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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
NINO D. NEALY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(AC 47267)
Suarez, Clark and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of
assault in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for
certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his habeas
petition. He claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that his
criminal trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance because she
failed to adequately investigate certain potential witnesses. Held:
This court dismissed the appeal because it concluded that the habeas court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal,
as the petitioner failed to demonstrate, in accordance with the test adopted
in Simms v. Warden (230 Conn. 608), that the issue of whether his trial
counsel’s representation was reasonably competent or within the range of
competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the
criminal law was an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that
a court could resolve in a different manner or that was adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.
Argued April 23—officially released October 21, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J.,
denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the
petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).
Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt,
state’s attorney, Kelly Masi, senior assistant state’s
attorney, and Angela Macchiarulo, supervisory assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The petitioner, Nino D. Nealy,
appeals following the denial of his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On
appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1)
abused its discretion by denying the petitioner’s petition
for certification to appeal the habeas court’s decision
and (2) improperly denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of crimi-
nal trial counsel. We conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the petition-
er’s appeal.
The following facts, as set forth by the habeas court,
and procedural history are relevant to the resolution
of this appeal. On July 23, 2018, at approximately 7:04
a.m., the police were dispatched to the petitioner’s resi-
dence to respond to a disturbance complaint. Upon
arrival, they were met by the petitioner’s girlfriend,
Holly Foster. Foster told the police that the victim1
showed ‘‘up at the residence banging on the door.’’
Foster stated that, when she opened the door, the victim
entered the residence ‘‘screaming and yelling,’’ grabbed
a set of car keys from the kitchen table, and left.
After Foster gave her statement to the police, the
officers began traveling in the direction of the victim’s
residence. While en route, they learned that the victim
1 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for,
or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
had contacted emergency services to address a head
wound she sustained from a BB gun. When the officers
arrived, they observed a laceration on the top of the
victim’s head, ‘‘several minor puncture wounds on her
chest and stomach area, and a scrape on her right arm.’’
The victim told the police that she was awoken
around 6 a.m. by the petitioner, who had entered her
residence uninvited. The petitioner directed the victim
into another room, where the two began arguing. The
petitioner punched her in the face, and she struck him
back. The petitioner then brandished a black crowbar
and began jabbing her in the stomach with it while
saying, ‘‘ ‘I will continue to break in anytime I want.’ ’’
At the time, the petitioner was the subject of a full no
contact protective order in favor of the victim.
The victim stated that, as she attempted to leave the
room, the petitioner grabbed her cell phone out of her
pants pocket and ran out of her residence. The victim,
using her house phone, called the police. She then called
her 	cell 	phone 	and 	reported 	that 	the 	petitioner
answered the phone and said, ‘‘ ‘If you call the [police]
on me one more time I’m going to slice your throat.’ ’’
At this point, the victim borrowed a friend’s car and
proceeded to drive to the petitioner’s residence. The
petitioner opened the door when she knocked, and they
immediately began to argue about the return of the
victim’s cell phone. The petitioner began to walk toward
his bedroom, while still in possession of her phone. She
followed him into the room where she noticed Foster
apparently asleep in bed. According to the victim, Fos-
ter awoke, and the two began to argue with each other
when, suddenly, the victim was struck in the head with
a hard object. When she turned around, she saw the
petitioner standing behind her with a black BB gun.
The petitioner began to flee the apartment, and the
victim followed him. Once outside, the petitioner began

