Estate of Whiteside

23CA1956 Estate of Whiteside 12-26-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1956
City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 23PR30408
Honorable Elizabeth D. Leith, Judge

In the Matter of the Estate of Dorene Gayla Whiteside, deceased.

Shlonda Butts-Cosby,

Appellant,

v.

Shellisa L. Holloway, Melissa Schwartz, and Ta’Sha Burt,

Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Harris and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 26, 2024

Shlonda Butts-Cosby, Pro Se

Shellisa L. Holloway, Pro Se

Schwartz, McMinimee & Andrew, LLC, Melissa R. Schwartz, Carin Ramirez,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Melissa Schwartz

Ta’Sha Burt, Pro Se
¶1 In this intestate succession case, Shlonda Butts-Cosby, pro

se, appeals the probate court’s order approving a settlement

agreement between the interested parties below, dismissing many of

her filings and motions as moot, and ordering her to vacate the

residence of the decedent, Dorene Gayla Whiteside. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Butts-Cosby, Whiteside’s daughter and one of her heirs, lived

with Whiteside in her residence before she passed away in

November 2022. The residence is the estate’s only asset. Whiteside

had five other biological and adopted children and heirs, Shellisa

Holloway, Leland Butts Jr., DonTrell D. Burt, Tasha Alexander, and

Ta’Sha Burt. Holloway filed a petition for adjudication of intestacy

and to appoint herself as personal representative, which all of the

heirs supported except for Butts-Cosby. The court ultimately

appointed a special administrator and ordered that the parties

attend mediation to resolve the disposition of Whiteside’s home.

¶3 The mediation succeeded, and the parties executed a

settlement agreement on July 11, 2023. In the settlement

agreement, the heirs agreed that Holloway would withdraw her

petition to appoint herself as personal representative and that

1
Butts-Cosby would withdraw all of her objections currently pending

before the court. The agreement provided that Whiteside’s property

would be sold and the remaining proceeds distributed per the laws

of intestate succession. The heirs also agreed that certain expenses

of Holloway and Butts Jr. would be reimbursable from the estate.

Upon approval of the probate court, each party to the settlement

agreement forever discharged all claims related to Whiteside’s

property.

¶4 The settlement agreement also allowed the parties ten days

after the last party had signed to consult with an attorney and

object to the agreement. Each of the heirs signed the agreement.

Holloway was the last to sign on July 12.

¶5 On July 21, Butts-Cosby filed a document titled “objection,” in

which she requested more time to retain an attorney. Then, on

August 8, Butts-Cosby filed a document that she asserted was

Whiteside’s last will. The purported holographic will consisted of

copies of two pages, dated November 5, 2015, and contained notes

regarding Whiteside’s house and several names, including those of

Holloway and Butts-Cosby.

2
¶6 The court noted that Butts-Cosby had failed to comply with

the agreement’s ten-day window to consult with an attorney.

Nonetheless, it ordered that Butts-Cosby set the matter for a

hearing within fourteen days.

¶7 The court held the hearing in late October 2023 — at which

Butts-Cosby appeared pro se — and made the following pertinent

findings:

• Butts-Cosby was not paying rent to the estate, and she

was not paying the mortgage. She had sporadically made

payments toward the utilities.

• Holloway paid the majority of the payments toward the

house expenses, including the mortgage.

• Butts-Cosby’s testimony regarding her caretaker status

was not credible and was unsupported by the evidence.

• The settlement agreement included a full waiver of all

claims.

• Butts-Cosby was aware that a purported holographic

will, which consisted of the journal entries, existed prior

to the July 11 mediation.

3
• Butts-Cosby did not file a petition to probate this will, did

not secure a handwriting expert or other testimony to

support her claim, and did not show that the purported

journal entries had testamentary intent.

• The original purported holographic will is not in the

possession of the probate court.

¶8 The probate court ultimately found, based on Butts-Cosby’s

statements at the hearing, that

[Butts-Cosby] was aware that a holographic
Will purportedly existed and signed the
Settlement Agreement waiving any and all
rights not incorporated therein. Thus, even
were the document to constitute a Will, the
Court specifically finds that she waived the
right to proffer it to the Court by not including
such right in the Settlement Agreement. The
court further finds that she abandons the right
to probate the purported Will for not timely
prosecuting it.

¶9 The probate court then approved the settlement agreement

and ordered Butts-Cosby to cooperate with the sale of the house.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Butts-Cosby contends that the trial court erred by not

accepting and ruling on the holographic will. We disagree.

4
A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 “[P]leadings by pro se litigants must be broadly construed to

ensure that they are not denied review of important issues because

of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer.”

Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10 (quoting Jones v. Williams,

2019 CO 61, ¶ 5). It is not this court’s role, however, to rewrite a

pro se litigant’s pleadings. Nor may we act as an advocate for a pro

se litigant. Id. (citing People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34).

¶ 12 A court may approve a settlement agreement resolving an

estate dispute as long as certain conditions are satisfied.

§ 15-12-1102, C.R.S. 2024. We review the district court’s approval

of the settlement agreement for an abuse of discretion. See

Saunders v. Muratori, 251 P.3d 550, 555 (Colo. App. 2010). A court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

B. The Purported Holographic Will

¶ 13 Butts-Cosby argues that the probate court erred because “[t]he

accepting and ruling on the holographic Will must be included

because it was in the original case for the probate court.” This

statement is the entirety of the argument presented in her opening

5
brief. Because Butts-Cosby is pro se, we construe this argument

liberally, see McGrath, ¶ 10, viewing it within the context of the

probate court’s order denying the purported holographic will and

accepting the settlement agreement.

¶ 14 Butts-Cosby’s argument that the probate court erred by not

ruling on the purported holographic will is refuted by the record.

The court’s post-hearing order specifically addressed the

holographic will and found that Butts-Cosby failed to probate the

will and that she knew of the will’s existence before she signed the

settlement agreement. Most importantly, the probate court found

that Butts-Cosby signed and agreed to the settlement agreement’s

terms. The court found that the settlement agreement complied

with the laws of intestacy in Colorado. And by signing that

agreement to resolve the disputes over the estate, Butts-Cosby

waived her ability to later seek to probate the will. Butts-Cosby

points us to nothing in the record — nor have we seen anything on

our own review — calling the probate court’s findings into question.

The order both addressed and ruled on the purported holographic

will.

6
¶ 15 Butts-Cosby’s opening brief does not challenge the settlement

agreement itself. And to the extent she does so in her reply brief, it

is well-settled law that “[w]e do not consider arguments raised for

the first time in a reply brief.” In Interest of L.B., 2017 COA 5, ¶ 48.

¶ 16 We agree with the probate court that the signed settlement

agreement was intended to resolve the estate dispute, and it

contains no provision permitting a subsequent will contest.

Butts-Cosby signed it with the knowledge that a holographic will

could have existed. Doing so, she waived her right to pursue

additional claims against the estate involving that will.

¶ 17 In addition, the court found that the agreement is in the best

interest of the estate, it was served on all the heirs, it resolved the

dispute in good faith, and its terms are just and reasonable. See

§ 15-12-1102; Saunders, 251 P.3d at 555. These findings have

record support. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

probate court’s order adopting the settlement agreement and its

refusal to accept the purported holographic will.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The order approving the settlement agreement is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE YUN concur.

7