Farinas v. 712 Mayor Patricia

23CA1768 Farinas v 712 Mayor Patricia 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1768
Saguache County District Court No. 22CV30021
Honorable Christopher J. Munch, Judge

Luis Farinas,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

712 Mayor Patricia, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Harris and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 12, 2024

Robinson & Henry, P.C., Benjamin C. Whitney, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

3I Law, LLC, April Greene Apking, Jessamyn L. Jones, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 In this negligence action, defendant 712 Mayor Patricia, LLC,

appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion for a directed

verdict against the plaintiff, Luis Farinas. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In the summer of 2021, 712 Mayor Patricia, a real estate

holding company, purchased a parcel of land in Saguache County

from South Platte Distributors, LLC. As part of that transaction,

712 Mayor Patricia agreed to (1) rent the premises to South Platte

and (2) replace an existing marijuana greenhouse on the property

with a different structure. In late November, LB Distribution, LLC,

bought the greenhouse for purposes of reusing its components. LB

Distribution agreed to disassemble and remove the structure from

the property.

¶3 Roughly two weeks later, a windstorm swept through the area,

blowing off multiple roof panels from the partially dismantled

greenhouse onto Farinas’s neighboring property. Some of the flying

debris hit Farinas’s two greenhouses, ripping through the protective

sheeting and exposing his marijuana plants to the freezing outside

environment. Following the storm, Farinas tried to patch the

damaged sheeting and restore appropriate temperature inside the

1
greenhouses using additional heaters. His attempts proved futile,

and he lost all 816 marijuana plants in his commercial crop.

¶4 Farinas brought a negligence action for the loss of his plants

against 712 Mayor Patricia, South Platte, and Duong Hau. Hau is

the owner of both 712 Mayor Patricia and South Platte. The

defendants filed a cross-complaint against LB Distribution, alleging

that it was negligent in the disassembly and removal of the

greenhouse from 712 Mayor Patricia’s property because “it failed to

adequately secure the [g]reenhouse during the windstorm.”1

¶5 The suit proceeded to trial and at the close of Farinas’s case,

the defendants moved for a directed verdict under C.R.C.P. 50.

They contended that Farinas “ha[d] failed to introduce . . .

permissible evidence of damages” and that he had failed to

establish that they owed him a legal duty of care at the time of the

accident. In addition, the defendants argued that there had been

no evidence that the corporate veil had been pierced with regard to

Hau. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of South

1 Because LB Distribution was unable to obtain representation, the

trial court dismissed it from the suit and designated it as a
nonparty at fault.

2
Platte and Hau. But the court denied 712 Mayor Patricia’s motion

for a directed verdict and permitted it to make a further appellate

record by filing a supplemental written motion, which 712 Mayor

Patricia did.

¶6 The jury returned a verdict in Farinas’s favor, awarding him

$285,000 in damages and apportioning 75% of the fault to 712

Mayor Patricia and 25% to LB Distribution as a designated

nonparty at fault. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in

the amount of $213,750 against 712 Mayor Patricia.

¶7 On appeal, 712 Mayor Patricia contends that the court erred

by denying its motion for a directed verdict because Farinas failed

to establish (1) his damages with reasonable certainty and (2) that

712 Mayor Patricia owed him a legal duty of care at the time of the

accident. We disagree on both counts.

II. Analysis

A. Elements of Negligence and Standard of Review

¶8 To prevail on a negligence claim, a “plaintiff must show a legal

duty of care on the defendant’s part, breach of that duty, injury to

the plaintiff, and that the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s

injury.” Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1068-69 (Colo. 2011).

3
¶9 C.R.C.P. 50 authorizes a party to move for a directed verdict

on a claim at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing party

or at the close of all the evidence. But “[d]irected verdicts are not

favored.” Langlois v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 78 P.3d 1154, 1157

(Colo. App. 2003). A trial court may grant such relief “only if the

evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, ‘compels the conclusion that reasonable persons could not

disagree and that no evidence, or legitimate inference therefrom,

has been presented upon which a jury’s verdict against the moving

party could be sustained.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Goddard, 2021 COA 15, ¶ 25 (quoting Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins.

