Tschummi v. Fegan

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Tschummi v. Fegan
CAROLYN TSCHUMMI v. KIMBERLY FEGAN
(AC 47468)
Cradle, C. J., and Wilson and Norcott, Js.*
Syllabus
Pursuant to a provision (§ 46b-553) of the Connecticut Parentage Act (act)
(§ 46b-450 et seq.), the provisions of the act only “apply to a proceeding in
which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to
a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.”
The respondent, who had previously been in an intimate relationship with
the petitioner, appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating the
petitioner as a legal parent of the respondent’s minor child, M, pursuant
to the act. She claimed, inter alia, that, because the court had previously
dismissed a custody action brought by the petitioner in 2021 on the ground
that the petitioner was not a legal parent of M and, thus, lacked standing,
the court improperly denied her motion to dismiss the petitioner’s parent-
age petition. Held:
The trial court erred in denying the respondent’s motion to dismiss the
petition seeking an adjudication of parentage, as, pursuant to § 46b-553,
the court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s prior custody action constituted an
adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage by a court of competent jurisdiction
prior to January 1, 2022; thus, the petitioner did not have standing to bring
the parentage petition and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment
recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M.
Argued February 17—officially released September 8, 2026
Procedural History
Petition for the adjudication of the parentage of a
minor child, and for other relief, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the
court, M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion
to dismiss; thereafter, the court, Caron, J., denied the
respondent’s motion to dismiss; subsequently, the case
was tried to the court, Caron, J.; judgment adjudicating
the petitioner a parent of the minor child, from which
*The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as
of the date of oral argument.

Tschummi v. Fegan
the respondent appealed to this court. Reversed; judg-
ment directed.
Mark J. Claflin, for the appellant (respondent).
Kevin B. F. Emerson, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
WILSON, J. The respondent, Kimberly Fegan, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, Caron, J., adjudi-
cating the petitioner, Carolyn Tschummi, a legal parent
of a minor child, M, under the Connecticut Parentage
Act (act), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq. On appeal,
the respondent claims, inter alia, that the trial court, M.
Murphy, J., improperly failed to dismiss the petitioner’s
parentage petition brought under the act due to lack of
standing under General Statutes § 46b-475 on the ground
that her parentage as to M had already been adjudicated
in a prior custody action (custody action) before the effec-
tive date of the act and that her petition was therefore
barred by the act’s “transitional provision” set forth
in General Statutes § 46b-553.1 The respondent also
claims that the court, Caron, J., improperly concluded
that the petitioner had standing under General Statutes
§ 46b-458 by overlooking its provision incorporating the
standing requirements of General Statutes §§ 46b-488
(a) and 46b-553. The respondent claims that, because
the court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
parentage petition, the parentage adjudication cannot
stand. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M and
1In addition to the respondent’s claim that the court, M. Murphy, J.,
improperly denied her motion to dismiss because the petitioner lacked
standing to bring the petition, the respondent claims that the court,
Caron, J., in adjudicating parentage, improperly applied the act retro-
actively in violation of Connecticut law; lacked statutory authority to
hear the petition; improperly determined the best interest of the child;
improperly excluded relevant admissible evidence; and that the court’s
decision was against the weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous.
Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the respondent’s motion to dismiss should have been granted,
we need not reach these additional claims.

Tschummi v. Fegan
remand the case to the trial court with direction to grant
the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for an
adjudication of parentage under the act.
The following facts and procedural history as set forth
in the trial court’s memorandum of decision and the
record are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The
petitioner and the respondent were in an intimate rela-
tionship with one another beginning in September 2011
but were never married. In October 2015, the respondent
moved into the petitioner’s home in Somers.
During the early years of their relationship, the par-
ties discussed the possibility of having children. Being
a same-sex couple, the parties decided to pursue in vitro
fertilization (IVF). The respondent took on the primary
role of choosing the sperm donor and she paid for all the
expenses associated with securing the sperm. On the basis
of discussions that the parties had, the respondent nar-
rowed down the search to donors who most resembled the
petitioner in terms of traits including physical appear-
ance, intellect, and ethnicity. The respondent showed the
petitioner the donor profile that she preferred and asked
the petitioner her opinion. The petitioner concurred, and
they jointly chose that donor. Following successful IVF
treatment, the respondent gave birth to M at Baystate
Medical Center in Massachusetts in April 2018, by way
of a planned cesarean section.
After M was born, the parties remained in a committed
intimate relationship until late 2019, when the relation-
ship ended. They continued to live together in the peti-
tioner’s home, with the petitioner moving into a separate
bedroom in the home. This arrangement continued until
the respondent moved out of the petitioner’s home in
late January 2021. On January 28, 2021, the petitioner
returned home from work to find that the respondent
had moved out, taking M with her to Massachusetts.
The respondent also removed from the family home all
of her personal items, clothing and a significant amount
of furniture, as well as all of M’s belongings, including
M’s clothing, toys, books, and furniture.

