State v. Fluker

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State v. Fluker
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KWANZE FLUKER
(AC 47256)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of several crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder in the
shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia,
that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial when the trial court
denied his motion for a mistrial after a police officer testified that DNA evi-
dence obtained from the defendant’s vehicle matched the record of a ”known
felon” in a DNA database and that individual was the defendant. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for a mistrial, as the police officer’s remark was unprompted by the state, it
was an isolated occurrence, the court struck the remark from the record, the
state thereafter presented testimony that helped mitigate any prejudice that
may have resulted from the remark, the state’s case was relatively strong,
and the defendant declined the court’s repeated offers to provide the jury
with curative instructions; accordingly, the police officer’s remark did not
result in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant.
The defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor’s improper comments
during closing argument to the jury, namely, the prosecutor’s reference to a
witness as a “snitch,” which improperly referenced testimony stricken by the
trial court, her assertion that a witness testified that the defendant used a
“street name,” which was contrary to the actual testimony, and the prosecu-
tor’s improper appeal for sympathy for the victim, violated the defendant’s
due process right to a fair trial, as, although the defendant did not invite
any of the improprieties, the defendant did not object, request curative
instructions or move for a new trial on the basis of those comments, which
were not severe, frequent or central to the state’s case, the improper effect
of any of the comments was diminished by the court’s general instructions
to the jury after closing arguments, and, as the state’s case was strong and
persuasive, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would
have been different in the absence of the prosecutor’s improper comments.
The trial court did not commit plain error, as the defendant claimed, by
failing to provide the jury, sua sponte, with a special credibility instruction
regarding the testimony of his accomplice, who had entered into a cooperation
agreement with the state, as the defendant did not provide any authority
that required the court to give such an instruction sua sponte, he did not
claim that the instructions the court gave the jury on witness credibility and
accomplice testimony were improper, and, under the law existing at the time
of his trial, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction singling out a
state’s witness and highlighting that witness’ motive for testifying falsely.
Argued January 5—officially released July 28, 2026

State v. Fluker
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder, arson in the
second degree, arson in the third degree and tamper-
ing with or fabricating physical evidence, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford
and tried to the jury before Schuman, J.; thereafter,
the court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial;
verdict and judgment of guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder, arson in the second degree and tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Ruth Burke, deputy assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
attorney, Samantha Magnani, assistant state’s attor-
ney, Olivia Jones, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, and Jesse Giddings, former supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. The defendant, Kwanze Fluker, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
jury trial, of conspiracy to commit murder in violation
of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a), arson
in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-112 (a) (1) (B), and tampering with or fabricating
physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
155 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the
trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial,
(2) the prosecutor engaged in improprieties during the
trial and closing argument that deprived him of his due
process right to a fair trial, and (3) the court committed
plain error by failing, sua sponte, to provide the jury
with a special credibility instruction with respect to the
testimony of a witness who had a cooperation agreement

State v. Fluker
with the state. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to the
resolution of this appeal. On August 29, 2021, the defen-
dant called Emmanuel Floyd, an acquaintance of his for
several years, and asked him to meet. The two men, while
remaining on the phone with each other,1 met on Blue
Hills Avenue in Bloomfield. The defendant arrived in a
2008 Nissan Maxima, and Floyd arrived in a 2006 BMW
530i and in possession of a nine millimeter Glock 19 hand-
gun. While Floyd and the defendant were together, they
saw the victim, Dominique Miller, drive past them in a
red Polaris Slingshot. According to Floyd, the defendant
suggested that they follow the victim “to talk to him”
because “[the defendant] was [mad] [that the victim] was
chumming with Marion Edwards,” who had “told on [the
defendant] before . . . .” Floyd agreed. Floyd, too, had a
“problem” with the victim because the victim “had shot
at [Floyd] before.”
The defendant and Floyd then followed the victim in
their vehicles. They initially lost him but then located him
nearby on Euclid Street. The two men continued to follow
the victim, first to a nearby party on Granby Street and
then to Madison Motors, LLC (Madison Motors), an auto-
mobile dealership and repair shop in Bloomfield. While
the victim was at Madison Motors, the defendant drove
to a nearby Burger King restaurant, and Floyd drove to a
nearby Home Depot store. Once the victim left Madison
Motors, he drove to a gas station on Blue Hills Avenue,
with the defendant and Floyd still following him. After
the victim left the gas station, he traveled onto Interstate
91 northbound while Floyd and the defendant continued
following him. While on Interstate 91, the victim sped
up. The defendant instructed Floyd to speed up as well
because he was in a faster vehicle and told him “to get
1Call logs established that Floyd and the defendant spoke for approxi-
mately eight and one-half hours from August 28 through September
1, 2021, including during the one and one-half hours leading up to and
including the time of the shooting.

State v. Fluker
right and shoot [the victim].” Floyd refused because he
did not want to shoot the victim while they were driving
on the highway. The victim then drove off of Interstate
91 at exit 42, and Floyd and the defendant followed. The
victim stopped at a red traffic signal in the left lane of
the off ramp, and Floyd drove alongside him in the right
lane. The defendant then again instructed Floyd to “get
it right, shoot him now, shoot him now, do it . . . .” Floyd
then fired six gunshots at the victim and left the area.
Not long after the shooting, a complainant called 911
to report that she had found the victim deceased in his
car on the exit 42 off ramp of Interstate 91 northbound.
Officers with the Windsor Locks Police Department and
Connecticut State Police arrived at the scene and found
the victim in the driver’s side of the Slingshot with his
head slumped over, as well as multiple shell casings on
the ground by the Slingshot’s passenger side. Paramedics
then arrived, and the victim was pronounced dead at the
scene. Autopsy and ballistics evidence later established
that the cause of death was four gunshot wounds, one
each to the head and neck, and two to the upper torso.
There were no known eyewitnesses and no available
surveillance footage of the shooting was found.2 The
lead investigator, Detective Christopher Scott of the
Connecticut State Police, Central District Major Crimes
Squad (major crimes squad), and other investigating
officers were able to identify the victim’s last known loca-
tion. The officers were then able to collect surveillance
footage from several nearby businesses and to track his
movements until he drove onto Interstate 91 northbound.
While observing the surveillance footage, the investigat-
ing officers noticed the same two vehicles, a 2008 Nissan
Maxima and a 2006 BMW 530i, following the victim.3
2The complainant who called 911 did not witness the shooting.
3The officers determined that the Nissan had a distinctive faded hood,
tinted windows, and a sticker on the rear driver’s side window, but they
were unable to obtain a license plate number for it at that time based on
the surveillance footage. The officers also determined that the BMW
had a visible dent, a dark bumper, and tinted windows, and were able
to obtain a partial license plate number.

State v. Fluker
The officers obtained cell site location information (CSLI)
that provided evidence that the defendant’s and Floyd’s
cell phones were at locations that corresponded to the
vehicles’ presence on the surveillance footage. The offi-
cers also obtained surveillance footage of the driver of
the Nissan at the Burger King drive-through. The driver
was wearing sunglasses, which covered his eyes, and a
surgical mask pulled down to his chin, which left the
remainder of his face exposed.
On August 31, 2021, Scott and Detective Michael
Stanger, also with the major crimes squad, saw a Nis-
san in Bloomfield that matched the description of the
Nissan in the surveillance footage.4 When the officers
approached, the vehicle sped off and evaded the police;
however, the officers were able to obtain the license plate
number, which they later determined was not registered
to the Nissan.
On September 1, 2021, the officers observed Floyd
driving his BMW5 in Bloomfield and detained him. The
officers brought Floyd to the state police Troop H bar-
racks in Hartford for questioning and seized his cell
phone and the BMW as evidence.6 Floyd told the officers
that he was at home on the day of the shooting and never
mentioned the defendant.
On September 3, 2021, police officers investigat-
ing an unrelated matter saw the Nissan in Hartford.
They alerted officers with the major crimes squad and
attempted to block the vehicle into a driveway. In an
4Scott testified that “[t]he faded hood, the tinted windows, and the
sticker on the rear driver’s side” had drawn his attention to the vehicle.
5The officers determined that Floyd was the registered owner of the
BMW.
6Scott testified that two search warrants were obtained, one for Floyd’s
cell phone and another for his BMW. The search of Floyd’s cell phone
revealed the following Internet searches: “how fast does a Slingshot
go,” “homicide in Windsor Locks,” “man found dead off [Interstate 91]
Windsor Locks, Connecticut,” “Kwanze Fluker,” and “car wash near
me.” Police officers also found that Floyd had screenshotted multiple
photos of the victim and his family. As for Floyd’s BMW, the steering
wheel contained particles consistent with gunshot residue.

State v. Fluker
attempt to evade the officers, the defendant backed the
Nissan into a garage at the other end of the driveway,
hitting the corner of the garage, before driving forward,
colliding with police and civilian vehicles, going through
a chain-link fence and out another driveway. Scott and
Stanger responded to the location and observed the Nis-
san leaving the scene.
Shortly thereafter, police officers received a report of a
car on fire at the intersection of Princeton Lane and Mill-
brook Drive in East Hartford.7 Police officers responded
to the scene to find the Nissan on fire. They were able
to recover from the vehicle an opened Lunchables food
container from the floor under the driver’s seat, the
vehicle’s gas cap, a box of matches, and a lighter. The
officers subsequently were able to confirm that the fire
was incendiary and that the likely ignition source was
that of a person applying an open flame to the passenger
seat’s fabric. The officers also took swabs of the inside of
the Lunchables container and the vehicle’s gas cap. The
swabs were submitted to the state forensics laboratory
for testing. DNA profiles were generated from those
samples and compared to a DNA profile that later was
developed from a swab of the defendant’s saliva.8 The
results indicated that the defendant was a DNA con-
tributor to both samples.9 In addition, the CSLI obtained
during the investigation confirmed that the defendant
had been in the area of that intersection prior to the
discovery of the burned Nissan.
Police officers were also able to obtain the vehicle
identification number of the Nissan and located its last
7A witness who saw the car on fire and called 911 testified that he was
unable to identify the person he saw get out of the car but informed the
responding police officers that the individual was a Black male wear-
ing a black mask and black hoodie who told the witness that his car was
overheating before leaving the scene on foot.
8Scott testified that a search warrant had been obtained for the buccal
swab of the defendant’s saliva, which Scott executed on February 10,
2022. That buccal swab was sent to the state laboratory for forensic
testing in order to generate the defendant’s DNA profile for comparison.
9The defendant’s DNA profile was consistent with one of two contribu-
tors to the DNA profile developed from the Lunchables container and of
one of three contributors to the DNA profile developed from the gas cap.

