Peo v. Dockins

23CA0952 Peo v Dockins 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0952
Weld County District Court No. 20CR1916
Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Eric James Dockins,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Eric James Dockins, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of vehicular

eluding and driving under restraint (DUR). Dockins contends that

the district court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial;

(2) allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct; and (3) admitting

evidence of a prior conviction. Dockins further contends that the

cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 On August 27, 2020, Officer Albert Castillo was on patrol in

Lochbuie, Colorado, at approximately 1 a.m. when he noticed a

man he recognized as Dockins standing next to a motorcycle in

front of a house. As he drove by, Officer Castillo ran Dockins’ name

through Colorado and national criminal database systems, which

returned a photograph that matched Dockins’ appearance as well

as information that Dockins’ driving status was revoked. Officer

Castillo also confirmed that the motorcycle was registered to

Dockins.

¶3 When Officer Castillo circled back, Dockins started to drive

away on the motorcycle. Officer Castillo attempted to stop Dockins,

first activating his overhead lights and then his sirens. Dockins did

1
not stop. Instead, he accelerated, almost lost control in a

roundabout, and continued onto I-76, driving at speeds faster than

110 miles per hour. Officer Castillo ultimately terminated his

pursuit. He went back to the house where he first saw Dockins and

spoke with Dockins’ mother, who lived in the house and said she

did not know where Dockins was.

¶4 For this conduct, the prosecution later charged Dockins with

vehicular eluding and DUR. A jury convicted Dockins as charged.

II. Mistrial

¶5 Dockins contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion for a mistrial after his alleged alibi witness failed to appear.

We perceive no abuse of discretion.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 “A mistrial is a drastic remedy that is warranted only when the

prejudice to the accused is so substantial that its effect on the jury

cannot be remedied by other means.” People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d

365, 373 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting People v. Dore, 997 P.2d 1214,

1221 (Colo. App. 1999)). A trial court has broad discretion to grant

or deny a motion for a mistrial, and we will not reverse its decision

absent an abuse of that discretion and prejudice to the defendant.

2
People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion if

its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when

it misapplies the law. People v. Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 12.1

B. Additional Background

¶7 The district court initially set Dockins’ trial for May 2022. At

the pretrial readiness conference, defense counsel requested a

continuance because he was having issues contacting Dockins’ alibi

witness, later identified as Kimberly Collins. The court granted the

continuance over the prosecutor’s objection.

¶8 Dockins first proceeded to trial in July 2022. On the morning

of the second day, after the prosecution rested its case, defense

counsel told the court that Collins was scheduled to testify that

afternoon but was unable to appear due to an emergency with her

autistic son. Defense counsel represented that Collins could appear

1 The parties dispute whether we review the alleged error under the

constitutional harmless error standard or the harmless error
standard. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶¶ 11-12 (we review
preserved constitutional trial errors for constitutional harmless
error and preserved nonconstitutional trial errors for harmless
error). Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion or deprive Dockins of his right to present a defense,
we need not resolve this dispute.

3
the following morning, so the court continued the trial to the next

day to accommodate her.

¶9 Early the next morning, however, Collins texted defense

counsel’s investigator that she was not willing to come to court due

to ongoing issues with her son. Defense counsel requested, and the

court agreed, to allow Collins to testify by Webex. But Collins did

not respond to any attempts by counsel or the court to contact her.

¶ 10 Eventually, defense counsel requested a mistrial. She argued

that Collins was an essential witness and made an offer of proof

regarding her testimony. The prosecutor objected, noting that the

trial had already been continued once before because of Collins and

that Collins had twelve prior failures to appear in her own criminal

cases. The prosecutor said she had “zero confidence . . . regardless

of a mistrial that [Collins] w[ould] actually show up on a subpoena.”

The court granted the mistrial, reasoning that there appeared to be

a “true emergency,” which was not the product of any of the parties’

or the court’s actions, and that “there’s no question that she’s a

substantial material witness.”

¶ 11 Dockins’ second trial began on November 28, 2022. Collins

appeared by Webex that morning, despite having been subpoenaed

4
to appear in person, and the court told her to appear in person at

8:30 or 9 a.m. the following day. Again, the prosecution presented

its entire case and rested at the end of the first day of trial.

