Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

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Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
PATRICIA PETRAGLIA v. COMMISSIONER
OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(AC 48540)
Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing her
administrative appeal from the defendant’s decision to suspend her motor
vehicle operator’s license and to require the installation of an ignition
interlock device in her vehicle pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b). She claimed
that there was not substantial evidence on the whole record that she had,
in fact, been operating her motor vehicle while under the influence of any
intoxicating substance in violation of statute (§ 14-227a) because the chemi-
cal tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect any alcohol or
drugs in her system. Held:
The Superior Court properly applied the significantly deferential standard
of review applicable to administrative appeals involving license suspensions
in determining that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that the
defendant’s decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record.
Argued March 24—officially released September 29, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspend-
ing the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license and
requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain and tried to the court, Taylor, J.; judgment
dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Conrad Ost Seifert, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Deanna S. Levine, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general,
for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
KELLER, J. The plaintiff, Patricia Petraglia, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her
*The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as
of the date of oral argument.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
appeal from the administrative decision of the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) suspend-
ing her motor vehicle operator’s license. Pursuant to
General Statutes § 14-227b,1 the plaintiff’s license was
suspended for forty-five days and she was required to
install and maintain an ignition interlock device in her
vehicle for six months. In this appeal, we must decide
whether the trial court properly applied the correct legal
standard in upholding the commissioner’s decision that
the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the chemical
tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect
any alcohol or drugs in her system. The plaintiff claims
that her “rights were prejudiced because there was not
‘substantial evidence on the whole record’ ” that she
was, in fact, operating her motor vehicle while under
the influence of any intoxicating substance. We affirm
the judgment of the court.
A review of the record reveals the following. On March
4, 2024, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug or both in violation of
General Statutes § 14-227a.2 Following the plaintiff’s
arrest, Officer Sebastian Obando and Sergeant George
Caponera, both of the New Canaan Police Department,
prepared reports that included the following informa-
tion. On March 4, 2024, at approximately 4:57 p.m.,
Obando was dispatched to the plaintiff’s residence in New
Canaan to attempt to locate the driver of a vehicle that
was reported to have been involved in a possible evading
1Although § 14-227b has been amended by the legislature since the
events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2024, No. 24-40,
§ 54; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In
the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2Although § 14-227a has been amended by the legislature since the
events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-110,
§ 49; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In
the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
motor vehicle accident in Darien.3 While traveling to
the plaintiff’s residence, Obando was informed by the
desk officer about the color, make, model, and registra-
tion number of the vehicle in question and he further
learned that a separate complaint of erratic driving had
been made with respect to that vehicle. Specifically, the
vehicle had been observed swerving off the road, almost
striking a tree, and then taking a dangerous right turn,
nearly causing a collision.
When Obando arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, he
observed that the vehicle in question was parked in the
driveway and that there was a female, who later was iden-
tified as the plaintiff, seated in the driver’s seat. Obando
pulled his patrol vehicle into the driveway and parked
behind the plaintiff’s vehicle. As Obando was exiting his
patrol vehicle, the plaintiff opened her driver’s side door
and Obando announced his presence as he approached
her. The plaintiff explained that she had been at Quest
Diagnostics in Darien. Obando observed “numerous pre-
scription bottles in [the plaintiff’s] vehicle. Some of
the prescription bottles were in [the plaintiff’s] center
console and some were in her bag which was on her lap.”
When Obando asked the plaintiff for her motor vehicle
operator’s license, “she began to fumble her belongings.”
She also was “being very slow with her movements,” and
she dropped her bag, causing its contents, including
loose pills, to fall out and scatter both inside and outside
of her vehicle. When Obando asked the plaintiff if she
had been involved “in any motor vehicle accident,” the
plaintiff said no. Obando observed, however, that there
was damage to the passenger side front bumper of the
plaintiff’s vehicle. Obando did not smell any alcohol on
the plaintiff’s breath, but it was “clear” to him that she
“was impaired.”
3The report came from the Darien Police Department. “The essence
of the offense of evading responsibility is the failure of the driver to
stop and render aid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wil-
liams, 137 Conn. App. 250, 251, 47 A.3d 914, cert. denied, 307 Conn.
921, 54 A.3d 182 (2012).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
At this point, Caponera arrived on the scene. Caponera
“spoke with [the plaintiff] and advised her about the
incident in Darien.” The plaintiff appeared to Caponera
“to be disoriented and was not able to answer questions
clearly.” She “denied drinking any alcoholic beverages,
but admitted she took prescription medication earlier in
the day.” Caponera and Obando decided to conduct stan-
dardized field sobriety tests (sobriety tests) “to determine
if [the plaintiff] was impaired and unsafe to drive.” The
plaintiff exited her vehicle at Caponera’s request, and
Obando “had [her] come to the rear end of her vehicle,”
which she did without any reported incident or diffi-
culty. Obando then asked the plaintiff whether she had
any head or eye injuries and she responded no. Caponera
asked the plaintiff if she was diabetic, and she responded
no. Obando then administered the horizontal gaze nys-
tagmus test (HGN test)4 and was “unable to observe any
nystagmus however [the plaintiff] repeatedly moved her
head after being told not to numerous times.” He then
4“The [HGN] test measures the extent to which a person’s eyes jerk as
they follow an object moving from one side of the person’s field of vision
to the other. The test is premised on the understanding that, whereas
everyone’s eyes exhibit some jerking while turning to the side, when
the subject is intoxicated the onset of the jerking occurs after fewer
degrees of turning, and the jerking at more extreme angles becomes
more distinct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon,
232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.4, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn.
902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).
“To administer the test, the officer positions a stimulus approximately
twelve to eighteen inches away from and slightly above the subject’s eyes.
The stimulus, usually a pen or the officer’s finger, is then moved slowly
from the midline of the nose to maximum deviation, the farthest lateral
point to which the eyes can move to either side. The officer observes the
subject’s eyes as [the subject tracks the stimulus. The officer] looks for
six clues, three for each eye, to determine whether the subject passes or
fails the test. The officer looks for (1) the inability of each eye to track
movement smoothly, (2) pronounced nystagmus at maximum deviation
and (3) the onset of nystagmus at an angle less than forty-five degrees
in relation to the center point. A finding of four clues indicates failure
of the test and is a sign of intoxication.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Balbi, 89 Conn. App. 567, 571, 874 A.2d 288, cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 919, 883 A.2d 1246 (2005).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
administered the walk and turn test,5 and the plaintiff
“lost balance, did not walk heel to toe, stepped off line
and turned incorrectly.” Finally, he administered the
one leg stand test,6 during which the plaintiff “was sway-
ing, hopping and continuously putting her foot down.”