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
throwing rocks at her and shot her again with the BB
gun, striking her in the chest multiple times.
After the victim gave her statement, the police returned
to the petitioner’s residence in an attempt to locate
him. Upon arrival at his residence, they conducted a
search that resulted in the discovery of a black BB
gun behind the living room sofa. Shortly following this
search, the petitioner was found hiding in a rear stair-
way of his residence and was arrested. During a subse-
quent search of the victim’s residence, the police discov-
ered a black crowbar located under a rug outside of her
apartment door. They also found that the front windows
were unlocked.
While incarcerated, but prior to his conviction, on
February 27, 2019, the petitioner received a letter from
his trial counsel, TaShun Bowden-Lewis, explaining the
terms of a proposed plea agreement. In it, Bowden-
Lewis stated: ‘‘Your offer is to plead to [a]ssault in the
[f]irst [d]egree (felony, [twenty] year max jail, [five]
year mandatory minimum) and [a]dmit your [p]robation
[v]iolation ([three] years jail exposure). . . . If you
accept your offer you will receive [eight] years to serve
with [ten] years special parole.’’ Bowden-Lewis also
stated in the February 27, 2019 letter that ‘‘[t]he alleged
victim in these cases . . . spoke to my investigator as
well as the prosecutor . . . . She sticks to her story
about what happened in these cases as well as admits
to being aggressive and standing up for herself with
you. . . . We have spoken to Kendria [Stenson], the
[m]other of . . . one of your minor children as well as
[Foster], your current girlfriend.’’
On March 27, 2019, the petitioner appeared before
the trial court, Hon. Roland D. Fasano, judge trial ref-
eree, for a plea hearing. At the start of the hearing, the
petitioner addressed the court regarding a letter he

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
submitted to the court expressing a desire to fire Bow-
den-Lewis as his attorney. The petitioner stated on the
record: ‘‘I was just expressing my remorse and sincerity
in the situation and hoping that you would lessen the
charge. Because right now I’m being charged with
assault first, and I don’t believe it was an assault first, I
believe it was an assault second.’’ At this point, Bowden-
Lewis and the petitioner asked the court for a moment
of time to discuss whether the petitioner would accept
the state’s offer. Bowden-Lewis explained her discus-
sion with the petitioner and stated: ‘‘[The petitioner]
asked if the offer was going to change. . . . And I said
no, it was not, so we passed and we talked, and he’s
prepared to go forward with the offer today. . . . And
both of these pleas, Judge, will be an Alford2 plea.’’
(Footnote added.)
Prior to accepting the petitioner’s plea, the court
asked him: ‘‘Are you satisfied with [Bowden-Lewis’]
advice and counsel? That doesn’t mean thrilled with
the sentence, but satisfied she did her job,’’ to which the
petitioner responded, ‘‘Yes.’’ The court further asked:
‘‘[Are] you . . . satisfied based on the evidence the
state claims to have, that if you went to trial on all the
charges, you would probably be found guilty on some or
all of the charges, and you want to accept the agreement
rather than risk a heavier penalty after trials and hear-
ings; is that accurate?’’ The petitioner again responded,
‘‘Yes.’’ On the advice of counsel and in accordance with
the plea agreement proposed by the state, the petitioner
entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to one
count of assault in the first degree in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3). The petitioner also admit-
ted to a violation of probation pending under another
docket number in exchange for a recommended total
effective sentence of eight years to serve, followed by
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970).

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
ten years of special parole. The court imposed the sen-
tences in accordance with the plea agreement on May
31, 2019.
The petitioner commenced this habeas action on
November 12, 2019. His amended petition, filed on
August 24, 2022, alleges that Bowden-Lewis provided
ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to conduct
an adequate investigation and that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, he would not have entered a
guilty plea and would have proceeded to trial.3 The
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a
return on August 30, 2022, which generally left the peti-
tioner to his proof with respect to the substantive allega-
tions in the petition. The case was then tried to the
habeas court, Newson, J., on August 24, 2023.
During the habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel called
four witnesses and submitted several exhibits that were
admitted into evidence, including the February 27, 2019
letter. The first witness was Bowden-Lewis. She testi-
fied about her discussions with the petitioner regarding
his acceptance of the plea agreement. Regarding her
development of a defense, she stated that her strategy
was to prove ‘‘that he didn’t do it.’’ She believed that
the state would call as a witness ‘‘obviously [the victim],
and I’m assuming [Foster] would be one . . . too.’’ She
testified that she did not think it was likely that the
3 Specifically, the petitioner alleged that Bowden-Lewis provided ineffec-
tive assistance by (a) ‘‘[f]ailing to adequately investigate or sufficiently inter-
view’’ Foster, Stenson and/or the victim, (b) ‘‘[f]ailing to develop a defense
utilizing the testimony of’’ Foster, Stenson and/or the victim, and/or (c)
‘‘[f]ailing to call as a defense witness’’ Foster, Stenson and/or the victim.
He further alleged that, ‘‘[b]ut for trial counsel’s deficient performance, there
is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have [pleaded]
guilty and would have insisted upon a trial.’’ The petitioner’s counsel later
expressly abandoned the petitioner’s claim in his petition of ineffective
assistance on the basis of Bowden-Lewis’ failure to investigate the victim,
stating at the habeas trial that, as to the victim, ‘‘[w]e’re not having her
testify and we’re not pursuing claims related to her.’’