State v. Fluker
known owner, who informed the officers that he had
sold the vehicle to Tiffany Castro in Bridgeport. Castro
testified that, in August 2021, she sold the Nissan on
Facebook Marketplace to a Black man who arrived in an
Uber to make the purchase. Castro provided the police
with two phone numbers that the buyer had used, one of
which was associated with the defendant, and the Face-
book messages between them. Because the purchaser,
who was later identified as the defendant, used the
name “Willie Mays” when communicating with Castro
on Facebook, the police were able to link the Facebook
profile for “Willie Mays” to the defendant through the
account’s profile photo and associated email address
(kwanze.fluker@facebook.com).
The defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant and
subsequently charged in a long form information with
one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation
of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a) (count one), one count of
arson in the second degree in violation of § 53a-112 (a)
(1) (B) (count two), one count arson in the third degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-113 (a) (count three),
and one count of tampering with or fabricating physical
evidence in violation of § 53a-155 (a) (1) (count four). Fol-
lowing a jury trial during several days in July and August
2023, the defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder, arson in the second degree, and tamper-
ing with or fabricating physical evidence.10 On October
12, 2023, the trial court, Schuman, J., sentenced the
defendant to thirty-five years of incarceration.11 This
appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history
will be set forth as necessary.
10Because the jury found the defendant guilty of arson in the second
degree, it did not consider the charge of arson in the third degree, and,
therefore, count three was merged with count two.
11The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years of incar-
ceration on the charge of conspiracy to commit murder and fifteen
years of incarceration on the charge of arson in the second degree, to
run consecutively to each other. In addition, the court sentenced the
defendant to five years of incarceration on the charge of tampering
with or fabricating physical evidence, to run concurrently, for a total
effective sentence of thirty-five years of incarceration.

State v. Fluker
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
erly denied his motion for a mistrial. The defendant
contends that the court should have declared a mistrial
because Scott’s testimony that the DNA obtained from
the Lunchables container matched the DNA profile of a
“known felon” and that Scott’s subsequent identification
of that person as the defendant was so prejudicial that
the testimony deprived the defendant of his due process
right to a fair trial. We disagree.
The record reveals the following additional facts and
procedural history that are relevant to the resolution of
this claim. Scott testified during the state’s case-in-chief
that a search warrant was obtained for the Nissan and
that, on September 22, 2021, officers with the major
crimes squad conducted a search of the vehicle. Scott
further testified that a Lunchables food container was
recovered from the vehicle and that a swab was taken
from that container and sent to the state forensics labo-
ratory for DNA testing. The prosecutor asked Scott
to discuss a DNA “hit” notification generated by the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).12 The following
colloquy took place:
“[The Prosecutor]: At some point during the course
of this investigation, and I’m going to ask you to tell
me if you recall when, were you notified by the state
lab of a DNA match or DNA hit from the Lunchable[s]
[container]?
“[Scott]: I was notified of a DNA—it was considered
a CODIS hit.
“[The Prosecutor]: Okay.
“[Scott]: And I was informed that it matched a record
on file for a known felon.
12“CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares
them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added
to the database.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. State,
237 Conn. App. 737, 739 n.2, 353 A.3d 76, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 928,
353 A.3d 847 (2026).

State v. Fluker
“[The Prosecutor]: Okay. I’m going to ask the court
to—
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
“[The Court]: The objection was relevance? Overruled.
“[The Prosecutor]: Who was that individual that was
named?
“[Scott]: It was named Kwanze Fluker.”
The defendant did not object further, and the prosecu-
tor’s direct examination of Scott continued. The trial
court later met with counsel at a sidebar conference
before excusing the jury for the day. Once the jury was
excused, the defendant orally moved for a mistrial based
on Scott’s testimony, arguing that the testimony con-
stituted “a very direct implication that [the defendant]
was a known felon,” which was “information not in the
record” that was unduly prejudicial, especially given
that the defendant did not intend to testify in order to
prevent such evidence from being elicited. The prosecu-
tor argued that Scott’s testimony only implied, rather
than directly asserted, that the defendant was a known
felon and that the use of “felon . . . was in connection
with CODIS” rather than the defendant. The prosecutor
asked the court to give a curative instruction if the court
believed that there was “any kind of prejudice” and to
strike the remark from the record. The prosecutor also
offered to call a witness from the state forensics labo-
ratory who would testify that CODIS contains profiles
other than those of convicted felons.
The trial court noted that it “did not hear the wit-
ness refer to felons” and that it had “misconstrued the
defendant’s objection.” The court further explained: “I
didn’t know that you were objecting to the reference to
felon, and I should have sustained the objection. But,
given the situation we’re in now, I think the curative
instruction is sufficient to address the situation, know-
ing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions, and
I can also repeat the instruction in the closing . . . charge

State v. Fluker
to the jury. I also think that testimony from the [state’s
proposed] DNA witness . . . as to the type of information
that CODIS includes and [that it] is not limited to known
felons will help meliorate the situation. And even [defense
counsel] agrees that there was no direct statement that
the defendant is a known felon, although the witness’
testimony may have created that—may have implied
that.” The court then asked defense counsel whether it
should give a curative instruction to the jury. Defense
counsel requested that the court replay the recording
of Scott’s testimony. After the playback of the testi-
mony, the court explained that, “the witness stated that
the DNA matched a record for a known felon and then
after that said the individual was [the defendant].” In
response, defense counsel argued: “For a known felon,
and that individual is [the defendant], sounds to me like
directly saying that [the defendant] is a known felon.”
The court agreed but stated that the appropriate remedy
was a curative instruction and afforded the defendant the
opportunity to consider the proposed remedy overnight.
The following day, the defendant declined the trial
court’s offer to give the jury a curative instruction,
reasoning that there was no curative instruction that
could cure the defect created by Scott’s testimony and
that “any curative instruction might just highlight
the information.” The court then asked, “[a]nd even an
instruction to the effect that the jury should disregard
the testimony from . . . Scott concerning why there was
a hit on the CODIS network and that the jury should
draw no inference of guilt from the CODIS hit, you’re
declining or you ask that I not give that instruction?”
Defense counsel answered affirmatively, again reason-
ing that “it would just draw attention to that fact . . . .”
The prosecutor argued that the motion for a mistrial
should be denied but that she would “join in the applica-
tion for a cautionary instruction” should the defendant
choose to seek one. The prosecutor then offered again
to call a witness from the state forensics laboratory to
testify regarding the information contained in CODIS

State v. Fluker
and requested that the court strike Scott’s remark from
the record.
The trial court then denied the defendant’s motion
for a mistrial. The court explained: “One, I am striking
the testimony of the witness that the DNA obtained
from the evidence matched a record for a known felon,
which means that the state cannot rely on it for closing
argument . . . . Second, I will note that [the] testimony
was unsolicited by the state. The state’s question did not
call for a response that the DNA matched the record for
a known felon. So, there was no prosecutorial misconduct
involved. Third, I am more than willing to charge the
jury or caution the jury . . . that they should disregard
that testimony, that they should draw no inference of
guilt from the CODIS hit. They should rely on the pre-
sumption of innocence. But the defendant has asked
that I not give that instruction, and I will adhere to the
defendant’s request in that regard. But I am certainly
willing to do so. I’m also willing to do so in the closing
charge to the jury and will entertain a request from the
defendant or the state to charge in that regard and see
what the positions of the parties are at that time. I don’t
feel, although the evidence was inadmissible, that it’s
shocking; it’s not, as defense counsel says, it’s not sur-
prising that a CODIS hit would be from a known felon,
but I agree that it’s inadmissible.”
The trial court also reasoned that it believed that the
testimony by the state’s witness concerning CODIS would
further ameliorate any resulting prejudice. The state
then called Megan Olt, a DNA analyst and forensic sci-
ence examiner with the state forensic science laboratory,
who testified that CODIS is “a database of known and
unknown profiles that are searched regularly,” which
includes individuals who do not have prior criminal
records, and that “[t]he purpose of the database is to
provide investigative leads either linking a case to [a]
case or a case to a known profile.”
After the close of evidence, the trial court discussed
the jury charge with counsel and the defendant. The

State v. Fluker
following colloquy between the court, defense counsel,
and the prosecutor occurred:
“The Court: . . . The only issue that I want to make
sure of at this point, because it’s really a request not to
charge on something that I would charge on, is this: I
had proposed in my charge two sentences under a title
called specific evidence, the title could change, but those
two sentences are as follows. You should disregard any
testimony of . . . Scott concerning the background of the
persons on the CODIS database. You may draw no infer-
ence of guilt from the fact that the defendant’s name was
on the CODIS database. It’s my understanding . . . that
[the defendant] do[es] not want me to give that charge.
“[Defense Counsel]: That’s correct, Your Honor. We
would decline that instruction for the reason that . . .
what the jury has heard they’ve already heard, and we
can’t put the cat back in the box, basically. And my con-
cern is, if I have the instruction there, it would simply
draw attention to it again.
“[The Court]: All right. That’s a choice you can make.
What’s the state’s position on that?
“[The Prosecutor]: Judge, the state had requested
that you read the instruction, but as long as it is on the
record, what you were going to read, and the defendant
declines it, then I think the record is clear.”
After the charge conference,13 the defendant orally
renewed his motion for a mistrial, which the trial court
13The record indicates that a charge conference was conducted in
chambers off the record. After the close of evidence on August 4, 2023,
the court summarized the charge conference on the record, explaining
that “[it] [had] sent an initial draft of the substantive part of the charge
to the jury to counsel by email approximately a week [prior]. Then [it]
met with counsel briefly . . . [on August 3, 2023] in chambers. [They]
discussed the charge. [The court] sent a revised and complete copy of
the draft charge to counsel [on August 3, 2023] at the close of business.
Then [they] met [the] morning [of August 4, 2023], and [the court]
discussed the charge with counsel, [the court] did make some changes
in light of that discussion and [it] sent a final draft to counsel . . . [via]
email. [Accordingly] [the court] believe[d] [that] [it] ha[d] satisfied the
Practice Book requirement for a charge conference.”

