Parental Responsibilities Concerning RMP

24CA0275 Parental Resp Conc RMP 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0275
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV328
Honorable Elizabeth J. McCarthy, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning R.M.P. and D.J.P., Children,

and Concerning A.B.P.,

Appellant,

and

C.S.O.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Harris and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Warren Domangue, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant

Curtis Law Firm, LLC, Robert V. Salter, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this allocation of parental responsibilities case between

A.B.P. (father) and C.S.O. (mother), father appeals the juvenile

court’s judgment restricting his parenting time with the parties’

twins, R.M.P. and D.J.P. (the children). We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 In November 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated father as

one of the children’s legal parents. Father subsequently moved for

an allocation of parental responsibilities for the children under the

Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, section 14-10-123, C.R.S.

2024.

¶3 As part of temporary orders, the juvenile court granted father

a few hours of unsupervised parenting time once a week, contingent

on completing certain requirements. The court also directed father

to refrain from disparaging mother to or in front of the children;

going to mother’s residence; discussing the case with the children;

and making any promises to the children about future parenting

time.

¶4 In November 2023, the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL),

along with the parties’ attorneys, filed a joint trial management

certificate (JTMC). In it, the GAL expressed serious concerns about

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father’s behavior and its damaging impact on the children’s

emotional development.

¶5 Following an evidentiary hearing on father’s motion, the

juvenile court orally adopted the GAL’s “statements” in the JTMC as

its factual findings. The court also found that (1) mother’s

testimony was credible regarding the parties’ “toxic relationship”;

(2) father “talk[ed] to the children . . . about this case”; and (3) this

was a “high conflict” matter. The court designated mother the

children’s primary residential parent, while father was allocated

eight hours of supervised parenting time every Sunday.

¶6 On January 31, 2024, the juvenile court entered a written

judgment that, for the most part, tracked its oral ruling.

¶7 Father now appeals.

II. Parenting Time

¶8 Father contends that the juvenile court’s decision to restrict

his parenting time lacked sufficient factual findings and that the

record does not support such a restriction. We are not persuaded.

A. Preservation

¶9 We begin by addressing mother’s argument that father’s

contentions are unpreserved because he did not object when the

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juvenile court adopted the GAL’s statements as its factual findings.

She is mistaken. A party does not need to object to a court’s

findings to preserve a challenge to those findings. See In re

Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17; C.R.C.P. 52. Thus, our

review is not precluded on this basis.

B. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 10 A court has broad discretion over parenting time orders, and

we exercise every presumption to uphold its decision. In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. We may

not overturn the court’s decision absent a showing of an abuse of

discretion, meaning that it acted in a manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair manner. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d

326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 11 However, we review de novo whether the court applied the

correct legal standard. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.

¶ 12 A court allocates parenting time in accordance with the child’s

best interests, giving paramount consideration to the child’s safety

and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024; see In re Custody of C.J.S.,

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37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. App. 2001). In making that determination,

the court considers the factors listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a).

While it need not make specific findings on each factor, the record

must indicate that the court considered the pertinent factors. In re

Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 77 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 13 Parents generally have a right to a relationship and reasonable

parenting time with their child. § 14-10-104.5, C.R.S. 2024; Martin,

42 P.3d at 77.

¶ 14 A court cannot restrict parenting time unless it “finds, after a

hearing, that parenting time by the party would endanger the

child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional

development.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d

318, 323 (Colo. 2006). When a court “impos[es] or continu[es] . . . a

parenting time restriction,” it must “enumerate the specific factual

findings supporting the restriction.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).

¶ 15 The determination of what constitutes endangerment is highly

individualized, and we will not disturb a court’s findings on this

issue if they are supported by the record. In re Marriage of

Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26.

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C. Discussion

¶ 16 Father argues that the juvenile court’s factual findings are

inadequate to justify the restriction on his parenting time. We

disagree.

¶ 17 The juvenile court adopted the GAL’s “statements” in the

JTMC as its factual findings. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022

COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (court’s oral findings supplement its written order).

The GAL wrote the following:

• Mother requested that father’s parenting time be

supervised. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) (the parents’

wishes are relevant to the child’s best interests).

• Father sought an equal parenting time arrangement. See

id.

• Father harassed and intimidated mother, including by

following her, yelling at her, parking his RV near her

home, and riding his scooter up and down her street.

See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (the court must consider “all

relevant factors” when determining the child’s best

interests).

