2025 CO 56, 23SC956, By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado
Supreme Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for
the reader's convenience. As such, they may not be cited or
relied upon. If there is any discrepancy between the language in
the summary and the opinion, the language in the opinion
controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
September 15, 2025

2025 CO 56

No. 23SC956, By the Rockies v. Perez-Labor and Industry - Colorado Wage
Claim Act-Limitation of Actions -Colorado Minimum Wage Act- Recovery
of Balance of Minimum Wage-Courts and Court Procedures -General
Limitation of Actions Six Years.

This case requires the supreme court to decide which statute of limitations
applies to claims asserted under the Minimum Wage Act, § 8-6-118, C.R.S. (2024).
The Act itself is silent on this topic. The district court below concluded that the
two- or three-year limitations period set forth in the Wage Claim Act, § 8-4-122,
C.R.S. (2024), applies. It then granted a motion to dismiss Samuel Perez's
complaint as untimely because it was undisputed that Perez filed his complaint
five years after By the Rockies, LLC allegedly violated the Minimum Wage Act.

A split division of the court of appeals reversed the district court's
judgment. It concluded that the default six-year limitations period set forth in
section 13-80-103.5(1)(a), C.R.S. (2024), which applies to claims seeking to recover
a "liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money" applies to

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claims brought under the Minimum Wage Act. Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC,
2023 COA 109, 1 8, 543 P.3d 1054, 1055 (quoting § 13-80-103.5(1)(a)).

The supreme court granted certiorari to resolve which limitations period
applies. It now concludes that the two- or three-year statute of limitations period
in the Wage Claim Act applies to claims brought under the Minimum Wage Act.
Accordingly, the court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands
the case to the division with directions to reinstate the district court's order of
dismissal.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2025 CO 56

Supreme Court Case No. 23SC956 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 22CA1791

Petitioners:

By the Rockies, LLC, and Duane Layton,

V.

Respondent:

Samuel Perez.

Judgment Reversed

en banc

September 15, 2025

Attorneys for Petitioners:

Jackson Lewis P.C. Veronica T. Hunter Houston, Texas

Jackson Lewis P.C.

Melisa H. Panagakos

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC

Brian D. Gonzales

Fort Collins, Colorado

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Attorneys for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America and Colorado Chamber of Commerce:
Holland & Hart LLP
Stephen G. Masciocchi
Aja R. Robbins
Mary Elizabeth Beasley
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Hotel & Lodging Association and
Colorado Restaurant Association:
Fisher & Phillips LLP
Micah D. Dawson
Hillary R. Ross
James S. Bradbury
Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE GABRIEL, and JUSTICE HART joined.
JUSTICE SAMOUR did not participate.

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11
This case requires us to decide which statute of limitations applies to claims
asserted under the Minimum Wage Act, § 8-6-118, C.R.S. (2024). The Act itself is
silent on this topic. The district court below concluded that the two- or three-year
limitations period set forth in the Wage Claim Act, § 8-4-122, C.R.S. (2024), applies.
It then granted a motion to dismiss Samuel Perez's complaint as untimely because
it was undisputed that Perez filed his complaint five years after By the Rockies,
LLC ("BTR") allegedly violated the Minimum Wage Act. A split division of the
court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment. It concluded that the
default six-year limitations period set forth in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a), C.R.S.
(2024), which applies to claims seeking to recover a "liquidated debt or an
unliquidated, determinable amount of money" applies to claims brought under
the Minimum Wage Act. Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, 2023 COA 109, 1 8, 543 P.3d
1054, 1055 (quoting § 13-80-103.5(1)(a)).

12 We granted certiorari to resolve which limitations period applies and now
conclude that the two- to three-year statute of limitations period in the Wage
Claim Act governs such claims.1 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

1 The Wage Claim Act states that "[a]ll actions brought pursuant to this article shall
be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues ... except that
all actions brought for a willful violation ... shall be commenced within three
years." § 8-4-122. Because the matter here does not involve an allegedly willful

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court of appeals and remand the case to the division with directions to reinstate
the district court's order of dismissal.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

T3
In 2022, Perez filed a claim for relief pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act,
which, among other things, creates a private right of action to enforce the payment
of unpaid wages. § 8-6-118, C.R.S. (2024). As mentioned, Perez asserted that BTR
failed to provide him and other employees their required meal and rest breaks
during their shifts while he was employed by BTR in 2016 and 2017.