Tschummi v. Fegan
On February 3, 2021, in accordance with General Stat-
utes § 46b-61, the petitioner filed a custody application
in Superior Court. As required by § 46b-61 (a), in her
application for custody, the petitioner stated that, by the
first scheduled date the matter appeared on the docket,
she would file “accompanying documents” as defined in
§ 46b-61 (b). The petitioner also filed an application for
an emergency ex parte order of custody, which the court,
Macierowski, J., granted on February 3, 2021, ordering
that the respondent may not remove M from the state of
Connecticut and giving the petitioner shared parenting
time consistent with their prior practice. On February 10,
2021, the court, while keeping the ex parte orders then
in effect, continued the matter for three weeks so that
the petitioner’s counsel could effectuate service on the
respondent. On March 3, 2021, the court entered further
orders, including that the child be returned to Connecti-
cut, that the petitioner have primary residence, and that
the parties share parenting time in accordance with their
prior practice. The petitioner hired a Massachusetts
attorney to have the Connecticut orders enforced in Mas-
sachusetts. On March 22, 2021, the petitioner traveled
to Plymouth, Massachusetts, where the respondent and
M were living with the respondent’s sister, and, with
the assistance of marshals, returned the child to Con-
necticut. On that same day, the respondent filed her own
application for an emergency ex parte order of custody
in Connecticut and the court ordered that she could have
regular visits with M in Connecticut. The respondent
traveled to Connecticut and stayed in a hotel for four
nights so she could visit with the child.
On March 31, 2021, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the petitioner’s application for custody on the
ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the petitioner was not a legal parent of the minor
child and had no standing to apply for custody.
Pending a hearing and ruling on the motion to dis-
miss, on April 1, 2021, the court entered further orders
that the parties were to have shared parenting with M

Tschummi v. Fegan
in their respective homes. On April 9, 2021, the court
entered temporary orders that the petitioner would have
at least two consecutive overnights per week with M and
encouraged the parties and their attorneys to work out
a mutually agreeable schedule until the parties could
return to court. M returned to the respondent’s home in
Massachusetts on April 9, 2021, and the petitioner had
M in her home in Connecticut every other weekend. The
petitioner altered her work schedule so she could have
access with M in Connecticut, and the parties negotiated
certain changes to the access schedule during this time.
The petitioner’s access with M continued until Novem-
ber 4, 2021, at which time, after evidentiary hearings
had been held on the respondent’s motion to dismiss,
the court, Macierowski, J., determined that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s
custody action because the petitioner “is not a legal par-
ent, and therefore, does not have standing to pursue this
claim.” Significantly, the court considered whether the
petitioner was able to establish that she had the rights
of a legal parent as to M under “[the] four recognized
statutory or legal pathways to parentage under current
Connecticut law . . . .” The court observed that it did not
have the equitable authority “to define or determine who
is a legal parent . . . .” The court, therefore, confined
its analysis to the legally defined methods of establish-
ing parentage under existing law, as described by our
Supreme Court in Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681,
689, 12 A.3d 783 (2011). Consequently, the custody case
was dismissed. Following the judgment of dismissal, the
petitioner did not bring an appeal.
Thereafter, on January 6, 2022, the petitioner filed the
petition in the present case to adjudicate parentage under
the act, which became effective on January 1, 2022. In
her petition, the petitioner alleged that, pursuant to §
46b-458 (4), “she is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a
parent under the provisions of the Connecticut Parentage
Act . . . [t]he [respondent] is the biological parent of the
minor child; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent] were

Tschummi v. Fegan
never married; [t]here was one minor child born during
the parties’ relationship, to wit [M], born [in] April . . .
2018; [t]he petitioner reside[d] in this state at the time of
the filing of this petition; [t]he petitioner is a presumed
parent of the minor child under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the
act in that the petitioner jointly with another parent
resided in the same household with the child and openly
held out the child as the petitioner’s own child from the
time the child was born or adopted and for a period of
at least two years thereafter, including any period of
temporary absence; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent]
entered into assisted reproduction (IVF) together as
a couple; [t]he petitioner is an intended parent under
[General Statutes §§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the act as
the petitioner manifested an intent to be legally bound
as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction;
[o]nly the petitioner and the [respondent] claim parent-
age of the minor child; [i]t is in the best interest of the
minor child that the petitioner be adjudicated a parent
pursuant to the factors set forth in [§ 46b-475] of the
act; [and] [n]either the petitioner, the [respondent] nor
the minor child have received any aid from the state of
Connecticut.”
On February 10, 2022, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner lacked
standing. The respondent asserted that the petitioner
lacked standing because she was previously adjudged,
on November 4, 2021, in the custody action, not to be
a legal parent of M, and § 46b-553 expressly provides
that the provisions of the act “apply to a proceeding in
which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022,
with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
or determined by operation of law.” General Statutes §
46b-553. The respondent further claimed that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition pur-
suant to General Statutes § 46b-115k.2
2The jurisdictional issue raised by the respondent in the present appeal
is based solely on the application of § 46b-553 of the act and not on §