Co., 841 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. App. 1992)). Accordingly, the court

should deny a motion for a directed verdict “unless there is no

evidence that could support a verdict against the moving party on

the claim.” Parks v. Edward Dale Parrish LLC, 2019 COA 19, ¶ 10.

¶ 10 We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a

directed verdict. Argo v. Hemphill, 2022 COA 104, ¶ 19. In doing

so, we apply the same standards the court does. Goddard, ¶ 25.

Whether a particular defendant owes a legal duty to a particular

4
plaintiff is also a question of law that we review de novo. See

Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶ 18.

B. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Denying
a Directed Verdict Based
on the Evidence of Damages

¶ 11 712 Mayor Patricia contends that “[t]he trial court erred [by]

denying the motion for directed verdict because Mr. Farinas failed

to establish damages beyond mere speculation.” It contends that it

was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of damages because

(1) Farinas “failed to present probative, credible, and competent

evidence of lost profits because he presented only his own

conclusory opinion of the gross revenue value of his [marijuana

plants]”; (2) Farinas presented no evidence as to whether his

destroyed plants were of “commercial quality” or had “value to

commercial buyers”; and (3) the sought lost profit damages were

improper given that “[t]he commercial marijuana industry is

speculative in nature.” We conclude that the first argument is not

preserved, and we’re not persuaded by the other two.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 12 “The principle of making the injured party whole underlies all

negligence cases.” Hodge v. Matrix Grp., Inc., 2022 COA 4, ¶ 13

5
(quoting Cope v. Vermeer Sales & Serv. of Colo., Inc., 650 P.2d 1307,

1309 (Colo. App. 1982)). “As a general rule, a party is entitled to

recover for damages that naturally and probably result from the

negligence of another.” Id. To do so, the party must prove the

damages they suffered with reasonable certainty. Boulders at

Escalante LLC v. Otten Johnson Robinson Neff & Ragonetti PC, 2015

COA 85, ¶ 55.

¶ 13 However, “[t]he rule which precludes recovery of uncertain and

speculative damages applies only where the fact of damages is

uncertain, not where the amount is uncertain.” Cope, 650 P.2d at

1309 (citing Peterson v. Colo. Potato Flake & Mfg. Co., 435 P.2d 237,

239 (Colo. 1967)). Accordingly, once the party has established the

fact of damages, the party need not prove the measure of damages

with mathematical certainty. See Hoff & Leigh, Inc. v. Byler, 62

P.3d 1077, 1079 (Colo. App. 2002); see also Cope, 650 P.2d at 1309

(“Difficulty or uncertainty in determining the precise amount does

not prevent an award of damages.”). Rather, the party must only

“provide evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable estimate of the

loss sustained.” Byler, 62 P.3d at 1079.

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2. Discussion

¶ 14 It’s a well-established rule that a property owner is competent

to testify about his opinion of the value of his own property without

being qualified as an expert, as long as that opinion is based on

proper considerations. See Vista Resorts, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co., 117 P.3d 60, 69 (Colo. App. 2004); In re Marriage of

Plummer, 709 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Colo. App. 1985); see also Denver

Urb. Renewal Auth. v. Berglund-Cherne Co., 568 P.2d 478, 483

(Colo. 1977) (extending this rule to the testimony about the value of

a company’s property from an officer of the corporation). Farinas

gave such an opinion in this case.

¶ 15 Farinas testified that he had lost in total 816 marijuana plants

due to the accident. In support, he presented a Metrc report that,

among other things, identified the reason for each plant’s death

(cold weather), its strain, the greenhouse it was grown in, and

whether the plant was in a vegetative or flowering phase.2 Farinas

2 Metrc is marijuana track and trace software that the Colorado

Department of Revenue, Marijuana Enforcement Division, utilizes to
track medical and recreational marijuana markets through unique
RFID identifiers that are integrated inside the software and
assigned to each plant. Metrc, https://perma.cc/TPV2-432N.

