Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
WILLIE HOBBY v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 48638)
Suarez, Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, including sexual
assault in the first degree, appealed, on the granting of certification, from
the habeas court’s judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus as untimely pursuant to statute (§ 52-470). The petitioner claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that he failed to establish
good cause under § 52-470 (e) to overcome the presumption of unreasonable
delay in the filing of his third habeas petition. Held:
The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner’s habeas petition, as the
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the petitioner had failed
to establish good cause for his untimely filing, the court having declined to
credit the petitioner’s unsupported testimony that his counsel in two prior
habeas actions the petitioner had withdrawn failed to advise him about the
deadlines for refiling set forth in § 52-470 (d).
Argued March 19—officially released April 21, 2026
Procedural History
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where
the court, Wagner, J., rendered judgment dismissing the
petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert L. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on
the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel,
for the appellant (petitioner).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle,
Jr., state’s attorney, and Jennifer Fields, deputy assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Willie Hobby, appeals
from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant
to General Statutes § 52-470. On appeal, the petitioner

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed
to establish good cause within the meaning of § 52-470
(e) to overcome the presumption of unreasonable delay
in the filing of his third habeas petition. We affirm the
judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of the petitioner’s appeal. In 2005, the
petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
to one count of sexual assault in the first degree in vio-
lation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1); one count of
attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-70 (a) (1);
one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-92; and one count of assault in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59
(a) (2). In accordance with the plea agreement, the peti-
tioner received a total effective sentence of fifty years
of incarceration, suspended after thirty years, followed
by twenty-five years of probation.
In September, 2008, the petitioner filed his first peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. He withdrew that peti-
tion prior to trial. In January, 2017, the petitioner filed
his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He also
withdrew that petition prior to trial.
On February 14, 2024, the petitioner filed his third
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is the subject
of this appeal. In that petition, he alleged that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with his 2005 guilty pleas. On December 30, 2024, the
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a
motion with the habeas court pursuant to § 52-470 (c) for
an order directing the petitioner to show good cause as
to why his petition should be permitted to proceed when
it was filed approximately nineteen years “after [his]
conviction was finalized” in 2005.1 The petitioner, repre-
1 General Statutes § 52-470 (c) provides: “Except as provided in sub-
section (d) of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been
delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
sented by counsel, filed an objection to the respondent’s
motion, arguing that his counsel in his prior habeas
proceedings had failed to advise him of the deadlines set
forth in § 52-470, which constituted good cause to excuse
the delay in the filing of his third petition pursuant to
Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333, 304
A.3d 431 (2023).
The court, Wagner, J., granted the respondent’s
motion, ordering the petitioner to show cause as to why
the petition should not be dismissed as untimely, and held
a hearing on February 19, 2025. At the show cause hear-
ing, the petitioner testified, inter alia, that the attorneys
who had represented him in connection with his first and
second habeas petitions had advised him to withdraw
those petitions without mentioning any deadlines for
refiling.2 The petitioner also testified about his mental
health history and presented as an exhibit certain records
obtained from the Department of Correction concerning
mental health evaluations and assessments of him that
had been conducted in 2001 and 2002. Following the
petitioner’s testimony, the petitioner’s counsel argued
that prior habeas counsel’s failure to advise the petitioner
about the deadlines set forth in § 52-470 amounted to
good cause to permit the third habeas petition to proceed
following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of convic-
tion is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October
1, 2017; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or
statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and
made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appel-
late Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by
the enactment of any public or special act. The time periods set forth
in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other
petition challenging the same conviction.”
The respondent’s motion does not appear to recognize that the peti-
tioner had filed two prior habeas petitions. As set forth subsequently
in this opinion, the time limit for successive petitions is set forth in
§ 52-470 (d).
2 The petitioner also testified that he was not aware of the deadlines
set forth in § 52-470 because he did not learn to read until the end of
2023 or 2024 and has not had access to a law library while he has been
incarcerated.