14 BTR moved to dismiss Perez's complaint as untimely. It acknowledged that
because the Minimum Wage Act contains no explicit limitations period, the
applicable statute of limitations could default to the six-year limitations period for
actions to "recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of
money." § 13-80-103.5(1)(a). But it argued that the court should instead apply the
two-year limitations period set out in the Wage Claim Act because that statute,
which applies to any claims for unpaid wages, is, by definition, more specific to
unpaid wage claims than the default limitation that applies to debt collection
actions. It explained that applying the Wage Claim Act's statute of limitations to
Perez's Minimum Wage Act claim makes sense because both provisions are part

violation, and for ease of reading, going forward we refer to the Wage Claim Act's
limitations provision as a two-year limitations period.

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of the same overarching statutory scheme. Additionally, BTR asserted that
applying the six-year limitations period would conflict with other well-established
wage protection laws, all of which apply two- or three-year statutes of limitations
to claims seeking to recover unpaid wages.

15
5 In response, Perez urged the district court to deny BTR's motion to dismiss.
First, he pointed to the limiting language in the Wage Claim Act. It provides that

All actions brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced within
two years after the cause of action accrues and not after that time;
except that all actions brought for a willful violation of this article
shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrues and not after that time.

§ 8-4-122 (emphasis added). He argued that this two-year limitations period only
applies to actions brought "pursuant to this article" - meaning article 4 of title 8. Id.
The plain language of the statute, he asserted, necessarily excludes actions brought
under the Minimum Wage Act, which is codified in article 6 of title 8.

16
6 Perez additionally posited that the General Assembly has ratified this
interpretation. It amended the Minimum Wage Act twice, he observed, after a
federal district court held that the six-year limitations period applies to such
claims, without expressing any disagreement with the court's holding. See
Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1188-89 (D. Colo. 2018). If
the General Assembly had intended a different interpretation, according to Perez,
it would have already explicitly said so. Last, Perez argued that even if the Wage

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Claim Act's limitations period was applicable, the district court should defer to the
most fundamental statutory construction rule: the explicit legislative directive to
interpret the Minimum Wage Act to maximize employee protection. See § 8-6-102,
C.R.S. (2024) ("Whenever this article or any part thereof is interpreted by any
court, it shall be liberally construed by such court.").

17
The district court agreed with BTR. First, the court noted that when two acts
are part of the same statutory scheme -such as the Wage Claim Act under article 4
of title 8 and the Minimum Wage Act under article 6 of title 8 - and both authorize
private rights of action to recover monetary damages, they should be considered
together when analyzing a statute of limitations issue. See Pilmenstein v. Devereux
Cleo Wallace, 2021 COA 59, 1 25, 492 P.3d 1059, 1064-65. Regardless of whether a
claim arises under the Wage Claim Act or the Minimum Wage Act, the district
court emphasized that "the purpose ... is to recover some form of allegedly
unpaid wages." (Quoting Balle-Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc., No. 21-cv-03106-NRN,
2022 WL 1521767, at *4 (D. Colo. May 13, 2022)). Then, the district court relied on
this court's guidance to determine which of the two limitations periods applies:
(1) a later enacted statute should be applied over an earlier enacted statute; (2) the
more specific of two applicable statutes should be applied; and then, (3) the longer
of two applicable statutes should be applied. See Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss,
890 P.2d 663, 668 (Colo. 1995). Because the Wage Claim Act is part of an

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overarching statutory scheme concerning wages and is the more specific of the
two applicable statutes of limitations, the district court applied the two-year
limitations period and granted BTR's motion to dismiss.

18 Perez appealed, contending that (1) the district court erred by applying the
two-year limitations period rather than the general six-year limitations period for
Minimum Wage Act claims; (2) the district court erred by relying on rules of
statutory construction without first finding any statutory ambiguity; and (3) even
if the statute was ambiguous, the court failed to credit the legislative directive to
interpret the Minimum Wage Act in favor of employee protection.

19 A split division of the court of appeals agreed with Perez and reversed the
district court's judgment. Perez, 1 21, 543 P.3d at 1057. First, the majority
explained that Perez's Minimum Wage Act claim fit the description of a
"liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money" set forth in
the six-year limitations period. Id. at 18, 543 P.3d at 1055 (quoting
§ 13-80-103.5(1)(a)). And because the Minimum Wage Act contains no limitations
provision specific to Minimum Wage Act claims, the majority stated that "it would
seem clear" that the six-year limitations period applies. Id. Next, the majority
concluded that the limitations period set forth in the Wage Claim Act applies only
to claims brought pursuant to the Wage Claim Act. Id. at | 10, 543 P.3d at 1056. It
reasoned that the legislature's decision to cabin the Wage Claim Act's limitations

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provision to claims brought pursuant to article 4 "clearly manifests the
legislature's intent that the general six-year limitations provision applies to article
6 claims." Id. at | 11, 543 P.3d at 1056.

