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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
DANIEL W. E. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION*
(AC 46617)
Seeley, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of sexual assault and
risk of injury to a child, appealed after the habeas court denied his petition
for certification to appeal from its judgment denying his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly construed
the allegations in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, resulting in a
deprivation of his right to due process. Held:
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner
certification to appeal, as he failed to demonstrate that his underlying claim
of error was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve
the issues in a different manner or that the question was adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further, and, accordingly, this court concluded
that the petitioner failed to invoke this court’s jurisdiction, and the appeal
was dismissed.
The habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
as, despite the petitioner’s claim to the contrary, the court properly construed
the allegations of the petition to the petitioner’s benefit, in light of the
petitioner’s legal burden and the specific relief sought by him, and, even if
the petitioner could demonstrate that the court erred in its interpretation
of the allegations in the petition, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
it resulted in a specific due process violation as was alleged.
Argued March 17—officially released September 16, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J.,
denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the
petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
Cheryl A. Juniewic, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).
Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Anne Mahoney,
state’s attorney, and Donna Fusco, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
WILSON, J. The petitioner, Daniel W. E., appeals fol-
lowing the denial of his petition for certification to
appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying
his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
petitioner claims that the court (1) abused its discretion
in denying his petition for certification to appeal and
(2) improperly construed the allegations in his amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, resulting in a depri-
vation of his right to due process. We conclude that
the habeas court properly denied the petition for certifi-
cation to appeal and, therefore, dismiss this appeal.
The following procedural history is relevant to the
claims raised on appeal. On September 27, 2012, follow-
ing a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of two
counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and one count of
risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2001) § 53-21 (a) (2). The conviction was based
on evidence that the petitioner sexually assaulted the
victim, his daughter, when she was between six and
nine years of age. On November 26, 2012, the court,
Boland, J., imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-
five years, followed by fifteen years of special parole.
At the petitioner’s criminal trial, he was represented by
Attorney Mark Hauslaib.
Following his conviction, the petitioner brought a
direct appeal to this court. Our Supreme Court trans-
ferred the appeal to itself pursuant to General Statutes

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
§ 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2. Thereafter, our
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
See State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn. 593, 142 A.3d 265
(2016), overruled by State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213,
330 A.3d 73 (2025). In that appeal, our Supreme Court
rejected the petitioner’s claim that the trial court had
improperly instructed the jury on the use of constancy
of accusation testimony.1 Id., 616. In connection with
his direct appeal, the petitioner was represented by
Attorney Glen W. Falk.
While the petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, he
brought a habeas action challenging his conviction
(prior habeas action). The amended petition filed in the
prior habeas action set forth a single claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, which was based on various
alleged deficiencies. On April 26, 2018, following a trial,
the court, Kwak, J., denied the petition. In connection
with the prior habeas action, the petitioner was repre-
sented by Attorney James E. Mortimer. Thereafter, this
court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Daniel
W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App.
905, 217 A.3d 59 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 926,
224 A.3d 904 (2020).
Subsequently, the petitioner brought the present habeas
action. In count one of his August 17, 2020 amended
petition, the petitioner alleged that he was denied his
right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel,
Attorney Falk. The petitioner alleged that Attorney
Falk’s representation fell below the standard of care
1 We note that in Daniel W. E. our Supreme Court modified the constancy
of accusation doctrine by requiring trial courts to instruct juries in sexual
offense cases in which defendants had not challenged the complainants’
credibility based on delayed reporting, that they could not consider a com-
plainant’s delay in reporting a sexual offense in evaluating a victim’s credibil-
ity. State v. Daniel W. E., supra, 322 Conn. 629–30. The court subsequently
overruled Daniel W. E. and abandoned the modified approach to constancy
evidence. See State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213, 330 A.3d 73 (2025).