7
had been growing commercial marijuana for about five years at the

time of trial. He stated that, in his experience, each plant could

produce between one and three pounds of flowers, which is the

portion of the plant he would sell. In calculating the value of his

plants, however, Farinas selected the lower end of this range and

assumed that each destroyed plant would have yielded one pound

of flowering material. Then, he multiplied 816 pounds of lost

product by the average market rate to arrive at the measure of his

damages — roughly $775,000.

¶ 16 Like the trial court, we conclude that Farinas’s opinion about

the value of his lost marijuana plants constituted sufficient

evidence to survive 712 Mayor Patricia’s motion for a directed

verdict and have the issue of damages submitted to the jury.

a. 712 Mayor Patricia Didn’t Preserve Its
Net Profits Argument

¶ 17 In arguing otherwise, 712 Mayor Patricia asserts that Farinas

only presented his “self-serving testimony regarding what he

believed he would have sold his crop for.” Relying on Hoover v.

Shott, 189 P. 848 (Colo. 1920), it contends that Farinas was

required, but failed, to offer “evidence, by way of testimony or other

8
documentation, as to his overhead, cost of doing business, or

historical sales data to establish what his net profits would have

been had he sold his crops for the price stated.” In other words,

712 Mayor Patricia posits that it was entitled to a directed verdict

because Farinas’s damages calculation was based on his estimated

gross lost profits, not the profits he would have made after

incurring costs associated with the “maturing, harvesting, and

marketing” of his plants. See id. at 849.

¶ 18 But the record shows that 712 Mayor Patricia didn’t preserve

this argument in the trial court.3 At the close of Farinas’s case, 712

Mayor Patricia requested a directed verdict on the grounds that

Farinas didn’t present any documentation — such as receipts,

invoices, contracts, or manifests — in support of his opinion about

the market value of his plants, the amount of product his plants

would have yielded upon maturation, or whether he would have

been able to sell his product for the assumed price. 712 Mayor

3 We note that Farinas concedes preservation. However, we’re not
bound by his concession because we have an independent,
affirmative duty to determine whether this issue is preserved for
appellate review. See People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 11.

9
Patricia repeated those arguments in the supplemental motion for a

directed verdict it filed after the trial. It also supplemented its

arguments to point out that Farinas didn’t demonstrate he would

get a full crop, that he had any buyers, what they would purchase

the crop for, and whether he would get maximum return per plant.

And 712 Mayor Patricia argued that the marijuana market is

inherently speculative, preventing damages for lost profits. But at

no point did 712 Mayor Patricia contend that the measure of

Farinas’s damages was uncertain or speculative because it only

captured his gross, as opposed to his net, lost profits.

¶ 19 “It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower

court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.” Melat,

Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61,

¶ 18; see also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d

1182, 1188 n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“We review only the specific

arguments a party pursued before the district court.”). When a

party fails to advance an argument in the trial court, that argument

is generally deemed waived. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P., ¶ 18.

Under the circumstances of this case, then, we conclude that 712

10
Mayor Patricia waived this issue. We thus decline to consider it

further.

b. Supporting Documentation for the Value
of Farinas’s Plants

¶ 20 712 Mayor Patricia argues that a directed verdict was

warranted because Farinas presented no supporting documentation

— let alone expert testimony — about the market value of his

marijuana plants, that those plants would have produced the

amount of commercially viable product he assumed in calculating

his damages, or that he would have been able to sell the entire

expected yield to commercial sellers.

¶ 21 As we note above, Farinas didn’t need to be qualified as an

expert before he could opine about the value of the personal

property he had lost as the result of the accident. See Vista

Resorts, Inc., 117 P.3d at 69; Plummer, 709 P.2d at 1389. And

while, perhaps, supporting documentation and expert testimony

would have made Farinas’s case stronger, the absence of that

additional evidence doesn’t mean that “no evidence . . . has been

presented upon which a jury’s verdict against [712 Mayor Patricia]

could be sustained.” Goddard, ¶ 25 (citation omitted). Indeed, his

11
opinion as to the value of his plants constituted competent evidence

both as to the fact of damages and its amount.4 Byler, 62 P.3d at

1079.

