People In Interest of C.M.W.R.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 11, 2024

2024COA4

No. 22CA0925, People in Interest of CMWR — Juvenile Court —
Delinquency — Adjudicatory Proceedings; Criminal Law —
Rights of Defendant — Speedy Trial — Exceptions —
Continuance Granted Without Defendant’s Consent —
Unavailability of Evidence Material to State’s Case

A division of the court of appeals considers what statutes a

juvenile court must apply when determining whether to continue an

adjudicatory action against a juvenile past the speedy trial deadline,

over the juvenile’s objection. The division decides, as a matter of

first impression, that a court must consider the factors set forth in

section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023 — a statute that addresses

continuances in trials of adult defendants — when deciding whether

continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory action would

violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights. Under the facts of the case,

the division holds that the juvenile court erred by continuing the
juvenile’s trial past the speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor

failed to meet her burden of establishing, and the court did not find,

that the requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2024COA4

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0925
Mesa County District Court No. 21JD132
Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of C.M.W.R.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur

Announced January 11, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for
Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 Juveniles charged with offenses in adjudicatory actions, like

adults charged with criminal offenses, have statutory and

constitutional rights to a speedy trial. But those rights are not

absolute. In this opinion, we consider the statutes that a juvenile

court must consider when determining whether a juvenile’s speedy

trial rights would be violated by granting a continuance at the

request of the prosecutor, without the juvenile’s consent. We

decide, as a matter of first impression, that a court must consider

the factors set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023, which

addresses continuances in trials of adult defendants, when ruling

on a prosecutor’s request to continue the trial in a juvenile

adjudicatory action past the speedy trial deadline, without the

juvenile’s consent.

¶2 C.M.W.R., a/k/a L.M.R. (the juvenile), contends that (1) their

statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, and

(2) the court erred by not merging their first degree arson and

criminal mischief convictions. We agree that the juvenile’s

statutory speedy trial rights were violated, vacate the juvenile’s

adjudication of delinquency, and remand to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the charges filed in this case. In light of our

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disposition, we need not reach the juvenile’s constitutional speedy

trial or merger arguments.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

¶3 In April 2021, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Meetinghouse in Fruita caught fire, resulting in more than one

million dollars in damage. Law enforcement officers arrested the

juvenile in connection with the fire. Two months later, the

prosecutor charged the juvenile with one count of criminal mischief

in violation of section 18-4-501(1), C.R.S. 2023; one count of first

degree arson in violation of section 18-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2023; and

one count of second degree burglary in violation of section

18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2023.

¶4 At a hearing conducted on September 27, 2021, the juvenile

entered a not guilty plea and requested that the court set a bench

trial within sixty days, pursuant to section 19-2.5-902(1), C.R.S.

2023. The court determined that the speedy trial deadline was

November 26, 2021 (sixty days from September 27).

¶5 The prosecutor and defense counsel announced that they were

available for a five-day trial starting on November 22, 2021 — the

Monday of Thanksgiving week. After the court set the trial for that

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date, the prosecutor said she “[had] a feeling that [she] may have an

issue with witnesses . . . because it is Thanksgiving [week].” The

court asked the prosecutor to check with her witnesses and said

“that way we’re not going through herculean efforts to set over a

holiday and it’s going to cause us a problem anyway. And then we

can figure out” the setting.

¶6 At a hearing conducted three days later, the prosecutor

advised the court that “at least a couple [of witnesses] as of right

now” would be unavailable Thanksgiving week. Defense counsel

objected to setting the trial more than sixty days from the date of

the juvenile’s not guilty plea.

¶7 At a further hearing conducted on November 3, 2021, the

prosecutor formally requested a continuance of the November 22

trial date due to witness unavailability. The prosecutor’s entire

argument in support of her request for the continuance was:

So the People have reached out to multiple
witnesses, and they’re unavailable that
weekend [sic]. And we have spoken to those.
Some of whom are essential to the case in
proving the People’s case, and we can’t proceed
without them. So given the holiday conflict —
the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness
conflict and unavailability and some of whom

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are flying or will be flying from across the
country.