Obando “terminated the test due to [the plaintiff] being
unable to keep her balance and for her safety.”
After Obando completed the sobriety tests, Caponera
decided to “retest [the plaintiff] in the HGN and [walk
and turn tests] to determine if she was under the influence
of her prescription medications.” In readministering the
HGN test, Caponera “noticed [the plaintiff’s] pupil size
to be equal, but her pupils were pin point.”7 He “observed
a lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes,” “a slight bounce
of each eye,” and “at maximum deviation [he] would see a
slight bouncing of each eye.” At Caponera’s request, the
plaintiff also performed the walk and turn test a second
time “but did not touch heel to toe on any step. In fact,
she took wide strides, and did not count out loud. She
did not appear to have good balance as her steps appeared
random and in a non-linear manner.”
In addition, Caponera performed two Advanced Road-
side Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) tests8—the
5“The walk and turn test requires the subject to walk heel to toe along
a straight line for nine paces, pivot, and then walk back heel to toe along
the line for another nine paces. The subject is required to count each
pace aloud from one to nine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.5, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353
Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).
6“The one leg stand test requires the subject to stand on one leg with
the other leg extended in the air for [a set time period], while counting
aloud . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232
Conn. App. 122, 126 n.6, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902,
341 A.3d 959 (2025).
7“Pinpoint pupils occur when the pupils shrink to a small size. This
can be due to various conditions and medications, such as prescription
opioids, hypertension medications, and eye inflammation.” B. Weaver,
Seven Causes of Pinpoint Pupils, (last modified June 3, 2024), available
at https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321209 (last visited
September 16, 2026).
8General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (A) provides in relevant part:
“ ‘[A]dvanced roadside impaired driving enforcement’ means a program

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
lack of convergence and the modified Romberg tests.
During the lack of convergence test, the plaintiff’s “eyes
failed to converge the first time at the bridge of her nose,
but the second time came closer.”9 The plaintiff passed a
portion of the modified Romberg test, which Caponera
administered “to see if she had suffered any loss of coor-
dination,” but she “failed to do the test properly” because
she kept her head at the resting position.10 “Ultimately
based on the totality of circumstances [Caponera] advised
[the plaintiff] that she failed the tests” and summoned
a female officer to the scene to “search and arrest [the
plaintiff]” for illegal operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of §
14-227a.11
The plaintiff then was transported to the New Canaan
Police Department for booking. A National Crime Infor-
mation Center (NCIC) check was conducted, “which
developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Techni-
cal Advisory Panel, which focuses on impaired driving enforcement
education for police officers . . . .”
ARIDE was intended “to bridge the gap in training between the [sobri-
ety tests] and the Drug Evaluation and Classification program. ARIDE
includes a set of three tests: (a) the lack of convergence eye test; (b) the
finger to nose coordination test; and (c) the modified Romberg balance
test. ARIDE is additional training for more experienced officers con-
ducting [sobriety test] investigations to help detect drug impairment.”
State v. Langshaw, Docket No. CR-21-0373037-S, 2025 WL 2124394,
*1 n.2 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2025).
9In his report, Caponera explained that, when he administered this
test, he “had [the plaintiff] stand with her feet together and hands at
her side. [He] held up [a pen] and advised her to follow it with her eyes
only. [He] then moved the pen clockwise in a circle, in front of her face
for two rotations. [He] then brought the pen to the bridge of her nose
to see if her eyes would meet in the center. [He] returned the pen to the
starting position and back to center.”
10In his report, Caponera explained that, before administering this
test, he “instructed [the plaintiff] to stand with her feet together and
hands at her side. [He] then advised her to close her eyes, tilt her head
back and approximate [thirty] seconds before opening her eyes, returning
to resting position and stating she was done. [He] demonstrated how to
perform the head tilt with eyes closed.”
11The record does not reflect whether or how the criminal charges
against the plaintiff were disposed.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
yielded no hits or wants.”12 At Obando’s request, the
plaintiff provided one breath sample, which tested nega-
tive for alcohol, and one urine sample, which was sent
to the Department of Emergency Services and Public
Protection Division of Scientific Services for testing. The
plaintiff also iterated that she had last taken prescription
medication earlier in the day, specifically at noon, and
further advised that she had not eaten anything since
the morning hours.13
During the booking procedure, Obando listed “all the
prescription bottles that were on [the plaintiff] dur-
ing the time of the incident” as follows: “Ciprofloxacin
500mg, Omeprazole 20mg, Potassium 10MEQ, Hydrala-
zine 25mg, Oxycodone 5mg, Acetaminophen 500mg,
Phospha 250 tablet, Valacyclovir 1GM tablet, Myco-
phenolic [acid] 180mg and Carvedilol 12.5mg.” He also
documented that “[t]here were duplicate prescription
bottles . . . and numerous tablets in her bag that were
not properly stored in a prescription bottle.” The plain-
tiff “completed the booking process without incident,”
although there “were moments that [she] was dozing off
and had to be seated.” Caponera asked the plaintiff if she
needed medical attention and she stated no.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2024, Obando prepared an
A-44 form14 for submission to the Department of Motor
Vehicles (department) pursuant to § 14-227b (c). In the
“INVESTIGATION INFORMATION” section of that
12“The NCIC database is maintained by the [Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation] and aggregates criminal justice information from a variety of
sources. Some files in the database contain information about individual
persons and are known as person files. Other files contain records regard-
ing stolen property. Law enforcement agencies routinely check NCIC
records to obtain information concerning persons in custody or under
investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bey, 240
Conn. App. 505, 506 n.1, ___ A.3d ___ (2026).
13The plaintiff had been read her notice of rights at 5:43 p.m.