¶ 22 Thus, what 712 Mayor Patricia effectively challenges here is

the weight to be given to that opinion considering that Farinas

didn’t introduce more evidence in support of his testimony. But the

weight to give to Farinas’s testimony — as well as his credibility —

when deciding damages were questions of fact for the jury to

resolve, not a question of law for the trial court to resolve at the

directed verdict stage of the proceedings. See Scholle v. Ehrichs,

2022 COA 87M, ¶ 50, aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other

grounds, 2024 CO 22.

c. Speculative Nature of Marijuana Industry

¶ 23 Finally, 712 Mayor Patricia posits that the trial court erred by

denying its motion for a directed verdict because the speculative

and unpredictable nature of the commercial marijuana industry

rendered the sought lost profit damages improper. It points out

4 Notably, 712 Mayor Patricia’s trial counsel conceded that, as the

owner of the plants, Farinas could testify about the average market
rate for his plants.

12
that Farinas’s plants weren’t mature at the time of the storm and

that, in calculating the damages, he only speculated that they

would have reached maturity. Among other things, 712 Mayor

Patricia asserts that, while Farinas testified that a successful

cultivation required “good conditions,” he “failed to introduce any

evidence explaining these ideal conditions of growth, whether these

allegedly ideal conditions had the support of industry experts,

whether his greenhouse[s] met any of these conditions, or whether

he made any efforts to minimize the uncertain nature of crop

growth.”

¶ 24 But 712 Mayor Patricia can’t prevail on this argument because

Farinas did testify about these issues. He stated that, in his

experience, successful greenhouse marijuana cultivation was

dependent on the appropriate climate inside the greenhouse.

Farinas opined that a hot climate of about eighty degrees was ideal

and stated that he had maintained proper temperature inside both

greenhouses before they sustained damage. And he testified that,

at the time of the accident, the plants located in one greenhouse

were roughly three weeks out from harvest and those grown in the

other greenhouse would have been ready in about a month and a

13
half. This record shows that, even if we were to agree with 712

Mayor Patricia’s argument about the speculative nature of the

commercial marijuana industry as a whole, Farinas presented

evidence that his plants were close to maturity. Viewing this

evidence in the light most favorable to Farinas as the nonmoving

party, reasonable persons could conclude that his marijuana plants

— while immature at the time of the accident — would have fully

matured. See Goddard, ¶ 25.

¶ 25 In sum, we conclude that Farinas presented sufficient

evidence in support of his damages request for the trial court to

submit that issue to the jury and deny 712 Mayor Patricia’s motion

for a directed verdict. This claim thus fails.

C. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Denying
712 Mayor Patricia’s Motion for a Directed Verdict
on the Issue of Legal Duty of Care

¶ 26 712 Mayor Patricia next contends that the trial court erred

when it denied the motion for a directed verdict asserting that

Farinas had failed to establish that 712 Mayor Patricia owed him a

legal duty of care. Specifically, 712 Mayor Patricia contends (1) that

Farinas “presented no evidence that [712 Mayor Patricia] was the

possessor and in control of the greenhouse” that caused damage to

14
his property. It further asserts that, even if Farinas presented

sufficient evidence in support of the duty element of his negligence

claim, he didn’t (2) argue the proper standard for establishing a

legal duty “until the trial court gave him this information during the

[trial]” or (3) present any evidence regarding the proper standard of

care to establish a breach.

1. 712 Mayor Patricia Didn’t Preserve the Duty Argument Relying
on Its Lack of Possession and Control of the Greenhouse

¶ 27 As an initial matter, in support of its argument that it had no

duty because it didn’t possess or control the greenhouse, 712

Mayor Patricia directs our attention to jury instruction number 9,

which the court drafted and provided to the jury after denying 712

Mayor Patricia’s motion for a directed verdict:

An owner of land is subject to liability for harm
to persons outside of the owner’s land caused
by activity of others on the owner’s land if
landlord authorized the activity and if, but
only if,

(a) the landowner, at the time of authorizing
the activity, knew that the activity would be
carried on, and

(b) the landowner knew or had reason to know
that the activity would unavoidably involve
an unreasonable risk without necessary
precautions for safety being taken.