State v. Fluker
“denied essentially for the same reasons [it] denied [the
motion] earlier in that the answer was unsolicited by the
state and [the court had] offered . . . twice to provide
a curative instruction to the jury. Defense [counsel]
declined to authorize [the court] to do so.” The court
also explained that Olt’s testimony regarding the CODIS
database would mitigate any prejudice. Finally, at sen-
tencing, the defendant again renewed his motion for a
mistrial, which the court also denied, reasoning that it
had “made the right decision in denying the motion for
a new trial [and] offered cures to the defendant, which
the defendant declined to accept.”
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly denied his motion for a mistrial. “Practice
Book § 42-43 provides in relevant part: Upon motion of a
defendant, the judicial authority may declare a mistrial
at any time during the trial if there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or any
conduct inside or outside the courtroom which results in
substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s
case. . . . The defendant bears the burden to establish
prejudice. . . . We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion
for a mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard.
. . . When reviewing a ruling on a mistrial motion, we
must ask whether the trial court considered the total-
ity of the circumstances in arriving at its decision. . . .
Further, our review must take into account the trial
judge’s superior opportunity to assess the proceedings
over which he or she has personally presided. . . . Every
reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the trial
court’s ruling . . . .
“Furthermore, [w]hile the remedy of a mistrial is per-
mitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored.
[A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some
occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is
apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot
have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are viti-
ated. . . . If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the
drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . On

State v. Fluker
appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare
a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many
circumstances [that] may arise during the trial in which
his . . . function is to assure a fair and just outcome. . . .
The trial court is better positioned than we are to evalu-
ate in the first instance whether a certain occurrence is
prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is
necessary to cure that prejudice.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Nichols, 226 Conn. App. 359,
368–70, 317 A.3d 861 (2024).
On appeal, the defendant argues, as he did before the
trial court, that Scott’s testimony that the DNA profile
generated from the swab of the Lunchables container
“matched a record on file for a known felon” and that
the individual “was named Kwanze Fluker” improperly
exposed the defendant’s criminal history to the jury
and “was not only inadmissible, but it was highly preju-
dicial and stigmatized the defendant to the jury,” and,
therefore, the court should have granted his motion for
a mistrial. We agree with the defendant, and the court,
that Scott’s testimony that the DNA profile from the
Lunchables swab “matched a record on file for a known
felon” was inadmissible.14 See, e.g., State v. Collins, 206
Conn. App. 438, 452, 260 A.3d 507 (“[a]s a general rule,
evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or misconduct is
not admissible” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 339 Conn. 914, 262 A.3d 135 (2021). Nev-
ertheless, because Scott’s remark was unprompted by the
state, the remark was an isolated occurrence, the court
struck the challenged remark so that the state could
not rely on it during closing argument to the jury, Olt’s
testimony helped to mitigate any prejudice, the state’s
case was relatively strong, and the court repeatedly
offered curative instructions that were rejected by the
defendant, we do not conclude that the remark resulted
in substantial and irreparable prejudice that deprived
the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial,
14The state rightfully does not contend otherwise.

State v. Fluker
and, therefore, we agree with the court that a mistrial
was unwarranted in this case.
Our reviewing courts have declined to find an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion in denying a motion for a
mistrial in cases in which a witness or prosecutor briefly
referenced a defendant’s prior criminal misconduct or
conviction in the presence of the jury. See, e.g., State v.
Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 264–66, 502 A.2d 886 (curative
instructions were sufficient to eliminate any prejudice
resulting from witness testimony “that the defendant
had ‘talked about getting down in robbery again’ ”), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S. Ct. 1797, 90 L. Ed. 2d
342 (1986); State v. Tarver, 166 Conn. App. 304, 322,
328–30, 141 A.3d 940 (curative instructions obviated
any prejudice from witness’ testimony that “ ‘[the defen-
dant] went to jail for robbery’ ” and had previously been
in jail), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 908, 150 A.3d 683 (2016);
State v. Vitale, 76 Conn. App. 1, 10–13, 818 A.2d 134
(curative instructions remedied prejudice from witness’
statement that “[the defendant said], ‘I’m on parole,
I’m going to jail’ ”), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906, 826
A.2d 178 (2003). In each of those cases, the trial court
promptly issued a curative instruction and struck the
testimony. See State v. Tarver, supra, 328 (“the giving
of a curative instruction . . . carries great weight in our
determination of whether the court’s denial of a motion
for a mistrial was an abuse of discretion”). In this case,
however, the defendant was given several opportunities
to have the court issue such an instruction but declined
each time.15 By declining the court’s repeated offers for
curative instructions, “the defendant made a legitimate
tactical decision not to emphasize the testimony. This
15Although the trial court initially overruled the defendant’s objec-
tion and did not strike the testimony or have the opportunity to issue a
curative instruction until the following day, fault cannot be attributed
to the court. Defense counsel did not state the basis for the objection.
In addition, defense counsel did not clarify the actual grounds for her
objection when the court clearly indicated that it believed that she
was objecting on relevance grounds. She also did not object to Scott’s
subsequent identification of the defendant as the DNA match, which
would have given her another opportunity to make her objection clear.

State v. Fluker
court will not second-guess such decisions on appeal.”
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Mitchell, 110 Conn. App.
305, 314–15, 955 A.2d 84, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 946,
959 A.2d 1012 (2008).
The defendant acknowledges that he declined the trial
court’s repeated offers of a curative instruction but
nevertheless contends that “[n]o curative instruction
could cure the prejudice, as any curative measure would
only draw more attention to the damaging testimony.”
In the present case, the court reasonably could have
concluded that, even if Scott’s remark was injurious
enough to necessitate an instruction, a mistrial was
unwarranted. Although it is true that, in some cases,
a statement may be so prejudicial that even a curative
instruction would be insufficient to dispel the prejudice,
that is not the case here. We repeatedly have stated that
“[d]efense counsel cannot opt for a mistrial instead of a
curative instruction, as if the two were interchangeable.
If defense counsel decides to move for [a] mistrial and
altogether eschews the instruction, the trial court can-
not be compelled by that decision to go further than it
otherwise would.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Collins, supra, 206 Conn. App. 454. We need
not speculate as to the potential effect of the proposed
curative instructions.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the defen-
dant has failed to show that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial on the
basis of Scott’s testimony.
II
The defendant also claims that he was deprived of his
due process right to a fair trial because the prosecutor
engaged in impropriety during the trial and closing argu-
ment by improperly appealing to the jurors’ emotions
through her stigmatization of the defendant because
of his criminal history and her invocation of sympathy
for the victim, as well as by commenting on facts not in
evidence. We agree that the prosecutor made certain

State v. Fluker
improper statements during closing arguments but
conclude that those improprieties did not deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.
Before addressing the defendant’s specific claims on
appeal, we first set forth general principles governing
our review of claims of prosecutorial impropriety. “In
analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage
in a two step analytical process. . . . The two steps are
separate and distinct. . . . We first examine whether
prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Second, if an
impropriety exists, we then examine whether it deprived
the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. .
. . In other words, an impropriety is an impropriety,
regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the
trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful and thus
caused or contributed to a due process violation involves
a separate and distinct inquiry. . . .
“[O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct
by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair trial
rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State v.
Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)],
with due consideration of whether that [impropriety]
was objected to at trial. . . . These factors include: [1]
the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by
defense conduct or argument . . . [2] the severity of the
[impropriety] . . . [3] the frequency of the [impropriety]
. . . [4] the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical
issues in the case . . . [5] the strength of the curative
measures adopted . . . and [6] the strength of the state’s
case. . . . The question of whether the defendant has been
prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] depends on
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s
verdict would have been different absent the sum total
of the improprieties. . . . Under the Williams general
due process standard, the defendant has the burden to
show both that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper
and that it caused prejudice to his defense. . . . The two
steps of [our] analysis are separate and distinct, and we
may reject the claim if we conclude [that] the defendant

State v. Fluker
has failed to establish either prong.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Antwon B., 236 Conn. App.
428, 455, 348 A.3d 814 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn.
910, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026).
“[W]e must examine not only whether any individual
impropriety deprived the defendant of his right to a fair
trial, but also whether the cumulative effect of multiple
improprieties . . . deprived [him] of his . . . right to a fair
trial. . . . To [do so], we must determine whether the sum
total of [the prosecutor’s] improprieties rendered the
defendant’s [trial] fundamentally unfair . . . . We review
the instances of impropriety in the context of the entire
trial and not in a vacuum.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn.
428, 437, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025).
We recognize that defense counsel did not object
to many of the alleged improprieties at trial. “[O]ur
Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s failure
to object at trial to each of the occurrences that he [or
she] now raises as instances of prosecutorial impropriety,
though relevant to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of
his [or her] claims. . . . This does not mean, however,
that the absence of an objection at trial does not play
a significant role in the determination of whether the
challenged statements were, in fact, improper. . . . To
the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well estab-
lished maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object
to the [alleged improprieties at the time they occurred]
suggests that defense counsel did not believe that [they
were] [improper] in light of the record of the case at
the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Antwon B., supra, 236 Conn. App. 456–57.
Because several of the alleged improprieties took place
during the prosecutor’s closing argument, we set forth
the following additional relevant legal principles. “It is
well established that prosecutorial [impropriety] of a
constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of clos-
ing arguments. . . . When making closing arguments to
the jury, [however, counsel] must be allowed a generous

State v. Fluker
latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argu-
ment and fair comment cannot be determined precisely
by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the
zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . . Thus, as the
state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case
forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based [on]
the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom. . . .
“Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to
avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts
the jury’s attention from the facts of the case. [The
prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court, like every
attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing
the people of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for
the guilty as much as for the innocent. . . . By reason
of his [or her] office, he [or she] usually exercises great
influence [on] jurors. . . . While the privilege of counsel
in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed
or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license
to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest an inference
from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters [that]
the jury ha[s] no right to consider.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 456.
Finally, “[i]t is axiomatic that a prosecutor may not
advance an argument that is intended solely to appeal
to the jurors’ emotions and to evoke sympathy for the
victim or outrage at the defendant. . . . An appeal to
emotions, passions, or prejudices improperly diverts the
jury’s attention away from the facts and makes it more
difficult for it to decide the case on the evidence in the
record. . . . When the prosecutor appeals to emotions,
he invites the jury to decide the case, not according to
a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of
powerful and irrelevant factors [that] are likely to skew
that appraisal. . . . An improper appeal to the jurors’
emotions can take the form of a personal attack on the
defendant’s character . . . or a plea for sympathy for the
victim or her family.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705, 725, 259 A.3d

State v. Fluker
617 (2021). With these principles in mind, we address
each alleged impropriety in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the prosecutor improp-
erly adopted or attempted to elicit testimony concern-
ing the defendant’s criminal history “to stigmatize the
defendant and paint him as a dangerous criminal to the
jury” by eliciting and adopting testimony from Scott
that the defendant was a known felon. As discussed in
part I of this opinion, the testimony at issue arose in
the context of questions concerning the DNA sample
taken from the Lunchables container recovered from the
defendant’s vehicle. Scott testified that, after a CODIS
search was completed, he received a notification that
the sample matched with someone in the CODIS system
and indicated that a “known felon” was a contributor
to the sample.16 On appeal, the defendant argues that,
by asking, “[w]ho was that individual that was named,”
the prosecutor “vicariously adopted [Scott’s] testimony
and further elicited prejudicial information for the sole
purpose of disparaging the defendant to the jury.” We
disagree.17
The record does not support the defendant’s assertion
that the prosecutor adopted Scott’s inadmissible testi-
mony by asking him to identify the individual profile
matching the CODIS hit. There is no indication in the
record that, by asking this question, the prosecutor was
trying to link the defendant’s name to the phrase “known
felon.” Rather, the clear objective of the prosecutor’s
16The complete facts and procedural history regarding Scott’s “known
felon” testimony are set forth in part I of this opinion.
17The state contends that we need not address this claim because it is
an “unpreserved evidentiary [claim] masquerading as [a] constitutional
[claim] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morel-Vargas,
343 Conn. 247, 273, 273 A.3d 661, cert. denied, 	U.S. 	, 143 S. Ct.
263, 214 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2022). Because we agree with the state that the
prosecutor’s remarks were not improper, we need not decide whether
the defendant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim is actually an unpre-
served evidentiary claim. See State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750, 769, 311
A.3d 714 (2024).

