Marriage of Matchette

23CA1499 Marriage of Matchette 10-24-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1499
Garfield County District Court No. 22DR73
Honorable Stephen A. Groome, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Michael Thomas Matchette,

Appellee,

and

Rebecca Lynn Matchette,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Yun and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 24, 2024

No Appearance for Appellee

Rebecca Lynn Matchette, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Michael Thomas

Matchette (husband) and Rebecca Lynn Matchette (wife), wife asks

us to set aside the permanent orders. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Husband petitioned to dissolve the parties’ long-term marriage

in April 2022. Both parties proceeded pro se until July 2022, when

wife retained an attorney. Husband retained counsel in September

2022, who represented him for the remainder of the proceedings.

Wife’s counsel moved to withdraw in November 2022, and the court

granted the motion.

¶3 The court held a hearing on temporary orders in March 2023.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the court ordered that “wife

shall have exclusive possession of the [h]ome,” and that husband

“shall pay . . . the regular expenses for the [h]ome.” The court also

awarded wife prospective attorney fees. It ordered husband to pay

$6,000 directly to wife’s counsel, once “he ha[d] confirmation” that

wife had hired an attorney, and ordered wife to pay any balance, if

necessary. The court set a permanent orders hearing for May 31,

2023.

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¶4 Both parties moved to continue the May hearing. The court

granted the motions to continue and reset the permanent orders

hearing for July 10, 2023.

¶5 At the pretrial hearing held on June 29, 2023, wife appeared

pro se and again asked to continue the permanent orders hearing.

She informed the court that she had “found [a lawyer] that would

take the case” and gave the court his name. When the court asked

why the lawyer was not present, wife asserted that husband had

not paid attorney fees as the temporary orders required. Husband’s

counsel told the court that “this [was] the first time [she had] heard

about any attorney.” She asked the court to deny wife’s request for

another continuance, emphasizing that the case had been pending

for more than a year. The court denied wife’s motion to continue

but advised her that a different judicial officer would preside over

the hearing so, if she retained counsel “who actually enter[ed] an

appearance,” and counsel sought “some type of relie[f],” the other

judicial officer would make a decision “after the motion [wa]s filed

and [the lawyer] enter[ed] an appearance.”

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¶6 On the Friday before the Monday permanent orders hearing,

wife filed a pro se motion for additional attorney fees; the first page

of a “representation agreement” from a lawyer, dated June 23,

2023; and two motions to continue the hearing.

¶7 On the day of the hearing, wife again appeared pro se and

asked for a continuance because her “attorney wasn’t able to make

it today.” She explained that she had retained the lawyer on June

23, 2023, and she had asked husband’s counsel and husband to

pay the $6,000 ordered in the temporary orders, but “they did

nothing.” Wife told the court that “after 43 years of marriage, [she]

believe[d] that [she] should have a lawyer,” and that it was her

“desire to have a lawyer represent [her]” at the hearing.

¶8 Husband’s counsel acknowledged that wife gave her the name

of a lawyer on June 29. According to husband’s counsel, husband

called wife’s lawyer, but he did not call husband back. Then

husband’s counsel contacted wife’s lawyer and asked “if he was

going to be representing [wife].” The lawyer responded by asking if

husband’s counsel would agree to a continuance. Husband’s

counsel said no, and she “never heard back from [wife’s lawyer].”

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¶9 The court denied wife’s motion to continue, finding that the

proceeding had been pending “for a long time,” the issues were

“pretty straightforward,” and it was unfair to require husband to

continue paying the mortgage and for wife to “keep living there

basically for free indefinitely.” The permanent orders hearing then

proceeded with wife representing herself.

¶ 10 After hearing evidence, the court made oral rulings dividing

the marital estate and later issued a written order. The court

ordered that wife vacate the marital home by the end of August

2023, that husband place the home on the market, and that the

parties split the proceeds of the sale equally. The court split the

parties’ remaining property roughly equally, assigning each party

one or more vehicles, their own personal effects and bank accounts,

and responsibility for their personal debts. The court ordered a

$4,000 equalization payment to wife to account for certain silver

items awarded to husband. Lastly, the court awarded the parties’

horses to husband, determining that he was likely better able to

find a place to board them and provide consistent care.

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II. Motion to Continue

¶ 11 On appeal, wife contends that we should set aside the

permanent orders and remand the case for a new hearing because

the court denied her motion to continue.

¶ 12 We review a court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse

of discretion. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 13. A

court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unfair, or unreasonable. Id.