110 The majority was not convinced by BTR's argument that different
limitations periods for violations of the Minimum Wage Act and the Wage Claim
Act offended the legislature's intent because "the purposes of and investigatory
powers authorized by the acts are different." Id. at | 17, 543 P.3d at 1057. In its
view the "Wage Claim Act ensures timely payment of wages and defines methods
of payment of wages," while the Minimum Wage Act "aims to preserve the
'welfare of the state of Colorado' by protecting workers 'from conditions of labor
that have a pernicious effect on their health and morals."" Id. (quoting
§ 8-6-101(1)).

111 The majority was also unpersuaded that the limitations period should be
three years or less because Minimum Wage Order regulations "promulgated by
the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment require employers to
maintain employment records for only three years." Id. at | 18, 543 P.3d at 1057.
Last, the division did not share BTR's concern that the court's interpretation would
permit statute shopping based on the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at | 19,
543 P.3d at 1057.

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112 Judge Fox dissented. Applying Voss's rules of statutory construction, she
noted that the first rule - a later enacted statute should be applied over an earlier
enacted statute-was unhelpful since (1) the six-year limitations period in
section 13-80-103.5 was re-enacted in 1986, (2) the two-year limitations period in
the Wage Claim Act's predecessor statute was added in 1986, and (3) both
pre-dated the Minimum Wage Act's enactment in 2014. Perez, 1 25, 543 P.3d at
1058 (Fox, J., dissenting); see also Ch. 114, sec. 1, § 13-80-103.5, 1986 Colo. Sess.
Laws 695, 697; Ch. 65, sec. 10, § 8-4-126, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 504, 507; Ch. 276,
sec. 8, § 8-6-118, 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 1110, 1120.

113 However, applying Voss's second rule-that the more specific of two
statutes should be applied-Judge Fox emphasized that title 8, "Labor and
Industry," is more specific to an employer-employee dispute than title 13, which
generally concerns "Courts and Court Procedure." Perez, 1 26, 543 P.3d at 1058.
Because the Wage Claim Act and the Minimum Wage Act are both part of title 8,
Judge Fox observed that it would be more appropriate to apply the limitations
period in the Wage Claim Act to Minimum Wage Act claims rather than to apply
a limitations period from a different, less specific title. Id.

114 Judge Fox explained that applying the two-year limitations period from the
Wage Claim Act to the Minimum Wage Act made sense for several other reasons:

· This court has held that claims to recover regular wages for non-willful
violations must be brought within two years from when the wages

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became due and payable. Id. at | 27, 543 P.3d at 1058 (citing Hernandez v.
Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15, 1 16, 414 P.3d 700, 704).

· Non-willful violations of the Minimum Wage Order must be registered
within two years. Id., 543 P.3d at 1059 (citing Dep't of Lab. & Emp.,
7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:15 (2019), https://www.coloradosos.gov/
CCR/

GenerateRulePdf.do?ruleVersionId=7879&fileName=7%20CCR%20110
3-1 [https://perma.cc/GA3G-4ZUP]).2

· Colorado employees must keep payroll records for three years. Id. (citing
Dep't of Lab. & Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:12 (2019)).3

· When repealing and re-enacting earlier Colorado wage laws, the General
Assembly sought to bring the state's wage laws into compliance with the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), which applies a two-year
limitations period for non-willful violations. Id., 543 P.3d at 1058-59
(first citing Hearings on H.B. 1231 before the H. Bus. Affs. & Lab. Comm.,
55th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1986); and then citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a) (imposing a two-year limitations period for non-willful
violations)).

· An individual or entity claiming a refund or credit may amend a federal
tax return within three years after the date of the original filing, or two
years after the date taxes were paid, whichever is later. Judge Fox noted
that it "would be illogical for the legislature to not want the employer, or
the employee, to timely amend a tax return to pay the appropriate tax."
Id., 543 P.3d at 1059 (citing Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of Treasury,
Publ'n No. 17, Federal Income Tax Guide for Individuals 122 (2022), https://

2 Although this regulation was replaced by Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay
Standards Order No. 39, the two-year limitations period for registering a
complaint remains. Dep't of Lab. & Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:8.2 (2024),
https://cdle.colorado.gov/sites/cdle/files/
Adopted % 20COMPS%20Order%20%2339%207%20CCR%201103-
1%20%5Baccessible%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLA8-ZXFQ].

3 The record-retention requirement also remains the same. See Dep't of Lab. &
Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:7.3 (2024).

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www.efile.com/2022-irs-instructions-and-publications/
[https://
perma.cc/UX3P-SZ29]).