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
under § 52-470 and that the petitioner’s “mental health
issues . . . compound the problem exponentially.”
On February 28, 2025, the habeas court issued a memo-
randum of decision in which it concluded that the peti-
tioner had failed to establish good cause for his untimely
petition. The court explained: “[The petitioner] testified
at the show cause hearing that he withdrew his prior peti-
tions upon counsel’s advice and that both of his previous
habeas attorneys failed to advise him of the time limita-
tions for refiling contained within § 52-470. However,
[the petitioner] provided no testimony or evidence to
substantiate or verify his assertions. Importantly, [the
petitioner] did not present testimony from his prior
attorneys and entered no documents into evidence that
would substantiate his allegations. It is incumbent on
[the petitioner] to adduce evidence in support of a claim
that there is good cause for delay. . . . In the absence of
any corroborating and independent evidence, the court
does not credit [the petitioner’s] unsubstantiated testi-
mony at the show cause hearing.”3 (Citations omitted;
emphasis omitted.) The court concluded, as a result,
that the petitioner “failed to present credible evidence
of good cause for the delay in filing the present petition.”
Accordingly, the habeas court dismissed the petition. The
court subsequently granted the petitioner’s petition for
certification to appeal from the judgment of dismissal.
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly determined that he had not demonstrated
good cause within the meaning of § 52-470 (e) to overcome
the presumption of unreasonable delay in the filing of
his third habeas petition. Specifically, he argues that his
testimony concerning the alleged ineffective assistance
of his prior habeas attorneys was sufficient evidence of
good cause. We are not persuaded.
Section 52-470 (d) provides in relevant part that, “[i]n
the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on
3 The habeas court also noted that the petitioner had failed to include
an offer of proof demonstrating good cause for his delayed filing in his
response to the respondent’s motion.

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the
subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause
if such petition is filed . . . (1) Two years after the date on
which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be
a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review . .
. .” Subsection (e) of § 52-470 provides in relevant part
that, “[i]n a case in which the rebuttable presumption
of delay . . . applies, the court, upon the request of the
respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the
petition should be permitted to proceed. . . . For the
purposes of this subsection, good cause includes, but
is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which
materially affects the merits of the case and which could
not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence
in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d)
of this section.”
“[F]actors directly related to the good cause determi-
nation [under § 52-470 (e)] include, but are not limited
to: (1) whether external forces outside the control of the
petitioner had any bearing on the delay; (2) whether and
to what extent the petitioner or his counsel bears any
personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for the
untimely filing; (3) whether the reasons proffered by the
petitioner in support of a finding of good cause are cred-
ible and are supported by evidence in the record; and (4)
how long after the expiration of the filing deadline did
the petitioner file the petition. No single factor necessar-
ily will be dispositive, and the court should evaluate all
relevant factors in light of the totality of the facts and
circumstances presented. . . . In discussing § 52-470, we
have described [t]he habeas court’s exercise of its discre-
tion to manage [cases as] the best tool to . . . balance the
principles of judicial economy and due process. . . . Gen-
erally, when a finding requires the balancing of several
factors, many of which require factual determinations .
. . this court has held that such conclusions are reversed
only for an abuse of discretion. . . . Thus, [w]e will make
every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
[habeas] court’s ruling[s] . . . . In determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is
whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d]
as it did.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kelsey v. Commissioner of
Correction, 343 Conn. 424, 438–40, 274 A.3d 85 (2022);
accord Franko v. Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn.
App. 375, 380–81, 329 A.3d 1028, cert. denied, 351
Conn. 914, 331 A.3d 1217 (2025).
In Rose, our Supreme Court concluded that “ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel is an external, objective factor
that may constitute good cause to excuse the delayed
filing of a habeas petition under § 52-470 (c) and (e) .
. . .”4 Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 348
Conn. 349. Our Supreme Court explained: “Ineffective
assistance of counsel is an objective factor external to the
defense because the [s]ixth [a]mendment itself requires
that responsibility for the default be imputed to the
[s]tate. . . . In other words, it is not the gravity of the
attorney’s error that matters, but that it constitutes a
violation of [the] petitioner’s right to counsel, so that the
error must be seen as an external factor, i.e., imputed
to the [s]tate. . . . Although a petitioner is bound by his
counsel’s inadvertence, ignorance, or tactical missteps,
4 In Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 424, our
Supreme Court stated that, “to rebut successfully the presumption of
unreasonable delay in § 52-470, a petitioner generally will be required
to demonstrate that something outside of the control of the petitioner or
habeas counsel caused or contributed to the delay.” (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441–42. In Rose, our Supreme
Court sought to clarify its decision in Kelsey regarding “the funda-
mental distinction between internal and external factors that cause or
contribute to a petitioner’s failure to comply with a procedural rule.”
Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 348 Conn. 347; see Han-
kerson v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 562, 568–69,
308 A.3d 1113 (2024).
This court has reversed the judgments in several cases that predated
Rose and remanded them for new hearings and good cause determina-
tions where the habeas court, through no fault of its own, did not apply
the correct legal standard set forth in Rose. See, e.g., Gentile v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 354, 374–75, 329 A.3d 955
(2025); see also Walsh v. Commissioner of Correction, 233 Conn. App.
66, 74–75 n.6, 338 A.3d 1169 (2025) (listing cases).