Tschummi v. Fegan
On May 3, 2022, the petitioner filed an objection to the
motion to dismiss and argued that there was no adjudica-
tion of parentage in the previous custody action and that,
even if there was an adjudication of parentage, there is
no question that the ruling was without prejudice.
The court, M. Murphy, J., heard oral argument on
the motion on May 6, 2022, and, thereafter, on July 25,
2022, denied the motion to dismiss and sustained the
petitioner’s objection to the motion. The court stated
in its ruling on the motion: “The court in the custody
application case . . . dismissed the application for cus-
tody without prejudice. When asked by [the petitioner’s]
counsel if the court was making an adjudication about
whether the [petitioner] was a parent of [M] in dismiss-
ing the custody application, the court responded that it
was not deciding about the parentage of [M] . . . . After
reviewing the records in [the custody application case],
this court finds that no court has made an adjudication
regarding the parents of [M].” (Citation omitted.)
Prior to proceeding on the merits of the petition, on
March 9, 2023, the respondent filed a second motion to
dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The court, Caron, J., heard oral argument on the
motion on May 5, 2023. Although the respondent chal-
lenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, she did
not reiterate her earlier claim that the petitioner lacked
standing under § 46b-553 because of the prior adjudica-
tion of parentage.3 The court, Caron, J., in denying the
46b-115k. We therefore limit our analysis of whether the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s parentage petition to
whether § 46b-553 applies thereto.
3The respondent argued that Connecticut courts lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over any matters related to custody or visitation of M
because the child had not resided in Connecticut in more than two years
and, thus, the court could not make necessary findings related to M’s
best interest “to determine custody, visitation, or any other purpose.”
The respondent also argued that any ruling rendering the petitioner a
legal parent “would grievously and permanently impair [the respon-
dent’s] parental liberty rights” because Connecticut lacks any interest,
let alone a compelling interest, in entertaining an action that should
have been brought in Massachusetts. According to the respondent, the

Tschummi v. Fegan
motion to dismiss in an oral ruling on May 5, 2023, prior
to the trial on the merits of the parentage petition, did
not address that distinct ground, which is the basis of
the petitioner’s present claim before this court.4 Nev-
ertheless, because a challenge to a trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and the
record is adequate for us to review the claim, we will
consider its merits. See Milford Redevelopment & Hous-
ing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593, 602,
325 A.3d 971 (2024) (“claim that a court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the
proceedings, including on appeal”).
The petition was tried to the court, Caron, J., on June
21, 26 and 30, July 7, August 28, and December 8 and
15, 2023. In its March 6, 2024 memorandum of decision
finding parentage, the court, Caron, J., determined that
the petitioner had standing to maintain a proceeding to
establish parentage under the act because “the petitioner
legislature did not provide enabling legislation permitting the court
to exercise jurisdiction to decide the best interest of a child who has
permanently resided in another state since January 2021, and the court
lacked “[any] other source of authority, common-law, constitutional or
otherwise to make such a determination.”
The court rejected the respondent’s argument and concluded that
its jurisdiction was not based on M’s residency and that it had subject
matter jurisdiction because the petitioner, a resident of Connecticut,
sought to be adjudicated a parent under the act. The court also rejected
the respondent’s argument that the facts relevant to a best interest
analysis would not be available to it. The court also noted that, under the
act, it need not be established “that there be no other court that might
be able to establish jurisdiction over the issue. So, we’re not precluded
from going ahead and hearing it here even though there’s a possibility
that [a] Massachusetts [court] could also establish parentage.” Finally,
the court rejected what it labeled the respondent’s “collateral estoppel
argument” based upon the judgment in the custody action. The court
reasoned that the custody action was brought under a different statute
and that the judgment rendered in that action “was decided under the
law in effect in Connecticut at the time of the decision.” The court also
relied on the fact that Judge Macierowski, in the custody action, made
it clear that the petitioner “should be free to be able to adjudicate her
claim of parentage under the new [act].”
4The respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing in the
present case, which was denied by Judge Murphy, and from which the
respondent appealed and which is presently before this court.

Tschummi v. Fegan
is seeking to be adjudicated a parent under the [act] and,
as such, has standing under [§] 46b-458 to maintain these
proceedings.” The court did not consider the prior par-
entage adjudication and the application of § 46b-553 in
its determination that the petitioner had standing. The
court further determined that it had personal jurisdic-
tion over both the petitioner and the respondent. The
court concluded, therefore, that it had jurisdiction over
the matter to hear and decide the petitioner’s request to
be adjudicated the parent of M. After hearing evidence
on the merits of the petition, the court adjudicated the
petitioner a legal parent of M. Additional facts will be
provided as necessary.
We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal
principles. The standard of review that we apply to a trial
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled.
“A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the
face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . .
[O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and
resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will
be de novo. . . . In undertaking this review, we are mind-
ful of the well established notion that, in determining
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every
presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . .
“Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter differ-
ent situations, depending on the status of the record in
the case. . . . Different rules and procedures will apply,
depending on the state of the record at the time the
motion is filed.
“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question
raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the
complaint alone, it must consider the allegations . . . in
their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court
must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint,
including those facts necessarily implied from the alle-
gations, construing them in a manner most favorable
to the pleader. . . .