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
state would call Stenson because ‘‘she just came to the
scene after everything happened . . . .’’ Specifically,
Bowden-Lewis testified that she spoke with Stenson
and determined that Stenson would not be helpful. Bow-
den-Lewis 	further 	testified 	that 	she 	investigated
whether the victim may have fabricated her story. Bow-
den-Lewis testified that her investigator spoke to the
victim and reported that her story was the same as the
one she previously gave to the police. Bowden-Lewis
also testified that ‘‘[the petitioner] knew everything that
we did. All the investigation. We also spoke to [the
victim’s sister] . . . . He knew all the people we spoke
to, he knew the results of all the conversations, he
had seen all the materials, so he was informed about
everything.’’ Lastly, she testified about the February 27,
2019 letter she gave to the petitioner and described it
as ‘‘just one more way to make sure that he was
informed about the pros and cons of either accepting
or rejecting the offer.’’
The petitioner’s counsel next called Stenson as a
witness. Stenson and the petitioner share a child
together but were not in a relationship at the time of the
incident. She testified that Foster called her ‘‘between
6 [and] 7 [a.m.],’’ telling her to ‘‘get [her] child because
[the victim] had broke into the house with a knife.’’ She
further testified that it took her roughly five minutes
to get to the petitioner’s residence after Foster’s call.
Stenson testified that, although the petitioner was pres-
ent when she arrived, the victim was no longer at the
residence. Specifically, she testified: ‘‘I wouldn’t have
seen the break-in or nothing.’’
The petitioner was the third witness. The petitioner
testified about his impressions of the February 27, 2019
letter sent by Bowden-Lewis. He stated: ‘‘I felt like [Bow-
den-Lewis] already talked to [Foster] and [Stenson],
and they weren’t willing to help, basically.’’ The peti-
tioner also testified, ‘‘I wasn’t going to go to trial if she

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
already talked to them and, from what I interpreted,
they weren’t going to be helpful.’’ The petitioner testi-
fied that he believed Foster would testify that he was
with her for the entire night. Lastly, he testified that he
admitted to the trial court that he believed the allega-
tions supported a charge of assault in the second
degree, as opposed to assault in the first degree.
The last witness called was Foster. She testified that
she knew who the victim was and that the victim had
broken into the petitioner’s residence. Foster stated:
‘‘She ransacked the house, came into the bedroom, held
me at knifepoint. . . . And then [the petitioner] got her
out of the house.’’ She testified that the victim held her
up against the wall while the petitioner told her to get
out of the house. Additionally, she testified that, when
Stenson arrived, the petitioner had already left his resi-
dence, as had the victim. She also testified that she
received two phone calls after the incident regarding
the case. One of the callers was from the office of the
petitioner’s habeas counsel, but she could not recall the
other. Finally, she testified that she was never contacted
prior to the petitioner’s sentencing.
During closing arguments, the petitioner’s habeas
counsel 	argued 	that 	‘‘there’s 	a 	credibility 	contest
between the [victim] and the petitioner, and that credi-
bility contest must consider what happened afterwards
as well, in terms of what [the victim] alleged happened
during the initial assault.’’ His counsel further argued
that Foster and Stenson can testify to ‘‘the credibility
of the [the victim]’’ and that this is pertinent because
‘‘she’s the state’s evidence as to what happened in that
first incident.’’
The habeas court issued its memorandum of decision
on November 20, 2023, and found that the petitioner
failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel on the
basis of Bowden-Lewis’ alleged failure to adequately