¶ 12 By 9:52 a.m. on November 29, Collins had not yet appeared,

so defense counsel moved for a second mistrial. Counsel argued

that denying the motion for a mistrial would be extremely

prejudicial to Dockins because it would essentially deny him a

defense. The court delayed ruling on the motion to allow Collins

more time to appear, particularly given that it had snowed the night

before. But by 10:30 a.m., Collins had still not appeared or

contacted anyone to explain her absence.

¶ 13 Defense counsel supplemented her prior offer of proof

regarding Collins’ anticipated testimony, stating that Collins would

testify that she hired Dockins to do remodeling work at her house in

Colorado Springs from August 26-29, 2020, when she was

scheduled to be in Las Vegas; she picked Dockins up from his home

in Lochbuie on August 26, drove him to her home in Colorado

Springs, and then left for Las Vegas; Dockins was “still at her

house” on August 29 when she returned; and at some point that

day, Dockins’ girlfriend picked him up.

5
¶ 14 The prosecutor objected to the court declaring a mistrial,

arguing that Dockins could establish his whereabouts through his

mother’s testimony because they lived in the same house at that

time, his girlfriend’s testimony because she picked him up from

Colorado Springs, or his own testimony. The prosecutor also

argued that Collins’ behavior indicated that “she ha[d] no intention

of complying with court orders or appearing before this [c]ourt.”

Based on the prosecutor’s record, the absence of any

communication from Collins, and the procedural history of the

case, the court denied the motion for a mistrial.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Dockins’ Second Motion for a Mistrial

¶ 15 Dockins contends that the district court erred by denying his

second motion for a mistrial because identity was the central issue

at trial, and his ability to present an alibi witness was critical for

his defense. For three reasons, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Dockins’ request for a mistrial.

¶ 16 First, we are not persuaded that Collins’ anticipated testimony

was probative of Dockins’ whereabouts at the time the charged

crimes were committed. We acknowledge that Collins’ testimony

6
that she drove Dockins to Colorado Springs on August 26 would

have made it somewhat less likely that Dockins was in Lochbuie

early the following morning. But the offer of proof was not specific

regarding what time Collins drove Dockins to Colorado Springs and,

more importantly, did not account for Dockins’ whereabouts at

1 a.m. on August 27. After Collins dropped Dockins off at her

house in Colorado Springs, she took a trip to Las Vegas and did not

return until August 29.

¶ 17 So, while Collins may have been able to account for Dockins’

whereabouts at some point in time on August 26 and at another

point in time on August 29, she could not provide an alibi for

Dockins at the time of the charged offenses. And it is certainly

plausible for Dockins to have made it back to Lochbuie from

Colorado Springs between some unspecified time on August 26 and

1 a.m. on August 27. See People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235,

1238 (Colo. 1989) (“The defense of alibi has been defined as ‘[a]

defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in a different

place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to

render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.’” (quoting Black’s

Law Dictionary 66 (5th ed. 1979))) (emphases added); see also

7
People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921, 927 (Colo. App. 2003) (affirming the

trial court’s rejection of a theory of defense instruction claiming the

defendant was elsewhere during the crime when the defendant did

not present evidence showing he was in a different place at the

relevant time).

¶ 18 Second, there were other ways in which Dockins could have

presented his alibi defense — at least to the same extent that

Collins’ testimony would have been probative of that defense. For

example, Dockins could have (1) questioned his mother, who had

been called as a prosecution witness and testified that Dockins was

at her house on August 26 in the early afternoon,2 or (2) presented

his girlfriend’s testimony that she picked him up from Lochbuie on

August 29. In addition, Dockins had ample opportunity to

challenge Officer Castillo’s identification and the balance of the

evidence presented against him. As a result, Dockins was not

2 Although Dockins could have relied on his mother’s testimony

that he left her house sometime on August 26, we note that she
also testified that she thought Dockins “came back for awhile” and
“was there when [she] went to bed” sometime between midnight and
3 a.m. This testimony underscores our conclusion that Collins
could not provide Dockins with a true alibi because of her inability
to account for Dockins’ whereabouts at the time the charged crimes
were committed.