State v. Fluker
question was to elicit evidence that the defendant was the
“individual” whose DNA profile matched with the sample
taken from the Lunchables container in an attempt to
provide forensic evidence connecting the defendant to
the Nissan. The prosecutor therefore did not commit any
impropriety by asking that question.18
Our conclusion is further supported by the prosecu-
tor’s efforts to cure any prejudice resulting from Scott’s
remark. The prosecutor conceded that the testimony was
inadmissible, asked for a curative instruction if the court
or the defendant thought one was appropriate, agreed
that the remark should be stricken, and called another
witness, Olt, to testify regarding the information in
CODIS in order to ameliorate any prejudicial impact of
Scott’s testimony. Because there was no impropriety,
this claim fails.
B
The defendant next claims that the prosecutor improp-
erly attempted to elicit testimony concerning the defen-
dant’s criminal history in order “to stigmatize the
defendant and paint him as a dangerous criminal to the
jury” by asking Floyd to elaborate on the defendant’s
motive for killing the victim. The state argues that we
need not address this claim of impropriety because it is
an unpreserved evidentiary claim. We agree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary to our resolution of this claim. Floyd testi-
fied, inter alia, regarding the defendant’s and his motives
for killing the victim. The following colloquy occurred
between the prosecutor and Floyd:
18Insofar as the defendant contends that the prosecutor’s initial
question was an attempt to elicit improper testimony regarding the
defendant’s criminal history, we disagree. The prosecutor’s question
clearly did not call for Scott’s testimony that the DNA match was for
a “known felon” because the prosecutor asked only when the state labo-
ratory notified Scott of the DNA match. We also note the trial court’s
statement in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, although
it is not binding on this court, that “[t]here was no prosecutorial mis-
conduct involved” with respect to the prosecutor’s question.

State v. Fluker
“[The Prosecutor]: Do you know why [the defendant]
suggested you should follow [the victim]?
“[Floyd]: I know he said he wanted to talk to him.
“[The Prosecutor]: What did he want to talk to him
about?
“[Floyd]: He was [mad] [that] he was chumming with
Marion Edwards.
“[The Prosecutor]: Who is . . . Edwards?
“[Floyd]: [The victim’s] friend. . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: Did you have any kind of problems
with . . . Edwards?
“[Floyd]: Yeah. Kind of.
“[The Prosecutor]: What kind of problem?
“[Floyd]: I know he had shot at me before. . . .
“[The Prosecutor]: What about [the defendant], do you
know if he had a problem with . . . Edwards?
“[Floyd]: Yeah.
“[The Prosecutor]: What was that about?
“[Floyd]: Well, he said he was mad that he had told on
him before, supposedly.
“[The Prosecutor]: [The defendant] was mad that
[Edwards] had told on him before; what do you mean,
told on him?
“[Floyd]: He said he had snitched on him in a previous
case, and that’s why he was [mad] at him.”
Defense counsel then objected. The trial court stated,
“[a]ll right. Absent objection, I’ll strike that reference.”
The prosecutor then asked: “Judge, I can rephrase it and
lead a little bit; permission to lead?” The court replied:
“Yes. You may. But the jury will disregard the last sen-
tence of the witness.” The prosecutor then asked Floyd,
“[w]as [the defendant] angry at [Edwards] for giving

State v. Fluker
information,” to which Floyd replied, “[y]es.” The defen-
dant did not object to this question or Floyd’s answer.
“Although we have held that unpreserved claims of
prosecutorial impropriety are to be reviewed under the
factors set forth in State v. Williams, supra, [204 Conn.]
540 . . . that rule does not apply to unpreserved eviden-
tiary claims masquerading as constitutional claims . . . .”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Morel-Vargas, 343 Conn. 247, 272–73, 273
A.3d 661, cert. denied, 	U.S. 	, 143 S. Ct. 263, 214
L. Ed. 2d 114 (2022). “Regardless of how the defendant
has framed the issue, he cannot clothe an ordinary evi-
dentiary issue in constitutional garb to obtain appellate
review. . . . [R]obing garden variety claims [of an eviden-
tiary nature] in the majestic garb of constitutional claims
does not make such claims constitutional in nature.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Smith, 110 Conn. App. 70, 86, 954 A.2d 202,
cert. denied, 289 Conn. 954, 961 A.2d 422 (2008). In
other words, “[t]he defendant can not raise a constitu-
tional claim by attaching a constitutional label to a purely
evidentiary claim or by asserting merely that a strained
connection exists between the evidentiary claim and a
fundamental constitutional right.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 87.
On appeal, the defendant claims that, by asking Floyd
to elaborate on his initial testimony concerning the defen-
dant’s motive, the prosecutor improperly sought to elicit
inadmissible testimony concerning the defendant’s prior
misconduct. The defendant’s claim, in essence, is that
the prosecutor should not have sought to elicit testimony
concerning the defendant’s alleged motive because “[t]he
motive established at trial, that the defendant was upset
that [the victim] was associating with someone who had
given information in one of his past cases . . . improperly
referenced the defendant’s criminal past.” We disagree.
Although Floyd testified that the defendant was upset
with Edwards because he previously had “snitched on
him,” the record clearly reflects that the prosecutor was

State v. Fluker
attempting to establish the defendant’s motive to kill
the victim. The defendant’s claim therefore is a “classic
evidentiary claim” because it challenges the propriety
of the admission of evidence, specifically, evidence of
the defendant’s prior misconduct. See State v. Ampero,
144 Conn. App. 706, 714, 72 A.3d 435, cert. denied, 310
Conn. 914, 76 A.3d 631 (2013); see also State v. Devito,
159 Conn. App. 560, 574, 124 A.3d 14 (recognizing that
defendant’s claim that prosecutor improperly elicited
testimony from multiple witnesses that implicated defen-
dant’s right to remain silent after having been advised of
his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), was unpreserved
evidentiary claim rather than constitutional claim and
therefore declining to address it), cert. denied, 319 Conn.
947, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015); State v. Omar, 136 Conn.
App. 87, 93, 43 A.3d 766 (recognizing that defendant’s
claim “that the prosecutor committed impropriety at trial
by eliciting . . . evidence of the defendant’s subsequent
drug arrest during the direct examination of [a witness]
and cross-examination of the defendant” was evidentiary
claim rather than constitutional claim of prosecutorial
impropriety and therefore declining to address it), cert.
denied, 305 Conn. 923, 47 A.3d 883 (2012). Moreover,
the defendant’s claim with respect to the prosecutor’s
question is unpreserved because the defendant never
objected to that question but only to Floyd’s answer.
Because the defendant has couched in constitutional
terms his unpreserved evidentiary claim regarding the
propriety of the admission of prior misconduct evidence
to prove his motive, we decline to address his claim. See
State v. Smith, supra, 110 Conn. App. 87–88 (“[o]nce
identified, unpreserved evidentiary claims masquerading
as constitutional claims will be summarily dismissed”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
C
The defendant next claims that the prosecutor
improperly attempted to elicit testimony concerning
the defendant’s criminal history in order “to stigmatize

State v. Fluker
the defendant and paint him as a dangerous criminal to
the jury” by asking Floyd whether he previously had
“lost touch with [the defendant] and didn’t see him for
a period of time . . . .”19 We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the resolution of this claim. Floyd testi-
fied, inter alia, that he had known the defendant for
many years but had “hung out only a few times.” Dur-
ing the prosecutor’s direct examination, the following
colloquy occurred:
“[The Prosecutor]: Would it be fair to say that you
lost touch with [the defendant] and didn’t see him for a
period of time?
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Leading.
“The Court: Sustained.
“[The Prosecutor]: Judge, if we can approach?”
The trial court then held an off-the-record sidebar with
counsel. Immediately after the trial resumed before the
jury, the prosecutor’s direct examination continued:
“[The Prosecutor]: Would it be fair to say that you
lost contact with [the defendant] for a period of time?
“[Floyd]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: And so, you didn’t see him?
“[Floyd]: Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: And some time in 2020 or 2021, did
you get back in touch with [the defendant]?
“[Floyd]: Yes.”
The prosecutor then questioned Floyd about other
topics.
On appeal, the defendant claims that, by asking this
question, the prosecutor was attempting “to elicit
19The state contends that we need not address this claim because it
is an evidentiary claim rather than a constitutional one. Because we

State v. Fluker
testimony from Floyd about the defendant’s prior term
of incarceration . . . .” There is no indication in the record,
however, that the defendant’s prior term of incarcera-
tion was the reason why Floyd “lost touch” with the
defendant. Moreover, the evidence in the record does not
reflect that, by asking this question, the prosecutor was
attempting to elicit testimony regarding the defendant’s
criminal history.20 Because the prosecutor’s motive is
unclear from the record, we cannot determine whether
the prosecutor was attempting to elicit testimony regard-
ing the defendant’s prior misconduct and term of incar-
ceration by asking this question and, therefore, cannot
assume that the prosecutor did not have a good faith
basis for asking the question. See State v. Pjura, 200
Conn. App. 802, 817–18, 240 A.3d 772, cert. denied,
335 Conn. 977, 241 A.3d 131 (2020); id., 818 (“[o]n the
basis of the record, we have no way of determining the
prosecutor’s actual motive for asking [the] question, and
we [therefore] need not engage in needless speculation as
to the reason the [objectionable] question was asked in the
absence of direct evidence of the prosecutor’s intent”).
Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor committed any impropriety.
Defense counsel’s decisions after the prosecutor ini-
tially asked the question and after she repeated it further
support our conclusion that the prosecutor did not act
improperly by asking this question. When the prosecu-
tor first asked this question, defense counsel objected,
not because it was an attempt “to elicit testimony . . .
about the defendant’s prior term of incarceration,” but
because the question was “leading.” In addition, after
the sidebar conference, the prosecutor repeated the chal-
lenged question almost verbatim without objection from
the defendant.
conclude that the prosecutor did not engage in impropriety by asking
this question, we need not address this contention. See footnote 17 of
this opinion.
20The prosecutor never, for example, asked Floyd why he lost touch
with the defendant.