For these reasons, Judge Fox concluded that she would affirm the district court's
order. Id. at | 28, 543 P.3d at 1059.

115 BTR petitioned this court for certiorari review. We granted the petition to
resolve which limitations period applies to claims brought under the Minimum
Wage Act.4 We now conclude that the two-year limitations period set forth in the
Wage Claim Act applies. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the case with directions to reinstate the district court's order
of dismissal.

## II. Analysis

### A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

[16 When material facts are undisputed, as they are here, we review de novo
the issue of which statute of limitations applies to a particular claim. City & Cnty.
of Denver v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2024 CO 5, 1 26, 543 P.3d 371, 377.

4 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the statute of
limitations in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, [s]ection 8-4-122, C.R.S.
2023, does not apply to claims brought under the Minimum Wage
Act.

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117 Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate
the General Assembly's intent. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 1 37, 442 P.3d 379,
389. We first look to the statute's language, "giving its words and phrases their
plain and ordinary meanings." Id. We also endeavor to give effect to the purpose
of the legislative "scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all of its parts," while avoiding constructions that would "lead to illogical
or absurd results." Id. at 1 38, 442 P.3d at 389. Additionally, we "attempt to
interpret statutes of limitations consistent with their purposes of promoting
justice, avoiding unnecessary delay, and preventing the litigation of stale claims."
Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1052 (Colo. 2004).

118 If the statute is clear and unambiguous, then we look no further. McCoy,
1 38, 442 P.3d at 389. If the statute is ambiguous, however, then we may look to
"other aids to statutory construction, including the consequences of a given
construction, the end to be achieved by the statute, and the statute's legislative
history." Id. "A statute is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of multiple
interpretations." Godinez v. Williams, 2024 CO 14, 1 20, 544 P.3d 1233, 1237
(quoting McCoy, 1 38, 442 P.3d at 389).

119 When determining the applicability of a particular statute of limitations to
a case at issue, consideration should be given to "the nature of the right sued upon
and not necessarily the particular form of action or the precise character of the

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relief requested." Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168, 172 (Colo. 1987). And
if two competing statutes may be applicable (1) a later enacted statute should be
applied over an earlier enacted statute; (2) the more specific of two applicable
statutes should be applied; and (3) "because statutes of limitations are in
derogation of a presumptively valid claim," the longer of two applicable statutes
should be applied. Voss, 890 P.2d at 668. The third rule, favoring the application
of the longer statute, is "a rule of last resort." BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d
811, 814 (Colo. 2008).

## B. The Statute of Limitations in the Wage Claim Act Applies to Claims Brought Under the Minimum Wage Act

120 BTR argues that the division's holding, that the two-year limitations period
in the Wage Claim Act does not apply to claims under the Minimum Wage Act,
departs from this court's long-standing precedent regarding statutory
interpretation. Specifically, it contends that the Minimum Wage Act and the Wage
Claim Act are part of a comprehensive scheme addressing the same subject matter
(the payment of wages) and serving consistent purposes (the recovery of allegedly
unpaid wages). According to BTR, this means that regardless of whether a claim
is brought under the Minimum Wage Act or the Wage Claim Act, the purpose of
the action is to recover unpaid wages; thus, the two-year limitations period should
apply to all claims to recover unpaid wages.

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121 Further, BTR argues that the second Voss rule-the more specific of two
applicable statutes should be applied - is dispositive of this issue. This is because,
it asserts, title 8 is a statutory compilation of laws concerning "Labor and
Industry," which is far more specific to employer-employee disputes than title 13,
which broadly concerns "Courts and Court Procedure" (although admittedly
article 80 of that title concerns limitations). See Voss, 890 P.2d at 668. We agree.

122 To begin, we note that the General Assembly itself instructs that in enacting
a statute, the legislature must be presumed to have intended that the entire statute
be effective. § 2-4-201(1)(b), C.R.S. (2024). In the absence of any clear intent to the
contrary, statutes that are part of a single scheme or that deal with the same subject
should be construed harmoniously, to avoid absurdities. Martinez v. People,
69 P.3d 1029, 1033 (Colo. 2003). We presume as well that the General Assembly
intends various parts of a comprehensive scheme to be consistent with and apply
to each other, without having to incorporate each provision by express reference
to the other. Id. Here, the Wage Claim Act and Minimum Wage Act are part of
the same statutory scheme that addresses the payment of wages. Both acts share
the same purpose: allowing for the recovery of unpaid wages. We accordingly
construe the acts together and apply the two-year statute of limitations in the
Wage Claim Act to claims under the Minimum Wage Act.