Tschummi v. Fegan
“In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undis-
puted facts established by affidavits submitted in support
of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed
evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial
notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the
jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary
undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the
validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather,
those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them
by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . . If affida-
vits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a . . .
motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdic-
tion is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this
conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence,
the trial court may dismiss the action without further
proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits
either no proof to rebut the . . . jurisdictional allegations
. . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations
into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counter-
affidavits or other evidence to support the complaint,
but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.”
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State,
292 Conn. 642, 650–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
“[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is
raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it
is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before
proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn.
689–90.
“The issue of standing implicates a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction and is subject to plenary review. . . .
Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in
motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in
the subject matter of the controversy. . . . When standing
is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose

Tschummi v. Fegan
standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of the issue . . . . Standing is not a technical
rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor
is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical
concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are
not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable
interests and that judicial decisions which may affect
the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with
each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) V. V. v. V.
V., 218 Conn. App. 157, 167, 291 A.3d 109 (2023).
We now turn to the respondent’s claim that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for
parentage and therefore should have granted her motion
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner
had no standing under the act because her parentage as
to M was adjudicated prior to January 1, 2022, and the
petition is therefore barred by § 46b-553 of the act. We
note that this appeal raises an issue of first impression
in that it requires us to determine, for the first time
since the enactment of the act, who has standing under
the act and, specifically, to interpret its transitional
provision, § 46b-553.
Before addressing the merits of the respondent’s
claims, it is important to outline the historical legal
framework governing the establishment of parentage
in Connecticut, particularly in light of the context sur-
rounding this appeal. Prior to the enactment of the act,
the legal landscape for establishing parentage in Con-
necticut was shaped by legal precedent and statutory
provisions that defined parental rights and responsibili-
ties. This historical overview is important to understand
the evolution of parentage laws in this state prior to the
passage of the act.
Prior to the passage of the act, “[our Supreme Court]
[had] long recognized that there are three ways by which
a person may become a parent: conception, adoption or
pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes. . . .
The definitional section of chapter 803 of the General

Tschummi v. Fegan
Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights
and adoption, defines [p]arent as a biological or adoptive
parent. . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (5). The same
definitional section defines [t]ermination of parental
rights as the complete severance by court order of the
legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibili-
ties, between the child and the child’s parent or parents
. . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (8). Reading these two
subdivisions of the same statute together suggests that
only persons who are biological or adoptive parents have
parental rights with respect to the subject children.
“In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by
which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts
1975, No. 75-233, now codified at General Statutes
§ 45a-774. Section 45a-774 provides: Any child or chil-
dren born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire,
in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legiti-
mate child of the husband and wife who consented to and
requested the use of A.I.D. A.I.D. is defined as artificial
insemination with the use of donated sperm or eggs from
an identified or anonymous donor. General Statutes
§ 45a-771a (2). Artificial insemination is specifically
defined to include both intrauterine insemination and
in vitro fertilization. . . . General Statutes § 45a-771a
(1). Accordingly, a child born to a married woman and
conceived through artificial insemination by an egg or
sperm donor is the child of the wife and husband who
requested and consented to the use of A.I.D.” (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra,
299 Conn. 690–91.
“Our [Supreme Court’s] decisions prior to the pas-
sage of [the act and the court’s decision in Raftopol]
confirm[ed] that these three avenues were the exclu-
sive means by which a person could acquire parental
status. The question of the meaning of the term parent
ha[d] most commonly arisen in the context of dissolution
actions, when the parties [had] raised claims relating to
custody or support.” Id., 692; see, e.g., Remkiewicz v.

Tschummi v. Fegan
Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117, 429 A.2d 833 (1980)
(trial court’s judgment denying order of support was
affirmed because defendant was not child’s biological
father, he had not been adjudicated so in paternity pro-
ceeding and had not adopted child); see also Doe v. Doe,
244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (reaffirming
principle under existing statutory scheme that parent-
age could arise only by conception, adoption or by way
of artificial insemination statutes).
In Raftopol, which supersedes Doe, our Supreme Court
established a fourth avenue by which parentage could be
established. The court held that Connecticut law permit-
ted an intended parent who was neither the biological nor
the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent
of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement.5
Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 698.
In Raftopol, the plaintiffs, Anthony Raftopol and
Shawn Hargon, who were domestic partners, entered
into a written gestational agreement with the defendant,
Karma Ramey, in which she agreed to act as a gestational
carrier for the plaintiffs. Id., 687. “Pursuant to the ges-
tational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her
parental rights to any children resulting from the proce-
dures, and to sign any forms necessary for the issuance
of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs
as the parents of such children. Ramey also had agreed
to consent to the adoption of such children by Hargon
and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal.
5We note that, in bringing a petition for parentage under the act, the
petitioner did not rely on a gestational agreement. In the custody action,
however, the petitioner represented that, among the “accompanying
documents” that she would present to the court, was “[a] gestational
agreement giving [her] parental rights [with respect to M] . . . .” She
failed to do so. We discuss Raftopol because it is an important part of
the historical legal framework governing the establishment of parent-
age in Connecticut and it provides legal context for the underlying
proceedings in the present case. Specifically, the court, in dismissing
the custody action, concluded, under Raftopol, that the petitioner failed
to demonstrate that she had an existing legal relationship with M by
failing to provide “a legal document drafted with the intent of creat-
ing a legal parentage relationship or the obligations of a legal parent.”