14“The A-44 form is used by the police to report an arrest related to
operating a motor vehicle under the influence and the results of any
sobriety tests administered or the refusal to submit to such tests.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandlemire v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 117 Conn. App. 832, 835 n.2, 982 A.2d 212 (2009).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
form, Obando checked the box that indicated that the
plaintiff did not “have any physical injury or illness
which would prevent . . . her from performing any part
of the [sobriety tests].” With respect to the “WALK-
TURN” test, Obando checked the boxes for “Loses Bal-
ance,” “No Heel to Toe,” “Steps off Line,” and “Turns
Incorrectly.” With respect to the “ONE LEG STAND”
test, Obando checked the boxes for “Sways While Balanc-
ing,” “Hopping,” and “Puts Foot Down.” With respect
to the HGN test, Obando checked the box for “Other
(Explain)” and noted “Unable to perform.” Finally, with
respect to “PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST,” Obando
checked the boxes for “STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRI-
ETY TESTS” and “OTHER (EXPLAIN)” and noted the
“[c]omplainant observed erratic operating of vehicle.
Vehicle was involved in evading motor vehicle accident
in Darien prior to arriving at vehicle [owner’s] residence.
Numerous prescription bottles in vehicle.”
In the “POST ARREST INTERVIEW” section of the
form, Obando checked the boxes that indicate that the
plaintiff was not injured but that she was ill and noted
that her illness was “[d]ue to drugs taking.” The form
reflects that the plaintiff “take[s] medication” and states
“[n]umerous” to describe “what type.” Further, the form
indicates that the plaintiff “last [took] this medication”
at 12 p.m. and was not in need of any more. The form also
reflects that the plaintiff had “last eat[en]” at 9 a.m.15 All
of the questions related to “drinking” are marked “N/A.”
Finally, in the “CHEMICAL ALCOHOL TEST DATA”
section of the form, the “breath” and “urine” tests are
identified as the “TEST[S] SELECTED BY OFFICER.”
15We note that the form also reflects that the plaintiff had not “taken
any drugs” and that the follow-up question, “If so, what kind and how
much?” is left unanswered. Given the plaintiff’s admission that she had
taken medication at 12 p.m., we presume that this apparent inconsistency
is either a scrivener’s error or that it reflects an attempt to distinguish
between the prescribed medication the plaintiff admitted to taking and
other drugs she denied having consumed.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
The result of the chemical breath test was “0.00.” The
result of the chemical urine test was “[u]nknown.”
Thereafter, the plaintiff was notified in writing by the
commissioner that her operator’s license was to be sus-
pended for a period of forty-five days and that she would
be required to install and maintain an ignition interlock
device in her vehicle for six months. In that March 11,
2024 notice, the plaintiff also was advised that she had
the right to request an administrative hearing to deter-
mine whether her operator’s license should be suspended
pursuant to § 14-227b and that if she did not do so within
seven days, the suspension would automatically go into
effect. See General Statutes § 14-227b (e) and (i) (1).
The plaintiff requested a hearing and her case was
presented, on behalf of the commissioner, by one of its
attorney “presenters,” Attorney Thomas Donohue, in an
administrative per se hearing held on April 17, 2024.16
By that time, the results of the plaintiff’s chemical urine
test, which revealed “[n]o [d]rugs [d]etected,” had been
received.
At the hearing, Donohue submitted into evidence one
nineteen page exhibit that included the A-44 form; see
footnote 14 of this opinion; a breath test receipt, police
case/incident reports, a criminal appearance bond, an
advisement of rights form signed by the plaintiff, the
uniform arrest report, and a toxicology report dated
16“In most [administrative] per se hearings, the [department] Hearing
Officer plays the role of prosecutor and judge.” S. Tomeo & J. Sills, 21
Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut DUI Law (2025) § 4:5, pp.
139–40. However, “[t]he . . . [department] employs individuals referred
to as ‘Presenters’ to screen all A-44 Reports received by the department.
If the Presenter feels that a case or report is lacking evidence, he or she
may then subpoena additional testimonial or documentary evidence.
In such cases, the Presenter will . . . ‘present’ the case on behalf of the
[department], much like a prosecutor would in criminal court. Presenter
cases tend to be more adversarial with the hearing officer’s role more
judge-like. Since this remains a fact finding hearing, the hearing officer
is still permitted to ask questions of the witnesses and lawyers as well
as subpoena additional evidence.” Id., § 4:6, p. 140.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
March 27, 2024.17 Donohue also presented testimony
from Obando, whom he had subpoenaed.18 The plaintiff,
who was represented by counsel, submitted into evidence
a copy of a motion to dismiss, with exhibits, that she
had filed prior to the hearing. The motion to dismiss
was predicated on the plaintiff’s claim that there was
no physical or empirical evidence that the plaintiff “was
taking any drugs that would impair her ability to oper-
ate a motor vehicle . . . .” Her exhibits included copies
of the A-44 form, the breath test receipt, the toxicology
report and the uniform arrest report. The plaintiff also
testified on her own behalf.
At the beginning of the hearing, after the hearing
officer had sworn in the commissioner’s witnesses; see
footnote 18 of this opinion; but before the hearing began,
the hearing officer considered and denied the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss. In opposing that motion, Donohue
argued that “[c]ounsel said there is no physical evidence.
I’m going to disagree with that. I will agree that there’s
no chemical evidence. The drug test[s] for 150 drugs, but
there can be other drugs.”
Thereafter, during his direct examination, Obando
testified that once he made contact with the plaintiff,
he advised her that he had been dispatched to her home
because she was suspected of evading a motor vehicle
accident in Darien and, although she denied knowing
anything about an accident, he observed “fresh dam-
age” on her passenger front bumper, “which matched
17The toxicology report includes a section entitled “Limitations,”
which states in relevant part that “[a]nalytical methods used allow
for the detection of numerous drugs/metabolites, but are limited. For
questions about whether or not a specific drug or drug metabolite would
have been detected in this analysis, please contact the Toxicology Unit
at [the telephone number listed thereon].
“Analytes reported as ‘not detected,’ ‘negative,’ or similar verbiage
may mean that such analytes were either not detected or were below the
method’s reportable limit.”