15
712 Mayor Patricia asserts that “[t]he trial court apparently based

this instruction” on the following language in section 54 of the

Restatement (Third) of Torts: “The possessor of land has a duty of

reasonable care for artificial conditions or conduct on the land that

poses a risk of physical harm to persons or property not on the

land.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional

Harm § 54 (Am. L. Inst. 2012). Then, relying on the restatement’s

definition of a “possessor of land,” 712 Mayor Patricia contends that

LB Distribution, and not it, was the possessor of the greenhouse.

See id. at § 49. 712 Mayor Patricia then concludes that LB

Distribution owned the greenhouse and was solely responsible for

its disassembly and removal from the property.

¶ 28 But contrary to 712 Mayor Patricia’s assertion, the trial court

didn’t base its duty instruction on section 54 of the Restatement

(Third) of Torts. Instead, it relied on a case from a division of this

court. As the trial court told the parties during oral argument on

the motion for a directed verdict, it was basing the jury instruction

on a restatement provision that the division adopted in Gonzales v.

Bierman, 773 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1989). The Gonzales court

16
adopted section 379A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L.

Inst. 1965), which says that

[a] lessor of land is subject to liability for
physical harm to persons outside of the land
caused by activities of the lessee or others on
the land after the lessor transfers possession
if, but only if,

(a) the lessor at the time of the lease consented
to such activity or knew that it would be
carried on, and

(b) the lessor knew or had reason to know that
it would unavoidably involve such an
unreasonable risk, or that special
precautions necessary to safety would not
be taken.

Gonzales, 773 P.2d at 630.

¶ 29 Accordingly, 712 Mayor Patricia’s argument that it had no

legal duty under section 54 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts

because it wasn’t the possessor of the greenhouse is misplaced.

That argument is premised on the incorrect characterization of the

court’s instruction and inapplicable law.

¶ 30 Regardless, this argument is waived because 712 Mayor

Patricia failed to preserve it in the trial court. 712 Mayor Patricia

contended that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of

duty because the Colorado Premises Liability Act (PLA) abrogated a

17
common law duty of a landowner to others. It further argued that,

even if a landowner’s duty continued to exist after the PLA was

enacted, LB Distribution — not 712 Mayor Patricia — was the

landowner “under the alternative definition of landowner created by

the PLA and the [Colorado] Supreme Court” in Jordan v. Panorama

Orthopedics & Spine Center, PC, 2015 CO 24. And in support of

this argument, 712 Mayor Patricia asserted that LB Distribution

conducted “an activity on the [p]roperty when [it took] possession of

its own greenhouse” and “legally created the condition during the

disassembly of the greenhouse.”

¶ 31 True, during argument on its oral motion for a directed

verdict, 712 Mayor Patricia argued that it had no duty because it

was “undisputed that [it] didn’t control, possess, or own the injury

causing circumstance” (i.e. the greenhouse). But it also premised

this argument on the PLA and the assertion that there was no

common law negligence claim. Specifically, 712 Mayor Patricia

cited Woods v. Delgar Ltd., 226 P.3d 1178 (Colo. App. 2009), to

argue that Gonzales and section 379A of the Restatement (Second)

of Torts didn’t apply here.

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¶ 32 But it didn’t argue what it argues on appeal: that the trial

court’s instruction adopted the duty standard set forth in section

54 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts; that 712 Mayor Patricia

didn’t owe a legal duty under that standard because it wasn’t a

“possessor of land” within the meaning of that term under section

49 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts; and that the court’s duty

jury instruction, in 712 Mayor Patricia’s words, “presupposed that

[712 Mayor Patricia] was the ‘possessor’ of the greenhouse at the

time of the alleged damage to Mr. Farinas’[s] crops, alleviating [him]

of his burden of proof related to [712 Mayor Patricia’s] duty to him.”

¶ 33 Because 712 Mayor Patricia failed to present these points in

its motion for a directed verdict, the trial court had no opportunity

to assess their merits when ruling on the motion. See Cuevas v.

Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2023 COA 64M, ¶ 35 n.3 (noting that

although parties are not required to use “talismanic language” to

preserve issues for appeal, the district court must be presented with

an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of

law on the issue (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322

(Colo. 2004))) (cert. granted in part July 1, 2024). Under these

19
circumstances, we consider this issue waived, and we decline to

address it further. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P., ¶ 18.

2. 712 Mayor Patricia Didn’t Preserve
Its Instructional Challenge

¶ 34 712 Mayor Patricia also argues for the first time on appeal that

because Farinas didn’t provide a jury instruction setting forth “the

correct standard by which to establish a duty under a common law

negligence claim, it was error for the trial court to provide the

proper standard for him.”

¶ 35 However, the record shows that during oral argument on the

motion for a directed verdict, 712 Mayor Patricia itself agreed to the

jury instruction that the court prepared sua sponte. Specifically,

after the trial court observed that section 379A of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts set forth the governing duty of care standard, it

pointed out that neither party had requested “an instruction out of

the restatement.” Acknowledging that “generally, [courts] don’t give

instructions . . . sua sponte,” the trial court told the parties that it

had drafted a jury instruction based on the restatement and gave

them an opportunity to review the proposed draft. In response, 712

Mayor Patricia’s trial counsel stated, “I think you have to give this

20
instruction based on the case I read last night. So, I would agree.

I’m -- I’m in favor of this instruction.”

¶ 36 True, the record also shows that 712 Mayor Patricia later

objected to the duty instruction, stating that “just for the record,

. . . note [712 Mayor Patricia’s] objection to the inclusion of the

off-premise-landowner duty instruction . . . based on the

restatement.” But in doing so, 712 Mayor Patricia didn’t argue that

the instruction was improper because the court drafted it sua

sponte. See Vikell Invs. Pac., Inc. v. Kip Hampden, Ltd., 946 P.2d

589, 596 (Colo. App. 1997) (“A general objection to an instruction is

not sufficient to preserve a specific objection for appeal.”); see also

Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1188 n.4. Because 712 Mayor Patricia failed

to preserve this argument in the trial court, it is likewise waived,

and we decline to address it on the merits. See Melat, Pressman &

Higbie, L.L.P., ¶ 18.

3. Standard of Care for Disassembling
and Removing a Greenhouse

¶ 37 Finally, we’re not persuaded by 712 Mayor Patricia’s argument

that it was entitled to a directed verdict because no reasonable jury

would have been able to find that it breached its legal duty of care

21
given that Farinas didn’t establish what a reasonable care was in

dismantling and removing a greenhouse. It’s true that Farinas

didn’t present specific evidence regarding, in 712 Mayor Patricia’s

words, “the proper way to disassemble and remove the greenhouse.”

But 712 Mayor Patricia doesn’t provide any compelling argument or

authorities indicating why such specific proof was required under

the circumstances of this case.

¶ 38 Indeed, there is other evidence in the record from which a

reasonable juror could have concluded what the duty of care was

and that 712 Mayor Patricia breached it. Aubin Kemp, the owner of

LB Distribution, testified that he had dismantled the greenhouse

with the help of his three friends. Kemp stated that neither he nor

his friends were licensed contractors or had experience with the

type of work they did on 712 Mayor Patricia’s property. He also

testified that the greenhouse panels were secured through an

interlock system that was supposed to hold them down if there was

any wind and that he detached the panels from that system during

the dismantling process. When asked what he did to secure the

panels once they were removed from the structure, Kemp testified

that he threw unusable panels into 712 Mayor Patricia’s dumpster

22
and put “rocks or something on them . . . because a lot of times if

something’s even laying on the ground [t]here, the wind can pick it

up and throw it around.” And he further stated that Timothy Dang,

who had brokered the greenhouse transaction on 712 Mayor

Patricia’s behalf, helped him dispose of those panels.

¶ 39 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Farinas as

the nonmoving party, a reasonable jury could conclude that the

exercise of reasonable care required better securing the panels after

they were removed from the greenhouse. See Goddard, ¶ 25. The

court therefore didn’t err when it denied Mayor Patricia’s motion for

a directed verdict and submitted the issues of duty and breach to

the jury.

III. Disposition

¶ 40 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE YUN concur.

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