Tschummi v. Fegan
“Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs
brought [an] action [against Ramey and the department
of public health (department)] seeking a declaratory
judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that
the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and
requesting that the court order [pursuant to General
Statutes § 7-48a]6 the department to issue a replacement
birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey,
were parents of the children. . . . Following a hearing,
the trial court issued a ruling declaring that: (1) the
gestational agreement [was] valid; (2) Raftopol [was] the
genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon [was]
the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey [was] not
the genetic or legal mother of the children. The court
therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement
birth certificate pursuant to § 7-48a.” (Footnote added;
footnotes omitted.) Id., 687–88.
Our Supreme Court in Raftopol affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court and concluded that, (1) because
Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to
the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights
was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of
Hargon’s parental status with respect to the children
and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory
6General Statutes § 7-48a provides in relevant part: “(b) If the birth
is subject to a surrogacy agreement, the Department of Public Health
shall create a replacement certificate of birth immediately upon: (1)
Receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction
issuing an order of parentage pursuant to such surrogacy agreement, if
such order is received by the department after the birth of the child, or
(2) the filing of an original certificate of birth, if such order is received
by the department prior to the birth of the child. The department shall
prepare the replacement certificate of birth for the child born of the
agreement in accordance with such order. The replacement certificate of
birth shall include all information required to be included in a certificate
of birth of this state as of the date of the birth, except that the intended
parent or parents under the surrogacy agreement shall be named as the
parent or parents of the child. When a certified copy of a certificate of
birth is requested by an eligible party, as provided in section 7-51, for
which a replacement certificate of birth has been created pursuant to
this subsection, a copy of the replacement certificate of birth shall be
provided. The department shall seal the original certificate of birth in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of section 19a-42. . . .”

Tschummi v. Fegan
ruling regarding Hargon’s parental status. Id., 689.
The court further concluded that § 7-48a allowed an
intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational
agreement to become a parent without first adopting
the children, without respect to that intended parent’s
genetic relationship to the children. Id., 698. Consistent
with that conclusion, the court “conclude[d] that the
trial court properly ordered the department to issue a
replacement birth certificate listing Hargon as parent
of the children.” Id. The court “emphasize[d] that the
[trial] court’s order to the department to place Hargon’s
name on the replacement birth certificate follows from
its declaratory judgment concluding that Hargon is a
parent to the children.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The
decision in Raftopol thus established a fourth avenue
by which to establish parentage. After Raftopol, but
prior to the passage of the act, the law in Connecticut
was that parentage could be established in the follow-
ing four ways: conception, adoption, pursuant to the
artificial insemination statutes, or pursuant to a valid
gestational agreement.
In January 2022, the Connecticut legislature passed
the act, which “clarifies and broadens who can be included
in the legal relationship between a child and a parent of
the child.” A. Walsh, note, “All in the Family? Adopting
the Uniform Parentage Act is One Step Towards Equality
in Parentage,” 37 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 273, 274 (2024).
The act is an adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act,
which was revised by the Uniform Law Commission in
2017, and provides equal access to parentage regard-
less of marital status, sexual orientation, or biological
relationship. Id. The act “removes gender references to
parental roles, thereby creating a more inclusive environ-
ment for children born to same-sex couples” and “expands
recognition of non-biological parents, specifies criteria
for adjudicating parentage, and provides the process for
establishing acknowledged parentage.” Id.
The act has broadened the ways in which to estab-
lish parentage beyond the four ways established by

Tschummi v. Fegan
Connecticut statutes and articulated in Connecticut
decisional law prior to its enactment. See id., 277. “The
[a]ct provides ten different ways for establishing a par-
ent-child relationship.” Id.7 Notably, “[a] person is pre-
sumed to be the parent of a child if they or their spouse
gave birth to the child, if the child is born within 300
days of the marriage ending, or if they resided with the
child and held them out as their own. Along with this, a
parent-child relationship is established if a person is adju-
dicated a parent of the child, the person adopts the child,
or the person acknowledges parentage of the child, all as
provided under the [act]. Such a relationship may also
be established in situations utilizing assisted reproduc-
tion or surrogacy agreements.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the petitioner alleged in her peti-
tion in relevant part that, pursuant to § 46b-458 (4), “she
is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under
the provisions of the act; that she is a presumed parent
of the minor child, [M] under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the
7General Statutes § 46b-471 provides: “A parent-child relationship
is established between a person and a child if:
“(1) The person gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided
in sections 46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive;
“(2) There is a presumption under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection
(a) of section 46b-488 of the person’s parentage of the child, unless the
presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding;
“(3) There is a presumption under subdivision (3) of subsection (a)
of section 46b-488, and the person is adjudicated a parent of the child
or acknowledges parentage of the child under sections 46b-476 to 46b-
487, inclusive;
“(4) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under section
46b-490;
“(5) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under sections
46b-495 to 46b-505, inclusive;
“(6) The person adopts the child;
“(7) The person acknowledges parentage of the child under sections
46b-476 to 46b-487, inclusive, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded
under section 46b-482 or successfully challenged under section 46b-483;
“(8) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections
46b-509 to 46b-517, inclusive;
“(9) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections
46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive; or
“(10) The court is deemed to have made an adjudication of parentage
pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-468.”