¶8 The juvenile objected to the prosecutor’s request for a

continuance and asserted their right to a speedy trial. In its ruling

from the bench granting the prosecutor’s motion to continue, the

court said as follows:

 “[S]peedy trial runs on November 26, 2021.”

 “The prosecutor indicates [she] ha[s] witness

unavailability [but she] made diligent efforts in terms of

attempting to arrange witnesses but would require flights

and travel and individuals who are unavailable due to the

holiday.”

 “Given that and given the nature of the allegations in this

case, the amount of discovery, the investigation on the

part of all of the parties, the Court finds that there is

good cause to set beyond the speedy trial setting of

November 26th.”

The court then reset the trial for January 10, 2022, which was the

next date when both attorneys said they were available. Defense

counsel later filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the

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juvenile on the grounds that the juvenile’s right to a speedy trial

had been violated.

¶9 The juvenile’s initial trial began on January 10, 2022 — 105

days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. But on the

second day of trial, the prosecutor announced that several of her

out-of-state witnesses had been exposed to, or had contracted,

COVID-19 and were unable to travel. She requested a mistrial. The

defense objected, arguing that “the benefit that [the witnesses] do

add to the Prosecution does not outweigh [the juvenile’s] right to

have a speedy trial.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request for

a mistrial over defense counsel’s objection and continued the trial

to February 14, 2022. (The propriety of the court’s decision to grant

the mistrial is not at issue in this appeal.)

¶ 10 Defense counsel subsequently renewed her motion to dismiss

the case “because holding the trial past November 26, 2021 violated

[the juvenile’s] speedy trial rights.”

¶ 11 The juvenile’s bench trial began on February 14, 2022 — 141

days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. At the

conclusion of the trial, the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent

on all counts.

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II. Analysis

¶ 12 The juvenile raises two contentions on appeal. First, they

contend that their statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights

were violated when the court set their trial past the sixty-day

speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor’s argument for a

continuance lacked the necessary specificity regarding the

materiality of the unavailable witnesses’ anticipated testimony.

Second, they contend that the court erred by not merging the first

degree arson and criminal mischief convictions because those

offenses arose from the same conduct.

¶ 13 We agree with the juvenile that their statutory speedy trial

rights were violated. For this reason, we do not reach their other

contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 The interpretation and application of speedy trial statutes are

questions of law subject to de novo review. See People v. Sherwood,

2021 COA 61, ¶ 19, 489 P.3d 1233, 1238. (After the division

decided Sherwood, the General Assembly recodified and

renumbered title 19, which governs adjudicatory actions against

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juveniles. See Ch. 136, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 557-773. Like the

parties, we cite the speedy trial statutes as currently numbered.)

¶ 15 In addition, we review the district court’s factual findings for

clear error; “we will not disturb those findings if they are supported

by the record.” People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶ 25, 360 P.3d

175, 181. A trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only

if they have “no support in the record.” Id. at ¶ 17, 360 P.3d at

180.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 16 Section 19-2.5-904(2), C.R.S. 2023, specifies the deadlines for

the various phases of an adjudicatory action against a juvenile. As

applicable here, section 19-2.5-904(2)(d) states that, “[i]n bringing

an adjudicatory action against a juvenile . . . , the district attorney

and the court shall comply with the deadlines for . . . [h]olding the

adjudicatory trial, as specified in” section 19-2.5-902(1). Section

19-2.5-902(1), in turn, provides that the speedy trial deadline in

juvenile adjudicatory actions is sixty days from the entry of the

juvenile’s plea of not guilty, “[e]xcept as set forth in section

19-2.5-610, [C.R.S. 2023].” That exception — which applies when a

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juvenile requests a jury trial — is of no consequence here because

the juvenile did not request a jury. See § 19-2.5-610(4).

¶ 17 Next, section 19-2.5-904(3) says that “[t]he court may grant a

continuance with regard to any of the deadlines specified in

subsection (2) of this section upon making a finding of good cause.”

