Borsey v. Borsey

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Borsey v. Borsey
JOHN BORSEY v. NICOLE BORSEY
(AC 48779)
Alvord, Moll and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved,
appealed from the trial court’s judgment resolving, inter alia, her motion for
modification of the plaintiff’s child support obligations. She claimed, inter
alia, that the court improperly denied her claim for an educational support
order pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56c) for the postsecondary education of
the parties’ child. Held:
The trial court’s finding that the parties would not have contributed to the
child’s postsecondary education if the family had remained intact was clearly
erroneous, as it contradicted the court’s express finding that the plaintiff
had agreed to give the child money to assist with her first year of college
expenses, which satisfied the statutory threshold of § 46b-56c (c) for a court
to enter an educational support order; accordingly, this court remanded the
case to the trial court for consideration of all relevant circumstances pursu-
ant to § 46b-56c (c), on the basis of the existing record, and a determination
of whether to enter an educational support order.
The trial court abused its discretion in crediting prior child support pay-
ments the plaintiff made in determining any arrearage owed to the defendant
following its modification of the plaintiff’s child support obligation, as the
evidence reflected that the amount of the prior payments, although not
ordered by the court, was calculated in accordance with the child support
guidelines and, thus, the amount to which the child was entitled; accordingly,
this court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to order the
plaintiff to pay a deficit amount to the defendant.
(One judge concurring separately)
Argued May 19—officially released August 18, 2026
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon.
Stanley Novak, judge trial referee, rendered judgment
dissolving the parties’ marriage in accordance with a
separation agreement; thereafter, the court, Cooper, J.,
denied the defendant’s postjudgment motion for modi-
fication of child support and request for the issuance of
an educational support order and rendered judgment

Borsey v. Borsey
thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Nicole Borsey, self-represented, the appellant (defen-
dant).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the self-represented defendant, Nicole Borsey, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court resolving her motion
for modification of the child support obligation of the
plaintiff, John Borsey.1 On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court (1) made clearly erroneous factual findings
with respect to the defendant’s claim for an educational
support order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c,
and (2) improperly credited the plaintiff’s prior overpay-
ments of child support in declining to order an arrearage
following the court’s modification of his child support
obligation.2 With respect to each of these claims, we
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to the defendant’s claims on appeal. The parties were
married in September 2004 and had one child who was
born in February 2006. The marriage of the parties, who
were both self-represented at the time, was dissolved in
September 2012. The court incorporated into the dissolu-
tion judgment the terms the parties had included on the
Judicial Branch form titled “Dissolution Agreement” and
an attached written separation agreement, both dated
September 25, 2012 (separation agreement). Under the
terms of the separation agreement, the plaintiff was obli-
gated to pay the defendant $200 weekly in child support,
which amount the parties had represented followed the
1The plaintiff did not file a brief in this court. On January 2, 2026,
this court ordered that this appeal shall be considered on the basis of
the defendant’s brief, the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4,
and oral argument by the defendant.
2The defendant raises three additional claims on appeal. See footnotes
4, 7 and 8 of this opinion.

Borsey v. Borsey
child support guidelines. The parties checked the box
stating that they “ask the court to reserve jurisdiction to
determine whether a post-majority educational support
order should issue and the terms of the order.”
No motions were filed by either party for more than ten
years following the dissolution judgment. On January
30, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for modification
of child support. She represented in her motion that she
was requesting the court to increase child support on the
basis that her income had decreased while the plaintiff’s
income had increased significantly. The defendant also
noted that the plaintiff had agreed in writing to increase
child support to $300 per week on September 11, 2016,
but stopped paying that increased amount on April 8,
2019. The defendant sought an arrearage for the short-
fall. The defendant also noted that the court had reserved
jurisdiction over the issue of postmajority educational
support and sought an order that the plaintiff contribute
to postmajority educational expenses.3
The court, Cooper, J., held a hearing over three dates
in 2024. During the three day hearing, the plaintiff was
represented by counsel. On the third and final hearing
date, the defendant was represented by counsel. Both par-
ties testified and introduced documentary evidence.4 In
an April 4, 2025 ruling, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for modification of child support and request for
3The defendant also sought an arrearage related to unreimbursed
medical expenses, sole custody of the child, and an extension of child
support. The parties reached an agreement with respect to unreimbursed
medical expenses, and the defendant withdrew her requests for sole
custody and an extension of child support.
4The defendant claims on appeal that she was denied due process when
the court “closed the evidence without clear notice” after the defendant,
who was self-represented at the time, confirmed the assumption of the
plaintiff’s counsel that she “rested [her] case.” The defendant contends
that she did not understand the “procedural meaning of that state-
ment.” Our review of the record reveals that the defendant retained
counsel prior to the third hearing date. During the third hearing date,
the court permitted the defendant to introduce evidence and present
further testimony. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim that
she was denied the opportunity to present evidence.