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• Father repeatedly disparaged mother in the presence of

the children, which was harmful to the children’s

emotional well-being. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III)

(interaction and interrelationship of the child with their

parents, siblings, and any other person who may

significantly affect the child’s best interests are relevant

to the child’s best interests), (VI) (the ability of the parties

to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact

between the child and the other party is relevant to the

child’s best interests), (VII) (whether the past pattern of

involvement of the parties with the child reflects a

system, time commitment, and mutual support is

relevant to the child’s best interests).

• Father frequently discussed the case with the children,

which “emotionally damage[d]” them. He would promise

them increased parenting time, subject to mother’s

approval, and if she said no, the children would blame

her, creating disappointment and confusion. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (VI)-(VII).

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• While the children were well-adjusted overall, they

displayed behavioral issues at home, likely linked to the

“discord” between the parties. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (IV) (the child’s adjustment to

their home, school, and community is relevant to the

child’s best interests).

• Mother enrolled the children in therapy. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V) (mental and physical health of all

individuals involved is relevant to the child’s best

interests).

• Unlike mother, there were concerns about father’s ability

to encourage a healthy relationship between the children

and mother. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI).

• Although father was clearly devoted to the children, his

inability to manage his anger toward mother and place

the children’s needs over his own was deeply concerning.

See id.

• Mother demonstrated her ability to prioritize the

children’s needs above her own and maintained

cooperation throughout the case. See id.

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• Given father’s behavior, unsupervised parenting time for

him would significantly impair the children’s emotional

development. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (restrictions on

parenting time cannot be imposed unless the court finds

that the parenting time would endanger the child’s

physical health or significantly impair the child’s

emotional development).

¶ 18 So, contrary to father’s argument, those findings are sufficient

to inform us of the basis for the juvenile court’s decision to restrict

his parenting time. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); see also In re Marriage

of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must make

sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear

understanding of the basis of its order.”).

¶ 19 Still, father asserts that the record does not support the

juvenile court’s findings. Again, we disagree.

¶ 20 Mother testified that she wanted father to have eight hours of

supervised parenting time every Sunday, as suggested by the GAL.

Father, for his part, argued for equal parenting time.

¶ 21 Mother testified that the parties’ “toxic relationship,” which

included father’s abuse, led her to relocate to Colorado with the

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then-four-year-old twins in August 2018. Father soon thereafter

moved to Colorado and continued to threaten and harass her. He

sent many foreboding messages to her, including one stating, “I’m

going to be forced to do what I have to do. I can assure you[,] you

will not like how it ends.” She provided a recent photo of his RV

parked near her home, seemingly to intimidate her. She stated that

he rode up and down the street on a scooter, shouting at the house

and asking the children to come to him; the children were upset

and confused about whether they should go, as it was not during

his scheduled parenting time. According to her, those actions

burdened the children with adult issues. And she indicated that he

would often yell at her and call her names in front of the children,

“trying to turn them against [her].”

¶ 22 Mother also testified that his recent behavior frightened her

and that the potential for escalating conflict caused “tremendous

stress” for both her and the children.

¶ 23 Father constantly talked about the case to the children,

sometimes blaming mother for his limited parenting time under the

temporary orders. And the children became upset at her when she

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declined to accommodate his promises about additional parenting

time that deviated from the temporary orders.

¶ 24 When asked about the children’s well-being after unsupervised

parenting time with father, mother reported that they exhibited

anxiety, nightmares, anger, and confusion.

¶ 25 Next, mother testified that the children were thriving in their

small town, surrounded by many friends, and excelling at school.

¶ 26 Mother then testified that she went “over and above to

accommodate parenting time with [father].” She added that her

“goal” was for the children to have a safe and loving relationship

with father. Moreover, she placed the children in therapy.

¶ 27 Therefore, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.

And because the court’s decision to restrict father’s parenting time

is supported by sufficient findings and evidence, we cannot say that

the court abused its broad discretion. See S.Z.S., ¶ 13; see also

Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330; Wenciker, ¶ 26.

¶ 28 Nonetheless, father insists that other evidence compels a

different conclusion. For example, he points to a transcript of a

video visit in October 2023 between himself and the children, which

purportedly shows no instances of endangerment. But this

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argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we

cannot do. See Thorburn, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to

determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom); see also In re Marriage of Kann,

2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in [district] courts to weigh conflicting

evidence.”); In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989)

(appellate court may presume that the district court considered all

of the evidence admitted).

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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