Peo in Interest of KVDW

24CA0811 Peo in Interest of KVDW 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0811
Arapahoe County District Court Nos. 21JV344 & 22JV146
Honorable Victoria Ellen Klingensmith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Kai.V.D.W., Kay.V.D.W., and B.V.D.W., Children,

and Concerning R.V.D.W. and S.V.D.W.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Sarah Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant R.V.D.W.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
S.V.D.W.
¶1 In this consolidated dependency and neglect proceeding,

S.V.D.W. (mother) and R.V.D.W. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with

Kai.V.D.W., Kay.V.D.W., and B.V.D.W. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2021, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services (Department) became involved with the family following

concerns about mother’s substance abuse. Reports detailed that

mother left the children in father’s care for hours at a time even

though father was not able to lift the children and was frequently

fatigued due to his ongoing health issues. Based upon these

concerns, the Department initiated a petition in dependency and

neglect for the children, Kai.V.D.W. and Kay.V.D.W.

¶3 The parents admitted the allegations in the petition and the

children were adjudicated dependent and neglected. The juvenile

court then adopted a treatment plan for the parents. While the

case was pending, mother gave birth to B.V.D.W., who was born

substance exposed. A case was opened related to B.V.D.W. The

parents admitted the allegations in the petition, the child was

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adjudicated, and treatment plans were entered for the parents in

that case.

¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights.

After a five-day hearing spanning seven months, the court granted

the motion.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. A determination of the

proper legal standard to be applied in a case and the application of

that standard to the particular facts of the case are questions of law

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that we review de novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020

CO 11, ¶ 31.

¶7 However, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings and

conclusions when they have record support. Id. at ¶ 32; see also

A.M., ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses as well as the

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, and the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it are within the

court’s discretion. A.M., ¶ 15.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶8 The parents assert the juvenile court erred by finding the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and

reunite them with the children. We discern no basis for reversal.

A. Relevant Law

¶9 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), a county department of human services

must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and families.

§§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2024. Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care”

to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

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¶ 10 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other services,

including mental health and drug treatment, must also be provided

if the county has sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 11 The juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support a parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed

to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining

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whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 12 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination (based on those findings) as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Mother’s Arguments

¶ 13 Mother asserts the Department failed to provide reasonable

efforts in two ways — namely, that the Department (1) failed to

accommodate mother’s known disabilities and (2) failed to provide

her with domestic violence services. We discern no basis for

reversal.

1. Accommodation for Mother’s Issues

¶ 14 Mother argues that the Department refused to make

accommodations for her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and

complex trauma diagnoses and therefore failed in its duty to provide

reasonable efforts.

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¶ 15 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts, but that the parents needed to engage and did

not and there was “only so much that the Department can do when

the parents aren’t ready to address the underlying issues” that

warranted the Department’s intervention. There is record support

for the court’s findings.

¶ 16 Shortly before the termination hearing, mother filed a motion

asserting she had qualifying disabilities under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) and requested accommodations. The

Department and guardian ad litem did not dispute mother’s

diagnoses but refuted that the diagnoses qualified for protections

under the ADA. The court held a contested hearing on the motion.

The court ultimately denied the motion. The court concluded, as

relevant here, that the evidence did not show mother’s symptoms

limit one or more major life activities. In other words, mother’s

diagnoses were not so severe that they affected her ability to

execute her treatment plan objectives, and the Department was

already providing most of mother’s requested accommodations.

¶ 17 Mother appears to assert that, regardless of the court’s

findings, the Department knew she had a substantial impairment

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and failed to accommodate it in her treatment plan. However, the

record reveals that the Department was already providing most of

the general recommendations suggested by mother’s expert based

on her diagnoses and provided additional services where needed in

its efforts to engage mother in her treatment plan. For example,

many of the accommodations centered around repeated reminders

of meetings and appointments, simplifying complex instructions in

writing or verbally, and being consistent on follow through with

meetings and services. The record supports that when mother’s

communication with the caseworker lapsed, the caseworker would

attempt to call, text, email, and visit the home unannounced to

regain contact.