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
for appellate counsel and that, but for Attorney Falk’s
ineffective and deficient performance, there is a reason-
able probability that his conviction, in whole or in part,
would have been reversed on appeal.
In count two of his amended petition, the petitioner
alleged that he was denied his right to the effective
assistance of prior habeas counsel, Attorney Mortimer.
The petitioner alleged that, in his prior habeas action,
Attorney Mortimer failed ‘‘to investigate and locate a
trial witness who allegedly recanted her statements
made to law enforcement officials’’ concerning his crim-
inal conduct, failed ‘‘to consult and retain a medical
expert to independently assess the victim’s injuries,’’
and failed ‘‘to question Dr. David Mantell about whether
the quality of [State] Trooper Eric Trotter’s interview
of the victim fell below the standard of care under
recently promulgated guidelines for obtaining state-
ments from children.’’2 The petitioner alleged that Attor-
ney Mortimer’s representation fell below the standard
of care for habeas counsel and that, but for his ineffec-
tive assistance, there is a reasonable probability that
the court would have granted his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the prior habeas action.
In the present habeas action, the petitioner requested
that the habeas court vacate the judgment of conviction;
2 The record reflects that, at the prior habeas trial, the petitioner presented
testimony from Mantell. Mantell is a clinical psychologist who specializes
in forensic psychology and ‘‘particularly in child abuse and neglect issues.’’
In preparation for his testimony, Mantell reviewed a variety of documents
related to the victim, including records from the Department of Children and
Families, records of police interviews, investigation records, handwritten
witness statements and court records of testimony. At the prior habeas trial,
Mantell rendered an expert opinion about the merits of an interview of the
victim that was conducted by Trotter when the victim and her mother arrived
at the police station to file a complaint concerning the petitioner. At the
petitioner’s criminal trial, the state introduced evidence that Trotter had
interviewed the victim and that the statements that she made during this
interview led to the petitioner’s arrest.

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
return the matter to the trial court docket; direct the
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, to release
him from confinement; and order whatever other relief
that law and justice required. With respect to the sub-
stantive allegations of deficient performance and preju-
dice, the respondent left the petitioner to his proof.
On February 27 and March 13, 2023, the habeas court,
Newson, J., held a trial on the petition. On April 12,
2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision in
which it rendered judgment denying the petition. With
respect to the allegations in count one concerning appel-
late counsel, the court concluded that the petitioner
failed to satisfy his burden of proving ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel. 3
The habeas court then addressed the allegations in
count two that the petitioner was deprived of the effec-
tive assistance of habeas counsel in the prior habeas
action. After setting forth the applicable principles of
law, the court stated: ‘‘As to the claims that Attorney
Mortimer failed [to] investigate and call a witness who
allegedly recanted their statement and that he failed to
question Dr. Mantell about the quality of the trooper’s
interview of the victim, they . . . fail as a matter of law.
. . . Neither the unnamed witness [nor] Dr. Mantell
was called as a witness at the habeas trial, which pre-
vents the court from assessing the information either
of them allegedly had to offer or the potential impact
of that information on the outcome of the trial. . . .
As such, there is no need for further analysis of those
claims. . . .
‘‘Additionally, although Attorney Mortimer was asked
‘glancing’ questions about his memory or the testimony
the trooper provided at the prior habeas trial about
3 Because the court’s resolution of count one is not a subject of this
appeal, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the analysis of count one in any
greater detail.

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
his interview of the victim, there was no substantive
attempt to address why Attorney Mortimer handled the
trooper’s testimony the way he did or to substantively
address what, if any, other ways the petitioner alleges
he should have attacked that testimony. In other words,
the petitioner offered no affirmative evidence that made
Attorney Mortimer’s decisions in addressing the testi-
mony of Dr. Mantell and the trooper, under the circum-
stances presented to him at that time and based on the
information he possessed, objectively unreasonable.
. . . Attorney Mortimer was not questioned at all about
the unnamed recantation witness. Therefore, even if
those claims did not fail as a matter of law for failure
to call the witnesses in question to the stand, they would
fail because the petitioner did not offer any substantive
evidence addressing Attorney Mortimer’s performance
with regard to these claims. . . .
‘‘Another reason all of the claims above would fail
as a matter of law is because there was no evidence
presented directly regarding the performance of Attor-
ney Hauslaib, criminal trial counsel, regarding these
matters. Attorney Hauslaib also did not testify at the
habeas trial. As stated [previously], to be successful in
a claim of ineffective assistance against first habeas
counsel would require the petitioner to prove deficient
performance and prejudice against first habeas counsel
and criminal trial counsel. . . . Without directly ques-
tioning Attorney Hauslaib about what he knew, when
he knew those things, and why he made particular deci-
sions during the course of his representation, the peti-
tioner cannot meet his burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption that all of Attorney Hauslaib’s decisions fell
within the wide range of professionally reasonable deci-
sions under the circumstances. . . .
‘‘The petitioner’s final claim is that Attorney Mortimer
failed to consult with and obtain his own expert to
independently assess the victim’s injuries. By way of

