being on the “lower end of the

average [cognitive] range” or having “mild cognitive impairment,”

neither opined that she had a disability. But, even assuming that

mother had a qualifying disability, the record shows that the

Department accommodated for her impairments, and we agree with

the court’s determination that the Department made reasonable

efforts.

¶ 37 First, the Department provided “appropriate screening and

assessments” to determine if mother needed accommodations for a

disability. See S.K., ¶ 21. The intake caseworker testified that

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when she first met mother, she was concerned about mother’s

“functioning level” and possible “delays” but was unsure if those

were caused by substance use or something else. Based on these

concerns, the caseworker sent a referral for a psychological

evaluation. After mother completed the evaluation, the ongoing

caseworker contacted the psychologist, and he recommended

further assessment through the community board to determine if

mother qualified for services based on her adaptive functioning.

When the caseworker reached out to a provider to set up an

adaptive functioning assessment, they did not recommend an

assessment until mother was sober because the results would be

invalid if mother was actively using methamphetamine. Even so,

the caseworker arranged for a provider from Eastern Colorado

Services to attend a family engagement meeting, and the provider

interviewed mother over the phone to discuss the possibility of

services. But that provider determined that mother did not qualify

for any of Eastern Colorado Services’ programs because her

intelligence quotient was too high. Although mother told the

psychologist that she did not qualify for social security disability

19
benefits, the caseworker helped mother fill out a social security

application.

¶ 38 Next, the caseworker provided hands-on support to mother, as

recommended by the psychologist. For example, she gave mother a

planner with several months of appointments already written in it.

She also gave mother several rides to family time, inpatient

treatment, domestic violence services, and into town to do her

laundry. As noted above, the caseworker helped mother fill out

applications for services. When mother would call and was upset,

the caseworker provided emotional support and asked what she

could do to help. In fact, when asked what the Department had

done to help her comply with her treatment plan, mother testified

that “when it comes down to it, like when I need something, I can

call [the caseworker].”

¶ 39 Last, the Department provided mother with numerous

resources and services that were reasonably calculated to help her

complete her treatment goals and render her fit. Specifically, the

Department provided mother with parenting coaching classes,

referred her to dual diagnosis treatment, set up sobriety monitoring,

referred her for a psychological evaluation and parent-child

20
interactional assessment, offered her inpatient treatment and

transportation to get there, provided her with supervised and

therapeutic family time, helped her access domestic violence

services, provided her with housing resources and utilities

assistance, purchased several cell phones for her, and provided her

with gas vouchers and bus tickets.

¶ 40 On appeal, mother lists additional services she believes the

Department should have provided and argues that these services

were required to accommodate her disability. But the record does

not indicate that mother asked for these additional services at any

point throughout the case. See id. at ¶ 21 (a parent should identify

any modifications that she believes are necessary to accommodate

her disability); see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶

17 (waiting until the termination hearing to raise the ADA issue is

“problematic” because the department cannot provide, and the

court cannot order the department to provide, reasonable

accommodations to rehabilitate the parent during the case).

¶ 41 Based on the foregoing, we agree with the juvenile court’s

determination that the Department considered and reasonably

accommodated for mother’s level of cognitive functioning. Thus, we

21
discern no error in the court’s finding that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child.

V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 42 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination.

Specifically, they argue that the court improperly ruled out an

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to paternal grandmother

or grandfather. We disagree.

a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 43 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less

drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶

29. A juvenile court may also consider other factors, including

whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial

to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the

child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.

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And a juvenile court may consider whether the placement favors

adoption over an APR. Z.M., ¶ 31.

¶ 44 To aid the court in determining whether there is a less drastic

alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a

reasonable number of persons the parent identifies as placement

options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.

2004). But the department is not obligated to “independently

identify and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” People

in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 45 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Long-term or permanent placement with a

family member, short of termination, may not be in the child’s best

interests if it does not provide the permanence that adoption would

provide or otherwise meet the child’s needs. A.R., ¶ 41. If a

juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

alternative and order termination. A.M., ¶ 32.

¶ 46 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

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Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best

interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the

record supports its findings and legal conclusions. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

b. Analysis

¶ 47 The juvenile court considered whether there were any less

drastic alternatives to termination that would be in the child’s best

interests but ultimately determined there were not. In particular,

the court found that an APR to grandmother was not a viable option

because she was unwilling to acknowledge or recognize father’s

shortcomings, which created a safety issue for the child. The court

also found that an APR to grandfather, with whom the child was

placed, was not a viable option because father had been abusive

toward grandfather and had taken no accountability for the

deterioration of their relationship.

¶ 48 The record supports these findings. The intake caseworker

testified that when the case opened, she conducted a diligent search

to identify family members and reached out to several of them to

discuss the possibility of placement. At that time, the caseworker

24
determined that the child should not be placed with grandmother

because a juvenile sex offender was living with grandmother, and

she would not acknowledge that the parents’ drug use or the

conditions of their home were unsafe for the child. At the time of

the termination hearing, the ongoing caseworker testified that she

still had safety concerns because she believed that grandmother

would allow the child to be around father “no matter what condition

[father] was in.” Indeed, grandmother testified that she had never

had any concerns that either parent was under the influence of any

substances and still did not think that the parents needed to be

supervised around the child.

¶ 49 Next, the caseworker testified that when father requested a

meeting with grandfather at the Department, she set one up. But

at that meeting, she observed father yelling, cursing, and talking

over grandfather while grandfather remained calm and tried to

encourage father to work on his treatment plan. Grandfather

testified that he preferred adoption over APR because he had

obtained a protection order against father, which was the result of

father’s anger, hostility, and disrespect toward him and his wife

throughout the proceedings.

25
¶ 50 It is true, as mother points out, that the juvenile court focused

on father’s relationship with grandfather when determining whether

an APR to grandfather was a viable option. But the record does not

support her argument that the court should have ordered an APR

between her and grandfather because their relationship was good.

Rather, according to the caseworker, mother’s relationship with

grandfather was “conflicted” and there were times when mother was

“very much against” grandfather and his wife. Additionally, the

caseworker opined that an APR between mother and grandfather

would not be in the child’s best interests because mother’s

relationship with father would render that situation unsafe for the

child. Indeed, mother testified that her relationship with father was

“poisonous or dangerous,” that father “called the shots” in the

relationship, and that she would not go visit the child at

grandfather’s house if father was not allowed to go with her.

¶ 51 Moreover, the caseworker opined that termination, not an

APR, was in the child’s best interests because it would not be safe

for the child to continue to experience the “kind of harassment and

hostility” that father directed toward grandfather and because the

child needed the predictability it would provide. The caseworker

26
also opined that termination, and eventual adoption would provide

permanency, which is what the child needed.

¶ 52 Therefore, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that termination, not an APR, was in the child’s best

interests, we discern no basis for reversal.

VI. Disposition

¶ 53 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE LUM concur.

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