Borsey v. Borsey
issuance of an educational support order.5 This appeal
followed. Additional procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the court
improperly denied her claim for an educational support
order pursuant to § 46b-56c. Specifically, the defendant
contends that the court’s threshold finding that the par-
ties would not have contributed to the child’s education
if the family had remained intact is clearly erroneous.
We agree with the defendant.
The following additional procedural history is rel-
evant to our resolution of this claim. The defendant
testified that she had a series of conversations with the
plaintiff, beginning in the summer of 2022, regarding
college for the parties’ child. The defendant testified
that, during a November 2023 meeting, the plaintiff
agreed to postmajority educational support but stated
that he would only give the funds directly to the child.
The defendant testified that the parties met on March
12, 2024, at which time the plaintiff told the defendant
that he was prepared to contribute $12,000 toward the
child’s first year of college. The defendant testified that
she followed up with a text message to the plaintiff asking
him to pay the $12,000 amount and he did not respond.
The defendant testified that the child planned to attend
Fordham University.
The plaintiff also testified regarding conversations sur-
rounding college. He testified that he had a preliminary
conversation with the child wherein he told her that he
might be able to help her “along the lines of what [he]
had paid for child support.” On cross-examination, the
following colloquy occurred:
“[The Defendant]: [I]s it true that on March 12, [2024]
you came to our house, my house, at 5:30 p.m. to discuss
what you were willing to contribute to college?
5The defendant filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied.

Borsey v. Borsey
* * *
“[The Plaintiff]: It sounds reasonable. . . .
“[The Defendant]: Do you remember telling [the child]
you would pay $12,000 for the first year only?
“[The Plaintiff]: The first year [of] what?
“[The Defendant]: College. . . .
“[The Plaintiff]: So, what I remember saying to [the
child], in our conversation, was that I was thinking along
the lines, being able to support her and possibly being able
to give her, to her, what I was giving for child support.
That’s the way I remember it.
“[The Defendant]: You don’t recall $12,000 for the
first year?
“[The Plaintiff]: Well, if you do the math.”6
In its order denying the request for an educational
support order, the court stated: “The parties certainly
agreed to reserve jurisdiction for the courts to determine
whether to issue an educational support order . . . but
they purposefully stopped short of agreeing to pay for
their daughter’s college tuition. The parties testified that
[the child] went to private elite schools throughout her
entire K–12 education because she was awarded annual
$50,000 scholarships. In fact, the defendant testified
that [the child] received scholarships, in part, because
she was ‘underprivileged.’ Neither party established a
college savings account for [the child’s] benefit or made
any other financial arrangement(s) in preparation for
college.
6The colloquy continued:
“[The Defendant]: As you sit here today, are you stating you did not
say you would give her $12,000 towards tuition on March 12, 2024?
“[The Plaintiff]: I don’t recall the specific language.
“[The Defendant]: Did you or did you not say $12,000 towards tuit-
ion? . . .
“[The Plaintiff]: Repeat the question, please.
“[The Defendant]: Did you not say $12,000 towards tuition on March
12?
“[The Plaintiff]: I don’t recall. I don’t recall what I said that long ago.”