18Donohue also had subpoenaed Caponera and Lieutenant Marc DeFe-
lice, but neither testified at the hearing. Although Caponera did not
testify at the hearing, his written report had been submitted into
evidence by the commissioner and the plaintiff.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
up with” where the Darien Police Department said the
damage should be. With respect to the plaintiff herself,
Obando observed that “[s]he was a bit slow in her reaction
in her speech with [him]” and that there were “a lot of
prescription bottles all over her center console [and] in
her lap . . . .” He described her movement as “very slow,
a little lethargic, just not really having full capabilities
of her . . . movements” and recounted that, at one point,
as she was searching for her driver’s license, the bag on
her lap “fell over and tons of prescription bottles fell out,
[and] empty pills fell out as well.”19
Obando explained that he was attempting to gather
as much information as he could in order to determine
whether the plaintiff was “intoxicated, was she under
the influence of drugs.” He testified that, in addition to
the “[driving under the influence (DUI)] option [training]
in the [police] academy,” he attended a week long DUI
school in Waterford and that he had advanced ARIDE
training, which “helps you detect if someone is impaired
. . . under drugs instead of alcohol . . . .”20 He stated that,
once Caponera arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, they
decided to conduct field sobriety tests. They first asked
the plaintiff “[is she] diabetic, [does she] have any head
injuries? Any recent injuries . . . that wouldn’t allow
[her] to perform the test such as . . . ankle, legs, hips,
anything of that sort” and the plaintiff said no. They
“asked her numerous questions . . . and she didn’t raise
any flags to us . . . .” Therefore, they proceeded with
the tests and Obando testified that the plaintiff “didn’t
perform to standard.”21 Obando further testified that,
19As stated previously in this opinion, Obando had documented in his
report that “[t]here were duplicate prescription bottles in [the plaintiff’s]
bag and numerous tablets in her bag that were not properly stored in
a prescription bottle.”
20Obando testified that it was Caponera who conducted the ARIDE
testing, which is consistent with the police report.
21Obando testified during cross-examination that he had no special
training “as it relates to physical limitations of elderly people perform-
ing these tests” and did not agree that “someone who’s elderly, older,
infirm, maybe has physical limitations, would be unable to perform”
some of these tests. He explained that, “if that was the case, they would

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
“based [on] the totality of circumstances with the Darien
call, the [subsequent] traffic complaint, and just, you
know, what I observed with prescription bottles and my
observation of her in and of itself, we believed that there
was probable cause to arrest her for DUI,” and they did
so. Obando confirmed that the chemical breath test the
plaintiff took resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and
that she also submitted a urine sample that showed “no
drugs detected.”
During his cross-examination, Obando reiterated that,
before administering the sobriety tests, he and Capo-
nera “asked [the plaintiff] the basic questions that we
ask anyone else, if they’re diabetic, if they’ve had any
recent injuries that they would be unable to perform these
tests,” and she gave no indication that she did. With
respect to the chemical breath and urine tests, Obando
acknowledged, again, that the plaintiff’s breath test
resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and that the urine
test revealed “no drugs detected.” Thereafter, he agreed
that, on the basis of the chemical breath test results, the
plaintiff was not suffering from alcohol impairment.
Obando did not agree, however, that the plaintiff was
not impaired by drugs. As grounds for his disagree-
ment, he referenced his “observation” of the plaintiff and
explained that he is trained to detect whether someone
is “taking drugs” “based off of their eyes, based off of
their movements.” Nonetheless, he admitted that he was
not qualified to determine by sight exactly what drugs
people are taking, that “people can take drugs all the
time that do not impair their ability to operate a motor
vehicle” and that not every person who loses control of
their vehicle and gets into an accident is impaired. Even
so, he iterated what he had written in his report, namely,
that the plaintiff “did say that she did consume some of
put an age limit as to when . . . someone of the age can . . . perform the
test.” Apart from the fruitless questioning of Obando by the plaintiff’s
counsel, no evidence was introduced at the hearing to indicate that, after
reaching a certain age, a person would have difficulty performing any
of the tests performed on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not raise
this as an issue on appeal to the trial court.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
her prescription drugs at twelve o’clock and has not eaten
since.” Obando did not know what specific medication the
plaintiff had taken, let alone whether that medication
was intoxicating in nature and would have impaired her
ability to operate her vehicle. Indeed, Obando admitted
that he did not ask the plaintiff what prescription medi-
cation she had taken at noon. He acknowledged that his
report is silent in this regard and he confirmed that, had
he asked the plaintiff what medication she had taken,
this information would have been included in his report
because he was “trying to prove [that] she was impaired.”
The seventy-one year old plaintiff testified that she
was not using any prescription drugs that would impair
her ability to operate a motor vehicle and that she had a
handicapped placard on the console of her vehicle when
Obando first approached her.22 She testified that Obando
did not ask her whether she “had physical limitations”
before they administered the sobriety tests but that,
once “they started to do the walking exercises, [and]
they asked [her] to put one . . . foot in front of the other
and walk [in] a straight line . . . [she] explained to them
that [she has] a lot of pain and that [she] had sciatica and
damage in [her] lower body.” She further testified that
“the reason why I don’t walk properly is because I’ve
had two kidney transplants and I developed a condition
called . . . calcineurin-inhibitor pain syndrome, and it’s
a rare condition that happens posttransplant that is very
painful and it affects mostly the lower body. So . . . it
feels as if you’re walking on broken bones sometimes,
and that is the condition that I have; that’s the reason
for the handicapped placard.”
During cross-examination, the plaintiff explained
that, with respect to the accident that prompted the
investigation, she “thought that [she] had struck a curb
and basically kind of chastised [herself] and kept going
to [her] appointment.” She further explained that when
the officers asked her about an accident, she thought they
22Obando testified that a handicapped placard “was not something
that I observed.”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
meant a collision with “someone” and that “later when
the Darien police came to New Canaan, I told them, they
said you hit more than a curb, and I apologize[d] because
I thought that I had just hit the curb.” When Donohue
asked whether the plaintiff recalled Obando asking her,
“if you had any injuries or illnesses that would hinder
the performance of the test,” as reflected on the A-44
form, she testified that she did not. Finally, when asked
if she was “upset that night being arrested,” the plaintiff
responded “[a]bsolutely. I have never in my whole life
had any type of arrest or, you know, any type of contact
like this. I was frightened . . . .”23
During his closing argument, Donohue argued that
“[t]he real issue” for the hearing officer to decide was
whether there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff
was in fact operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, and
that was, in fact, the only issue the plaintiff’s counsel
addressed in his closing argument. On this point, Dono-
hue argued that “the state admits she blows zeros. And
I actually followed up to check, it’s a 150; so, it’s a lot
of drugs they test for. Because I thought if it’s ten or
something—but again I’m straightforward. They test
for 150. They said approximately 150 the [state Forensic
Science Laboratory] told me, because I didn’t know. . . .