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
additional information, Dr. Erica Kesselman testified at
the petitioner’s criminal trial as an expert in sexual
assault examinations and was also part of the Windham
County child sexual assault multidisciplinary team. She
was asked to perform a sexual assault examination on
the victim by the Department of Children and Families
during the course of the investigation. . . . In the end,
based on all of the information available, Dr. Kesselman
reached a conclusion that her findings . . . were ‘inde-
terminate’ on the issue of whether the victim had suf-
fered sexual trauma. She also testified that she did not,
and would not expect to, find any physical evidence of
injury with regard to the reports of anal penetration. It
was the petitioner’s contention that Attorney Mortimer
should have offered his own expert to testify as to these
critical issues.
‘‘The petitioner did present the testimony of Dr. Ste-
phen Guertin, an expert in pediatric care and child
sexual assault investigations. The testimony Dr. Guertin
presented, however, was not overly compelling nor did
it actually contradict Dr. Kesselman’s ultimate opinion
that the physical findings were ‘indeterminate.’ Also,
Dr. Guertin’s testimony, despite the fact that he is an
expert witness, must be viewed through the lens that
he has never actually spoken to the victim, never exam-
ined, and never even saw photographs or other medical
imaging of the structures Dr. Kesselman physically
examined. In other words, Dr. Guertin’s entire opinion
was based on his review of Dr. Kesselman’s written
report and the transcripts of her testimony. Notwith-
standing, his only real dispute was he claimed there
are studies that indicate that the type of injuries seen
on the victim’s hymen could be associated with her
current sexual activity . . . [and] that such informa-
tion should have [been] provided within Dr. Kessel-
man’s testimony. Other than that, he agreed that Dr.
Kesselman’s examination of the victim appeared to have

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
followed proper protocols and that her ultimate conclu-
sion that the findings were ‘indeterminate’ was the
proper conclusion called for based on all of the informa-
tion.
‘‘Given [that] Dr. Guertin’s expert opinion ultimately
agrees with the opinion provided by Dr. Kesselman,
there is no reasonable likelihood that presenting his
testimony at the prior habeas, or the criminal trial would
have resulted in a more favorable outcome for the peti-
tioner. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to meet his
burden of showing that he was prejudiced . . . and it
is not necessary for the court to analyze habeas or trial
counsel’s performance.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
in original; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)
Following the habeas court’s denial of the amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner filed
a petition for certification to appeal. In the petition, he
set forth the following ground: ‘‘The habeas . . . court
erred in denying the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because trial counsel did not call a
medical expert at trial.’’ The court denied the petition.
This appeal followed.4 Additional facts will be set forth
as necessary.
I
We first address the petitioner’s claim that the court
abused its discretion in denying his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal. We are not persuaded.
4 As stated previously in this opinion, the petitioner’s claims in this appeal
do not concern the habeas court’s resolution of count one of his amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In challenging the court’s resolution
of count two of the amended petition, however, the petitioner relies on the
alleged constitutional violation that we discuss in greater detail in part II
of this opinion. Beyond arguing in connection with that claim that the court
misinterpreted count two of his amended petition, the petitioner does not
challenge the reasons on which the court relied in denying him relief in
connection with count two. Accordingly, we do not review the court’s sub-
stantive analysis of that claim.