But section 19-2.5-904(3) does not contain a definition of “good

cause.” In addition, section 19-2.5-904(1) states that a “juvenile’s

right to a speedy trial is governed by section 18-1-405 and [Crim.

P.] 48(b).”

¶ 18 Section 18-1-405(6) specifies the time periods that are

excluded from the computation of the speedy trial deadline

pursuant to section 18-1-405(1). Section 18-1-405(6)(g) provides

that, in adult criminal cases, the calculation of the speedy trial

deadline does not include a “delay not exceeding six months”

resulting from a continuance granted at the prosecutor’s request,

without the defendant’s consent. That subsection applies in two

situations: (1) when evidence material to the state’s case is

unavailable, “the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence

to obtain such evidence,” and “there are reasonable grounds to

believe that this evidence will be available at the later date,”

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§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); and (2) when “the prosecuting attorney [requires]

additional time in [a] felony case[] to prepare the state’s case and

additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of

the case,” § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II).

¶ 19 “The burden of compliance with the speedy trial statute is on

the district attorney and the trial court.” People v. Roberts, 146

P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. 2006) (analyzing a prior version of section

18-1-405(6)(g)(I) that contained substantially similar language to

the current version). “Meeting this burden requires that the People

provide to a trial court, with some specificity, enough information

on the record to show that they met their statutory burdens,

including how the unavailable evidence is material to the state’s

case.” Id. at 594.

¶ 20 The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the

charges with prejudice. People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18, 467

P.3d 1272, 1275.

C. We Review the Court’s Order Granting the Continuance
by Analyzing Section 18-1-405(6)(g)

¶ 21 On appeal, the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the

speedy trial deadline was November 26, 2021 (sixty days from the

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date of the juvenile’s not guilty plea). See §§ 19-2.5-904(2),

19-2.5-902(1). But the parties disagree as to which statutes apply

to the determination of whether the juvenile’s speedy trial rights

were violated. The juvenile argues that their statutory speedy trial

rights were violated because the court failed to apply section

18-1-405(6)(g), while the People contend there was no speedy trial

violation because the court satisfied the general good cause

standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3).

¶ 22 We hold that the standard for continuing a trial without the

defendant’s consent set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g) applies to

requests for continuances in adjudicatory actions against juveniles.

¶ 23 “Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Each provision of

a statute must be construed in harmony with the overall statutory

scheme to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was

enacted.” People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo.

App. 2001); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001)

(discussing the principle of statutory construction that specific

provisions prevail over general provisions).

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¶ 24 The People assert that the speedy trial analysis requires only a

determination of whether the trial court correctly applied the open-

ended good cause standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3). They

point to the description of good cause in People v. Hines, 2021 COA

45, 491 P.3d 578, as “an amorphous term, difficult of precise

delineation.” Id. at ¶ 21, 491 P.3d at 584 (quoting People v. Roberts,

2013 COA 50, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 581, 587). The Hines division

explained that, “[f]or that reason, whether the good cause standard

has been satisfied depends on the facts of each case and is an

inquiry left to the district court’s discretion.” Id.

¶ 25 But the Hines division did not hold that the court’s discretion

is unbounded. Rather, the division applied “speedy trial case law”

to determine whether “good cause” existed for purposes of the

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the Act) in the

absence of a definition of “good cause” in the Act. Id. at ¶ 22, 491

P.3d at 584. Specifically, the division looked to the law governing

speedy trial in analyzing whether the prosecution had exercised due

diligence to obtain certain evidence — and, thus, whether the trial

court had erred by finding good cause for a continuance under the

Act. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23-24, 491 P.3d at 584.