Borsey v. Borsey
“The plaintiff credibly testified that he never agreed
to pay for college, and his testimony is consistent with
his actions in that he did not participate in the college
application and/or selection process, he declined invita-
tions to visit schools with [the child], and he refused to
complete and submit financial aid documents during the
application process. The plaintiff[’s] and the defendant’s
testimony was consistent on only one point—that the
plaintiff agreed to give [the child] money ([approximately]
$12,000) to assist for the first year. The plaintiff further
testified that he is not a huge proponent of college, but
he fully supports [the child’s] decision to attend except
he is not willing to pay for it. Given the facts and cir-
cumstances, this court cannot make a factual finding,
based on the evidence presented, that the parties would
have contributed to [the child’s] higher education if
the family had remained intact.” (Citation omitted;
emphasis added.)
We first set forth applicable legal principles and our
standard of review. Section 46b-56c provides in relevant
part: “(a) For purposes of this section, an educational
support order is an order entered by a court requiring a
parent to provide support for a child or children to attend
for up to a total of four full academic years an institution
of higher education or a private career school for the
purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other undergraduate
degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An
educational support order may be entered with respect
to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of
age and shall terminate not later than the date on which
the child attains twenty-three years of age.
“(b) (1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may
enter an educational support order at the time of entry
of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment,
and no educational support order may be entered there-
after unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion
or petition for an educational support order may be filed
by either parent at a subsequent date. . . .

Borsey v. Borsey
“(c) The court may not enter an educational support
order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as
a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the
parents would have provided support to the child for
higher education or private career school if the fam-
ily were intact. After making such finding, the court,
in determining whether to enter an educational sup-
port order, shall consider all relevant circumstances,
including: (1) The parents’ income, assets and other
obligations, including obligations to other dependents;
(2) the child’s need for support to attend an institution
of higher education or private career school considering
the child’s assets and the child’s ability to earn income;
(3) the availability of financial aid from other sources,
including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the
higher education to be funded considering the child’s
academic record and the financial resources available;
(5) the child’s preparation for, aptitude for and com-
mitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any,
of the institution of higher education or private career
school the child would attend. . . .”
The defendant’s claim on appeal challenges the court’s
finding that the parties would not have contributed to
the child’s higher education if the family had remained
intact. We address the defendant’s claim as challenging
that finding on the basis that it contradicted the court’s
separate factual finding that the plaintiff had agreed
to give the child $12,000 to assist the child for the first
year.7 “The trial court’s findings are binding upon this
court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the
7The defendant also claims that the court abused its discretion in
excluding relevant evidence. First, the defendant claims that docu-
ments were improperly excluded from evidence but does not identify the
specific documents she contends were “excluded or left unmarked,” and
does not provide any citation to the record of the court excluding such
evidence. “Claims are . . . inadequately briefed when they . . . consist
of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and
minimal or no citations from the record . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Rosario v. Rosario, 198 Conn. App. 83, 90, 232 A.3d 1105
(2020). Accordingly, we decline to address this claim as inadequately
briefed. Moreover, we note that additional documentary evidence was

Borsey v. Borsey
evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . .
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Buehler v. Buehler, 211 Conn.
App. 357, 368, 272 A.3d 736, cert. denied, 343 Conn.
917, 274 A.3d 869 (2022); see Barbour v. Barbour, 156
Conn. App. 383, 396, 113 A.3d 77 (2015) (identifying
as factual finding determination whether parties would
have provided support to child for higher education).
In the present case, following our careful review of the
record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Specifically, the court
made an express factual finding that the plaintiff agreed
to give the child “money ([approximately] $12,000) to
assist for the first year.” This finding is supported by
undisputed evidence in the record, including the testi-
mony of both parties, which the court recognized was
consistent on this point. In light of this finding, the
court’s contradictory finding that the parties would not
have contributed to the child’s education if the family
had remained intact is clearly erroneous and cannot
stand. Rather, the court’s finding regarding the $12,000
introduced following the defendant’s retention of counsel. See footnote
4 of this opinion.
Second, the defendant contends that the court improperly refused to
permit her to present the testimony of the parties’ child and denied her
application for a subpoena for the plaintiff’s spouse. We conclude that
the defendant has not satisfied her burden on appeal of demonstrating
that the court abused its broad discretion. See Nweeia v. Nweeia, 142
Conn. App. 613, 626, 64 A.3d 1251 (2013) (court did not abuse its discre-
tion by precluding plaintiff from calling child as rebuttal witness); see
also Practice Book § 7-19 (c) (“[a] judge may direct or deny the issuance
of subpoenas as such judge deems warranted under the circumstances,
keeping in mind the nature of the scheduled hearing and future oppor-
tunities for examination of witnesses, as may be appropriate”); Furbush
v. Commissioner of Correction, 158 Conn. App. 821, 824, 120 A.3d 1255
(“[t]he court is granted broad discretion in issuing subpoenas for wit-
nesses on behalf of self-represented parties” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 924, 212 A.3d 241 (2015).