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
At the outset, we observe that the ground set forth by
the petitioner in his petition for certification to appeal
is different than the claim that he advances in this
appeal. As set forth previously in this opinion, in the
petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner set
forth as the ground for the appeal that ‘‘[t]he habeas
. . . court erred in denying [his] ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because trial counsel did not call a
medical expert at trial.’’ In this appeal, however, the
petitioner challenges the denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that the habeas court
improperly construed count two of his amended peti-
tion. More specifically, in his appellate brief, the peti-
tioner argues as follows: ‘‘The habeas court incorrectly
read 	beyond 	the 	four 	corners 	of 	the 	petitioner’s
amended petition and inferred claims that were not
included in the petition. More particularly, the habeas
court read the petition to specify that it contained
claims that prior habeas counsel, [Attorney] Mortimer,
failed to plead and prove that trial counsel, [Attorney]
Hauslaib, was ineffective for the various reasons as
alleged in the complaint.
‘‘This reading of the complaint by the habeas court
was erroneous, and prejudiced the petitioner, because
by adding claims to the complaint that were not actually
pled, and that did not have any basis in the evidence
presented at trial, the habeas court preempted the abil-
ity of the petitioner to file any type of future ineffective
claim against current habeas counsel for her failure to
properly plead the underlying complaint, thus violating
the petitioner’s due process right to bring a claim alleg-
ing [in]effective assistance of current habeas counsel.’’
The petitioner does not dispute that he failed to
include this claim, which he couches in constitutional
terms, in his petition for certification to appeal. Instead,
the petitioner argues before this court that the habeas
court abused its discretion in denying certification

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
because the unpreserved claim is not frivolous. The
petitioner argues that the judgment of the habeas court
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must
be reversed on its merits in light of the habeas court’s
flawed interpretation of count two. The respondent cor-
rectly observes that the habeas court was not asked to
consider this issue when it considered the petition for
certification to appeal. The respondent urges us to con-
clude that, even if the unpreserved claim had been
included in the petition for certification to appeal, the
habeas court would have properly exercised its discre-
tion to deny the petition because the claim ‘‘is wholly
frivolous and underserving of encouragement to pro-
ceed further.’’ Setting aside the fact that the petitioner
did not include the claim raised in this appeal in the
petition for certification to appeal, he argues that he
preserved the claim for appellate review ‘‘through the
testimony and arguments that were presented during
the habeas trial.’’ Alternatively, the petitioner seeks
review of this claim pursuant to the bypass doctrine
articulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). In Banks v.
Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 359–60,
297 A.3d 541 (2023), our Supreme Court concluded ‘‘that
unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court’s han-
dling of the habeas proceeding are reviewable under
the plain error doctrine and Golding, despite the peti-
tioner’s failure to include such claims in the petition
for certification to appeal denied by the habeas court,
if the petitioner can demonstrate, consistent with [the
criteria set forth in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608,
618, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (Simms II)], that the unpre-
served claims involve issues that are debatable among
jurists of reason, could be resolved in a different man-
ner, or deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ In
Banks, the court specified that a petitioner may fulfill

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
this burden in one of two ways: ‘‘First, the petitioner
may strictly comply with the two part showing required
by Simms II and expressly argue specific reasons why
the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certifi-
cation. Second, the petitioner may expressly allege that
his [or her] argument on the merits demonstrates an
abuse of discretion. . . . Although the burden is not
onerous, requiring compliance with the Simms II crite-
ria provides petitioners with the requisite incentive to
include their unpreserved claims in the petition for cer-
tification to appeal whenever possible.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 359.
For the reasons set forth in part II of this opinion,
we conclude, on the basis of our review of the record
and applicable legal principles, that the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that his underlying claim of error
is debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could
resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the
question is adequate to deserve encouragement to pro-
ceed further. Accordingly, we conclude that the peti-
tioner has failed to invoke this court’s jurisdiction, and
the appeal must be dismissed.
II
We next address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court improperly 	construed the allegations 	in his
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, resulting
in a deprivation of his right to due process. We are not
persuaded.
According to the petitioner, in his amended petition,
he ‘‘failed to plead any counts alleging ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel or a claim of ineffective assistance
of prior habeas counsel for failure to plead a claim
against trial counsel due to deficient performance.’’ The
petitioner correctly states that, with respect to the claim
concerning prior habeas counsel, Attorney Mortimer,