So, no drugs detected of those 150.”24 Donohue also
emphasized that “two ARIDE trained officers” were
involved in the investigation and that the hearing officer
should consider what they observed when reviewing the
evidence.
The plaintiff’s counsel argued, in response, that there
“has to be substantial evidence to indicate that [the plain-
23The plaintiff’s driving history as of May 10, 2024, reflected only
the April 18, 2024 per se license suspension.
24Although the toxicology report identified “[l]imitations” with respect
to the “numerous drugs/metabolites” that would be detected; see foot-
note 17 of this opinion; no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented at the hearing that the plaintiff’s urine sample was tested
for “approximately 150” drugs as Donohue argued. See, e.g., State v.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
tiff] was impaired” and there was not. He emphasized
the evidence regarding the negative chemical breath
and urine tests, the plaintiff’s physical condition and
“lower body syndrome,” and Obando’s admissions that
(1) taking medication does not necessarily mean that it
will impair one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle and
(2) he did not know, or even ask, what medication the
plaintiff had taken at noon that day as support for this
conclusion.
In a one page decision dated April 19, 2024, the hear-
ing officer found that the requirements of § 14-227b
were satisfied and ordered that the plaintiff’s license
or operating privilege be suspended for forty-five days
and that an ignition interlock device be installed and
maintained for six months. In reaching this conclusion,
the hearing officer made the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law:
“1. The [plaintiff] was placed under arrest.
“2. The [plaintiff] is not the holder of a commercial
driver’s license.
“3. [The plaintiff] was operating the motor vehicle.
“4. The police officer had probable cause to arrest the
[plaintiff] for a violation specified in [§ 14-227b].
“5. [The plaintiff] was operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.”
The hearing officer also made the following subordinate
findings. “There is sufficient evidence that the [plaintiff]
was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug or both.
“[Obando] gave sworn testimony that once he walked up
to the motor vehicle, he observed that the [plaintiff] had
numerous prescription bottles in plain sight, the bottles
were in her purse, in her lap and on the center console.
[Obando] testified that the [plaintiff’s] movements were
Stepherson, 237 Conn. App. 65, 81 n.9, 350 A.3d 1174 (2026) (repre-
sentations of counsel are not evidence).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
very slow and that she did not know that she was in an
accident. Further, [Obando] terminated the [sobriety
tests] due to the [plaintiff] being unable to keep her bal-
ance and for her safety.
“[Caponera] stated in the police report that he con-
ducted the [HGN test] and he noticed her pupil size was
equal, but pinpoint. [Caponera] observed a lack of smooth
pursuit, slight bounce of each eye as they would track
the stimulus and at maximum deviation there was slight
bounce of each eye as well.” The hearing officer made no
mention of the negative chemical breath and urine test
results. On April 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a petition
for reconsideration with the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles Petition Review Committee, which was sum-
marily denied without comment on May 6, 2024.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,25 the plaintiff
appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of
the commissioner, claiming that the decision should be
reversed because the hearing officer’s “findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions . . . [are] clearly erroneous
in light of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
produced at the hearing . . . .” Specifically, the plaintiff
claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the
hearing officer’s finding that she was “under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs at the time of
operation.” She posited that, “[w]ith such reliable and
substantial evidence of a 0.00 reading on the chemical
breath test and ‘No Drugs Detected’ on the chemical urine
test, it is impossible to establish impairment without
additional substantial evidence of impairment” and that
her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment
to the United States constitution had been violated.
In a memorandum of decision, the court, Taylor, J.,
noted that the sole basis of the plaintiff’s appeal was the
hearing officer’s finding that the plaintiff was “operating
25General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person who
has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency
and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior
Court as provided in this section. . . .”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug, or both.”26 See General Statutes § 14-227b
(g) (3) (C). The court explained in its recitation of the
facts, derived from the evidence in the record, that “[t]he
plaintiff’s breath and urine samples were negative for
alcohol or any of the drugs that are tested for in these
circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) It then recounted
much of the information that was included in the police
report, including the officer’s observations with respect
to the plaintiff’s slow movement, the “numerous pre-
scription bottles in the plaintiff’s vehicle,” her admission
that she had taken “her prescription medication at noon
that date,” and the damage to her vehicle. The court also
listed the names of the prescribed medications, just as
Obando had done in his report.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “the
fact that [she] tested negative for alcohol and for drugs
meant that she had not been operating under the influ-
ence” because “there was no evidence to show that the
tests for drugs was capable of excluding all drugs.” Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that, “[b]ecause there is
substantial evidence in the record supporting the hearing
officer’s conclusion that [Obando] had probable cause to
arrest the plaintiff for operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of alcohol/drugs and that the record did
contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the plaintiff was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol while
operating a motor vehicle,” the plaintiff could not pre-
vail and it dismissed her appeal. This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
Before we address the plaintiff’s claim that there was
not substantial evidence in the record to support the
finding that she was operating her motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug,
we set forth our standard of review and the general legal
principles that are germane to our analysis. “[J]udicial
26We note that the court referenced “§ 14-227b (g) (3) (3)” in doing
so, which plainly is a scrivener’s error.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
review of the commissioner’s action is governed by the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [General Stat-
utes §§ 4-166 through 4-189], and the scope of that review
is very restricted. . . . [R]eview of an administrative
agency decision requires a court to determine whether
there is substantial evidence in the administrative record
to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether
the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . .
Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case
or substitute its own judgment for that of the administra-
tive agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of
fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all
of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order,
acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its
discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
254 Conn. 333, 343, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).
“In an administrative appeal, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that the commissioner’s decision to
suspend a motor vehicle operating privilege was clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record. . . . Substantial
evidence exists if the administrative record affords a
substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue
can be reasonably inferred. . . . The evidence must be
substantial enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury,
a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought
to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. . . . [I]f
the administrative record provides substantial evidence
upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have
based [her] finding . . . the decision must be upheld. . . .