State v. Fluker
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant has failed to
show that the prosecutor engaged in impropriety by ask-
ing Floyd whether he “lost contact” with the defendant.
D
The defendant’s remaining claims allege prosecutorial
impropriety during closing argument. We begin with
the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly
appealed to the jurors’ emotions and commented on
facts not in evidence by improperly suggesting that the
defendant may want to have Floyd killed for testifying
and using the word “snitch” when testifying. Although
we disagree with the defendant’s contention that the
prosecutor’s argument constituted impropriety, we do
agree that the prosecutor acted improperly when she
used the word “snitch” after the trial court had struck
it from the record.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary to our resolution of this issue. During
closing arguments, defense counsel argued, inter alia,
that there were “no eyewitnesses” to the shooting of the
victim and made the following remarks concerning Floyd:
“And the only witness who really implicates [the defen-
dant] in this trial is . . . Floyd, which the state is not
trying to emphasize his lack of record and so forth, but
you saw . . . Floyd’s demeanor in his police interview, he
didn’t seem nervous, he didn’t seem scared. And remem-
ber in the police interview that . . . Floyd gave after being
arrested, he didn’t say a word about [the defendant]. And
you’d think such an unsophisticated criminal would come
forth, it wasn’t me, it was this other guy that made me
do it, you know, but no, he didn’t say anything about [the
defendant], he just denied his own involvement, and you
saw his demeanor and attitude in the video.”
Defense counsel also highlighted Floyd’s cooperation
agreement with the state and his resulting strong inter-
est in testifying against the defendant. In her rebuttal
argument, the prosecutor argued, inter alia:

State v. Fluker
“And, again, I believe the comment that there’s no
eyewitness in here, you have the testimony of . . . Floyd
. . . . With regard to . . . Floyd, I don’t think that it’s
unreasonable based on what you heard from him, you
can tell the little snippet that you saw of his video inter-
view, he was kind of sitting there drinking his coffee,
right, he was talking about his jobs . . . making good eye
contact with the police. As soon as they started asking
him about Madison Motors or where he was that day,
he kind of looked away, you could even see his facial
expression, he wasn’t belligerent, but you know, it’s not
realistic to expect that he’s going to go in—and he knows
he’s in trouble, right, he goes there seizing his car and
his phone and confessed, it’s not like he said, hey, [the
defendant] did it. And again, what he did by coming in
here and getting up on the witness stand, you know, in
the street term, right, he was kind of a snitch, right. He
did in this case by getting up on that [witness stand] and
telling what he knows against [the defendant] exactly
what led to [the victim] being killed in this case, right
. . . Edwards told on the defendant and that’s what the
defendant’s problem was. So, maybe it took him a little
while to, you know, come around and get up on the stand,
but again, his testimony is not all you have here, and I
would submit to you, based on the evidence, it was cred-
ible, but you have so much other evidence in this case
to consider.” (Emphasis added.) The defendant did not
object to these statements.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the prosecutor
“insinuate[d] that the defendant might have intentions
to kill a witness against him—notably, more or less the
same offense for which he was already on trial,” and that
this insinuation, “[was] impermissible, as it [was] specu-
lative, inflammatory, not in the record and again incites
emotion over rational evaluation of the evidence.” The
state argues that the prosecutor’s argument “in no way
implied that the defendant would seek retribution against
Floyd” but that, nevertheless, “the evidence support[ed]
Floyd’s fear of the defendant and his initial hesitancy to
provide information on the victim’s murder.”

State v. Fluker
This court’s analysis in State v. Crocker, 83 Conn.
App. 615, 852 A.2d 762, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910,
859 A.2d 571 (2004), is instructive. In Crocker, the
prosecutor, during closing arguments, made arguments
similar to those made by the prosecutor in the present
case. For example, in Crocker, the prosecutor argued,
“[w]ell, after an incident where you witness the defen-
dant shoot somebody in cold blood, you can understand
how easy it would be to tell the police what happened in
the privacy of the police station. You can understand
how it’s quite different sitting up there on that [wit-
ness] stand having to face this particular defendant.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 663 n.12. This
court concluded that, in so arguing, the prosecutor had
not acted improperly because the arguments pertained
to the fear of certain witnesses, which were based on the
evidence. See id., 663–64.
The same is true in the present case. The prosecutor’s
comments about Floyd’s fear of the defendant prevent-
ing him from reporting the defendant’s involvement
to the police or initially intending to testify at his trial
were supported by the evidence in the record, and, there-
fore, were not improper. Floyd testified, inter alia, that
he shot the victim when told to do so by the defendant
because, inter alia, “[he] was scared that [the defendant]
was going to do something to both of [them].” Floyd also
testified that he did not initially tell the police officers
about the defendant’s involvement in the victim’s death
because he was “scared and nervous.” Floyd explained
that he was afraid of the defendant “[b]ecause [Floyd]
heard that [the defendant] had told [on] somebody [in] a
previous case, and [he] [was] scared that [the defendant]
was going to tell on him” and because “[he] didn’t want
to get on [the defendant’s] bad side.” Floyd testified
that the defendant’s motive in this case was the victim’s
relationship with Edwards, who the defendant was “mad
[at because Edwards] had told on [the defendant] before,
supposedly.” Moreover, when the prosecutor asked Floyd
whether the defendant “[w]as . . . angry at [Edwards]
for giving information,” Floyd replied, “[y]es.” Finally,

State v. Fluker
Floyd also testified that the defendant had told him
that “if he loses the trial, that he would beat people up,
stab people and try to get an appeal.” The defendant did
not object to any of this testimony, and, accordingly, it
was admitted at trial. The prosecutor, therefore, could
properly rely on this evidence in closing argument as
well as on any reasonable inferences from those state-
ments, including Floyd’s fear of the defendant and the
defendant’s alleged motive. Moreover, the prosecutor’s
remarks clearly were intended to address Floyd’s cred-
ibility after defense counsel, in her closing argument,
had highlighted Floyd’s failure to report the defendant’s
involvement to the police earlier and his motivation for
testifying. Accordingly, on the basis of Floyd’s testi-
mony, which was largely admitted without objection, it
was not improper for the prosecutor to argue the reason-
able inference that Floyd did not initially tell the police
about the defendant’s involvement or wish to testify
against him because he was scared that the defendant
might seek to harm him.
We do, however, agree with the defendant that the
prosecutor’s comment during closing argument that
Floyd was “kind of a snitch” was improper because the
trial court, upon the defendant’s objection, had struck
Floyd’s testimony that “[the defendant] said [Edwards]
had snitched on him in a previous case, and that’s why he
was [mad] at him.” (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., State v.
Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 565, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (“it
is improper for a prosecutor, in his [or her] argument, to
refer to evidence that has been stricken or ruled inadmis-
sible”). Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor
acted improperly when she used the term “snitch” in
this context.
E
The defendant next claims that, during closing argu-
ments, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’
emotions and commented on facts not in evidence by
describing Floyd as “not a sophisticated criminal” in
juxtaposition to her description of the defendant as “more

State v. Fluker
sophisticated . . . .” According to the defendant, “[t]hese
comparisons . . . undeniably invite[d] the jurors to specu-
late as to the defendant’s criminal record and improperly
suggest[ed] prior violence . . . .” We are unpersuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary to our resolution of this issue. During
closing arguments, the prosecutor described Floyd as
“not a sophisticated criminal” several times. First, the
prosecutor argued that “[the defendant] didn’t pick very
wisely with . . . Floyd because, as was evident from the
witness stand and also all the evidence that came out
here . . . Floyd is not a very sophisticated criminal, right.
You heard that he had never been arrested before this
crime. He’s driving around in a vehicle that’s registered
to him, he has a phone that’s in his mother’s name, and
he might have gotten rid of the gun, but he didn’t get rid
of his phone. And his phone had all of that evidence on
it, all of these screenshots . . . . Floyd looked up the day
before information about a Glock, looked up how fast a
Slingshot went, told you that he saw this photo of [the
victim] on [his] Facebook account. All of that was on . . .
Floyd’s phone, screenshots before, screenshots after,
screenshots of the location of the murder . . . . He should
have gotten rid of his phone in addition to the gun, but
he didn’t because he’s not a sophisticated criminal.”
(Emphasis added.)
Later in her closing arguments, the prosecutor drew
comparisons between the defendant’s and Floyd’s actions
following the murder, arguing that, “[w]ith [the defen-
dant], again . . . Floyd is not very sophisticated, but [the
defendant] is driving around in a car that he purchased off
Facebook Marketplace five days before the murder . . . .”
(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor continued, stating
“that phone number [that the defendant provided the
seller of the car] is not registered, it’s not in the defen-
dant’s name, because again, he’s a little bit more sophis-
ticated than . . . Floyd.” (Emphasis added.)
On appeal, the defendant argues that the prosecu-
tor’s use of the term “sophisticated” to describe him

State v. Fluker
“undeniably implie[d] that the defendant [had] commit-
ted crimes in the past to warrant such experience . . .
[which] [was] not a reasonable inference that could be
drawn from the evidence, as the defendant’s criminal
history was not in the record.” When read in context,
however, the prosecutor’s characterization of the defen-
dant as “a little bit more sophisticated than . . . Floyd”
referred to the steps that the defendant and Floyd had
taken to conceal their involvement in the victim’s death,
not the defendant’s criminal history, and was a reason-
able inference drawn from the evidence.
In characterizing Floyd as “not a sophisticated crimi-
nal” and “not very sophisticated,” the prosecutor was
referring to Floyd’s use of a vehicle registered in his
name and a phone registered in his mother’s name during
the commission of the underlying crime, keeping that
phone on his person leading up to his arrest, taking and
keeping screenshots of photographs of the victim and his
family, and conducting incriminating Internet searches.
The prosecutor explained that the defendant, on the
other hand, had purchased the Nissan—which he did
not register in his name—off of Facebook Marketplace
just five days before the victim’s death and provided the
seller with a fake name and a phone number that was not
registered in his name. Based on this evidence, the jury
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant took
those steps to conceal his identity. Surely, it is reasonable
to infer that one who takes additional steps to conceal
his or her identity or involvement in a crime is “a little
bit more sophisticated” than one who does not take those
steps, regardless of his or her criminal background.
This characterization, therefore, was a reasonable infer-
ence based on the evidence because it referred to the
defendant’s specific conduct in this case as it related to
concealing his involvement with the murder rather than
the defendant’s general criminal history. Although the
defendant contends that “[i]t strains credulity that the
jury would not identify such similarities to infer that
the state was describing the defendant as a sophisticated
criminal,” the prosecutor was clear that, in referring to