Borsey v. Borsey
contribution necessarily satisfies the statutory threshold
“that it is more likely than not that the parents would
have provided support to the child for higher education
. . . if the family were intact.” General Statutes § 46b-
56c (c).
Because the court erroneously did not make the thresh-
old finding that the parties would have contributed to
the child’s education, the court did not continue on to
“consider all relevant circumstances” pursuant to § 46b-
56c (c). See also Barbour v. Barbour, supra, 156 Conn.
App. 396–97 (reversing court’s educational support
order when court did nothing more than grant plaintiff’s
proposed order regarding college expenses, did not state
that it had considered statutory factors, and included
erroneous statement as to plaintiff’s income). Consid-
eration of these factors, including the parties’ financial
situation, the child’s need for support, the availability
of other financial aid, the reasonableness of the educa-
tion in light of the child’s academic record, the child’s
preparation for higher education, and evidence of the
school the child would attend, all involve factual deter-
minations that cannot be made by this court in the first
instance. See Simpson v. Simpson, 352 Conn. 81, 100,
335 A.3d 472 (2025) (“[a]n appellate court cannot find
facts or draw conclusions from primary facts found, but
may only review such findings to see whether they might
be legally, logically and reasonably found” (emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). Con-
sideration of these factors may or may not result in the
issuance of an educational support order. Accordingly,
we must remand the case for consideration of the statu-
tory factors, on the basis of the existing record, and a
determination of whether to enter an educational support
order. See McKeon v. Lennon, 321 Conn. 323, 350, 138
A.3d 242 (2016) (remanding case to trial court to make
findings regarding exercised stock options and restricted
stock and to reconsider motion for modification in light
of its findings).

Borsey v. Borsey
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
credited the plaintiff’s prior overpayments of child sup-
port in determining an arrearage following the court’s
modification of the plaintiff’s child support obligation.
We conclude that the court abused its discretion in cred-
iting the plaintiff’s prior payments.
The following additional procedural history is rel-
evant to our resolution of this claim. With respect to the
motion for modification of child support, the court found:
“Under the parties’ custody agreement, the plaintiff
was required to pay $200/week for child support . . . .
The defendant testified that on or about September 11,
2016, the plaintiff agreed to increase child support pay-
ments to $300/week, which was not approved by the
court. The plaintiff paid $300/week until April 1, 2019.
The plaintiff then paid $237/week until April 22, 2024.
The plaintiff paid his final five weeks of child support in
the court-ordered amount of $200/week.
“The defendant claims she is owed $19,568 in child sup-
port arrears because the plaintiff ‘breached’ the ‘agree-
ment’ to pay $300/week from 2016. The parties engaged
in self-help when they entered into a collateral agreement
in 2016. In Connecticut, the general rule is that a court
order must be followed until it has been modified or suc-
cessfully challenged. . . . Our Supreme Court repeatedly
has advised parties against engaging in ‘self-help’ and
has stressed that an ‘order of the court must be obeyed
until it has been modified or successfully challenged.’
“The defendant also asserts that child support should
be modified ‘as of April 5, 2024, to $296 per week pursu-
ant to the child support guidelines,’ which entitles her
to child support arrears of $854 (9 x $96/week). Assum-
ing the defendant has established a substantial change
in circumstances, the court exercises its discretion to
‘credit’ the plaintiff for years of voluntary overpay-
ment of child support. ‘Courts have recognized that the