8
deprived of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

See People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 93 (“A defendant’s right to

present a defense is violated only where the defendant was denied

virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution

evidence.” (citing Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo.

2009))).

¶ 19 Third, denying the mistrial was justified by the procedural

history of the case and Collins’ repeated failures to appear. The

court had previously continued the trial twice and declared a

mistrial once to accommodate the same witness. By the time

Dockins requested his second mistrial, the prosecution had

presented and rested its case twice. Had the court granted another

mistrial, the prosecution would have had to present its case a third

time after yet further delay in the proceedings. See People v.

Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 697 (Colo. 2010) (“The months invested in

preparing for the trial, and the burdens already placed on the lives

of witnesses, should not be lightly tossed aside once the trial has

begun.”); cf. People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983) (that

the “mistrial motion was made at the very outset of the trial, before

the expenditure of time and effort in the presentation of testimony

9
and evidence to the jury” favored granting a mistrial), overruled on

other grounds by West v. People, 2015 CO 5. And given Collins’

historic behavior and her lack of communication with the court or

counsel, it is speculative whether she would have shown up if

another mistrial had been granted. See People v. Marsh, 396 P.3d

1, 14 (Colo. App. 2011) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying a continuance where defendant could not establish a

reasonable probability that the witness would ever be available to

testify), aff’d, 2017 CO 10M; People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206,

1213 (Colo. 1987) (a defendant’s constitutional rights were not

violated where a defense witness left the jurisdiction after being

subpoenaed and the witness’ unavailability was not due to the

prosecution or the court).

¶ 20 Considering all these circumstances, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dockins’

second motion for a mistrial and that “the type of substantial

prejudice that requires a mistrial was absent” here. People v.

Williams, 2012 COA 165, ¶ 23; see also Grant, ¶ 12; Cousins, 181

P.3d at 373.

10
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 21 Dockins contends that the district court erred when it allowed

the prosecutor to commit misconduct during opening and closing

arguments. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 22 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096

(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Second, if the conduct was improper, we decide whether it warrants

reversal under the proper standard of review. Id.

¶ 23 While prosecutors can use every legitimate means to bring

about a just conviction, they have a duty to avoid using improper

methods designed to obtain an unjust result. Domingo-Gomez v.

People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005). We evaluate claims of

improper argument in the context of the argument as a whole and

in light of the evidence before the jury. People v. McMinn, 2013 COA

94, ¶ 60.

¶ 24 If the defendant objected at trial, we review the trial court’s

ruling for a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice and a

11
denial of justice.” People v. Camarigg, 2017 COA 115M, ¶ 39

(quoting People v. Garner, 2015 COA 175, ¶ 26). If the defendant

failed to object at trial, we review for plain error. Id. “To constitute

plain error, prosecutorial misconduct must be flagrant or glaringly

or tremendously improper, and it must so undermine the

fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.” McMinn, ¶ 58.

B. “I Believe That I Have Proven”

¶ 25 During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury,

This is your opportunity to — dig into the facts
that you heard, into the physical documents
you have and then, look at the law that he just
provided you and make sure that I met my
burden. If I did not meet my burden, you will
find Eric Dockins not guilty. That’s your duty
as a juror; however, I’m up here and I believe
that I have proven —

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected, arguing that

“[c]ounsel’s belief is irrelevant,” and the district court sustained the

objection.

¶ 26 The prosecutor rephrased, “I have met my burden beyond a

reasonable doubt of the two counts that I charged [Dockins] with.”

But because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s

12
rephrased statement, we will not consider this alleged error further.

See People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA 69, ¶ 101 (declining to consider

alleged error where prosecutor rephrased the comment and defense

counsel requested no further relief); People v. Douglas, 2012 COA

57, ¶ 65 (declining to consider alleged error where court sustained

objection and defense counsel requested no further relief).