The obvious corollary to the substantial evidence rule
is that a court may not affirm a decision if the evidence
in the record does not support it.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fernschild v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 177 Conn. App. 472, 476–77, 172 A.3d 864
(2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 997, 175 A.3d 564 (2018).
The “so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the
sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to
sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis
of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred. . . . [I]t imposes an important limitation on the
power of the courts to overturn a decision of an admin-
istrative agency . . . and [provides] a more restrictive
standard of review than standards embodying review of
weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action. . . .
The United States Supreme Court, in defining substan-
tial evidence . . . has said that it is something less than
the weight of the evidence, and [that] the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence. . . . [T]he
credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual
issues are matters within the province of the administra-
tive agency. . . . As with any administrative appeal, our
role is not to reexamine the evidence presented to the
[hearing officer] or to substitute our judgment for the
agency’s expertise, but, rather, to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to support its conclu-
sions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council,
313 Conn. 669, 689–90, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014). “In deter-
mining whether an administrative finding is supported by
substantial evidence, a court must defer to the [hearing
officer’s] . . . right to believe or disbelieve the evidence
presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in
part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391,
405–406, 710 A.2d 807, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 917,
717 A.2d 234 (1998).
Moreover, “[a]lthough proceedings before administra-
tive agencies . . . are informal and are conducted without
regard to the strict rules of evidence, the hearing must be
conducted so as not to violate the fundamental rules of
natural justice.” Id., 407–408. Our Supreme Court has
explained that “[f]undamentals of natural justice require
that there must be due notice of the hearing, and at the
hearing no one may be deprived of the right to produce

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
relevant evidence or to cross-examine witnesses produced
by his adversary . . . . Put differently, [d]ue process of law
requires that the parties involved have an opportunity to
know the facts on which the commission is asked to act
. . . and to offer rebuttal evidence.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Grimes v. Conser-
vation Commission, 243 Conn. 266, 274, 703 A.2d 101
(1997). “In an administrative action . . . the agency need
only produce probative and reliable evidence to ensure
that the proceedings are fundamentally fair.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O’Rourke v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 508, 636 A.2d
409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994).
“Section 14-227b, commonly referred to as the implied
consent statute, governs license suspension hearings.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mata v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, 221 Conn. App. 25, 35, 299
A.3d 1262 (2023). Section 14-227b (b) (1) provides in
relevant part that “[a] police officer who has placed a
person under arrest for a violation of section 14-227a
. . . may request that such person submit to a blood,
breath or urine test at the option of the police officer . . .
after such person has been [inter alia] . . . (D) informed
that such person’s license or operating privilege may be
suspended in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion if (i) such person refuses to submit to such test . . .
(ii) such person submits to such test and the results of
such test indicate that such person has an elevated blood
alcohol content, or (iii) the officer concludes, through
investigation, that such person was operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any
drug, or both.”
Section 14-227b (d) provides in relevant part that, “[i]f
a police officer who has placed a person under arrest for
a violation of section 14-227a . . . obtains results from
a test administered under subsection (b) of this section
that indicate that the person does not have an elevated
blood alcohol content, such officer shall: (1) Advise such
person that such person’s license or operating privilege

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
may be suspended in accordance with the provisions of
this section if such police officer concludes, through
investigation, that such person was operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any drug, or both; and (2) Submit a report to the com-
missioner in accordance with the procedure set forth in
subsection (c) of this section and, if such report contains
the results of a blood, breath or urine test that does not
show an elevated blood alcohol content, such report shall
conform to the requirements in subsection (c) of this sec-
tion for reports that contain results showing an elevated
blood alcohol content.27 In any report submitted under
this subdivision, the officer shall document (A) the basis
for the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to
arrest such person for a violation of section 14-227a . . .
and (B) whether the officer concluded, through inves-
tigation, that the person was operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug,
or both. . . .” (Footnote added.)
Section 14-227b (e) provides in relevant part that,
“upon receipt of a report submitted under subsection
. . . (d) of this section, the commissioner may suspend
any operator’s license” and that “[a]ny person whose
operator’s license . . . has been suspended in accordance
with this subdivision shall automatically be entitled to
a hearing before the commissioner . . . .”
Section 14-227b (g) (3) provides that the hearing shall
be limited to the determination of the following issues:
“(A) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest
the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the
27General Statutes § 14-227b (c) provides in relevant part that “[t]he
police officer shall prepare a report of the incident not later than six
business days after such arrest and thereafter, shall mail or otherwise
transmit in accordance with this subsection the report and a copy of the
results of any chemical test to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The
report shall contain such information as prescribed by the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles and shall be subscribed and sworn to under penalty
of false statement as provided in section 53a-157b by the arresting
officer. . . . The report shall set forth the grounds for the officer’s belief
that there was probable cause to arrest such person for a violation of
section 14-227a . . . .”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both;
(B) was such person placed under arrest; (C) was such
person operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both; and (D) was
such person operating the motor vehicle.”
Finally, § 14-227b (g) (5) provides that, “[i]n a hearing
based on a report submitted under subsection (d) of this
section, evidence of operation under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both shall be admis-
sible. Such evidence may include, but need not be limited
to, (A) the police officer’s observations of intoxication, as
documented in a report submitted to the commissioner
under subsection (d) of this section; (B) the results of
any chemical test administered under this section or a
toxicology report certified by the Division of Scientific
Services within the Department of Emergency Services
and Public Protection; (C) hospital or medical records
obtained in accordance with subsection (j) of this section
or by the consent of the operator; (D) the results of any
tests conducted by, or the report of, an officer trained
in advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement; or
(E) reports of drug recognition experts.”28
In the present case, the administrative record reveals
that Obando requested that the plaintiff submit to both
chemical breath and urine tests and that the plaintiff
consented. See General Statutes § 14-227b (b) (1). After
obtaining the results of the plaintiff’s breath test, which
28A “ ‘drug recognition expert’ ” is “a person certified by the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police as having met all requirements of
the International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.” General
Statutes § 14-227a (a) (C). Drug recognition experts are qualified to
conduct “drug influence evaluation[s],” which are evaluations “devel-
oped by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police” that “determine the level
of a person’s impairment from the use of drugs and the drug category
causing such impairment.” General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (B); see also
D. Evans, 1 Drug Testing Law, Technology & Practice (2026) § 4:59
(drug recognition experts “are trained to review vital signs and other
physical and mental data to determine if a subject is under the influence
of a drug and what kind of drug”). No evidence from a drug recognition
expert was produced by either party during the administrative hearing.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
revealed that she did not have an elevated blood alcohol
content, Obando prepared and submitted to the commis-
sioner an A-44 form in accordance with § 14-227b (d).