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
investigate Stenson and Foster. Regarding Stenson, the
court found her testimony to be ‘‘wholly irrelevant’’ and
incapable of supporting a defense. The court stated
that, ‘‘[b]y the time Stenson got to the scene . . . the
dispute between the victim and petitioner was over,
and the victim and petitioner were both gone.’’ The
court further found that Foster’s testimony lacked cred-
ibility. The habeas court noted that, although she testi-
fied about her interaction with the victim, Foster never
testified regarding how the victim sustained her injur-
ies, nor did she testify that there was any physical con-
tact between the victim and the petitioner. The habeas
court found ‘‘Bowden-Lewis credible that she spoke to
. . . Foster and did not find any of the information
[she] provided at that time would have been helpful to
the petitioner’s defense . . . .’’
Regarding 	the 	petitioner, 	the 	court 	noted 	that,
although he pleaded for leniency on his assault charge,
absent from his plea was any intimation that he was
not present at the victim’s residence. Additionally, after
reviewing the petitioner’s letter to the trial court, the
habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s letter con-
stituted an admission to assaulting the victim. The
habeas court contrasted the petitioner’s version of
events with Foster’s testimony to illustrate her lack of
credibility. The court noted that the petitioner met with
his trial counsel multiple times and had at least one
month to consider the consequences of accepting the
Alford plea.
Additionally, the ‘‘court found . . . Bowden-Lewis
credible that she spoke to both Stenson and Foster and
did not find any of the information they provided at
that time would have been helpful to the petitioner’s
defense . . . .’’
The habeas court concluded by finding there was ‘‘no
credible evidence the petitioner was ever prepared, in

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
this matter, to proceed to trial.’’ The court additionally
found that there was no credible evidence to suggest
that defense counsel failed to ‘‘conduct a diligent inves-
tigation or that she did not contact the available wit-
nesses in the case.’’ For these reasons, the habeas court
found that the petitioner ‘‘failed to meet his burden [of]
proving deficient performance or prejudice . . . .’’
The petitioner filed a petition for certification to
appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The habeas court denied the petition for certifi-
cation to appeal. This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth applicable principles of
law and our standard of review. ‘‘Faced with a habeas
court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal,
a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal
of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the
two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in
Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994),
and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612,
646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, he [or she] must demonstrate
that the denial of his [or her] petition for certification
constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . To prove an
abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate
that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves
issues that] are debatable among jurists of reason; that
a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];
or that the questions are adequate to deserve encourage-
ment to proceed further. . . . Second, if the petitioner
can show an abuse of discretion, he [or she] must then
prove that the decision of the habeas court should be
reversed on the merits. . . . In determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable
presumption should be given in favor of the correctness
of the court’s ruling . . . [and] [r]eversal is required
only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where
injustice appears to have been done. . . .