C. “Uncontested Facts”

¶ 27 During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, “There

are several uncontested facts here. The first one is that [Dockins]

does not have a driver’s license and he hasn’t for the last . . . seven

years.” Counsel objected to the prosecutor’s “characterization of

uncontested facts.” The court viewed “this as [the prosecutor’s]

argument that there’s uncontested facts” but reminded the jurors

they were to “determine what the facts are.”

¶ 28 The prosecutor rephrased, “I believe it’s uncontested, based

upon Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 8.” The prosecutor summarized Exhibit

8, which was a video of Dockins twice admitting he did not have a

license, and Exhibit 6, which was Dockins’ Department of Motor

Vehicle (DMV) record, reflecting that his license had been revoked

13
since 2015. Then the prosecutor stated, “So, that’s the basis for

why I believe this is uncontested.”

¶ 29 Dockins contends that these comments improperly conveyed

the prosecutor’s personal opinion to the jury. True, a prosecutor’s

expression of personal opinion or belief as to the guilt of the

defendant or the truth or falsity of witness testimony is improper.

Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. But when viewed in context,

the prosecutor’s statements did not reveal her personal opinion

about the evidence but instead amounted to an argument that

certain facts should be viewed by the jury as uncontested based on

the admitted evidence. Because the statements were properly

tethered to the evidence — indeed, the prosecutor walked the jury

through the two exhibits on which she based her argument — we

do not see any impropriety. See People v. Rogers, 220 P.3d 931,

938 (Colo. App. 2008) (a prosecutor’s statements about what “the

People believe” or what “we believe” had been proved, when tied to

specific evidence, was not improper), overruled in part on other

grounds by Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6.

14
D. “I Charged Mr. Dockins”

¶ 30 During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “You’re here

because I charged Mr. Dockins with two counts: [v]ehicular eluding

and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint.” Defense counsel did not object.

The prosecutor then reviewed the elements of each charge with the

jury. Similarly, after discussing the evidence that was presented,

the prosecutor said, “I charged [Dockins] with [v]ehicular [e]luding

and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint. I’ve met each and every one of

those elements beyond a reasonable doubt and I am standing up

here asking that you find him guilty.” Again, defense counsel did

not object.

¶ 31 Dockins contends that by “[r]epeatedly noting that she,

personally, charged Mr. Dockins with the crimes,” the prosecutor

insinuated she had more knowledge about the case than did the

jury. Although a prosecutor “cannot intimate that she has personal

knowledge of evidence unknown to the jury,” Domingo-Gomez, 125

P.3d at 1049, we discern no reversible misconduct here, see People

v. Sauser, 2020 COA 174, ¶ 80. Although the prosecutor’s

comments irrelevantly informed the jury that she was the

prosecutor who charged Dockins, they did not suggest that the case

15
had gone through a special screening process or imply that

additional evidence supporting guilt existed. See Domingo-Gomez,

125 P.3d at 1049. The jury knew Dockins had been charged with

and was being tried for the two crimes the prosecutor identified.

And the prosecutor’s statements bookended her discussion of the

elements of each offense and the evidence that was presented to

prove each element. See Rogers, 220 P.3d at 938. Under the

totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the statements were

not flagrant or glaringly or tremendously improper. See McMinn,

¶ 58; People v. Walters, 148 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“During closing argument, a prosecutor has wide latitude and may

refer to the strength and significance of the evidence, conflicting

evidence, and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

evidence.”).

E. “I Am Telling You It Was Dockins”

¶ 32 The prosecutor made two almost identical statements during

opening statement and closing argument. During opening, the

prosecutor told the jury,

[T]his entire case will come down [to], was it
Eric Dockins on that motorcycle? And at the
end of this trial, I will tell you that yes, it was

16
and I believe that you should find [Dockins]
guilty of [e]luding Officer Castillo that night
and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint, because he did
not have an active driver’s license at that time.

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not object.

¶ 33 Similarly, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated,

“What’s in dispute here is that it was Eric Dockins. And I am up

here telling you that it was Eric Dockins . . . .” This time, defense

counsel objected. The court overruled the objection but reminded

the jurors that closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecutor

reiterated, “The only thing that’s in dispute here is the Defendant’s

identity,” and then recounted the evidence that had been presented

to establish Dockins’ identity.