Upon receipt of the A-44 form, the commissioner issued
a notice that the plaintiff’s operator’s license was sus-
pended, and the plaintiff requested a hearing to contest
the suspension. See General Statutes § 14-227b (e).
At the hearing, the evidence that the commissioner
produced that was relevant to the issue of whether the
plaintiff was under the influence of “intoxicating liquor
or any drug, or both” when she was operating her motor
vehicle included (1) the observations of Obando and Capo-
nera, two ARIDE trained officers, that she was “slow
with her movements,” “disoriented and was not able to
answer questions clearly,” unable to follow directions,
and fumbling her belongings; (2) the plaintiff’s failure
to recall the accident she had been in; (3) the results of
the chemical breath and urine tests to which the plaintiff
submitted at Obando’s request; and (4) the results of the
field sobriety and ARIDE testing the officers adminis-
tered. See General Statutes § 14-227b (g) (5).
Moreover, a recurring observation, made in both the
documentary and testimonial evidence, was that the
plaintiff had several prescription bottles in her vehicle
and in her bag. Indeed, both Obando’s police report and
the A-44 form specifically reference “numerous prescrip-
tion bottles,” and Obando testified that, when the bag
on the plaintiff’s lap “fell over . . . tons of prescription
bottles fell out” and he also observed in her bag duplicate
prescription bottles and numerous tablets not stored in
bottles. He further testified that, “what [he] observed
with prescription bottles,” in addition to the traffic
complaints and what he observed of the plaintiff “in and
of itself,” informed his determination that there was
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.
Another point of emphasis was the plaintiff’s admis-
sion that she had taken some prescription medication
that day. Caponera noted in his report that she “denied
drinking any alcoholic beverages, but admitted she took

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
prescription medication earlier in the day.” Likewise,
Obando noted in his report that, “[d]uring the booking
process, [the plaintiff] did state she last took her prescrip-
tion pills at noon and had not eaten since the morning
hours.” Obando also noted on the A-44 form that the
plaintiff “take[s] medication” and that she last took it
at 12 p.m. Finally, Obando testified, almost verbatim
from his report, that the plaintiff “did say that she did
consume some of her prescription drugs at twelve o’clock
and has not eaten since.”
Indeed, Caponera stated in his report that he decided
to readminister two of the field sobriety tests Obando
had already administered specifically “to determine if
[the plaintiff] was under the influence of her prescription
medications.” He also performed two ARIDE tests, which
are tests geared toward “detecting drug impairment.”
State v. Langshaw, Docket No. CR-21-0373037-S, 2025
WL 2124394, *6 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2025). Obando
testified that he was attempting to determine whether
the plaintiff was “intoxicated, was she under the influ-
ence of drugs,” and he agreed that, on the basis of the
results of the plaintiff’s chemical breath test, she was not
suffering from alcohol impairment. Even so, the results
of the plaintiff’s chemical urine test, as reflected in the
toxicology report, revealed “[n]o [d]rugs [d]etected.”
Placing great emphasis on the chemical urine test
results, the plaintiff claims that this evidence was not
sufficient to support the hearing officer’s conclusion that
she “was operating a motor vehicle under the influence
of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.” Although
she acknowledges that “behavioral evidence in certain
situations [can] constitute sufficient and substantial
evidence of a finding of intoxication” and that, in fact,
§ 14-227b “clearly permits it even when, for example,
the chemical or urine tests are exculpatory”; see General
Statutes § 14-227b (d) (1) and (g) (5); she argues that,
“in this particular case and on the whole record, the
hearing officer’s ‘findings, inferences’ and conclusion

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
were clearly erroneous in view of the highly ‘reliable,
probative’ and forensic evidence.”29
The commissioner claims in response that “[t]he record
in this case, including the observed behavior of the plain-
tiff, supports the reasonable inference that the plaintiff
was under the influence of ‘any drug.’ ” The commissioner
argues, inter alia, that the plaintiff “admitted that she
consumed prescription medication at noon on the day of
her arrest and that she was ill due to the medications. . . .
She had ten prescription medication bottles in her vehicle
at the time of her arrest, and there were loose pills in her
bag.” (Citations omitted.) Moreover, the commissioner
emphasizes that those ten prescription bottles “included
ciprofloxacin 500mg, hydralazine 25mg, oxycodone 5mg,
valacyclovir 1GM tablet, mycophenolic [acid] 180mg,
and carvedilol 12.5mg . . . .” Finally, with respect to the
toxicology report, the commissioner points out that it
“was not exhaustive. Rather, the toxicology report spe-
cifically identified its limitations, explaining: ‘Analytical
methods used allow for the detection of numerous drugs/
metabolites, but are limited . . . . Analytes reported as
“not detected,” “negative,” or similar verbiage may mean
that such analyses were either not detected or were below
the method’s reportable limit.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
29The plaintiff also argues as support for her claim on appeal that the
HGN test results were exculpatory and that the hearing officer gave
improper weight to the evidence concerning her performance on those
tests. In fact, she argues that the hearing officer “should have opined
that the HGN test observations did not support a finding that [she] was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs” because the A-44 form merely
indicates that she was “unable to perform” the test, not that she dem-
onstrated nystagmus or lack of smooth pursuit. As the commissioner
points out in his brief, however, and our review of the record confirms,
the plaintiff did not advance this argument during the administrative
hearing or before the trial court. Our review of the record also reveals
that Obando testified before the hearing officer that the plaintiff “didn’t
perform to standard” on any of the sobriety tests. Moreover, Caponera’s
report indicates that after he readministered the HGN and walk and turn
tests and administered the ARIDE tests, he advised the plaintiff that
she had “failed” them. Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support the conclusion that the HGN test results were inculpatory
and the plaintiff’s belated argument that the hearing officer should
have found to the contrary lacks merit.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
Thus, the commissioner maintains that the chemical
urine test results did not “definitively establish that
[the plaintiff] was not under the influence of a drug at
the time she operated her vehicle.”