Tschummi v. Fegan
act in that she jointly with another parent resided in
the same household with the child and openly held out
the child as the petitioner’s own child from the time the
child was born or adopted and for a period of at least two
years thereafter, including any period of temporary
absence; that she and the respondent entered into assisted
reproduction (IVF) together as a couple; that she is an
intended parent under [§§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the
act as she manifested an intent to be legally bound as
a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction;
and that it is in the best interest of the minor child that
she be adjudicated a parent pursuant to the factors set
forth in [§ 46b-475] of the act.”
As previously noted, in the present action, the court,
M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dis-
miss the petitioner’s petition for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because it determined that the court in
the custody action had not adjudicated parentage and,
therefore, the petitioner had standing to maintain the
proceedings to establish parentage under the act. The
court, Caron, J., in ruling on the respondent’s renewed
motion to dismiss in the present action determined,
without analysis, that, merely because the petitioner
was seeking to be adjudicated a parent under the act,
she had standing pursuant to § 46b-458 to maintain the
proceedings to establish parentage and therefore that
the court had subject matter jurisdiction.
The issue, therefore, for this court to decide is whether,
under the act, the petitioner lacked standing to maintain
the underlying parentage action. A determination of
whether the petitioner lacked standing under the act
requires this court to interpret the relevant statutory
provisions that govern who has standing to maintain
a proceeding to establish parentage under the act. This
court must also determine whether the proceeding held
on November 4, 2021, before Judge Macierowski in the
custody action, was “a proceeding . . . with respect to a
person’s parentage that [was] . . . adjudicated by a court
of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of

Tschummi v. Fegan
law.” General Statutes § 46b-553. Stated otherwise, we
must consider whether, in the custody action, the court
adjudicated the issue of whether the petitioner was M’s
legal parent.
The respondent claims that the trial court improperly
denied her motion to dismiss because the plain language
of § 46b-553, which is incorporated into § 46b-458, bars
a proceeding under the act if “parentage has already
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or
determined by operation of law [prior to January 1, 2022,
the effective date of the act].” The respondent claims
that the petitioner’s parentage over M was previously
adjudicated on November 4, 2021, in the custody action
before Judge Macierowski, and that Judge Macierowski,
after the submission of evidence at the evidentiary hear-
ings on the motion to dismiss, made express findings as
to the petitioner’s parentage and determined that the
petitioner was not a legal parent.
The petitioner argues that her parentage over M was
not adjudicated in the custody action, prior to the effec-
tive date of the act, because Judge Macierowski dismissed
the action without prejudice to the petitioner filing a
petition for parentage under the act, which was not in
effect at the time of the dismissal. The petitioner argues
that, because “the matter was dismissed for lack of stand-
ing under the existing law, Judge Macierowski did not
allow the hearing to proceed on the merits with regard to
the custody claim [and thus] no adjudication was made
by Judge Macierowski.” We agree with the respondent.
The respondent’s claim requires us to interpret rel-
evant statutory provisions under the act and determine
their applicability to the present case. Accordingly, we
apply the plenary standard of review. See, e.g., Sera-
monte CT, LLC v. Blau, 236 Conn. App. 861, 867, 349
A.3d 1096 (2025) (reviewing court applies plenary stan-
dard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and
application), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 918, 351 A.3d 411
(2026).

Tschummi v. Fegan
“The process of statutory interpretation involves the
determination of the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of the case, including the question
of whether the language does so apply. . . .
“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent
intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holmes v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America, 171 Conn. App. 597, 606–607, 157
A.3d 1147 (2017).
“[P]ursuant to § 1-2z, [the court is] to go through the
following initial steps: first, consider the language of
the statute at issue, including its relationship to other
statutes, as applied to the facts of the case; second, if
after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude[s]
that, as so applied, there is but one likely or plausible
meaning of the statutory language, [the court] stop[s]
there; but third, if after the completion of step one, [the
court] conclude[s] that, as applied to the facts of the case,
there is more than one likely or plausible meaning of the
statute, [the court] may consult other sources, beyond
the statutory language, to ascertain the meaning of the
statute.
“It is useful to remind ourselves of what, in this
context, we mean when we say that a statutory text
has a plain meaning, or, what is the same, a plain and