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¶ 26 Consistent with the reasoning of Hines, in our view, it makes

little sense to grant trial courts nearly unbridled discretion to grant

a prosecutor’s request for a continuance in a juvenile adjudication

trial, without the juvenile’s consent, when trial courts lack the same

degree of discretion when considering similar requests for

continuances in cases involving adult defendants. The General

Assembly’s determination that the speedy trial deadline applicable

to juvenile adjudications should be shorter than the speedy trial

deadline in criminal cases involving adults reflects a policy decision

that juveniles accused of delinquency should be brought to trial

more quickly than adult defendants. Compare § 19-2.5-902(1)

(providing a sixty-day speedy trial deadline in juvenile

adjudications), with § 18-1-405(1) (providing a six-month speedy

trial deadline in criminal cases involving adult defendants). For this

reason, it would run counter to the General Assembly’s policy

decisions to conclude that a continuance resulting in a violation of

an adult’s speedy trial rights would not, under similar

circumstances, result in a violation of a juvenile’s speedy trial

rights.

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¶ 27 Further, the reference to section 18-1-405 found in section

19-2.5-904(1) means that the provisions of the former section apply

to juvenile adjudications, to the extent they are not inconsistent

with the provisions of the Children’s Code. See J.M.N., 39 P.3d at

1263 (holding that, “to give effect to all relevant statutory

provisions,” a court must read section 19-2.5-904(1) to incorporate

the tolling and enforcement provisions of section 18-1-405, “at least

to the extent that these provisions are not inconsistent with the

more specific sixty-day and ‘good cause’ continuance provisions” of

sections 19-2.5-902(1) and 19-2.5-904(3)). In other words, section

19-2.5-904(1) engrafts onto juvenile cases the speedy trial

provisions found in section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b), to the

extent those provisions fill in gaps in the Children’s Code.

¶ 28 Following the logic of J.M.N., we hold there is no inconsistency

between the general good cause language in section 19-2.5-904(3)

and the factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g) that address when a

continuance entered without the defendant’s consent stops the

running of the speedy trial clock. The People’s argument that the

section 18-1-405(6)(g) factors do not apply to adjudicatory actions

against juveniles cannot be squared with the language of section

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19-2.5-904(1), which, as noted above, explicitly incorporates the

requirements of section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b) into section

19-2.5-904. See People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5, ¶ 25, 409 P.3d 338,

342 (“When the statutory language is clear, . . . we give consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to each part of the statute, and we

interpret every word, rendering no words or phrases superfluous

and construing undefined words and phrases according to their

common usage.”).

¶ 29 For these reasons, a court must consider the section

18-1-405(6)(g) factors when determining whether a prosecutor’s

request for a continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory

action past the speedy trial deadline, without the juvenile’s consent,

would violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights.

D. The Prosecutor Did Not Make a Sufficient Showing that
the Requested Continuance Would Not Violate
the Juvenile’s Speedy Trial Rights

¶ 30 The record supports the juvenile’s contention that the

prosecutor did not proffer, let alone establish, and the court did not

find, that the first section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor — evidence

material to the prosecutor’s case was unavailable — was satisfied.

See § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); Roberts, 146 P.3d at 592.

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¶ 31 To satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under the first factor, the

prosecutor must “provide to [the] trial court, with some specificity,

enough information on the record to show that . . . the unavailable

evidence is material to the state’s case.” Roberts, 146 P.3d at 594

(emphasis added). The reference to “material” in the first section

18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor means more than “merely probative or

relevant evidence in the context of continuing a trial beyond the

speedy trial deadline.” Id. at 593. “A motion containing

unsupported allegations that a witness is material and unavailable

for trial is insufficient.” Id.

¶ 32 In this case, the prosecutor attempted to bolster her request

for a continuance with the very type of unsupported allegations that

the Roberts court indicated would be insufficient to continue a trial

past the speedy trial deadline. See id. The prosecutor did not

reveal the identity of the unavailable witnesses, provide a proffer of

their anticipated testimony, or explain why such testimony was

material to the prosecutor’s case. Rather, the prosecutor merely

represented that she had “reached out to multiple witnesses, and

they’re unavailable . . . . Some of [the witnesses] are essential to

the case . . . .”