Borsey v. Borsey
decision to allow or disallow credit lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.’ Goold v. Goold, 11 Conn.
App. 268, 270, 527 A.2d 696, cert. denied, 204 Conn.
810, 528 A.2d 1156 (1987). The defendant’s request for
modification of child support and request for arrears is
denied.”8 (Citations omitted.)
We first set forth applicable legal principles and our
standard of review. “We previously have explained the
specific method by which a trial court should proceed
with a motion brought pursuant to [General Statutes] §
46b-86 (a). When presented with a motion for modifica-
tion, a court must first determine whether there has been
a substantial change in the financial circumstances of
one or both of the parties. . . . Second, if the court finds
a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly
consider the motion and, on the basis of the . . . [General
Statutes] § 46b-82 criteria, make an order for modifica-
tion. . . . The court has authority to issue a modification
only if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite
changes in the circumstances of the parties. . . . Simply
8The defendant also claims on appeal that the court failed to comply
with Practice Book § 64-1 (a), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he
trial court shall state its decision either orally or in writing” in certain
matters, including “in making any . . . rulings that constitute a final
judgment for purposes of appeal . . . .” The defendant argues that the
court failed to satisfy § 64-1 (a) because it “issued only a judicial notice
of decision” that “briefly summarizes selected testimony and announces
conclusions but makes no express findings of fact or articulated reason-
ing connecting the evidence to the law. It contains no determination of
whether the defendant proved a substantial change in circumstances
. . . no threshold family intact finding . . . and no analysis of the six
statutory factors” for educational support orders.
The defendant’s claim that the court’s decision failed to comply with
Practice Book § 64-1 (a) is unavailing. First, we reject the defendant’s
argument to the extent that she contends the order is noncompliant
on the basis that it is set forth in a judicial notice of decision or order
(JDNO) rather than a memorandum of decision. See Belevich v. Renais-
sance I, LLC, 207 Conn. App. 119, 123 n.5, 261 A.3d 1 (2021) (treating
JDNO as memorandum of decision). Second, the defendant did not “file
with the appellate clerk a notice that the decision has not been filed in
compliance with [§ 64-1 (a)],” as directed by § 64-1 (b). Third, we need
not address the claimed deficiencies in light of our resolution of the
defendant’s first two claims on appeal.

Borsey v. Borsey
put, before the court may modify . . . [a child support
order] pursuant to § 46b-86, it must make a threshold
finding of a substantial change in circumstances with
respect to one of the parties.
“The party seeking the modification has the burden
of proving a substantial change in circumstances. . . .
To obtain a modification, the moving party must dem-
onstrate that circumstances have changed since the last
court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable
to hold either party to it. Because the establishment
of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a
party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire
as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modifi-
cation of the existing order. In making such an inquiry,
the trial court’s discretion is essential. . . .
“[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on a
motion for modification of alimony or child support
unless the court has abused its discretion or reasonably
could not conclude as it did, on the basis of the facts pre-
sented. . . . Furthermore, [t]he trial court’s findings [of
fact] are binding upon this court unless they are clearly
erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the
record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mountain v. Mountain, 189 Conn. App. 228,
232–33, 206 A.3d 802 (2019).
“Retroactive modifications of support orders are ordi-
narily impermissible. . . . With the exception of the period
following service of a motion for modification, [n]o order
for periodic payment of permanent alimony or support
may be subject to retroactive modification . . . . The
power of the trial court to modify orders of support and
alimony is . . . a creature of statute. General Statutes