Tschummi v. Fegan
unambiguous meaning. [Our Supreme Court] has already
defined that phrase. By that phrase we mean the meaning
that is so strongly indicated or suggested by the language
as applied to the facts of the case, without consider-
ation, however, of its purpose or the other, extratextual
sources of meaning . . . that, when the language is read
as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears
to preclude any other likely meaning. . . . Put another
way, if the text of the statute at issue, considering its
relationship to other statutes, would permit more than
one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be
said to be plain and unambiguous.” (Emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner
of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission,
137 Conn. App. 307, 314–15, 48 A.3d 694 (2012), aff’d,
312 Conn. 513, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014).
We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory
provisions. Section 46b-458 governs who has standing
to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under
the act and provides in relevant part: “Subject to the
provisions of sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive, a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained
by . . . (4) a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent
under the provisions of sections 46b-450 to 46b-553,
inclusive . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The term “subject to” is not defined in § 46b-458 or
in any other provisions of the act. “In the absence of a
statutory definition, words and phrases in a particular
statute are to be construed according to their common
usage. . . . To ascertain that usage, we look to the diction-
ary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Rubin v. Brodie, 228 Conn. App. 617, 638–39,
325 A.3d 1096 (2024); see also General Statutes § 1-1
(a). “We may find evidence of such usage, and technical
meaning, in dictionary definitions, as well as by reading
the statutory language within the context of the broader
legislative scheme.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Greenwich, 233 Conn. App. 78,
87, 340 A.3d 463, aff’d, 355 Conn. 367, ___ A.3d ___

Tschummi v. Fegan
(2026); see also, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338
Conn. 687, 697, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (“in the absence
of statutory definitions, we look to the contemporaneous
dictionary definitions of words to ascertain their com-
monly approved usage”).
This court, interpreting “subject to,” as that phrase
appears in zoning regulations, has stated: “Merriam-
Webster’s Online Dictionary defines ‘subject to’ to mean
(1) ‘affected by or possibly affected by (something),’ (2)
‘likely to do, have, or suffer from (something)’ or (3)
‘dependent on something else to happen or be true.’ Mer-
riam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to
(last visited April 22, 2024). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines ‘[s]ubject to’ to mean ‘[l]iable, subordinate, sub-
servient, inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by;
provided that; provided; answerable for.’ Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 1425; see also Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1723 (defining ‘subject’
to mean, inter alia, ‘[d]ependent on or exposed to (some
contingency); esp., being under discretionary author-
ity,’ with sample sentence reading, ‘funding is subject
to the board’s approval’). These assorted definitions can
support either a broad or limited reading of the phrase
‘subject to’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Lepkowski v. Plan-
ning Commission, 225 Conn. App. 120, 132, 315 A.3d
380 (2024).
Our Supreme Court, defining the term “subject to,”
as it appears in deeds, has stated that the term is “lan-
guage of qualification and not of contract, which renders
it a provision of notice that will not by itself create an
encumbrance in the absence of other circumstances.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abel v. Johnson,
340 Conn. 240, 257, 263 A.3d 371 (2021). The court in
Abel reasoned that the meaning of the term should be
evaluated in light of the context in which it appears. See
id., 258–59; id., 259 (“subject to language is contextual”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Tschummi v. Fegan
Section 46b-553 provides: “Sections 46b-450 to
46b-553,8 inclusive, apply to a proceeding in which no
judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with
respect to a person’s parentage that has not already
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
or determined by operation of law.” (Footnote added.)
Under § 46b-553, General Statutes §§ 46b-450 through
46b-553, inclusive, which encompasses § 46b-458, only
apply to a proceeding where there has been no adjudica-
tion of parentage prior to January 1, 2022. Thus, the
term “subject to” only has one reasonable interpretation
when we look at its placement in the act as a whole, which
is that it limits those who have standing under § 46b-458.
Moreover, when interpreting § 46b-458 together with
§ 46b-553, a person who seeks adjudication to be a parent
under the provisions of §§ 46b-450 through 46b-553,
inclusive, has standing provided that person’s parent-
age has not already been adjudicated prior to January
1, 2022.
The critical question for this court to answer in order
to determine whether the petitioner had standing to
maintain the underlying petition, therefore, is whether
the proceeding held on November 4, 2021, before Judge
Macierowski, on the respondent’s motion to dismiss the
custody action, was an adjudication of the petitioner’s
parentage of M. “Because [t]he construction of a judg-
ment is a question of law for the court . . . our review of
the . . . [issue] is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Perry v. Perry, 156 Conn. App. 587, 593, 113
A.3d 132, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 906, 114 A.3d 1220
(2015).
It is important to point out that, in her application
for joint legal custody, the petitioner alleged that she
was the mother of M and acknowledged that she would
provide, in accordance with § 46b-61 (a), “accompanying
documents,” as defined in § 46b-61 (b), to establish that
8General Statutes § 46b-452 sets forth the scope of the act and provides
in relevant part: “(a) Sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive, apply to
a determination of parentage. . . .”