¶ 13 In determining whether to grant a continuance, the court

should consider the circumstances of the case, weighing the right of

the party requesting the continuance to a fair hearing against the

prejudice that might result from delay. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d

853, 858 (Colo. 1985); Bithell v. W. Care Corp., 762 P.2d 708, 711

(Colo. App. 1988). The burden to show good cause for a

continuance falls on the party requesting it. In re Marriage of

Lorenzo, 721 P.2d 155, 156 (Colo. App. 1986).

¶ 14 Here, wife had more than three months from the temporary

orders to retain an attorney, yet she made contact with the lawyer

only a couple of weeks before the permanent orders hearing. That

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lawyer never entered an appearance or otherwise indicated to the

court that he intended to represent wife. And although wife told the

court that her lawyer was unable to appear on the date of the

hearing, she never said that the lawyer had agreed to appear on any

other date. The lawyer himself never asked for a continuance.

According to husband’s counsel, no one had paid the lawyer

because he failed to re-contact husband’s counsel after she refused

to agree to a second continuance. Thus, the court had no

assurance that wife had a lawyer who had unconditionally agreed to

represent her, nor did the court have any information about when a

lawyer would be available to appear on wife’s behalf at a

rescheduled hearing.

¶ 15 Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court

abused its broad discretion. The court appropriately weighed the

prejudice to wife of proceeding pro se against the financial prejudice

to husband if the hearing were continued. The court could also

properly consider whether, if it granted a continuance, wife would

appear with counsel at a later date. The court engaged in this

analysis twice, once at the pretrial hearing and again the morning

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of the permanent orders hearing. Both times, the court made the

same findings and reached the same conclusions.

¶ 16 In determining whether a trial court’s decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, the question is not whether we

would have reached a different result. See Churchill v. Univ. of

Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74. Instead, we review the decision only to

ensure “that it was based on credible evidence and that it did not

exceed the bounds of rationally available choices.” Id. (citation

omitted). Because, on this record, the court’s decision not to grant

a second continuance in a case that had been pending for more

than a year was not irrational, we will not substitute our judgment

for that of the trial court.

III. Other Contentions

¶ 17 First, wife appears to argue that the trial judge was biased.

We disagree.

¶ 18 A party asserting bias on the part of the trial judge must

establish that the judge had a “substantial bent of mind against

him or her.” People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988).

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Mere speculative statements and conclusions are insufficient to

satisfy the burden of proof. Id.

¶ 19 To the extent wife relies on the court’s sometimes brusque

comments, we conclude that any comments fall far short of

demonstrating actual bias. See, e.g., Klinck v. Dist. Court, 876 P.2d

1270, 1277 (Colo. 1994) (concluding that the judge’s rude and

accusatory statements were not sufficient evidence of bias). The

court’s comment that wife’s demeanor affected her credibility was

not improper. It is the court’s job to assess credibility during the

hearing. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.

2007) (district court determines the credibility of witnesses and the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence). To the

extent wife relies on the court’s adverse rulings, wife does not

provide any legal authority, record support, or specific allegations

about why or how the court’s rulings were improper. And in any

event, adverse rulings do not establish bias. People in Interest of

S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 448 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Unfavorable rulings and

a court’s alleged personal opinion formed from the judicial

proceeding are insufficient to establish bias.”).

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¶ 20 Second, wife asserts that the court erred in dividing the

marital property. Specifically, she says the court should have

awarded her a 2004 Ford truck and the parties’ horses. Again, we

disagree.

¶ 21 We do agree with wife that the court incorrectly determined

that she had not listed the Ford truck on her financial disclosures.

Nonetheless, this inaccuracy did not render the property division

erroneous. As husband explained at the hearing, the truck was

given to the parties’ son during the marriage. Therefore, at the time

of the property division, husband did not own the truck, and the

court could not have awarded it to wife as marital property. See In

re Marriage of Schmedeman, 190 P.3d 788, 790-91 (Colo. App.

2008) (because husband gave a cabin to his parents during the

marriage, it was not “marital property” subject to division upon

dissolution of the marriage).

¶ 22 As for the horses, wife does not explain why the court’s

decision to award the horses to husband constitutes error. Wife

testified that she did not “know[] right here today” what she would

do with the horses; she said she would “have to see if somebody

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[she] kn[ew] ha[d] a spot for them.” The court found that wife was

unlikely to be able to keep the horses, she was not in a financial

position to take care of them, and, if awarded to her, the horses

“would suffer.” We see nothing manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair about the court’s decision.

¶ 23 Finally, although wife asks whether “there’s any way that

[ownership of the marital home] could be mediated to come to a

better conclusion,” we note that the parties waived mediation. And

wife does not explain why the court’s decision to equally distribute

the proceeds from the sale of the home constitutes an abuse of

discretion.

IV. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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