¶ 34 Dockins contends that the prosecutor’s statements improperly

conveyed her personal opinion that Dockins was guilty. We do not

endorse the prosecutor’s language, which certainly risked conveying

to the jury her personal opinion that Dockins was the person on the

motorcycle who committed the charged offenses. See

Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. But we see neither a gross

abuse of discretion by the district court in overruling defense

counsel’s objection during closing argument nor flagrant or

17
glaringly or tremendously improper conduct by the prosecutor in

opening statement. See Camarigg, ¶ 39; McMinn, ¶ 58.

¶ 35 Prosecutors have “wide latitude in the language and

presentation style used” to convey their arguments.

Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048. And “because arguments

delivered in the heat of trial are not always perfectly scripted,

reviewing courts accord prosecutors the benefit of the doubt when

their remarks are ambiguous or simply inartful.” People v. Samson,

2012 COA 167, ¶ 30. Although inartful, we view the prosecutor’s

comments as oratorical embellishments meant to convey to the jury

that the evidence of identity could lead to only one conclusion —

that Dockins was the offender — rather than an invitation for the

jury to jettison its factfinding responsibility and rely on the

prosecutor’s opinion to convict. See People v. Carter, 2015 COA

24M-2, ¶ 70 (“A prosecutor may ordinarily ‘employ rhetorical

devices and engage in oratorical embellishment and metaphorical

nuance.’”) (citation omitted). In the context of the argument as a

whole, and in light of the strong evidence of identity before the jury,

we perceive no error. See id. at ¶ 71.

18
IV. Dockins’ DMV Record

¶ 36 Dockins contends that the district court erred by admitting

evidence of a prior DUR conviction contained in Dockins’ DMV

record as other act evidence under CRE 404(b). We disagree.

A. Driving Under Restraint

¶ 37 A person commits DUR if they drive a motor vehicle on any

highway of the state with the knowledge that their license or

privilege to drive is under restraint. § 42-2-138(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

“Knowledge” is “actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever

source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a

reasonable person to be aware that such person’s license or

privilege to drive was under restraint.” § 42-2-138(4)(a). “Restraint”

is “any denial, revocation, or suspension of a person’s license or

privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this state or another state.”

§ 42-2-138(4)(b).

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 38 CRE 404(b) provides that evidence of “any other crime, wrong,

or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity

with the character” but may be admissible “for another purpose,

19
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” CRE

404(b)(1)-(2).

¶ 39 Even so, the admissibility of other act evidence must be

analyzed under the four-part test set forth in People v. Spoto, 795

P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990). Such evidence is admissible if (1) the

evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is logically

relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the prohibited

intermediate inference that the defendant was acting in conformity

with his bad character; and (4) the probative value of the evidence

is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Id. at 1318.

¶ 40 A trial court has considerable discretion when determining the

admissibility of evidence. People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 17. We

review a court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People

v. Sims, 2019 COA 66, ¶ 44. A court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it

misapplies the law. Id.

20
C. Additional Background

¶ 41 Before trial, the prosecution provided written notice of its

intent to introduce Dockins’ DMV record under CRE 404(b) to

establish that Dockins’ license had been under restraint since 2015

and that he was aware of that fact. Defense counsel filed a written

objection arguing that the DMV record contained “mostly irrelevant

and prejudicial information.”

¶ 42 During a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor offered to

redact significant portions of the DMV record but did not agree to

redact the reason for a 2016 conviction: “Drove

(Motor/Off-Highway) Vehicle When License Under Restraint

(Suspended).” The prosecutor argued that the information was

relevant to establish that Dockins knew his license was restrained,

not just that he did not have one. Defense counsel objected

because the conviction description showed the jury that Dockins

had previously been convicted of the crime he was charged with in

this case and was not necessary because it was cumulative of other

evidence of Dockins’ knowledge. The court ruled that “given the

redactions that have occurred and the relevance of the certified

21
document, the [c]ourt would find that any 401, 403 issues have

been resolved through the redactions.”