Borsey v. Borsey
§ 46b-86.9 Nothing in our statute regarding modification
of alimony and support can be construed as authorizing
retroactive modification. Such a construction has been
expressly disavowed by our Supreme Court.” (Footnote
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v.
Marshall, 200 Conn. App. 688, 718, 241 A.3d 189 (2020).
Resolution of the defendant’s claim first requires us to
interpret the language used in the court’s order. “Because
[t]he construction of a judgment is a question of law for
the court . . . our review of the . . . claim is plenary. As a
general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same
fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determi-
native factor is the intention of the court as gathered
from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation
of a judgment may involve the circumstances surround-
ing the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be
given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that
which is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a
consistent construction as a whole.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Anketell v. Kulldorff, 207 Conn. App.
807, 821, 263 A.3d 972, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 905,
263 A.3d 821 (2021).
Although the trial court in conclusory fashion indi-
cated that it was denying the defendant’s motion for
modification of child support, we have carefully con-
strued the judgment as a whole and are persuaded that
the court, in effect, granted the defendant’s motion for
modification. As we explain in greater detail later in
this opinion, the court credited the plaintiff for what it
described as “years of voluntary overpayment of child
support.” In order to have issued the plaintiff a “credit”
for overpayments, however, the court necessarily also
had to have determined that the plaintiff owed the defen-
dant an arrearage against which to apply that credit
9General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: “No order for
periodic payment of . . . support may be subject to retroactive modifica-
tion, except that the court may order modification with respect to any
period during which there is a pending motion for modification of [a] . . .
support order from the date of service of notice of such pending motion
upon the opposing party pursuant to section 52-50. . . .”

Borsey v. Borsey
notwithstanding the fact that, following the defendant’s
motion for modification, the plaintiff had paid support
in amounts equal to or greater than the amount required
under the judgment of dissolution.
Having concluded that the court, in effect, granted
the motion for modification, we turn to the defendant’s
contention that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that a credit was appropriate. We agree
with the defendant.
We first note the general rule that “a court order must
be followed until it has been modified or successfully chal-
lenged. . . . Our Supreme Court repeatedly has advised
parties against engaging in self-help and has stressed
that an order of the court must be obeyed until it has
been modified or successfully challenged.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence
v. Lawrence, 92 Conn. App. 212, 215–16, 883 A.2d
1260 (2005).
The court in the present case stated that it was
“credit[ing] the plaintiff for years of voluntary over-
payment of child support,” and cited Goold v. Goold,
supra, 11 Conn. App. 268, for the proposition that the
decision to allow or disallow a credit is within the discre-
tion of the trial court. In Goold, the trial court declined
to provide the defendant father with a credit against
child support for amounts spent by him in the form
of direct support of the parties’ child while the child
was in the defendant’s physical custody. Id., 270. On
appeal, this court recognized that equity may require,
in certain circumstances, that a credit toward a child
support arrearage be given to a noncustodial parent for
direct support provided while the child lived with the
noncustodial parent, and set forth the following factors
to determine whether a credit should be allowed, includ-
ing whether: (i) the party seeking the credit has pursued
a motion for modification of the support order; (ii) the
parties’ separation agreement expressly provides that
the payor may deduct or adjust the support payments
when the child is no longer in the payee’s custody; and

Borsey v. Borsey
(iii) the payee has in some manner consented to accept
the payor’s direct support of the child as an alternative
method of payment of support. Id., 274–75. This court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the credit because the defendant did not file
a motion for modification, the separation agreement did
not provide for a credit to the defendant for expenditures
incurred by him while the child resided with him despite
providing for credits in the event of other enumerated
circumstances, and the plaintiff had not consented “in
any manner to accept the alternate payments as partial
or complete satisfaction of the [defendant’s] obligation
under the decree.” Id., 277.
The court in Goold further explained that “[t]he plain-
tiff, having obtained legal custody of the children and
having been awarded child support for their maintenance,
had the right and privilege to determine how and in what
manner child maintenance funds should be spent. . . . By
unilaterally reducing the amount of his child support pay-
ments without the consent of the plaintiff, the defendant
diverted such maintenance funds from [the plaintiff],
thereby reducing [the plaintiff’s] ability to make such
decisions. . . . To permit the defendant to receive credit
for his payments under these circumstances would be to
vary the terms of the decree and usurp from the plaintiff
the right to control the disbursement of the support
money.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. Accordingly, this court concluded that
the trial court properly denied the defendant’s request
for a credit.
Goold is distinct both procedurally and factually from
the present case in that it involved a contempt proceed-
ing brought in connection with a child support arrear-
age wherein the payor, the respondent in the contempt
proceeding, sought a credit for direct support provided.
For that reason, the factors enumerated in Goold do not
guide our analysis. The case is useful, however, for its
illustration of the limited situations in which a credit
would be appropriate and its explanation of why the

