Peo v. Jackson

24CA0037 Peo v Jackson 12-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0037
City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CR4876
Honorable Alex C. Meyers, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Billy Lawrence Jackson,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Dunn and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 19, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Billy Lawrence Jackson, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Billy Lawrence Jackson, appeals the district

court’s order granting in part and denying in part his motion to

correct the mittimus. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2011, the prosecution charged Jackson with second degree

kidnapping of a robbery victim under section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b),

C.R.S. 2011, and robbery under section 18-4-301(1), C.R.S. 2011.

The version of section 18-3-302(3) in effect at the time provided that

“[s]econd degree kidnapping is a class 2 felony if any of the

following circumstances exist: (a) [t]he person kidnapped is a victim

of a sexual offense pursuant to part 4 of this article; or (b) [t]he

person kidnapped is a victim of a robbery.”

¶3 A jury convicted Jackson as charged. The district court

sentenced him to twenty-four years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections.

¶4 The district court issued a mittimus reflecting Jackson’s

convictions. The mittimus listed the charges as “KIDNAPPING

2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” under section

18-3-302(1), (3), and “ROBBERY” under section 18-4-301(1).

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¶5 Jackson appealed his convictions, and a division of this court

affirmed. People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1602, Mar. 19,

2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The supreme court

denied certiorari, and the mandate was issued in 2015.

¶6 Eight years later, Jackson filed a motion to amend the

mittimus. As relevant here, he argued that the charge for

“KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” was incorrect

because there had been no allegations that he committed a sex

offense. He asserted that the error violated his due process rights

and caused him undue hardship.

¶7 The district court granted the motion in part, explaining that

“Count 1 is listed as ‘KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/

ROBBERY,’ and Defendant correctly states he was not charged or

convicted of a sex offense of any kind.” But, the court stated, the

description for second degree kidnapping under section 18-3-302(3)

is hardcoded into the computer system to show “KIDNAPPING

2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” (showing both subsection

(3)(a) and (3)(b)), and the court “[could not] change this hard-coded

computer entry.” The court also said it was “not aware of any

undue hardship posed by this mittimus language, and Defendant

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cites none.” Nonetheless, the court said it would amend the

mittimus with “additional language to clarify that the associated

robbery is the basis for designating the kidnapping charge as a

class 2 felony, not a sex offense.” It further stated that the order

was “intended to clarify the issue if needed as Defendant completes

his prison sentence and parole in this case.”

¶8 The court amended the mittimus by adding the following

sentence: “PER ORDER DATED 12/6/23, COUNT 1 IS AS TO

KIDNAPPING DURING THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY ONLY,

NOT A SEX OFFENSE.”

II. Analysis

¶9 Jackson appeals the district court’s order, contending that the

kidnapping charge listed on his mittimus is ambiguous as to

whether section 18-3-302(3)(a) or (3)(b) is applicable to him, which

renders the statute void for vagueness and violates his due process

rights. He again requests an amended mittimus so that the

description of the kidnapping charge does not show “KIDNAPPING

2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY.” We discern no error in the

court’s order.

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¶ 10 “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the

record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission

may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if

any, as the court orders.” Crim. P. 36. Because the language of

this rule indicates that the decision to correct an error is

discretionary rather than mandatory, we review for an abuse

of discretion. Quintana v. People, 613 P.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Colo.

1980). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Rodriguez, 2022 COA

98, ¶ 12.

¶ 11 Whether a defendant was denied due process is a question of

law that we review de novo. People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144,

¶ 23.

¶ 12 We cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by amending the mittimus as it did and by finding that it

couldn’t change the description of the kidnapping charge. This

ruling was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, but

rather was based on the court’s determination about its own

computer system. Jackson is not entitled to further amendment of

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the mittimus because correction of the kidnapping charge’s

description isn’t possible.

¶ 13 The language in the mittimus also doesn’t violate Jackson’s

due process rights. Due process requires that defendants receive

adequate notice of the charges filed against them. See People v.

Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 455 (Colo. 2005); see also U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Here, Jackson received notice

of the charges against him through the complaint and information.

The complaint correctly identified the statute under which he was

being charged — second degree kidnapping under section

18-3-302(1), (3). It stated that “the victim was the victim of a

robbery; in violation of section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b).” And the

mittimus accurately reflects that Jackson was convicted under

section 18-3-302(1), (3).

¶ 14 Furthermore, given that the court added clarifying language,

Jackson’s claim of ambiguity fails. The mittimus clearly states that

the kidnapping was related to a robbery, not a sex offense.

¶ 15 Moreover, for all intents and purposes, Jackson received the

relief he seeks — an amended mittimus reflecting that his

kidnapping charge was unrelated to any sex offense. Because the

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district court already made this clarification, there is no relief for

this court to grant.

¶ 16 As to Jackson’s void for vagueness challenge, Jackson’s claim

is not that the second degree kidnapping statute is vague, but

rather that the mittimus’ description of the charge under the

statute is vague. He is not challenging the constitutionality of his

convictions and is instead challenging the accuracy of the mittimus.

But the manner in which a mittimus references a statute cannot

render the statute unconstitutionally vague. See People ex rel. Rein

v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 33 (“The essential inquiry in addressing

a void for vagueness challenge is whether the statute ‘forbids or

requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of

ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and

differ as to its application.’” (quoting People v. Gross, 830 P.2d 933,

937 (Colo. 1992))).

¶ 17 Nevertheless, any constitutional claim would be cognizable

under Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I), and we don’t address such a claim for the

first time on appeal. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34

(“[A]lthough we will broadly construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings to

effectuate the substance, rather than the form, of those pleadings,

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we will not consider issues not raised before the district court in a

motion for postconviction relief.”). Such a constitutional claim

would also be untimely and successive. See § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S.

2024 (requiring a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to be filed within three

years of a conviction for a non-class 1 felony); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)

(requiring the district court to deny any Crim. P. 35(c) claim that

could have been raised on direct appeal).

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

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