Although we agree with the plaintiff that the chemical
breath and urine test evidence does offer support for a
conclusion that she was not impaired by alcohol or drugs
while operating her motor vehicle, it is neither disposi-
tive nor can it be considered in a vacuum. Indeed, as the
plaintiff herself acknowledges, § 14-227b allows for
the suspension of a motor vehicle operator’s license in a
situation where chemical test results are negative but a
police officer concludes, nonetheless, that a driver was
operating a motor vehicle while “under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both . . . .” See General
Statutes § 14-227b (d) (1) and (g) (5). In this case, the
toxicology report itself specifies that there are limita-
tions to the testing performed and, thus, leaves room for
a finding that, notwithstanding the negative results, the
plaintiff was under the influence of a “drug/metabolite”
that either was not detectable or was “below the method’s
reportable limit.” Indeed, no evidence was produced by
either party as to the type of medication the plaintiff
indicated she had ingested earlier in the afternoon, and
there was no indication that any of the medications on the
list Obando made of the identifiable prescription drugs
found in the plaintiff’s vehicle would have been detected
in the chemical testing. Moreover, there is no evidence
as to the nature of the loose pills Obando observed in the
plaintiff’s vehicle. Finally, and although not raised by
either party, we are compelled to note that there may
be an issue with an insufficient temporal nexus between
the time of the ingestion of any drug and the time of the
testing. This lack of information renders untenable any
conclusion that the chemical urine test results could be
considered conclusive in favor of the plaintiff.
To this end, we further note that the toxicology report
expressly invites “questions about whether or not a spe-
cific drug or drug metabolite would have been detected in

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
this analysis” by contacting “the Toxicology Unit” at a
phone number listed thereon. Although the investigating
officers compiled a detailed list of ten different prescrip-
tion medications the plaintiff had in her vehicle at the
time of her arrest and the plaintiff admitted that she
had, in fact, consumed prescription medication earlier
in the day, there is no evidence as to whether pertinent
questions to inform the chemical urine test results were
asked, such as what drug did the plaintiff ingest earlier
that day, or whether any or all of the ten listed prescribed
medications “would have been detected in [the] analysis.”
At the very least, if the record reflected that the invited
question had been asked and the answer was that all of the
ten medications would have been detected and they were
not, the hearing officer may have weighed the results
reflected in the toxicology report differently.
Even without the toxicology report, however weighed,
the record reflects that the hearing officer had evidence
before her, which she expressly credited, as to the obser-
vations and conclusions of Obando and Caponera with
respect to the numerous prescription bottles and loose
pills that were in the plaintiff’s vehicle and purse, her
slow movements, her lack of recall with respect to the
accident, the report about her erratic driving, her inabil-
ity to follow directions and her subpar performance on
the sobriety tests and ARIDE tests. Based on that evi-
dence, she concluded that the plaintiff was operating her
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug, or both. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues
that there are several innocent explanations for what
the officers observed and that reasonably support the
conclusion that the plaintiff was not impaired, includ-
ing (1) the chemical breath and urine test results, (2) the
plaintiff’s age, (3) the plaintiff’s testimony regarding
her health issues and physical limitations vis-à-vis the
sobriety tests and ARIDE tests, (4) the fact that she
had been at Quest Laboratories, and (5) the fact that she
had not eaten since 9 a.m. We must defer to the hearing
officer’s assessment of the credibility and reliability of
the evidence, however, and the plaintiff presented only

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
her own testimony as evidence, which the hearing officer
was not obligated to accept as persuasive. See Bancroft
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn.
App. 405–406. We note, for example, that the record
does not reflect that the plaintiff submitted any reports
from a physician regarding the health issues and physical
limitations about which she testified. See, e.g., Ludwig
v. Salinas, Docket No. CV-97-0341550-S, 1999 WL
329945, *2 (Conn. Super. May 14, 1999) (report from
physician describing plaintiff’s medical condition was
entered into evidence at suspension hearing). Although
she was under no obligation to do so, any such report
may have bolstered her testimony and credibility before
the hearing officer. See FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut
Siting Council, supra, 313 Conn. 689 (“[t]he credibility
of witnesses and the determination of factual issues
are matters within the province of the administrative
agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, one cannot overlook the fact that on two
occasions that afternoon, prior to her arrest, the plaintiff
had been observed as incapable of operating her vehicle
in a manner consistent with that of a careful and pru-
dent driver. She stated that she thought she had struck
a curb, although her vehicle sustained front end dam-
age, and she left the scene. Moreover, the plaintiff later
swerved and almost struck a tree, then took an unsafe
right turn and almost caused a collision, her pupils were
constricted, she failed at least five sobriety tests, lost
her balance, had trouble following simple directions
and admitted to having taken prescription medication
earlier in the day, hours after she had eaten anything.
This substantial circumstantial evidence supported the
hearing officer’s findings.
Indeed, this court previously has explained that “[a]
driver operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of a drug is one whose mental, physical or nervous
processes have become so affected that [she] lacked to
an appreciable degree the ability to function properly in
the operation of [her] vehicle. . . . Typical indicia of the

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
inability to function as a driver because of the intoxicat-
ing effect of drugs or alcohol include whether a defendant
smells of the drug, has slurred speech, fumbles in retriev-
ing paperwork, has glassy and bloodshot eyes, admits
that [she] has, while driving, been using drugs or fails
sobriety tests. . . . Most importantly, the main indicia of
intoxication relates to the ability to operate the vehicle
without committing traffic violations.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 182 Conn. App. 165, 179, 189 A.3d 629, cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 940, 195 A.3d 1134 (2018). And our
Supreme Court has stated, “the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting
Council, supra, 313 Conn. 689.
We conclude, therefore, that the observations of
Obando and Caponera in their reports, the A-44 form
and the testimony of Obando provide reliable, probative
and substantial evidence that the plaintiff was operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, as the hearing officer found.
The trial court properly applied the significantly defer-
ential standard of review applicable to administrative
appeals involving license suspensions in determining that
the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that the
commissioner’s decision was clearly erroneous in view
of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on
the whole record.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.