¶ 18 Additionally, the Department provided three dual-diagnosis

evaluation referrals for mother, one of which was closed for lack of

engagement and the other two resulting in recommendations for

treatment. Mother briefly engaged in treatment after the third

referral but was later discharged from the program for failure to

engage.

¶ 19 To address her trauma, the Department also provided mother

with a list of trauma-informed therapists and allowed mother to

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select her provider. Mother did so but was discharged shortly

thereafter for failure to engage, despite the caseworker’s efforts to

ensure mother had recorded the appointment times in her phone

and planner.

¶ 20 When mother reported anxiety surrounding urinalysis (UA)

testing, the Department offered her mouth swabs. Despite this,

mother continued to miss most of her substance use tests, once

going ten months without providing any tests at all. At the time of

the termination hearing, mother had not provided any UAs for three

months.

¶ 21 Although mother lived across the street from the testing

facility, the Department provided bus passes to assist with

transportation to the facility. When mother did complete her UAs,

she was often positive for illicit substances.

¶ 22 Mother further argues the Department significantly delayed in

providing her a life skills worker referral. However, the record

reveals it was mother’s failure to engage that prevented her from

taking advantage of that service.

¶ 23 The caseworker made a referral for a life skills worker a month

after mother initially requested one. However, mother failed to

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engage with the life skills worker until five months after the referral

and was later discharged from the service for lack of engagement.

¶ 24 The record reveals that it was mother’s unwillingness to

engage in the services and treatment, and not the Department’s

lack of reasonable efforts or accommodations, that prevented her

from successfully completing her treatment plan. A.V., ¶ 12.

2. Domestic Violence Services

¶ 25 Mother argues that the Department also failed in its duty to

make reasonable efforts because it failed to provide or include

domestic violence services in her treatment plan objectives. Even

assuming error, we discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 26 At the beginning of the cases, the juvenile court found that

domestic violence was not a concern. When it later arose, referrals

for domestic violence services were provided but neither parent

engaged. But we acknowledge that the record reveals that domestic

violence was described as a concern when these cases started and

that the treatment plans were not initially crafted to specifically

address those concerns.

¶ 27 For example, in a 2018 case, domestic violence was among the

primary concerns that led to Department involvement. The

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caseworker testified that when that case closed, the Department’s

domestic violence concerns were mitigated. But the petitions in

both cases here identify domestic violence concerns.

¶ 28 Mother later alleged domestic violence was occurring in the

home. Despite this, the parents’ treatment plans were never

amended. The caseworker testified that the Department was

concerned that adding additional components to the parents’

treatment plans — when they were already struggling to engage —

would overwhelm them. Therefore, the goal was that the parents

could address domestic violence via existing mental health

components.

¶ 29 But despite the treatment plans not being amended, the

caseworker repeatedly offered domestic violence resources to

mother. She further attempted to coordinate multiple meetings

between mother and a domestic violence program liaison. Mother

repeatedly declined the resources and reported that those services

were not needed and that she felt safe in the home. Thus, she

canceled all related scheduled meetings. Additionally, family time

services and monthly contacts with the Department were offered

separately to each parent. The caseworker ultimately testified she

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did not believe adding a domestic violence component to the

treatment plan would have made the plan look any different.

¶ 30 Furthermore, as described above, substantial concerns

surrounding mother’s substance abuse and mental health remained

at the time of termination. As mother admits, she struggled to

engage and had largely failed to make progress in almost every

other component of her treatment plan.

¶ 31 So, if the failure to include domestic violence treatment in the

parents’ treatment plan was error, it was not reversible error.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern no reversible

error in the court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable

efforts. My.K.M., ¶ 33

C. Father’s Arguments

¶ 32 Father asserts that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts because it did not assist with releases of

information, providing a phone, family time, and father’s illness.

¶ 33 The juvenile court found that the Department had provided

reasonable efforts, that the parents failed to engage, and that the

same issues that caused the Department’s involvement remained at

the time of termination. The record supports the court’s findings.