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
he alleged in his amended petition that Attorney Morti-
mer’s representation was deficient in that he failed ‘‘to
investigate and locate a trial witness who allegedly
recanted her statements made to law enforcement about
the petitioner’s criminal conduct,’’ failed ‘‘to consult
and retain a medical expert to independently assess the
victim’s injuries,’’ and failed ‘‘to question Dr. [Mantell]
about whether the quality of Trooper [Trotter’s] inter-
view of the victim fell below the standard of care under
recently promulgated guidelines for obtaining state-
ments from children.’’ When the habeas court addressed
these counts, however, it noted: ‘‘Although the allega-
tions [in count two] failed to specify the further neces-
sary allegation that [prior] habeas counsel ‘failed to
plead and prove that trial counsel’ was ineffective for
the various reasons alleged, the court reads them in
that fashion. It was also clear from the proceedings and
closing arguments that the respondent also read the
allegations in the same fashion, so [the petitioner] was
not prejudiced in any way.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
For the first time in this appeal, the petitioner claims
that the habeas court’s decision to interpret the allega-
tions in count two in the manner previously noted was
improper and deprived him of his right to due process.
The petitioner argues that ‘‘[t]he four corners of the
amended petition did not contain any allegations against
criminal trial counsel, nor did it contain any allegations
that prior habeas counsel failed to plead and prove that
criminal trial counsel was deficient in any manner, nor
did current habeas counsel present any witnesses or
evidence at petitioner’s habeas trial in support of any
alleged ineffectiveness by criminal trial counsel.’’ Accord-
ing to the petitioner, ‘‘any testimony as to any presumed
deficiencies by criminal trial counsel . 	. . 	was for
background information only, relative to the claims that
prior habeas counsel put forth.’’ The petitioner urges
us to conclude that the alleged error amounted to a

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
due process deprivation in that the court ‘‘preemptively
denied the petitioner his right to bring a habeas petition
against current habeas counsel, since the court read
beyond the four corners of the amended petition and
sua sponte and arbitrarily decided claims not raised in
that amended petition.’’
The petitioner asserts that the present claim was
adequately preserved for appellate review ‘‘through the
testimony and arguments that were presented during
the habeas trial.’’ The petitioner does not provide us
with citations to the record that support this assertion.
Our review of the record does not reflect that the pres-
ent claim of constitutional error was distinctly raised
before the habeas court and considered by that court.
The claim, however, is reviewable under Golding
because the record is adequate for review and the claim
is of constitutional magnitude.5 For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the alleged constitutional vio-
lation does not exist and, thus, the petitioner has failed
to demonstrate that he was deprived of a fair trial.
Because the petitioner’s due process claim is based
on a claim that the habeas court improperly interpreted
count two of his amended petition for a writ of habeas
5 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim
is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;
(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the
state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote
omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see In re Yasiel R.,
supra, 317 Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of Golding). ‘‘The first two
[prongs of Golding] involve a determination of whether the claim is review-
able; the second two . . . involve a determination of whether the [party
claiming error] may prevail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Skye
B., 230 Conn. App. 725, 737, 331 A.3d 769, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 922, 333
A.3d 105 (2025).

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
corpus, we first set forth the following relevant princi-
ples concerning the interpretation of pleadings. ‘‘It is
well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should
conform generally to a complaint in a civil action. . . .
The principle that a plaintiff may rely only upon what
he has alleged is basic. . . . It is fundamental in our
law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to
the allegations of his complaint. . . . While the habeas
court has considerable discretion to frame a remedy
that is commensurate with the scope of the established
constitutional violations . . . it does not have the dis-
cretion to look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence
to decide claims not raised. . . . [A] habeas petitioner
is limited to the allegations in his petition, which are
intended to put the [respondent] on notice of the claims
made, to limit the issues to be decided, and to prevent
surprise.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ayuso v. Commissioner of Correction, 215
Conn. App. 322, 382–83, 282 A.3d 983, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022).
‘‘[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question
of law for the court . . . . Our review of the [habeas]
court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore [also]
is plenary. . . . [T]he modern trend, which is followed
in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and
realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . .
[T]he [petition] must be read in its entirety in such a
way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to
the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do
substantial justice between the parties. . . . As long
as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts
claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise
or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude
that the [petition] is insufficient to allow recovery.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Woods v. Commissioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App.