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether
the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
tioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) McClain v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 188 Conn. App. 70, 74–75, 204
A.3d 82, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 914, 204 A.3d 702 (2019).
‘‘In other words, we review the petitioner’s substantive
claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those
claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria . . .
adopted by this court for determining the propriety of
the habeas court’s denial of the petition for certifica-
tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v.
Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 339, 345,
242 A.3d 756 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 905, 242
A.3d 1009 (2021).
The standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well
settled. ‘‘In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb
the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless
they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether
the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a
violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .
‘‘In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States
Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to pre-
vail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he
must show that counsel’s assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . . That
requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient and (2) that the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense. . . . Unless a [peti-
tioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that
the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
. . . Because both prongs . . . must be established for
a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a
petitioner’s claim if he [or she] fails to meet either
prong.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson
v. Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 1, 11–
12, 242 A.3d 107, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 983, 242 A.3d
105 (2020).
To prove deficient performance, the petitioner must
prove that ‘‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to him]
by the [s]ixth [a]mendment.’’ Strickland v. Washington,
supra, 466 U.S. 687. The petitioner is tasked with ‘‘dem-
onstrat[ing] that his [or her] attorney’s representation
was not reasonably competent or within the range of
competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training
and skill in the criminal law.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 201 Conn. App. 12. Additionally, ‘‘[a] court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal-
lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the context of a guilty plea, the Strickland test
requires the petitioner to prove that counsel’s conduct
falls outside of the range of reasonable professional
assistance and to show that, ‘‘but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.’’ Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). ‘‘For example,
where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investi-
gate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the
determination whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defen-
dant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to
trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
evidence would have led counsel to change his [or her]
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in
turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether
the evidence likely would have changed the outcome
of a trial.’’ Id.
With respect to determinations of witness credibility,
‘‘[t]he habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole
arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given to their testimony. . . . Appellate courts
do not second-guess the trier of fact with respect to
credibility.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Necaise v. Commissioner of Correction, 112
Conn. App. 817, 825–26, 964 A.2d 562, cert. denied, 292
Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 660 (2009). With these principles
in mind, we turn to the merits of the petitioner’s claims.
The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused
its discretion by denying his petition for certification
to appeal. There are two aspects to the petitioner’s
claim. First, he argues that Bowden-Lewis failed to ade-
quately investigate Foster, Stenson, and the victim. Sec-
ond, he argues that Bowden-Lewis failed to formulate a
defense using information that she would have obtained
had she investigated the witnesses mentioned pre-
viously. For the following reasons, we are not per-
suaded that the petitioner demonstrated that the issue
of whether Bowden-Lewis’ performance amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel was ‘‘debatable among
jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues
[in a different manner]; or that the questions are ade-
quate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616; see Anderson
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 201 Conn.
App. 11.
This court previously found that ‘‘[t]he issue of credi-
bility is not debatable among jurists of reason and, thus,

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
cannot be used to overturn the decision of a habeas
court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v.
Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 239, 243,
220 A.3d 901, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 910, 221 A.3d 43
(2019). Specifically, ‘‘[t]he habeas judge, as the trier of
facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given to their testimony. . . .
Appellate courts do not second-guess the trier of fact
with respect to credibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 242.
The petitioner’s claim closely mirrors credibility
issues raised in Perez. In Perez, the petitioner claimed
that he was coerced into a guilty plea. Id., 241. Prior
to his trial, the petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty. Id.
Only four witnesses testified in the habeas trial: the
petitioner, his grandmother, and his two trial attorneys.
Id. The habeas court found that the only testimony
supporting his claim came from the petitioner himself
and his grandmother. Id. Prior to his guilty plea, the
petitioner’s grandmother and his cousin were arrested
for witness tampering in the petitioner’s case. Id. The
petitioner and his grandmother subsequently met with
his attorneys where he claimed his attorneys threatened
him, saying ‘‘that [the petitioner’s grandmother] and the
petitioner’s cousin would go to prison if he did not
plead guilty.’’ Id. The habeas court heard from the two
trial attorneys, who stated that the petitioner had
already decided to plead guilty prior to their meeting.
Id. Additionally, they stated that the petitioner informed
them that he wanted his grandmother present so he
could consult her about whether to accept the plea and
that they simply accommodated that request. Id. The
habeas court found only the attorneys’ testimony credi-
ble and denied the petitioner’s petition and his petition
for certification to appeal, which led to this court’s
review of the decision. Id., 242. We held that, due to