¶ 43 At trial, the prosecutor moved to admit the redacted DMV

record based on the court’s previous ruling and asked the court to

give the jury a limiting instruction. The court admitted the exhibit

and told the jury,

Now, ladies and gentlemen, you’re about to
hear or see evidence regarding [Dockins’]
driving record. This evidence is admissible for
the particular purpose of demonstrating
[Dockins’] identity and that [Dockins] knew his
license was revoked. It may only be used as
evidence for the purpose of showing [Dockins’]
identity, knowledge and motive. Such
evidence must not be considered for any other
purpose and is not admissible to prove the
character of [Dockins] in order to show that he
acted in conformity with that character.

¶ 44 Officer Castillo then testified that the DMV record

(1) contained a photo of Dockins, who was the person the officer

saw on the motorcycle; (2) showed that Dockins had been served

with notice that his license was under restraint; and (3) reflected

that Dockins’ license had not been reinstated since it was originally

revoked.

22
¶ 45 There was no testimony about the prior DUR conviction.

During closing argument, however, the prosecutor reviewed the

DMV record with the jury and explained, “You can also see in the

[c]onviction section that there is a prior [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint

conviction and that’s to show that Eric Dockins knew he did not

have a valid driver’s license and that was in fact because he was

revoked at the time.”

D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting
Evidence of Dockins’ Prior DUR Conviction

¶ 46 Dockins contends that the district court erred by admitting

evidence of his prior DUR conviction because it served only to

inform the jury that Dockins had been previously convicted of the

same crime and to encourage them to convict based on that prior

bad act. Dockins further contends that the court’s limiting

instruction did not mitigate this prejudice. We are not persuaded.

¶ 47 There appears to be little dispute that the first three Spoto

prongs were met. The evidence related to whether Dockins knew

his license was under restraint, which is an essential element of a

DUR charge. See Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 464 (Colo. 2009)

(the first Spoto prong is met if the purpose for which the prior act

23
evidence is offered is somehow probative of an ultimate or

intermediate fact); People v. Boulden, 2016 COA 109, ¶ 8

(“Knowledge is an essential element of the crime of driving under

restraint.”). The evidence made it more likely than not that Dockins

knew his license was under restraint. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at

464-65 (the second Spoto prong is satisfied if “the prior act evidence

has any tendency to make the existence of the material fact more or

less probable than without the evidence”); CRE 401. And the

prosecution offered the evidence to prove Dockins’ knowledge,

which is independent of the inference that Dockins acted in

conformity with his bad character. See People v. Jones, 2013 CO

59, ¶ 16 (the third Spoto prong is satisfied so long as the logically

relevant evidence achieves its purpose other than through an

impermissible inference); People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1080

(Colo. 1994) (“The third prong of the Spoto test does not demand

the absence of the inference but merely requires that the proffered

evidence be logically relevant independent of that inference.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that the prior DUR conviction satisfies the

first three Spoto prongs.

24
¶ 48 The parties focus on the fourth Spoto prong, which asks

whether “the probative value of the evidence is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Spoto, 795 P.2d at

1318; see CRE 403. “[U]nfair prejudice within the meaning of [CRE

403] still refers only to ‘an undue tendency on the part of the

admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper

basis’ and does not mean prejudice that results from the legitimate

probative force of the evidence.” People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043

(Colo. 2002) (citation omitted). We consider the following factors

when analyzing the fourth prong: the importance of the material

fact for which the evidence is offered and whether it is disputed, the

chain of inferences necessary to establish the material fact, the

availability of other proof, and the effectiveness of a limiting

instruction. Vialpando v. People, 727 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1986).

“In deference to the trial court’s discretion, we must assume the

maximum probative value and the minimum unfair prejudice to be

given the evidence.” Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.

¶ 49 The district court determined that the probative value of the

DMV record was not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice in light of the redactions that were made to it. But

25
Dockins contends that the probative value of the prior DUR

conviction was “miniscule” because the prior conviction occurred in

2016, and there was a more recent revocation in 2019.3 While

Dockins concedes that the 2019 revocation was relevant, he asserts

that the reason for the 2016 conviction was not. And even if it was

relevant, Dockins argues it was cumulative of the other evidence

that was also part of the DMV record. We are not persuaded.