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¶ 34 Though father argues that the Department failed to assist him

in signing necessary releases of information as required by his

treatment plan, the record contradicts this. The caseworker

provided, and father signed, a release of information allowing the

Department to speak with father’s initial mental health provider.

However, the release was a standard form from the Department,

and the treatment provider refused to accept it; the provider

required clients to sign a specific release of information. Therefore,

father had to sign the release through his provider to allow the

caseworker to speak with the provider. The caseworker followed up

with father, his counsel, and the treatment provider to confirm

whether he had signed the treatment-specific release of information,

but it was never completed.

¶ 35 When father later switched providers, he failed to sign a

release of information until weeks before the termination hearing.

The caseworker reached out to the provider after obtaining the

release, but never received a response. Ultimately, the caseworker

was never able to confirm whether father received any mental

health treatment. Notably, father does not argue he was engaged in

or successfully compliant with his mental health treatment.

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¶ 36 Father next asserts that the Department should have provided

him with a phone and that the Department inappropriately

contacted him through mother.

¶ 37 First, father cites to no law, and we are aware of none, that

would require the Department to provide him with a phone.

¶ 38 Next, while the caseworker did testify that throughout much of

the case she used a single phone number to speak to both parents,

it was because the parents shared a phone. After father got his own

number, it was difficult to remain in contact with him as he went

through six phone numbers in less than a year without timely

notifying the caseworker of the number change. When father was

unresponsive, the caseworker would further attempt to reach him

via phone calls, texts, emails, and unannounced visits.

¶ 39 Additionally, father argues that the Department should have

provided him with one-on-one family time and assisted him in

providing alternative healthy foods during family time. Notably, the

record is devoid of any requests from father to split family time or

assist with obtaining healthy food.

¶ 40 While the Department never split the children’s visits

individually, the Department did facilitate some visits where the

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older two children would visit father and then the youngest child

would have an individual visit. Father’s own expert witness also

testified that it would be important for a parent to demonstrate the

ability to balance the needs of all children simultaneously. And,

while the Department did not help with obtaining healthier food for

the children during family time, the family had food assistance.

¶ 41 Finally, father argues that the Department failed to provide

appropriate assistance with his ongoing illness. However, father

does not describe what additional assistance was needed, other

than arguing he should have been provided “more assistance.”

¶ 42 The record reveals father was provided assistance that could

have aided him amid his ongoing medical issues, but he failed to

engage with or take advantage of those services.

¶ 43 At the beginning of the case, father reported he was connected

with the appropriate medical providers. At some point in the case,

father disengaged from medical treatment. When father requested

to reconnect with medical providers, father was provided a life skills

worker, who could have assisted in finding providers and

scheduling appointments. Father was ultimately discharged from

the service for failure to engage.

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¶ 44 Additionally, while father’s UA testing facility was across the

street from his home, he was provided bus passes to assist in

transportation to UAs. When father reported anxiety about taking

UAs, he was offered mouth swabs as an alternative. Yet his

engagement with the substance testing component of his treatment

plan remained nearly nonexistent.

¶ 45 The caseworker regularly inquired of father regarding any

potential barriers to treatment, and father reported no barriers that

were not ultimately addressed.

¶ 46 The record reveals that father’s unwillingness to engage, and

not the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts, prevented him from

successfully completing his treatment plan. A.V., ¶ 12.

IV. Reasonable Time

¶ 47 The parents both assert that the juvenile court erred when it

found they could not become fit parents within a reasonable period

of time. We disagree. Mother characterizes her argument that she

could have become fit within a period of six months as a less drastic

alternative; however, we interpret this as a reasonable time

argument and therefore address it as such.

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A. Relevant Law

¶ 48 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable parental

care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and

safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and

mental needs and conditions. Id.

¶ 49 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition. Id. at ¶ 75. Where a parent has

made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the juvenile court

need not give the parent additional time to comply. See People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 34; see also People in Interest of

V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even

“increased compliance” over the course of a case may not justify

additional time).