State v. Fluker
the defendant as “a little bit more sophisticated than . . .
Floyd,” she was referencing not the defendant’s criminal
background, but how the defendant had provided the
seller of the Nissan with a phone number that was not
registered to him whereas Floyd had used a phone number
registered in his mother’s name.
Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor acted improperly by describing Floyd
as “not very sophisticated” and referring to the defendant
as “more sophisticated . . . .”
F
The defendant next claims that, during closing argu-
ments, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’
emotions by using “[r]acially biased language” that
“encourag[ed] [the jurors] to convict [the defendant]
based on propensity and fear based grounds, rather than
the evidence before them.” The defendant also claims
that the prosecutor improperly commented on facts not
in evidence. Specifically, the defendant contends that
the prosecutor engaged in impropriety by misstating the
evidence when asserting that Castro had testified that
the defendant used a “street name,” “utiliz[ing] slang
that [she] qualified in terms of the ‘street,’ ” and using
the word “beef.” The defendant argues that the pros-
ecutor’s use of the term “snitch” was improper because
it “only served to invoke assumptions and stereotypes
about what happens to ‘snitches’ on the ‘street.’ ” We
agree with the defendant insofar as he contends that
the prosecutor misstated the evidence in the record by
asserting that Castro had testified that the defendant
used a “street name.” Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded
that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “street term” and
the word “beef” were improper. We address each alleged
impropriety in turn.
The defendant first claims that the prosecutor com-
mitted impropriety when she argued that “[Castro] said
he said some street name when she gave him the car,
but she doesn’t remember what it was . . . .” (Emphasis

State v. Fluker
added.) We have not found, and the state has not called
our attention to, any point at which Castro testified that
the defendant gave her “some street name . . . .” Rather,
the record reveals that Castro testified that she sold the
Nissan to “[s]ome guy,” and, when asked whether she
remembered or learned the buyer’s name, Castro replied,
“[n]o.”21 Accordingly, the prosecutor’s assertion that
Castro had testified that the defendant gave her “some
street name” was not grounded on any evidence in the
record and was therefore improper.
The defendant also claims that the prosecutor improp-
erly argued that “what [Floyd] did by coming in here and
getting up on the witness stand, you know, in the street
term, right, he was kind of a snitch, right.” (Emphasis
added.) According to the defendant, this characteriza-
tion “further charged the [jurors] to view the defendant
as a dangerous ‘street’ criminal, encouraging them to
convict based on propensity and fear based grounds,
rather than the evidence before them. There was no evi-
dence . . . warrant[ing] linking the defendant to ‘street’
terms.” The prosecutor, however, was not calling the
defendant a “street criminal” or implying that there
were some “street crimes o[r] affiliations” linked to the
defendant. Rather, the prosecutor was characterizing
her use of the word “snitch” as being a “street term . . . .”
Accordingly, the defendant has failed to show that the
prosecutor acted improperly by using the phrase “street
term” in this context.
Finally, the defendant contends that the prosecutor’s
use of the term “beef” to describe the defendant’s motive
was improper because it was never used in evidence.22
21Although the defendant used the name “Willie Mays” when com-
municating with Castro on Facebook, there is no evidence in the record
to support the inference that “Willie Mays” is the defendant’s “street
name.”
22Specifically, the prosecutor argued that “[the defendant] planned,
conspired and had the same intent as . . . Floyd, and I would submit to
you that [the defendant] had even more of an intent [than] . . . Floyd
because you heard what the motive for this killing was. You heard
that it was over another individual by the name . . . Edwards, who
[the defendant] didn’t really care too fondly for because [he] had given

State v. Fluker
Although “beef” certainly is a colloquial term, “[i]t does
not follow . . . that every use of rhetorical language or
device [by the prosecutor] is improper. . . . The occasional
use of rhetorical devices is simply fair argument.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Michael T., supra,
338 Conn. 723–24. The defendant does not explain why
it would be improper for a prosecutor to use this term
even if it was not in evidence, especially because, as the
defendant acknowledges in his brief, “ ‘beef’ . . . [is] a
common slang term interpreted to mean a grudge or
animosity . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The defendant also
has not explained how the word “beef” would improperly
appeal to the jurors’ biases or otherwise stigmatize the
defendant. The defendant therefore has failed to dem-
onstrate that the prosecutor’s use of the word “beef”
was improper. Accordingly, we conclude that the pros-
ecutor did not act improperly by using the word “beef”
or describing the word “snitch” as a “street term . . . .”
G
Finally, the defendant claims that the prosecutor
improperly appealed to the jurors’ sympathies when she
made certain remarks during closing argument regarding
the victim. We agree that, when viewed in their total-
ity, the prosecutor’s comments regarding the victim
constituted an improper appeal to the jurors’ emotions.
The defendant alleges that the following four argu-
ments made by the prosecutor during her closing argu-
ments were improper appeals to the jurors’ emotions:
“I started my opening statement by telling you that [the
victim] was murdered two days before his twenty-third
birthday, and, based on the evidence that you heard in
this case, I’m going to open my closing with that same
line—that he was killed two days before his twenty-third
birthday; however, based on the evidence that unfolded
over the past week, it’s clear that this was a planned
execution . . . .”
some information over . . . previously. So, that’s what this was about;
it was [the defendant’s] beef in this case, and, in some sense . . . Floyd
was kind of a pawn in [the defendant’s] plan here.” (Emphasis added.)

State v. Fluker
The prosecutor later argued, “[b]ut, at the end of the
day [the victim] was a twenty-two year old kid who really
hadn’t lived. And, whatever, you’ve heard no evidence
about anything [in] his background that would have led
to something like this; so, he had some marijuana on
him, you know, really, does that mean he deserves what
happened to him? I would submit no, it doesn’t.”
The prosecutor also argued, “[s]o, the evidence in this
case that you saw was that [the victim] was enjoying two
days before his birthday, it was a Sunday afternoon,
right, he was driving around in that car, which, you
know, some people might say is flashy, but, to a twenty-
two year old kid, he’s excited about it, right, he’s driv-
ing around in it, he’s posting about it on Facebook, he’s
with his friend . . . who you heard from. They went to a
barbeque, he saw his mom, he saw his new baby, he was
. . . with his mom at the house. And then he was just
going to a pool party later that day; he’s just enjoying
life.” The prosecutor then played a video of the victim
and stated, “[i]t’s kind of hard to watch that as well as
the video of him in the . . . gas station because we know
now, watching it, right, it’s the last few minutes of his
life. He was enjoying the last few minutes, right, being
a young kid, driving around, just enjoying himself. And
then the next shot that we see, five minutes later—” The
prosecutor then displayed for the jury a photograph of
the victim and stated, “[f]ive minutes later [the victim]
is dead in his car, shot in the head, shot in the neck.”
Finally, as part of her rebuttal argument, the pros-
ecutor stated: “[The victim] was, again, twenty-two
years old. He did not deserve to die this way. This was
a senseless killing, and I’m going to ask you to convict
the defendant on all counts.” The defense did not object
to any of these statements.
On appeal, the defendant contends that “[t]hese four
comments have no probative value and can only be inter-
preted to be intended to improperly appeal to the emo-
tions of the jurors.” According to the defendant, “[i]t
was never in dispute that [the victim] was twenty-two

State v. Fluker
years old, that the crime happened two days before his
birthday, that he had a new baby, and that he saw his
mother and the baby that day.” In response, the state
argues that these comments did not improperly appeal
to the jurors’ emotions. Specifically, the state contends
that “[t]he [prosecutor] commented on the victim’s recent
birthday and visit with his child to explain: (1) why he
was driving the sporty Slingshot on the day of the mur-
der . . . and (2) that the murder was planned and not the
instantaneous result of any dispute between the victim
and the defendant. . . . Moreover, in reminding the jury
that the victim was a real person with a future, who was
‘enjoying life,’ and whose murder was ‘senseless,’ the
[prosecutor] fairly commented on the seriousness of the
charges and the jury’s important obligation to evaluate
the evidence.”
With respect to the prosecutor’s references to the age
of the victim, we acknowledge that the victim’s age was
properly introduced into evidence. We also note that this
court previously has concluded that a prosecutor’s brief
references to a victim’s age or youth were not improper.
See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 170 Conn. App. 768, 794–
95, 156 A.3d 66 (prosecutor’s remark that victims were
“ ‘pretty much teenagers’ ” “did not improperly appeal to
the emotions of the jury”), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 910,
158 A.3d 320 (2017); State v. Maner, 147 Conn. App.
761, 791–94, 83 A.3d 1182 (prosecutor’s references to
victim as “poor young James Caffrey” and “poor young
man in Waterbury lying dead in his hallway” during
initial argument to jury were based on evidence and
“nothing more than a permissible rhetorical flourish”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 311
Conn. 935, 88 A.3d 550 (2014). Similarly, insofar as
the defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s remark
that “[the victim] did not deserve to die this way,” such
statements are not necessarily improper. See State v.
James, 54 Conn. App. 26, 48, 734 A.2d 1012 (no impro-
priety where prosecutor remarked that “despite all of
[her] problems [the victim] doesn’t deserve to be dead
. . . [s]he doesn’t deserve—she didn’t deserve to die at

State v. Fluker
the hands of [the defendant]” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 903, 738 A.2d 1092
(1999). Moreover, the defendant does not contend that
these remarks were comments on facts not in evidence or
unreasonable inferences based on the evidence presented.
Therefore, the prosecutor’s references to the victim’s
age and the manner of his death, in isolation, were not
necessarily improper.
We agree, however, with the defendant that, when
read in totality, the repeated references to the victim’s
age and birthday, and the description of the victim’s
actions leading up to his death, including his visit with
his mother and his new baby were improper because these
facts, although in evidence, had no connection to the
issues presented but, rather, seemingly were calculated
solely to appeal to the jurors’ emotions in an effort to
elicit sympathy for the victim. See, e.g., State v. Henry
B.-A., 234 Conn. App. 197, 216, 342 A.3d 1063 (“state-
ments that have no reasonable connection to evidence
offered or issues presented in a case are more likely to be
deemed improper” (emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d
876 (2025); State v. Montoya, 110 Conn. App. 97, 108,
954 A.2d 193 (“[e]ven though the prosecutor’s state-
ments were grounded in evidence, her language invoked
overly sympathetic images of the victim that improperly
appealed to the emotions of the jury”), cert. denied, 289
Conn. 941, 959 A.2d 1008 (2008).
Although the state contends that the remarks concern-
ing “the victim’s recent birthday and visit with his child
[were meant] to explain: (1) why he was driving the sporty
Slingshot on the day of the murder . . . and (2) that the
murder was planned and not the instantaneous result
of any dispute between the victim and the defendant,”
these arguments are unavailing. It is unclear how these
asserted reasons for the victim’s driving the Slingshot
would be relevant to the issues presented at trial. Simi-
larly, it is unclear how any of the prosecutor’s references
to the victim’s actions prior to his death would show