Borsey v. Borsey
payor in that case had not satisfied the equitable criteria
with respect to a credit.
Of the three factors, most relevant to the present case
is the third factor of consent to an alternative payment
as satisfaction of the payor’s obligation. Importantly,
the record in the present case contains no evidence to
suggest that the defendant had any way of knowing that
the plaintiff unilaterally would reduce his child support
payments from the agreed upon higher amount and, fol-
lowing a successful modification in which it was shown
that he owed support in that increased amount, seek a
credit for the prior overpayments.
To the contrary, the primary evidence in the record
of the parties’ understanding at the time the plaintiff
commenced making $300 payments is a September 11,
2016 email exchange between the parties, admitted into
evidence without objection. In the plaintiff’s email, he
writes that he has agreed to pay $300 weekly in child
support. He continues: “At a future date if you are not
satisfied with $300 child support payment you have
every right to bring me to court for a modification if
you so desire. Again, my lawyer used estimates for the
child support guideline worksheet that I believe to be
fair.” The plaintiff additionally wrote: “[It’s] not that
you can’t ask me for more at a later date if you feel so
inclined. Just that since we’re not going to court to
modify the agreement, my only legal obligation per the
Divorce Agreement is $237 at this time.”10 The plaintiff
sought confirmation from the defendant that “this is a
deviation I’ve agreed to from the $237 that the original
divorce agreement states and . . . that you are currently
satisfied with $300 per week.”
Thus, there was no consent to any prepayment of child
support but, rather, an understanding that the plaintiff,
10It is unclear why the plaintiff referenced “a legal obligation per the
Divorce Agreement” of $237. When asked by the plaintiff’s counsel, the
defendant agreed that the email was “incorrect,” in that the plaintiff’s
child support obligation under the parties’ separation agreement was
$200.

Borsey v. Borsey
by 2016, owed more in child support than the separation
agreement had provided for, and an agreement between
the parties that the plaintiff would pay an amount that
had been calculated in accordance with the child support
guidelines, in an effort to avoid judicial proceedings. The
plaintiff’s straightforward and unqualified statement
to the defendant that she had every right to pursue a
modification is important, in that he does not therein
give any indication that he would seek a credit in the
event that she were to pursue such modification.
Moreover, issuing a credit in the present case would
be inconsistent with the principle that, “[a]s a result of
being awarded child support, the [payee] has the right and
privilege to determine how and when the funds should
be spent.” Lawrence v. Lawrence, supra, 92 Conn. App.
216. A unilateral attempt to prepay a support obligation
without the payee’s consent reduces the payee’s ability
to make decisions regarding how and when funds should
be spent and “usurp[s] the right to control the disburse-
ment of the support.” Id.
Finally, the issuance of a credit in the present case
would be incongruent with the traditional purpose of
child support. General Statutes § 46b-84 (a) imposes
“a duty on divorced parents to support the minor chil-
dren of their marriage, [and] creates a corresponding
right in the children to such support. . . . This right
does not come through their [parental custodian] . . . .
Child support therefore furnishes the custodian with
the resources to maintain a household to provide for
the care and welfare of the children; in essence, the cus-
todian holds the payments for the benefit of the child.”
(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn.
539, 555, 46 A.3d 112 (2012). In the present case, the
plaintiff’s prior payments properly were considered to be
overpayments because they exceeded his court-ordered
obligation. However, the uncontroverted evidence in
the form of an email written by the plaintiff suggested
that the amount of the prior payments was calculated in