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
the deference afforded to the habeas court in its deter-
minations of a witness’ credibility, the petitioner had
failed to meet his burden, and we dismissed the appeal.
Id., 243.
In the present case, the habeas court, as the sole
arbiter of witness credibility, found Bowden-Lewis’ tes-
timony credible. Bowden-Lewis investigated all key wit-
nesses and considered whether their testimony would
aid the petitioner’s defense. In her February 27, 2019
letter to the petitioner, Bowden-Lewis informed the
petitioner of the actions she had taken with respect to
her investigation of key witnesses. In the letter, she
explained the details of the proposed plea agreement
and the actions she took to investigate each potential
witness. From this letter, it is reasonable to conclude,
as the habeas court did, that Bowden-Lewis investigated
and considered the possibility of each individual’s par-
ticipation as a potential witness should the petitioner
proceed with a trial. Ultimately, it was her reasoned
opinion that the petitioner should accept the plea agree-
ment. As previously stated, the burden falls on the peti-
tioner to overcome the presumption that the challenged
action was not sound trial strategy. See Anderson v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 201 Conn. App. 12.
By contrast, the habeas court found that neither Fos-
ter’s nor the petitioner’s testimony was credible. Fos-
ter’s testimony at the habeas trial conflicted with the
testimony of other witnesses. Foster testified that she
never spoke with Bowden-Lewis; however, in her letter
to the petitioner, Bowden-Lewis stated that she had
spoken with Foster. The habeas court, as the trier of
fact, was not required to credit Foster. Next, Foster’s
recollection of events conflicts with the victim’s state-
ment to the police. Foster stated that she let the victim
into the residence after the victim showed up for some

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unknown reason and began banging on the door. 4 The
victim, however, stated that the petitioner let her into
the residence. 5 Once inside, Foster alleged that the vic-
tim held her at knifepoint, before she ransacked the
residence and left with Foster’s purse and keys.6 The
victim explicitly told the police that she was assaulted
while at the petitioner’s residence.7 Yet, Foster’s testi-
mony 	did 	not 	address 	how 	the 	victim’s 	injuries
occurred.
Lastly, Foster testified that the petitioner was asleep
the entire night. The petitioner’s own statements, how-
ever, are in direct conflict with her testimony. At his
plea hearing, the petitioner stated, ‘‘right now I’m being
charged with assault first, and I don’t believe it was an
assault first, I believe it was an assault second.’’ The
court found that the petitioner’s statements are effec-
tively an admission to having committed an assault.
Notably, nowhere in his statement does he say that he
was not present at the victim’s residence or that he
was asleep with Foster, further casting doubt on the
credibility of both Foster and the petitioner.
The petitioner next argues that Bowden-Lewis should
have investigated Stenson to aid the creation of a
defense. We agree with the habeas court’s conclusion
that Stenson’s testimony was ‘‘wholly irrelevant’’ to the
4 ‘‘[Foster] stated that a female she knows . . . came to her residence,
and was banging hard on her apartment door. When she opened her door
[the victim] walked into her apartment screaming and yelling . . . .’’
5 ‘‘When [the victim] knocked on the door [the petitioner] opened the
door, and [they] began to argue when she asked him for her phone.’’
6 ‘‘When [Foster] opened her door [the victim] walked into her apartment
screaming and yelling but [Foster] did not [understand] what she was saying
because [Foster] was half [asleep]. During the incident [the victim] grabbed
her car keys from the dining room table and left the area in an unknown vehi-
cle.’’
7 The police incident report notes, ‘‘Upon arrival [at the victim’s residence]
I located [the victim] and I observed that she had a laceration on the top
of her head a few minor puncture wounds on her chest and stomach, and
a minor scrape on the right arm.’’

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Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner’s underlying claim. Through her testimony,
Stenson was able to corroborate only the fact that Fos-
ter called her ‘‘between 6 [and] 7 [a.m.]’’ on the day of the
incident. Although Stenson arrived at the petitioner’s
residence shortly after the call, neither the petitioner
nor the victim was present. Stenson’s testimony could
not help establish an alibi or any other defense for the
petitioner and, therefore, lacked any exculpatory value
to the petitioner had he elected to go to trial.
In short, the petitioner failed to show how Bowden-
Lewis’ representation was ‘‘not reasonably competent
or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 201 Conn. App. 12.
Stenson’s testimony was irrelevant, and Foster’s incon-
sistent testimony was found not credible. Bowden-
Lewis’ choice to build a defense without those wit-
nesses’ testimony reflects a wholly reasonable belief
that their testimony would have had little value at trial.
Because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
the issues raised in his habeas petition are debatable
among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the
issues in a different manner, or that the questions are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,
the petitioner failed to prove that the habeas court
abused its discretion in denying his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.