¶ 50 A “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time, and it must be

determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

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emotional conditions and needs. A.N-B., ¶ 29. What constitutes a

reasonable time is fact specific and varies from case to case. Id. at

¶ 40. However, where, as here, the child is under the age of six

years old, the court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions, which require the court to place the child

in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

B. Mother’s Arguments

¶ 51 The juvenile court found that the parents were unfit, that their

conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable

period of time, and that termination was appropriate based on the

children’s needs. The court further found that mother was not in

compliance with her treatment plan and the same concerns that

involved the Department with the family remained at the time of

termination. There is record support for the court’s findings.

¶ 52 Mother’s arguments rely largely on her assertion that she was

not provided reasonable efforts. We decline to address that

assertion here because we have addressed it in depth above.

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¶ 53 However, mother also argues that because she had

successfully completed a treatment plan once before, she could do

so again if provided reasonable additional time.

¶ 54 True, mother previously successfully completed a treatment

plan in a prior case. However, the caseworker testified here that

she was concerned that the changes seen in that case were not

sustainable because the current cases opened shortly after the prior

case’s closure and were opened due to similar concerns about

mother’s substance use.

¶ 55 The caseworker also believed mother would need an additional

year of active engagement in her treatment plan to become a fit

parent. Mother had not shown consistent engagement with most of

her treatment plan at any point in the case. Most notably, she

continued to use illicit substances and failed to engage in

therapeutic services, when substance abuse and mental health

concerns were among the primary reasons the current cases had

opened.

¶ 56 We recognize that, as mother asserts, her family time with the

children was reported to be largely positive. However, at the time of

termination, the family time coach would not recommend

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unsupervised visits due to ongoing concerns about mother’s

sobriety, the sometimes chaotic nature of visits, and mother’s

failure to bring necessary supplies to family time.

¶ 57 At the time of the first termination, the older two children’s

case had been open for two years and the younger child’s case for

over a year and a half. The caseworker testified that the children

could not wait an additional six months to a year for mother to

become fit and that the children needed the permanency and

stability that adoption would provide.

¶ 58 Because the record supports the court’s determination, we

may not disturb the judgment.

C. Father’s Arguments

¶ 59 As described above, the juvenile court found that the parents

were unfit, that their conduct or condition was unlikely to change

within a reasonable period of time, and that termination was

appropriate based on the children’s needs. The court further found

that father was not compliant with his treatment plan.

¶ 60 Father argues the court erred when it found he could not

become compliant with his treatment plan within a reasonable time.

He appears to argue that he partially complied with his treatment

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plan because (1) family time visits went well; and (2) he had stable

housing, attended meetings with professionals, communicated with

the Department when able, was receiving unemployment, completed

an evaluation, and participated in UA testing which revealed

primarily marijuana use.

¶ 61 The record reveals father’s arguments either distort his

engagement levels or are refuted by the record.

¶ 62 True, father’s family time was largely described as positive.

However, it was not without concerns. The family time supervisor

testified she was concerned that father focused primarily on the

older two children, while the youngest child was left alone. She was

also concerned about father not being prepared for family time, the

chaotic nature of some visits, and had concerns around the

nutrition of the food brought for the children during family time. At

the time of termination, the family time supervisor was still

recommending supervised family time.

¶ 63 Likewise, father did not consistently have safe and stable

housing. The caseworker testified that, during some home visits,

the condition of the apartment was deplorable and there were

unknown and potentially unsafe persons living in the home with

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the parents. At one point during the case, and again at the time of

the termination, there were concerns about the parents’ facing

eviction from their home.

¶ 64 Father did attend most meetings with the Department, but the

caseworker testified that father was difficult to reach and that she

ultimately did not believe father had been successful in maintaining

communication with the Department.

¶ 65 While father completed an evaluation, he failed to provide the

release of information to allow the Department access to that

evaluation and failed to follow through with any of its

recommendations.

¶ 66 Last, while the UAs father returned were primarily only

positive for marijuana, father missed most of his UA tests. Because

of this, the caseworker testified, she was unable to determine

whether he was sober.

¶ 67 Because the record supports the court’s determination, we

may not disturb the judgment.

V. Disposition

¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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