State v. Fluker
that the defendant planned the murder. In addition, the
defendant never argued that the victim’s death occurred
as an “instantaneous result of any dispute,” and, more
importantly, there is no indication in the record that
that is why the prosecutor argued those facts. We also
reject the state’s argument that, “in reminding the jury
that the victim was a real person with a future, who was
‘enjoying life,’ and whose murder was ‘senseless,’ the
[prosecutor] fairly commented on the seriousness of the
charges and the jury’s important obligation to evaluate
the evidence.” The prosecutor made those remarks while
playing a video that showed the victim prior to his death
and emphasizing that “[i]t’s kind of hard to watch . . .
because we know now, watching it . . . it’s the last few
minutes of his life” before displaying for the jury a pho-
tograph of the victim and stating, “[f]ive minutes later
[the victim] is dead in his car, shot in the head, shot in the
neck.” Simply put, the prosecutor’s comments regard-
ing the victim, especially in combination with her use
of visual aids, appear to have been a gratuitous plea for
sympathy for the victim and, therefore, were improper.
H
We have concluded that improprieties occurred during
the prosecutor’s closing arguments, namely, her (1) use
of the term “snitch,” which improperly referenced testi-
mony stricken by the court, (2) assertion that Castro had
testified that the defendant used a “street name,” which
was contrary to her actual testimony, and (3) improper
appeal for sympathy for the victim. We therefore must
consider whether the defendant has demonstrated that
any of those improprieties deprived him of his due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. See State v. Antwon B., supra,
236 Conn. App. 455.
As we explained previously in this opinion, to deter-
mine whether prosecutorial improprieties deprived the
defendant of his right to a fair trial, we must consider
the Williams factors. See State v. Williams, supra, 204
Conn. 540. Moreover, we must look at the effect of the

State v. Fluker
sum total of the prosecutor’s improprieties on the trial
as a whole. See State v. Dabate, supra, 351 Conn. 437.
First, the state concedes that none of the alleged impro-
prieties were invited by the defendant, and we therefore
weigh this factor in his favor. As to the second Williams
factor, when viewed in the context of the entire trial,
the improprieties were not severe. It is well settled that,
“when evaluating severity, we take into consideration
whether defense counsel object[ed] to any of the improper
remarks, request[ed] curative instructions, or move[d]
for a mistrial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Gary S., 345 Conn. 387, 418, 285 A.3d 29 (2022).
Here, defense counsel did not object to any of these impro-
prieties, “a choice that demonstrates that defense counsel
presumably [did] not view the alleged impropriet[ies]
as prejudicial enough to jeopardize seriously the defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. Moreover, in circumstances such as this one,
where the defendant has failed to object to the impro-
prieties, this court has indicated that “only instances of
grossly egregious misconduct will be severe enough to
mandate reversal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Ross, 151 Conn. App. 687, 701, 95 A.3d 1208,
cert. denied, 314 Conn. 926, 101 A.3d 271 (2014). The
prosecutor’s conduct in this case cannot be said to be so
egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Compare State v. Sullivan, 351 Conn. 798, 823, 334 A.3d
446 (2025) (concluding that prosecutor’s use of phrase
“ ‘nuts and sluts’ ” “was gratuitous and inflammatory
and ha[d] no place in our courts” but was not so egregious
that it deprived defendant of fair trial), and State v.
Camacho, 282 Conn. 328, 383, 924 A.2d 99 (“Although
the prosecutor undeniably crossed the line with his reli-
gious pedagogy and evocation of the victim’s blood crying
out for justice, we do not believe that these rhetorical
devices so prejudiced the defendant as to render the
entire trial unfair or the verdict untrustworthy. We
do not view these statements as grossly egregious . . .
[and] severe enough to mandate reversal.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 956,

State v. Fluker
128 S. Ct. 388, 169 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2007), with State v.
Parris, 352 Conn. 652, 678, 682, 338 A.3d 1139 (2025)
(new trial was warranted where impropriety was “inex-
cusable” because “prosecutors’ misstatements of the
law severely distorted the required legal analysis of the
extreme emotional disturbance defense—the defendant’s
only defense to the murder charge against him—in a
number of ways”), and State v. Mills, 57 Conn. App.
202, 209–10, 748 A.2d 318 (prosecutorial improprieties
were so egregious that new trial was warranted where
prosecutor “asked that the jury not victimize the vic-
tim again,” “appealed to the jurors to convict so that
evil would not triumph by their inaction,” and “spoke
the victim’s name with such repetition and used such
strong, inappropriate language that it could only be
inferred that his intent was to appeal to the sympathies
and emotions of the jury”), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 914,
754 A.2d 163 (2000), and cert. denied, 253 Conn. 915,
754 A.2d 163 (2000). Accordingly, this factor weighs
in the state’s favor.
In addition, although we have concluded that the pros-
ecutor made improper statements during closing argu-
ment, the improprieties were infrequent when considered
in the context of the entire trial, which lasted for seven
days and consisted of fifty witnesses and nearly 400
exhibits, and the prosecutor’s lengthy closing argu-
ments. See, e.g., State v. Dabate, supra, 351 Conn. 464
(four instances of prosecutorial impropriety were not
frequent “[w]hen considered in context of the 130 wit-
nesses and the 600 exhibits during the five week trial”);
State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 567, 34 A.3d 370 (2012)
(three improper statements made by prosecutor during
lengthy closing argument were not frequent). Accord-
ingly, the third and fourth Williams factors also weigh
in favor of the state.
The fifth Williams factor requires us to consider the
strength of the trial court’s curative instructions. The
court did not give any curative instructions directed spe-
cifically at any of the alleged prosecutorial improprieties

State v. Fluker
underlying the defendant’s appeal. Nevertheless, because
the defendant did not object to these improprieties as they
occurred at trial, he “bears much of the responsibility for
the fact that these claimed improprieties went uncured.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, supra,
151 Conn. App. 702. Where, as here, the defendant did
not object to any of the prosecutor’s arguments, request
curative instructions, or move for a new trial on the basis
of the improprieties, it is difficult to conclude that they
deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. Johnson, 107
Conn. App. 188, 203–204, 944 A.2d 416, cert. denied,
288 Conn. 905, 953 A.2d 650 (2008).
Moreover, although the trial court did not issue specific
curative instructions, the improper effect of any impro-
priety was diminished by the court’s general instructions
to the jury following closing arguments. See State v.
Maurice B., 228 Conn. App. 720, 746, 324 A.3d 850 (“[i]n
nearly all cases in which defense counsel fail[ed] to object
to and request a specific curative instruction in response
to a prosecutorial impropriety, especially an impropriety
that we do not consider to be particularly egregious,
and the court’s general jury instruction addresse[d]
that impropriety, we have held that the court’s general
instruction cures the impropriety” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 929, 326 A.3d
249 (2024). When the court read its instructions to the
jury, the court not only emphasized that arguments
made by counsel were not evidence, but the court also
instructed the jury to be mindful of any prejudices and
implicit biases, to utilize “[t]echniques to identify and
check one’s implicit biases,” and to remember that “deci-
sions based upon biases for or against other people or
stereotypes regarding other people have no place in the
courtroom.” The appellate courts of this state repeatedly
have stated that, “[i]n the absence of a showing that the
jury failed or declined to follow the court’s instructions,
we presume that it heeded them.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 338 Conn. 108, 152,
257 A.3d 283 (2021); State v. Thompson, 266 Conn.
440, 485, 832 A.2d 626 (2003); State v. Ross, supra,

State v. Fluker
151 Conn. App. 703–704. The defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the jury neglected to follow the court’s
instructions. We therefore conclude that this factor too
weighs in favor of the state.
Finally, we conclude that the state’s case was strong
and “not so weak as to be overshadowed by the [prosecu-
tor’s] impropriet[ies].” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Maurice B., supra, 228 Conn. App. 748.
The state presented evidence that the victim was being
followed by a Nissan and Floyd’s BMW. The state intro-
duced surveillance footage from local businesses prior to
the shooting and the CSLI of Floyd’s and the defendant’s
cell phones. The state also presented evidence that the
defendant was the owner and operator of the Nissan at the
time of the shooting and demonstrated that the Facebook
account used to purchase the vehicle was connected to
the defendant by both the account’s profile photograph
and email address. Moreover, the state connected the
defendant to the Nissan through the CSLI evidence and
the DNA evidence from the Lunchables container found
in the vehicle and the vehicle’s gas cap. Most impor-
tantly, the state presented the testimony of Floyd, who
had conspired with the defendant to commit the crime
and whose testimony directly linked the defendant to
the shooting. Accordingly, because the state’s case was
both strong and persuasive, this factor also weighs in
the state’s favor.
In light of the strength of the state’s case, the lack of
objection to the claimed improprieties identified by the
defendant, and the fact that they were not severe, fre-
quent, or central to the state’s case, we are not persuaded
that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s ver-
dict would have been different absent the sum total of the
[prosecutor’s] improprieties.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, 151 Conn. App. 706. The
defendant therefore has failed to establish that the trial
was so fundamentally unfair that he was deprived of a
fair trial in violation of his due process rights because
of prosecutorial impropriety.

State v. Fluker
III
The defendant finally claims that the trial court com-
mitted plain error by failing to provide the jury with a
special credibility instruction regarding the testimony
of a witness who had a cooperation agreement with the
state.23 The defendant neither requested a special cred-
ibility instruction at trial nor raised an objection to the
charge as given but argues that the court should have
given the instruction sua sponte. Because the defendant
has failed to demonstrate that the court made an obvi-
ous and readily discernable error, we reject his claim of
plain error.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary to the resolution of this claim. Prior to the
23Section 2.5-4 of the Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, titled,
“Witness with a Cooperation Agreement,” provides in relevant part:
“You have heard evidence that <witness> has signed a document
entitled ‘Cooperation Agreement’ with the state, the terms of which
are contained in <Exhibit #>. . . .
“Although the state is permitted to present the testimony of someone
who has signed a cooperation agreement in exchange for (his/her) testi-
mony, you must examine the testimony of such a witness who provides
evidence against a defendant with greater care and caution than the
testimony of an ordinary witness.
“While examining the testimony of a witness who has signed a coop-
eration agreement and . . . who has not yet been sentenced on a pending
case . . . you should keep in mind that (he/she) may, in (his/her) own
mind, be looking or hoping for some favorable treatment in the sentence,
supervision, or disposition of (his/her) own matters, and therefore may
have such an interest in the outcome of this case that (his/her) testimony
may have been colored by that fact. In considering the testimony of such
a witness, you may consider whether there was any motive developed
in the evidence for testifying falsely in inculpating the accused. . . .
“Further, notwithstanding any language contained in <Exhibit _>,
the cooperation agreement signed by <witness>, it is your exclusive
role to determine the credibility and believability of that witness. In
other words, you and you alone are to determine whether any evidence
offered by <witness> is to be believed wholly, partly, or not at all,
irrespective of any language in the cooperation agreement that may
suggest otherwise. . . .
“It is your duty to decide what credibility to give any witness. There-
fore, it is your duty to decide whether <witness> is to be believed wholly,
partly, or not at all.” (Emphasis in original.) See Connecticut Criminal
Jury Instructions, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/
Criminal.pdf (last visited July 21, 2026).