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
597, 607, 232 A.3d 63 (2020), appeal dismissed, 341
Conn. 506, 267 A.3d 193 (2021). ‘‘[T]he [petition] must
be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect
to the pleading with reference to the general theory
upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice
between the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Newland v. Commissioner of Correction, 322
Conn. 664, 678, 142 A.3d 1095 (2016).
Our analysis of whether the court improperly inter-
preted the allegations in count two is also guided by
the principles governing claims of ineffective represen-
tation. It is well settled that ‘‘[t]o succeed on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner
must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). . . . In Strickland . . . the
United States Supreme Court established that for a peti-
tioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, he must show that counsel’s assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction
. . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . .
‘‘With respect to the prejudice component of the
Strickland test, the petitioner must demonstrate that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the [peti-
tioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
. . . It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that
the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome
of the proceedings. . . . Rather, [t]he [petitioner] must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. . . . A reason-
able probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mukhtaar v. Commissioner

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
of Correction, 158 Conn. App. 431, 437–38, 119 A.3d
607 (2015).
‘‘In Lozada [v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 842–43, 613
A.2d 818 (1992)], our Supreme Court established that
habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for the ineffec-
tive assistance of appointed habeas counsel, authoriz-
ing what is commonly known as a habeas on a habeas,
namely, a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus
. . . challenging the performance of counsel in litigat-
ing an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . .
[that] had claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at
the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial or on direct
appeal. . . . Nevertheless, the court in Lozada also
emphasized that a petitioner asserting a habeas on a
habeas faces the herculean task . . . of proving in
accordance with Strickland 	. 	. 	. 	both (1) that his
appointed habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) that
his trial counsel was ineffective. . . . Any new habeas
trial would go to the heart of the underlying conviction
to no lesser extent than if it were a challenge predicated
on ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel.
The second habeas petition is inextricably interwoven
with the merits of the original judgment by challenging
the very fabric of the conviction that led to the confine-
ment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lebron v.
Commissioner of Correction, 204 Conn. App. 44, 50,
250 A.3d 44, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 948, 250 A.3d 695
(2021); see also Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 230 Conn. App. 741, 749, 331 A.3d 739, cert. denied,
351 Conn. 926, 333 A.3d 1109 (2025).
As stated previously in this opinion, in count two of
his amended petition, the petitioner alleged that he was
denied his right to the effective assistance of prior
habeas counsel in three distinct ways. Specifically, the
petitioner alleged that, in his prior habeas action, Attor-
ney Mortimer failed ‘‘to investigate and locate a trial
witness who allegedly recanted her statements made

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
to law enforcement officials’’ concerning his criminal
conduct, failed ‘‘to consult and retain a medical expert
to independently assess the victim’s injuries,’’ and failed
‘‘to question Dr. [Mantell] about whether the quality of
Trooper [Trotter’s] interview of the victim fell below the
standard of care under recently promulgated guidelines
for obtaining statements from children. In count two,
the petitioner alleged that, but for Attorney Mortimer’s
ineffective representation in the prior habeas action,
there was a reasonable probability that the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the prior habeas action would
have been granted. In his prayer for relief in the present
habeas action, the petitioner sought an order directing
‘‘the sentencing court to vacate the judgment’’ of convic-
tion and ‘‘return the matter to the trial court docket.’’
The petitioner argues that it was improper for the
court to have interpreted count two of his ‘‘ill pled
petition . . . to include an additional count containing
claims that alleged ineffective assistance of prior
habeas counsel for failing to bring claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel against criminal trial counsel,
when no such claims were pled.’’ This argument lacks
merit. In light of the authority previously cited, the
petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of prior
habeas counsel by its nature was factually and legally
intertwined with the issue of whether he received effec-
tive assistance from his trial counsel. The petitioner
could not prove prejudice in connection with prior
habeas counsel’s alleged deficient performance in the
prior habeas action without proving that, in the absence
of such deficient performance, the outcome of the prior
habeas action would have been favorable to him. Stated
otherwise, the prior habeas action was based on the
petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his right to
the effective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial.
Thus, the only way that the petitioner could prove preju-
dice in connection with any deficient performance on