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
regardless of whether counsel is flouting procedural
rules or hedging against strategic risks, a petitioner is
not bound by the ineffective assistance of his counsel.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 347–48.
“[A]lthough the court in Rose held that constitution-
ally deficient performance by habeas counsel may con-
stitute good cause for a late-filed petition, it did not hold
that counsel’s failure to advise a petitioner of the deadline
for filing a new petition necessarily constitutes ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. . . . Furthermore, although the
habeas court may conclude that ineffective assistance
of counsel constitutes good cause . . . it is not required
to do so. Such a determination is still left to the discre-
tion of the habeas court taking into consideration the
Kelsey factors.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.)
Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn.
App. 562, 569–70, 308 A.3d 1113 (2024).
In the present case, the habeas court explicitly recog-
nized our Supreme Court’s holding in Rose that ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel is an external, objective factor
that may constitute good cause to excuse the delayed
filing of a habeas petition under § 52-470 (c) and (e).
The court also recognized that the petitioner in Rose,
similar to the petitioner here, claimed that good cause
excused the delayed filing of his habeas petition because
his prior habeas attorney had advised him to withdraw
a prior petition but failed to advise him of the need to
file a new petition within the time constraints imposed
by § 52-470 (c). See Rose v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 348 Conn. 336. The court noted, however, that
the petitioner in Rose had presented testimony from his
prior habeas attorney, and he had submitted a transcript
of the proceeding at which he withdrew his prior petition,
which shed light on the advice that his prior counsel had
provided him.5 See id., 339–40.
5 In Rose, although our Supreme Court summarized the evidence that
had been presented in support of the petitioner’s claim, it remanded
the case for a new hearing and good cause determination because the
habeas court had not made any factual findings regarding the alleged

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
Here, the petitioner’s own testimony was the only
evidence that he offered in support of his claim that his
prior habeas attorneys had failed to advise him about the
deadlines set forth in § 52-470 at the time of withdraw-
ing his prior petitions.6 The habeas court found that
the petitioner’s testimony was not credible, as it was
not supported by any corroborating evidence.7 It is well
settled that “we do not second-guess on appeal the cred-
ibility determinations of the habeas court.” Franko v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 230 Conn. App. 381;
accord Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn.
App. 23, 32, 347 A.3d 984 (2025), cert. granted, 354
Conn. 911, 350 A.3d 1141 (2026);8 see also Rice v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 204 Conn. App. 513, 517–19,
251 A.3d 1009 (upholding habeas court’s dismissal of
habeas petition as untimely under § 52-470 where court
determined that there was “no evidence corroborating the
petitioner’s testimony” that his prior counsel failed to
advise him of time constraints), cert. denied, 337 Conn.
906, 252 A.3d 365 (2021). Accordingly, we cannot con-
clude that the court abused its discretion in determining
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause.
ineffective assistance. See Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
348 Conn. 349–50.
6 On appeal, the petitioner emphasizes that he also offered as evidence
his Department of Correction mental health records from 2001 and
2002. He argues that these records, along with his testimony about his
mental health history, “supported his claimed inability to understand
his attorneys, their advice, and his rights and obligations.” That evi-
dence, however, does not support his claim that his prior counsel failed
to provide him with any such advice in the first instance.
7 Contrary to the petitioner’s assertions, we do not view the habeas
court’s decision as stating that the petitioner’s testimony by itself would
be insufficient to establish good cause, even if the court had found that
testimony to be credible.
8 We note that, following the submission of the parties’ appellate briefs
but prior to oral argument, our Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s
petition for certification to appeal in Lisboa v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, supra, 236 Conn. App. 23, which involved a claim substantially
similar to the one at issue in this appeal. The habeas court in Lisboa,
however, “did not have the benefit of Rose”; id., 30; whereas the habeas
court in the present case explicitly considered and properly applied the
legal principles set forth in Rose.

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Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction
The petitioner, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that
the court erred in dismissing his third habeas petition
as untimely.
The judgment is affirmed.