State v. Fluker
defendant’s trial, Floyd pleaded guilty to murder and
faced a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of
incarceration in connection with the incident that is the
subject of this appeal. On July 25, 2023, two days before
the defendant’s trial, Floyd and the state entered into a
cooperation agreement that provided that, in exchange
for Floyd’s testimony against the defendant in this case,
Floyd would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to
murder and instead plead guilty to manslaughter in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 “with
a promise of [f]ifteen years [of] incarceration.” The coop-
eration agreement was admitted as a full exhibit with no
redactions and without objection at the defendant’s trial.
At the defendant’s trial, the prosecutor asked Floyd
why he agreed to the cooperation agreement. Floyd
explained, “[b]ecause I wanted the truth . . . [and] I was
mad [at] [the defendant]; I feel he used me.” He then clari-
fied: “I was mad at [the defendant]; I feel like he used me,
and [it was] [a] lesser sentence [than] what I previously
would have had.” Defense counsel also cross-examined
Floyd regarding his motivations for testifying and his
significant sentence reduction.
Early in the trial, the trial court sent the parties an
initial draft of the substantive portion of the jury charge.
On August 3, 2023, after the close of evidence, the court
met with counsel to discuss the jury charge and later
sent them a revised and complete version of the draft
charge. On August 4, 2023, the court again met with
counsel to discuss the revised charge and sent them a
final revised draft of the jury charge.. The defendant
never objected to the court’s proposed jury charge or
specifically requested an instruction for a witness with
a cooperation agreement.24
The trial court provided the jury with both an oral
recitation and a written copy of the charge to have with
24The defendant took one exception to the charge on the record; how-
ever, that exception concerned an unrelated portion of the trial court’s
proposed jury instructions. Specifically, defense counsel stated: “[T]he
one exception I did have to the charge—I know we noted this in the

State v. Fluker
it during deliberations. Regarding the credibility of wit-
nesses, the court instructed the jury that, “[i]n deciding
what the facts are, you must consider all the evidence. In
doing this, you must decide which testimony to believe
and which testimony not to believe. You may believe all,
none, or any part of any witness’ testimony. In making
that decision, you make take into account a number of fac-
tors, including the following: (1) was the witness able to
see, or hear, or know the things about which that witness
testified; (2) how well was the witness able to recall and
describe those things; (3) what was the witness’ manner
while testifying; (4) did the witness have an interest in
the outcome of this case or any bias or prejudice concern-
ing any party or any matter involved in the case; (5) how
reasonable was the witness’ testimony considered in light
of all the evidence in the case; and (6) was the witness’
testimony contradicted by what that witness has said
or done at another time, or by the testimony of other
witnesses, or by other evidence. Of course, you should
use your common sense and good judgment in applying
these factors.”
The trial court also provided the jury with a special
credibility instruction for accomplice testimony regard-
ing Floyd: “In weighing the testimony of . . . Floyd, you
should consider the fact that he has pleaded guilty to a
charge of murder [in] this case. It may be that you would
not believe a person who has committed a crime as read-
ily as you would believe a person of good character. In
conference—was under conspiracy. I know there’s a separate charge
for circumstantial evidence, but I had made an exception to the cir-
cumstantial evidence since it’s being a conspiracy charge . . . .” The
court replied, “as to the charge to the jury on circumstantial evidence
in the conspiracy charge, that’s in the model instructions, and I think
it’s important to instruct the jury that conspiracies can be proven by
circumstantial evidence. So, that exception is noted, but I’m not going
to change my charge. We can do further exceptions at the conclusion of
the charge.” At the conclusion of its charge, the court asked the parties
if they had any exceptions to its charge. Defense counsel stated that
“[her] only exception . . . [was] [the] other exception [she] made before
[regarding] the circumstantial evidence for conspiracy.” (Emphasis
added.) On appeal, the defendant has not challenged the trial court’s
decision regarding this exception.

State v. Fluker
weighing the testimony of an accomplice who has not yet
been sentenced or whose case has not yet been disposed
of, you should keep in mind that he may in his own mind
be looking for some favorable treatment in the sentence
or disposition of his own case. Therefore, he may have
such an interest in the outcome of this case that his tes-
timony may have been colored by that fact. Therefore,
you must look with particular care at the testimony of
an accomplice and scrutinize it very carefully before
you accept it.
“You should also bear in mind, however, that there
are many offenses that are of such a character that the
only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those
who are themselves implicated in the crime. It is for you
to decide what credibility you will give to an accomplice
and whether you will believe or disbelieve the testimony
of a person who by his own admission has committed or
contributed to the crimes charged by the state here. Like
all other questions of credibility, this is a question you
must decide based on all the evidence presented to you.”
Our standard of review of this claim is well settled.
“Our review with respect to whether to reverse a trial
court’s judgment under the plain error doctrine is ple-
nary. . . . [The] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5,
is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to
rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpre-
served, are of such monumental proportion that they
threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious
and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party . . . . It is
axiomatic that, [t]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a
rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. . . . Put
another way, plain error review is reserved for only the
most egregious errors. . . .
“To prevail on an unpreserved claim under the plain
error doctrine, the defendant must satisfy the two-
pronged plain error test. First, the defendant must estab-
lish that there was an obvious and readily discernable
error . . . . Second, the defendant must establish that
the obvious and readily discernable error was so harmful

State v. Fluker
or prejudicial that it resulted in manifest injustice. . . .
In sum, reversal is required only if the alleged error is
both so clear and so harmful that it affects the fairness
and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
proceedings. . . .
“When reviewing the challenged jury instruction . . .
we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge
to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a
whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its
individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s
charge is not whether it is as accurate [on] legal principles
as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it
fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that
injustice is not done to either party under the established
rules of law. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct
in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guid-
ance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as
improper.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orlando F.,
233 Conn. App. 1, 34–35, 338 A.3d 379, cert. denied,
353 Conn. 903, 341 A.3d 957 (2025).
“Our Supreme Court has emphasize[d] that it has been
especially rare for a jury instruction to be so clearly
improper that our courts have deemed plain error review
necessary to correct it. . . . This court has done so when
the trial court has affirmatively misstated the law . . . and
when it has failed to comply with a statute that mandates
a particular instruction. . . . We do not suggest that there
are no other circumstances in which an instruction could
constitute plain error, but the reluctance with which we
have chosen that course underscores that plain error is
reserved for only the most egregious defects.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 36–37.
“[W]hether an error is clear is premised on the law
existing at the time of trial.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 36. We have stated therefore that “[t]he
defendant . . . cannot establish that the court commit-
ted plain error in failing to provide the jury with an
instruction that it was not required to give [or] that our

State v. Fluker
Supreme Court has stated may be appropriate in a given
case.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
The defendant does not argue that the trial court’s
instruction as to accomplice testimony was improper but,
rather, that the instruction misled the jury by understat-
ing Floyd’s motivations to testify. The defendant, how-
ever, has not cited, and we have not found, any authority
for the proposition that the court, sua sponte, must give
the jury a special credibility instruction for a witness
with a cooperation agreement or that an accomplice
testimony instruction would be insufficient in these cir-
cumstances.25 Rather, our Supreme Court has recognized
that, “[g]enerally, a [criminal] defendant is not entitled
to an instruction singling out any of the state’s witnesses
and highlighting his or her possible motive for testifying
falsely. . . . [The] court has held . . . that a special cred-
ibility instruction is required for three types of witnesses,
namely, complaining witnesses, accomplices and jail-
house informants.” (Citation omitted; emphasis altered;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bruny, 342
Conn. 169, 202, 269 A.3d 38 (2022). Neither our Supreme
Court nor this court, however, has ever held that there
is a fourth category of special credibility instructions
required for a witness with a cooperation agreement with
the state, much less that the trial court must issue that
instruction sua sponte.26 Indeed, it is well settled that “it
25In his reply brief, the defendant relies on State v. Calhoun, 346
Conn. 288, 298, 289 A.3d 584 (2023), for the proposition that “[o]ur
Supreme Court has acknowledged how the witness with a cooperation
agreement provides a stronger and more comprehensive warning than
other special credibility instructions.” Even if we assume, arguendo,
that the defendant is correct in this assertion, just because a special
credibility instruction for a witness with a cooperation agreement is
“stronger and more comprehensive” than other warnings does not mean
that a court is required to give that instruction, much less to give it
sua sponte. See State v. Orlando F., supra, 233 Conn. App. 36 (“[t]he
defendant . . . cannot establish that the court committed plain error in
failing to provide the jury with an instruction that it was not required
to give and that our Supreme Court has stated may be appropriate in a
given case” (emphasis in original)).
26The defendant, in essence, advocates for a new rule requiring a
trial court to issue a witness with a cooperation agreement instruction

State v. Fluker
is within the discretion of a trial court to give a caution-
ary instruction to the jury whenever the court reasonably
believes that a witness’ testimony may be particularly
unreliable because the witness has a special interest in
testifying for the state and the witness’ motivations may
not be adequately exposed through cross-examination
or argument by counsel.” State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93,
113, 25 A.3d 594 (2011). The alleged error by the trial
court therefore could not have been “clear, obvious and
indisputable” based on the law existing at the time of
trial. See State v. Silva, 339 Conn. 598, 621, 262 A.3d
113 (2021) (“[T]he defendant . . . seeks a novel exception
to the general rule against singling out a witness and
highlighting the witness’ motive to testify falsely. . . .
[T]his court has yet to endorse, let alone require, trial
courts to provide such an instruction. . . . A fortiori . . .
the trial court’s failure to provide the instruction, sua
sponte, cannot constitute plain error.” (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)). Accordingly, the court cannot be said to have
committed plain error.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
whenever such a witness testifies. Even if we assume, arguendo, that
the defendant is correct insofar as he contends that it should be the
rule, “it is not enough for the defendant simply to demonstrate that his
position is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error review must
demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and
indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.” State
v. Coward, 292 Conn. 296, 307, 972 A.2d 691 (2009). The defendant
has failed to do so here.