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
the part of Attorney Mortimer in the prior habeas action
was by demonstrating that, but for such deficiencies,
he would have prevailed in demonstrating that Attorney
Hauslaib failed to provide competent representation at
his criminal trial. The court in the present action cor-
rectly recognized this when it stated in its memorandum
of decision that, in proving his claim of ineffective repre-
sentation of prior habeas counsel, ‘‘the petitioner bears
the task of proving the two Strickland factors against
both habeas counsel and trial counsel in order to pre-
vail.’’ (Emphasis in original.) By interpreting the allega-
tions in count two such ‘‘that [prior] habeas counsel
‘failed to plead and prove that trial counsel’ was ineffec-
tive’’; (emphasis omitted); in the various ways alleged,
the court did not alter the nature of count two. It cor-
rectly recognized that claims of ineffective assistance
of prior habeas counsel must ultimately challenge the
conviction itself.
Moreover, in connection with the present habeas
action, the petitioner sought an order vacating his crimi-
nal conviction and a new trial. It belies logic for the
petitioner to suggest that he was entitled to such relief
in connection with his criminal conviction based solely
on proof of Attorney Mortimer’s alleged deficiencies.
The petitioner bore the burden of proving that Attorney
Mortimer’s alleged deficiencies, if proven, prejudiced
him because Attorney Mortimer failed to demonstrate
that deficient performance during the criminal trial
undermined the outcome of that proceeding. By inter-
preting the allegations in count two in the manner that
it did, the court did nothing more than construe the
allegations of the petition to the petitioner’s benefit, in
light of the petitioner’s legal burden and the specific
relief sought by him. 6
6 The petitioner argues that the court’s interpretation of count two was
contrary to the respondent’s interpretation of count two at the time of the
habeas trial. Specifically, the petitioner draws our attention to statements
made by the respondent’s counsel at the habeas trial that, in his view, reveal
the respondent’s belief that the petitioner was not pursuing a claim of

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
Finally, we observe that, even if the petitioner could
demonstrate that the court erred in its interpretation of
count two, and that his claim did not implicate Attorney
Hauslaib’s performance during the criminal trial, the
petitioner failed to demonstrate that it resulted in the
specific due process violation claimed in this appeal.
As stated previously in this opinion, the petitioner
claims that his right to due process was violated
because the court’s alleged misinterpretation of count
two preemptively denied him his right to bring a habeas
petition against current habeas counsel in the future.
The petitioner does not cite to any relevant authority
in support of this proposition, and we are unaware of
any. Our Supreme Court has stated: ‘‘[T]he legislature
has created a statutory entitlement to counsel in ‘any
habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal mat-
ter . . . .’ General Statutes § 51-296 (a). This statutory
right includes the right to ‘ ‘‘effective and competent’’ ’
habeas counsel. Lozada v. Warden, [supra, 223 Conn.
838–39]. Connecticut takes that statutory right so seri-
ously that habeas petitioners in this state are afforded
the opportunity to challenge their convictions through
successive petitions based on inadequate performance
by habeas counsel. See, e.g., Kaddah v. Commissioner
of Correction, 324 Conn. 548, 559, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017)
(‘a third habeas petition is available as a matter of
fundamental fairness to vindicate the statutory right
under § 51-296 (a) to competent counsel in litigating a
second habeas petition’).’’ Cooke v. Williams, 349 Conn.
451, 475–76, 316 A.3d 278 (2024).
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The respondent argues that the habeas
court’s interpretation of the pleadings ‘‘neither surprised nor prejudiced
the respondent in any way because the respondent read the pleadings to
incorporate ineffective assistance of trial counsel into the petitioner’s claim
of ineffective assistance of first habeas counsel and litigated the case as
such. . . . Simply put, the petitioner lacks standing to claim that the respon-
dent was prejudiced by the manner in which the habeas court interpreted
the pleadings in the petitioner’s favor.’’

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Daniel W. E. v. Commissioner of Correction
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that
the petitioner has proven under Golding that the alleged
constitutional violation exists and that it deprived him
of his right to a fair trial.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.