¶ 50 The material fact for which this evidence was introduced was

crucial — indeed, knowledge is an element of the offense that the

prosecution was required prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See

§ 42-2-138(1)(a); Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 (we consider “the

importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is

offered”); Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶ 10 (the prosecution has

the burden to “prove every factual element necessary to constitute

the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation omitted).

Although the primary dispute at trial was identity, Dockins did not

admit or stipulate that he knew his license was under restraint at

the relevant time. So the knowledge element remained disputed,

3 We note that Dockins did not raise this specific argument before

the district court.

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and the prosecution had the burden to prove it. See Vialpando, 727

P.2d at 1096 (we consider “whether the fact of consequence for

which the evidence is offered is being disputed”).

¶ 51 Other portions of the DMV record showed that Dockins’

license was under restraint or had not been reinstated since it was

last revoked, but that does not establish that Dockins knew his

license was under restraint. See Boulden, ¶ 10 (“Colorado’s

‘knowledge’ requirement limits punishment to ‘those who are

subjectively aware of circumstances that would lead a responsible

driver to realize his license was under restraint and thus not

continue to drive.’” (quoting People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034, 1039

(Colo. 2000))). Evidence that Dockins had been convicted of driving

while his license was under restraint before, combined with

evidence that his license had not been reinstated since, was highly

probative of the knowledge element. See id.; Vialpando, 727 P.2d at

1096 (we consider “the strength and length of the chain of

inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence”).

¶ 52 By comparison, the other evidence Dockins claims would have

satisfied the prosecution’s burden was not as clear or compelling.

Attached to the DMV record was a “proof of service” form that had

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purportedly been served on Dockins while he was in custody in

2016 and that advised him, “[I]t is unlawful for you to operate a

motor vehicle on any roadway in Colorado.” But the prosecution

redacted the “signature of the person served” box, which contained

an “x with a circle” next to “In Custody,” in order to eliminate any

prejudicial reference to the fact that Dockins was in custody at that

time. Although Officer Castillo testified that Dockins was given

notice, the form does not contain Dockins’ signature or otherwise

reflect that he received it. Thus, as best we can tell, no other part

of the DMV record established Dockins’ knowledge that his license

was under restraint. Compare Boulden, ¶¶ 16-17 (concluding that

the knowledge element of the driving under restraint charge was not

proven by a driving record indicating notice of the suspension had

been mailed with no verification that the defendant received the

notice), with People v. Espinoza, 195 P.3d 1122, 1128 (Colo. App.

2008) (concluding that “the jury could infer that defendant drove

with knowledge that his license had been revoked because he was a

habitual traffic offender”).

¶ 53 Moreover, the court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to

cabin the jury’s use of the evidence before it was admitted. See

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§ 16-10-301(4)(d), C.R.S. 2024 (requiring a limiting instruction);

Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 (we consider “the potential

effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the event of admission”).

We are not persuaded by Dockins’ argument that the instruction

was ineffective because it allowed the jury to use the evidence for

several purposes other than knowledge — including identity.

During trial, Officer Castillo testified that the person in the photo

contained in the DMV record was Dockins and was the same

individual he initially saw standing in the driveway next to the

motorcycle and later saw driving away on the motorcycle. So

“identity” was a proper purpose for which the evidence was

admitted. And defense counsel did not object to using the DMV

record to establish identity in this way or to using a single limiting

instruction for the entire DMV record.

¶ 54 Affording the evidence its maximum probative value and

assuming its minimum unfair prejudice, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of

the prior DUR conviction. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.

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V. Cumulative Error

¶ 55 Dockins contends that, even if the district court’s alleged

individual errors do not require reversal, their cumulative

prejudicial impact does. Because we found no errors, Dockins’

contention necessarily fails. See People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148,

1155 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Cumulative error applies only if the trial

court committed numerous errors; a defendant’s mere assertions of

error are insufficient to warrant reversal.”) (citation omitted).

VI. Disposition

¶ 56 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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