Borsey v. Borsey
accordance with the child support guidelines and, thus,
was the amount to which the child was entitled. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion
in issuing the plaintiff a credit.11
Having concluded that the court abused its discretion
in determining that the plaintiff was entitled to a credit,
we turn to the issue of fashioning an appropriate remedy.
In the present case, the court considered the defendant’s
request for modification as of April 5, 2024, which the
court concluded would entitle the defendant to $854,12
calculated by considering a nine week period during
which application of the child support guidelines would
have required the plaintiff to pay an additional $96 per
week.13 Rather than ordering the plaintiff to pay that
amount, the court credited the plaintiff for “years of
voluntary overpayment of child support.” Underlying
the issuance of the credit is the implicit finding that an
11The defendant also argues that the plaintiff’s 2019 reduction in child
support, from the $300 to which he had agreed to the $237 amount,
implicates the doctrine of equitable estoppel. To the extent that the
defendant seeks a modification of the plaintiff’s child support obligation
for the period of time preceding her filing of the motion for modification,
we note that a modification may be made retroactive only to the date of
service of the motion for modification. See General Statutes § 46b-86
(a). Accordingly, the court properly denied the defendant’s request for
child support arrears prior to the filing of her motion for modification.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals that, aside from a brief
mention during closing argument, the defendant first distinctly raised
equitable estoppel to the trial court in her motion for reargument. “Rais-
ing an issue for the first time in a motion to reargue will not preserve
that issue for appellate review.” White v. Mazda Motor of America,
Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 634, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014). Accordingly, we decline
to review this claim as unpreserved.
12We note that $854 reflects a scrivener’s error, in that the amount
should be $864.
13In closing argument, the defendant’s counsel stated: “[I]f Your
Honor’s only inclined to issue an order since the date of the filing of the
motion for modification which was back earlier this year, we submitted
similar child support guidelines using the affidavits that the two of
them filed around that period of time, I think it was two ninety six . . .
a week. . . . And we’d ask that you at least make an order retroactive
to that date for that particular amount of money until June 6 which
is when the child was eighteen and graduated from high school so she
would have tapped out on the weekly child support.”

Borsey v. Borsey
arrearage was owed, which finding exists only upon a
determination that the defendant showed a substantial
change in circumstances and that an order for modifi-
cation was made. Thus, although the court stated that
it was denying the motion for modification, in light of
our careful review of the judgment as a whole, the only
rational interpretation of the judgment indicates that
the court found that the plaintiff owed $296 per week in
child support and, thus, granted the motion.
This conclusion is supported by the December 2, 2024
child support guidelines worksheet prepared by the defen-
dant’s counsel and contained within the trial court file.
The worksheet reflects income and deductions from the
plaintiff’s December 2024 financial affidavit. It shows a
presumptive child support obligation owed by the plain-
tiff in the amount of $296 weekly, which the court ref-
erenced in its order.
The motion was served on the plaintiff on April 5, 2024,
and child support was to terminate in June 2024, when
the child graduated high school. There was, therefore,
a nine week period, in which the plaintiff’s obligation
was $296. The undisputed evidence in the record dem-
onstrated that the plaintiff paid $237 weekly for three
of those weeks and paid $200 for the final payments.
Accordingly, the trial court’s determination of a $96
weekly difference for a total of nine weeks reflects a
mathematical error in that it does not account for three
payments of $237 made during that period. The deficit
during the nine week period was $753. Although the
defendant has not raised a claim on appeal concerning
this error, we nonetheless believe that it is appropriate
to direct that this error be corrected on remand because
it is technical in nature. See Mystic Oil Co. v. Shaukat,
LLC, 228 Conn. App. 147, 152 n.7, 323 A.3d 1094 (2024)
(“[a]lthough not raised by the parties, the error is clearly
technical and not substantive, and, thus, we will direct
its correction on remand”).
Concerning part I of this opinion, our determination
that the court made a clearly erroneous finding that the

Borsey v. Borsey
parties would not have contributed to the child’s educa-
tion if the family had remained intact and our determi-
nation that the court’s finding regarding the $12,000
contribution necessarily satisfies the statutory threshold
that it is more likely than not that the parents would have
provided support to the child for higher education if the
family were intact, necessitates a remand of the matter
for factual findings following due consideration of the
statutory factors, on the basis of the existing record,
and a determination of whether to enter an educational
support order. Concerning part II of this opinion, our
determination that the court abused its discretion in
issuing the plaintiff a credit toward child support owed
necessitates a reversal of the judgment in part and a
remand of the matter to the trial court with direction to
order the plaintiff to pay $753 to the defendant.
The judgment is reversed in part and the case is
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
In this opinion MOLL, J., concurred.