Marriage of Bogenrief

23CA1882 Marriage of Bogenrief 01-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1882
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30924
Honorable Anita M. Schutte, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova,

Appellee,

and

Brett David Bogenrief,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 2, 2025

Márquez Law, Jason A. Márquez, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Brett David Bogenrief, Pro Se
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Brett David

Bogenrief (husband) and Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova (wife),

husband appeals the permanent orders regarding the property

division. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2022, after nearly two years of marriage, wife

filed a petition for dissolution. Following the parties’ separation,

husband remained in the marital residence. The district court

scheduled a permanent orders hearing for March 17, 2023. In the

meantime, the district court issued a temporary order that required

husband to vacate the marital residence by February 28, 2023.

¶3 At the permanent orders hearing, the district court granted

husband’s request for a continuance and then entered a dissolution

decree.

¶4 At the next hearing on August 8, 2023, wife appeared with

counsel, but although husband’s counsel was present, husband

was not. Husband’s counsel explained that husband had texted

that morning saying that he was not going to attend. Husband’s

counsel requested a continuance, which the court denied.

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¶5 Husband’s counsel then moved to withdraw, stating that he

had already sent husband a formal letter outlining his grounds for

withdrawal. The court granted the request. Husband’s counsel

said he would follow up with a written motion to withdraw along

with the letter.

¶6 The district court proceeded with the hearing. A real estate

appraiser and wife testified. At the end, the court issued an oral

ruling dividing the marital estate. As relevant here, the court (1)

awarded wife the marital residence, valued at $410,000, subject to

a mortgage of $391,291, leaving equity of $18,709; and (2) required

husband to pay $2,000 in insurance deductibles incurred because

of damage he caused to the marital residence while residing there.

¶7 Husband’s counsel later filed a written motion to withdraw.

On August 22, 2023, the court granted the motion to withdraw and

issued a written judgment tracking its oral ruling.

¶8 Husband now appeals. Husband’s opening brief violates the

appellate rules, making it difficult for us to understand his

contentions on appeal. Although we construe his briefing broadly,

we may not raise arguments on his behalf. See Arnold v. Brent,

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2024 COA 104, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we have interpreted and

addressed all arguments fairly presented in his briefs to the best of

our ability.

II. Denial of Second Continuance

¶9 Husband contends that the district court erred by denying his

second motion for a continuance. We disagree.

¶ 10 A continuance of a hearing “shall be granted only for good

cause,” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11, meaning that “there are unforeseen

and exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” Miller v.

Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). The burden is on

the moving party to show good cause for a continuance. See In re

Marriage of Lorenzo, 721 P.2d 155, 156 (Colo. App. 1986).

¶ 11 The decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter

entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, and the

court’s decision will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse

of that discretion. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 814

(Colo. App. 2007); see People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies the law. E.B., ¶ 14.

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In determining whether a court abused its discretion, the appellate

court must consider the totality of the circumstances as reflected by

the record. Id.

¶ 12 We conclude that husband failed to establish good cause for a

continuance. On appeal, husband says he could not attend the

August permanent orders hearing because he was living in Canada

and prioritizing his basic needs. However, he did not take any steps

before the hearing to address his inability to attend, such as

requesting a continuance or permission to appear remotely. Thus,

we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny

counsel’s last-minute request for a continuance after husband

failed to appear. See Rodrick, 176 P.3d at 814; see also E.B., ¶ 14.

III. Withdrawal of Counsel

¶ 13 Next, husband contends that the district court erred when it

allowed his counsel to withdraw at the second permanent orders

hearing. We see no reversible error.

¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, husband’s counsel said that

he had previously informed husband of his grounds to withdraw.

He added that the ability to “work together as a team [was]

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obviously . . . unavailable” and that he could not proceed without

husband; he needed a “captive partner and participant.” Husband’s

counsel received a text message from husband a few hours before

the hearing indicating that husband would not appear. The district

court granted husband’s counsel’s oral motion to withdraw.

Husband had another opportunity to object to the withdrawal when

his counsel subsequently filed the written motion to withdraw, but

he did not. The court granted the written motion.

¶ 15 Under these circumstances, we conclude that husband cannot

object now. Cf. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law

Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (arguments not raised in or decided

by the district court will not be addressed for the first time on

appeal).

IV. Property Division

¶ 16 Husband contends that the district court erred by awarding

the marital residence to wife. We are not persuaded.

¶ 17 A district court has great latitude to make an equitable

property division based on the facts and circumstances of each

case, and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an

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abuse of its discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,

¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 18 Here, the district court found that the marital residence was

jointly titled and worth $410,000 at the time of the dissolution

decree. The parties stipulated that the existing mortgage was solely

in wife’s name and had a balance of $391,291. The court ultimately

awarded the residence and the mortgage to wife.

¶ 19 The record supports the district court’s decision. Wife testified

that the marital residence was titled in both parties’ names and

purchased with marital funds during the marriage. The appraiser

testified that the residence had a fair market value of $410,000.

Wife, a foreign national, testified that selling the residence would

result in a net loss due to foreign investment tax implications and

associated selling costs. She requested to keep the residence and

agreed to assume responsibility for the taxes and costs in the event

of a future sale. The evidence showed that husband could not

assume financial responsibility for the mortgage: in his August

2023 financial statement, he averred that he no income. Given

this, we cannot say that the district court erred by allocating the

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home to wife. See Collins, ¶ 19; see also In re Marriage of Amich,

192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (the district court can believe

all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).

¶ 20 Husband also asserts that the district court erred by requiring

him to pay $2,000 in insurance deductibles. We disagree. Wife

testified that upon arriving at the marital residence the day after

husband’s departure, she found it “uninhabitable” due to extensive

water damage resulting from his negligence. She indicated that she

submitted two insurance claims to address the damage. As she

explained, under the “best case scenario,” she was “out of pocket”

$2,000 for the deductibles. Under the “[w]orst case scenario,” the

insurance company could deny coverage for “some or lots of the

damages or the repairs.” Because the record supports the court’s

decision, we will not disturb it. See Collins, ¶ 19.

¶ 21 We decline husband’s invitation to consider certain “exhibits”

because they are not part of the appellate record. See In re

Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Only

facts appearing in the record can be reviewed . . . .”).

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V. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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