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¶ 33 Furthermore, this is not the type of case where the context

makes clear that, because of the limited number of potential

witnesses, most, if not all, of the prosecution’s witnesses are

necessarily material, if not essential. As of November 2, 2021, the

People had endorsed more than 170 lay witnesses and 24 expert

witnesses, including two “TBD” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms (ATF) agents. The prosecutor called only a modest

fraction of these endorsed witnesses at trial.

¶ 34 In any event, “a trial court must exercise its independent

judgment and may not accept the mere conclusions of a prosecutor”

in deciding whether to continue a trial past the speedy trial

deadline, over the defendant’s objection. Id. at 595. Beyond

initially requesting that the prosecutor make a record explaining

why a trial date of November 22, 2021, “doesn’t work . . . and what

efforts [she had] made to secure witnesses” — with the latter

inquiry going unaddressed — the court did not exercise

independent judgment regarding the prosecutor’s request for a

continuance past the speedy trial deadline. It did not ask the

prosecutor to explain her vague, generalized statement regarding

the materiality of the testimony of those witnesses who had

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indicated their unavailability the week of November 22. The court’s

unquestioning acceptance of the prosecutor’s inadequate argument

for a continuance is akin to “[a] minute entry made by the court

indicating that the People’s chief witness is missing,” which “is also

insufficient absent a showing of materiality.” Id. at 594.

¶ 35 Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor failed to establish —

and the court failed to adequately find — that, under the first

section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor, the juvenile’s speedy trial rights

would not be violated if the trial was continued past the speedy trial

deadline. In light of this determination, we need not consider the

second and third factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I). See Roberts,

146 P.3d at 593-94 (noting that the prosecutor’s and the court’s

burden of complying with the speedy trial statute “includes making

a sufficient record that all three elements of section

18-1-405(6)(g)(I), have been met”). The use of “and” in the list of

factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) means that a prosecutor is

entitled to an order continuing a criminal trial past the speedy trial

deadline, without the defendant’s consent, only if the prosecutor

has met all three of the factors. See United States v.

Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 326 (2021) (noting that, when

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three statutory requirements “are connected by the conjunctive

‘and,’” all three requirements must be met).

¶ 36 The People contend that we can affirm on the alternative basis

that the continuance was justified under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II),

which permits a court to grant a continuance past the speedy trial

deadline, without the defendant’s consent, when the continuance is

necessary “to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time . . . to

prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of

exceptional circumstances of the case.” In support of this

argument, the People point to two of the prosecutor’s

representations to the court: (1) on November 2, 2021 — the day

before requesting the continuance and twenty days before trial —

the prosecutor said she was still waiting on DNA and fingerprint

testing results from the state laboratory; and (2) on December 21,

2021 — nearly a month after the speedy trial deadline had run —

the prosecutor said her office had “just received long-awaited

litigation packets” from the ATF. But this was not the basis on

which the prosecutor sought the challenged continuance. Indeed,

when the prosecutor requested the continuance, she specifically

said that “the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness

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conflict . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the prosecutor

requested, and the court granted, the continuance exclusively on

the basis of witness unavailability, we do not consider whether the

prosecutor could have established grounds for a continuance under

section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II). The prosecutor did not present that

argument to the court, and the court did not refer to section

18-1-405(6)(g)(II) when continuing the trial.

¶ 37 Moreover, at the same December 21, 2021, status conference

at which the prosecutor discussed the recently received evidence

from the ATF, she told the court “there is DNA outstanding” —

presumably the same DNA test results she referenced during the

November 2, 2021, hearing. But she also told the court at the same

December hearing, “[w]e’re ready to proceed without [the DNA

evidence],” illustrating why it would be inappropriate for us to

consider grounds not identified to the court.

¶ 38 For these reasons, we hold that the court erred by continuing

the juvenile’s trial past the sixty-day speedy trial deadline, without

the juvenile’s consent, because the prosecutor failed to meet her

burden of establishing, and the court did not find, that the

requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied.

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III. Disposition

¶ 39 The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the

district court with instructions to dismiss the charges in this case.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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