Peo in Interest of ST

24CA0730 Peo in Interest of ST 10-24-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0730
San Miguel County District Court No. 24JV30000
Honorable Keri A. Yoder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.T., a Child,

and Concerning R.G.T, III and K.H.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 24, 2024

Amy T. Markwell, County Attorney, W. Herbert McHarg, Special County
Attorney, Telluride, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant R.G.T., III

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant K.H.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.T., III (father)

and K.H. (mother) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating

S.T. (the child) dependent and neglected following a jury trial. We

affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The San Miguel County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect regarding the two-month-old

child. The petition alleged that the Department received reports

that the parents were living in a home with no running water and

that they used substances in the home. The parents agreed to a

short-term safety plan whereby the paternal uncle would supervise

all family time between the parents and the child. A doctor saw the

child shortly after the safety plan was implemented and contacted

the Department with concerns about the child’s low weight and

suspected drug use by mother based on her behavior at the

appointment. Law enforcement later secured and executed a

search warrant on the home where the parents were purportedly

living and, according to the petition, found between seventy-five and

one hundred methamphetamine pipes, evidence of marijuana

distribution, and no running water or sewer services. The parents

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were arrested on drug related charges and child abuse, and the

Department took custody of the child.

¶3 Mother and father demanded a jury trial, which the court held

over two days. After hearing evidence, the jury found that (1)

mother and father mistreated or abused the child or tolerated or

allowed another person to mistreat or abuse the child without

taking steps to stop it; (2) the child lacked proper parental care as a

result of mother’s and father’s acts or failures to act; (3) the child’s

environment was injurious to her welfare; and (4) mother and father

failed or refused to provide the child with proper or necessary

subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary

for her health, guidance, or well-being. See § 19-3-102(1)(a)-(d),

C.R.S. 2024.

II. Drug Test Results

¶4 Both mother and father argue that the juvenile court erred

when it admitted the results of father’s positive urine test for

methamphetamine and the child’s positive hair test for marijuana

as records of regularly conducted activity under CRE 803(6). We

are not persuaded.

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 60. The

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.

¶6 To qualify a document for admission under CRE 803(6), a

proponent must establish several criteria that are not at issue here.

Even if the proponent satisfies these requirements, the court may

still exclude the evidence if “the source of information or the method

or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”

CRE 803(6).

¶7 An error in the admission of evidence is harmless if it does not

affect a substantial right of a party. CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. An

error affects a substantial right if it can be said with fair assurance

that it substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself. People in Interest of R.J., 2019

COA 109, ¶ 22.

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B. Analysis

¶8 At trial, father objected to the admission of the drug test

results because the laboratory directors who testified did not

conduct the testing themselves and because “the record itself did

not purport to describe the chain of custody prior to its arrival.”

After further testimony, during which both laboratory directors

testified that they were the “ultimate supervisors” for everyone

conducting testing in their laboratories and that they had reviewed

the individual results, the court admitted the exhibits showing the

positive test results.

¶9 On appeal, mother argues that the juvenile court erred

because each director had “minimal knowledge” of the specific

samples. But the director of the laboratory that tested the child’s

hair stated that he “reviewed all the data the same as a certifying

scientist . . . that was generated by the lab to ensure that it was

accurate” and the director of the laboratory that tested father’s

urine sample stated that he conducted his own review and found

“no issues with the testing process or any of our internal processes

during the testing of [the] sample.” Mother argues that “it is

unclear what this procedure [of review] entailed and what data was

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reviewed, aside from the quantitative result.” As best we

understand her, mother argues that the lab directors’ “minimal

knowledge” and the “unclear methods” by which they reviewed the

data “indicate[s] a lack of trustworthiness” under CRE 803(6). But

we cannot address this contention because mother didn’t raise it

below. See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Colo.

App. 1998) (declining to address contentions that were not

presented to the juvenile court).

¶ 10 Both parents also contend that the juvenile court erred

because none of the witnesses testified about the “chain of custody”

for the samples. Specifically, they argue that the supervisor at the

collection facility did not personally observe the collection of the

samples. And they assert that the laboratory directors did not

personally verify the chain of custody. We disagree.

¶ 11 The supervisor at the collection facility described the process

by which his company generated unique identifying numbers for

the samples, collected the urine and hair under supervision, sealed

and signed the samples, and sent them out for testing.

Additionally, the directors of the testing laboratories described their

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process of verifying the chain of custody and examining the samples

for tampering and irregularities.

¶ 12 There was no evidence of tampering or lack of authentication.

Thus, the Department was not required to call each witness who

may have handled the samples. See People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d

1192, 1197 (Colo. 1984); see also People v. Smith, 512 P.2d 269,

271 (Colo. 1973) (“When it is only speculation that there was

tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let the jury

determine its weight.”).

¶ 13 Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred when it admitted the

results of father’s and the child’s drug tests, any error was

harmless. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. Recall that the jury found

the child dependent and neglected on four separate grounds,

including that she lacked proper parental care and her environment

was injurious to her welfare. In addition to father’s and the child’s

test results, the jury heard evidence about the parents’ drug use,

their living environment, and care of the child. This evidence also

supported the jury’s verdict.

¶ 14 For example, the officer who executed a search warrant at the

house where the parents purportedly lived testified that he found

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multiple broken and intact methamphetamine pipes, four bags of

individually bagged marijuana with a pile of empty bags next to a

scale, a rifle, and multiple knives. The jury also saw several

pictures of the home taken during the search showing drugs, drug

paraphernalia, and rooms and hallways obstructed by trash and

debris.

¶ 15 Although the parents denied living in the home with the child,

the officer testified that in one bedroom he observed between 100

and 150 dirty diapers and a baby monitor that was still

transmitting a signal. And a family friend testified that she had

seen the parents with the child in the home and that they appeared

to be living there. She further testified that she saw the child

sleeping on a sofa next to a needle. Moreover, the caseworker

testified that both parents were taken into custody following the

search, leaving no one to care for the child.

¶ 16 Mother admitted she used marijuana and alcohol while she

was pregnant and that she had positive tests for methamphetamine

while she was pregnant. And she testified that she continued to

use marijuana while breast feeding. Although father testified that

he had not used methamphetamine in at least twenty years, the

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jury heard testimony from a family friend who said she had used

with father on multiple occasions at his home and as recently as

2021. The family friend testified that mother appeared intoxicated

while caring for the child, and the caseworker had similar concerns

about both parents. Both parents admitted that the water at the

home was not working.

¶ 17 Additionally, the jury heard testimony from the child’s doctor

who testified that the child was not gaining weight at the expected

rate and was diagnosed with “failure to thrive.” The doctor testified

that the child had been seen on January 8 and was to return

frequently for additional weight checks. The caseworker testified

that another appointment was scheduled for January 11, but by the

time the parents were arrested later on that date, they had not

taken the child for that appointment.

¶ 18 Based on this evidence, even without the results of the child’s

hair and father’s urine test, the jury had sufficient evidence to

support the determination that the child was dependent and

neglected.

III. Disposition

¶ 19 We affirm the judgment.

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JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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