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T23
An examination of the nature of the right sued upon similarly supports our
interpretation of the Minimum Wage Act limitations period. As we explained in
Persichini, in determining the statute of limitations applicable to a particular claim,
consideration should be given to "the nature of the right sued upon and not
necessarily the particular form of action or the precise character of the relief
requested." 735 P.2d at 172; see also Balle-Tun, 2022 WL 1521767, at *4. Applying
the limitations period from the Wage Claim Act to claims brought under the
Minimum Wage Act harmonizes the entire statutory scheme. Balle-Tun, 2022 WL
1521767, at *4. Applying the default statute of limitations to a claim under the
Minimum Wage Act does not. We decline to adopt an interpretation that would
apply a different statute of limitations based on the form of action rather than the
nature of the right to be enforced. Id.

124 We also agree with Judge Fox's analysis under Voss, 890 P.2d at 668. See
Perez, 11 24, 26, 543 P.3d at 1058 (Fox, J., dissenting). Because articles 4 and 6 are
part of title 8-which is more specific to an employer-employee dispute than
title 13-it is more appropriate to apply the limitations period in the Wage Claims
Act to claims brought under the Minimum Wage Act than to apply a default
limitations period from a different title. Id. at [ 26, 543 P.3d at 1058. And because
the Wage Claim Act is more specifically tailored to Perez's situation than the

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general statute, the rule of last resort does not apply. Balle-Tun, 2022 WL 1521767,
at *4.

125 Our conclusion regarding the two-year limitation period is further bolstered
by the recordkeeping requirements in the Minimum Wage Order. These require
Colorado employers to keep payroll records for three years. See Dep't of Lab. &
Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:12 (2019) (requiring that records be kept for three
years after the wage or compensation was due); Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.
1303 Frontage Holdings LLC, 2023 CO 28, 1 30, 531 P.3d 1012, 1020. The fact that
this record-keeping period matches the maximum period of liability under the
Wage Claim Act statute of limitations suggests that the General Assembly
intended that an employee could reach back no further than three years to recover
wages that were previously unpaid. Dep't of Lab. & Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs.
1103-1:12 (2019); see also § 8-4-103(4.5), C.R.S. (2024); Hernandez, 1 18, 414 P.3d at
705.

126 The time limitations to claim alleged violations under the Colorado
Minimum Wage Order - and its more recent replacement, the Colorado Overtime
and Minimum Pay Standards Order - also square with this two-year timeframe.
Alleged violations must be registered within two years for non-willful violations.
See Dep't of Lab. & Emp., 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:8.2 (2024).

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127 Legislative history sheds light on and further supports our understanding
of the General Assembly's intent. When repealing and re-enacting Colorado wage
laws, the General Assembly sought to bring our wage laws in line with the FLSA.
Perez, 1 27, 543 P.3d at 1058-59 (Fox, J., dissenting); see also Hearings on H.B. 1231
before the H. Bus. Affs. & Lab. Comm., 55th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Feb. 11,
1986); 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

128 The FLSA's statute of limitations utilizes the same two- or three-year
framework as section 8-4-122. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) ("Any action ... may be
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such
action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause
of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation
may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued."). If we
adopted Perez's interpretation, this aspect of the Minimum Wage Act would be in
direct tension with the FLSA. Hernandez, 1 19, 414 P.3d at 705.

129 But what of Perez's other arguments? His assertion that the two-year
limitation period in section 8-4-122 only applies to claims under the Wage Claim
Act seems persuasive at first glance, but it reads the word "only" into
section 8-4-122 where no such word exists. More importantly, this interpretation
fails to account for the comprehensive statutory scheme set forth in title 8 or to
consider the nature of the right sued upon. Perez's analysis also assumes that if

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Voss applies, its third rule (a longer period of limitations should prevail when two
statutes are arguably applicable) controls. But this is a rule of last resort, which
we need not reach as title 8 is more specific to employer-employee disputes than
title 13.

130 We note, as well, that Perez's approach would allow a plaintiff to reach back
only two years for wage claims under the Wage Claim Act but six years for
minimum wage claims under the Minimum Wage Act, which would be illogical.
This approach would also be out of sync with the two-year limitations period
contemplated by the rest of title 8, parallel federal law concerning minimum wage
claims, and the recordkeeping requirements of the Minimum Wage Order. Id.

131 For these reasons, we conclude that the two-year limitations period in the
Wage Claim Act applies to claims that are brought under the Minimum Wage Act.

## III. Conclusion

132 Because Perez's claim was filed well outside the two-year statute of
limitations under the Minimum Wage Act, we reverse the judgment of the court
of appeals and remand the case with directions to reinstate the district court's
order of dismissal.