Tschummi v. Fegan
she was the legal parent of M. Thus, it was the petitioner
herself who asserted parental rights as the basis upon
which her application for custody should be granted.
Section 46b-61 governs custody cases in which the par-
ents of a minor child live separately. Pursuant to § 46b-61
(a), “the superior court for the judicial district where any
parent resides may, on the application of any parent and
after notice is given to the other parent or parents, make
any order as to the custody, care, education, visitation
and support of any minor child of the parents . . . .” Sec-
tion 46b-61 (b) provides: “As used in this section, ‘accom-
panying documents’ means documents that establish an
existing legal relationship between the parents and the
child for whom an application for custody, care, educa-
tion, visitation and support is made under this section.
‘Accompanying documents’ include, but are not limited
to, a copy of a birth certificate naming the applicant and
the respondent as the parents of the child, a copy of a
properly executed acknowledgment of parentage, a court
order or decree naming the legally responsible parents,
including adoptive parents, a surrogacy agreement as
defined in section 7-36,9 documents showing that the
minor child was born during the parents’ wedlock or
other sufficient evidence within the discretion of the
court.” (Footnote added.) The petitioner listed the fol-
lowing “accompanying documents” that she would file
with the court: “A copy of a birth certificate naming [the
petitioner] as one of the parents; [a] copy of a properly
executed (finalized) acknowledgement of paternity; [a]
court order or decree naming [the petitioner] as a legally
responsible parent (including an adoptive parent); [a]
gestational agreement giving [the petitioner] parental
rights (see [General Statutes §] 7-36 . . . ); [d]ocument(s)
9General Statutes § 7-36 provides in relevant part: “(16) ‘Surrogacy
agreement’ means an agreement between one or more intended parents
and a person who is not an intended parent in which such person agrees
to become pregnant through assisted reproduction and which provides
that each intended parent is a parent of a child conceived under the
agreement. Unless the context otherwise requires, ‘surrogacy agreement’
includes an agreement with a person acting as a gestational surrogate
and an agreement with a person acting as a genetic surrogate . . . .”

Tschummi v. Fegan
showing that the child or children was/were born during
[the petitioner’s] marriage; or [a]ny other evidence [the
petitioner deems] is sufficient (enough) to convince the
court that [she is] a legal parent’ of the child or children.”
The court, in denying the petition for custody, noted
that the documents on which the petitioner relied were
health-care provider forms, not documents that were
drafted with the intent of creating a legal parentage
relationship between the petitioner and M.
As previously discussed, prior to the enactment of
the act, our Supreme Court and state legislature have
long recognized that there were four ways by which a
person could establish parentage: conception, adoption,
pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes, or as
established in Raftopol via a gestational agreement. See
Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 690. Prior to the
act, the definitional section of chapter 803 of the Gen-
eral Statutes, which deals with termination of parental
rights and adoption, defined “ ‘[p]arent’ ” as “a biological
or adoptive parent. . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 45a-707 (5). Thus, the “accompanying documents” that
parents seeking custody under § 46b-61 were required
to submit as evidence of an existing legal relationship
between the parents and the child for whom an applica-
tion for custody was being made were consistent with
the four ways by which parentage could be established.
Thus, in order to have standing to seek custody under §
46b-61, the person seeking custody must establish the
existence of a legally recognized parental relationship
with the child for whom custody is sought.
The petitioner argues that Judge Macierowski’s grant-
ing of the respondent’s motion to dismiss filed in the
custody action did not preclude her from filing the under-
lying parentage petition pursuant to the act because the
ruling on the motion to dismiss in the custody action was
not a proceeding in which an adjudication of parentage
occurred. The petitioner argues that, because the custody
action was dismissed for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, due to the petitioner’s lack of standing, Judge

Tschummi v. Fegan
Macierowski did not allow the hearing to proceed on the
merits with regard to the custody claim and, therefore,
there was no adjudication of parentage by the court.
In her ruling granting the motion to dismiss, Judge
Macierowski stated that the respondent had accurately
characterized “the . . . four recognized statutory or legal
pathways to parentage under current Connecticut law
. . . .” The court concluded that the petitioner had not
established parentage under any of these four avenues.
The court noted, in particular, that the “health-care
documents” that had been submitted to the court had
not been drafted “with the intent of creating a legal par-
entage relationship or the obligations of a legal parent.”
Thus, the court concluded that the petitioner was unable
to demonstrate that she was a legal parent pursuant
to Raftopol. The court further noted that it lacked the
equitable authority to determine who is a legal parent.
Although it granted the motion to dismiss, the court,
however, referred to the act, which had not yet been
enacted. It stated that it was dismissing the action “solely
on the grounds of existing law, which is markedly dif-
ferent than the law that will take effect in just a few
months, and so any dismissal is without prejudice to . . .
the [petitioner’s] right to pursue a claim under other
law . . . .” In claiming that the court’s ruling was not an
adjudication of parentage, the petitioner relies on these
statements, which she argues suggested that the issue
of parentage was an issue that could be raised, or at least
revisited, at a later date.10
Relying on the legislative history of the act, the
petitioner further argues that the preclusive effect of
10The petitioner filed her complaint in the custody action in March
2021. On March 31, 2021, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
custody action. On October 8, 2021, the petitioner filed a motion for
request for leave to amend her complaint “to properly reflect the [peti-
tioner’s] intention to seek visitation rather than custody.” It is note-
worthy that, in her memorandum of law in opposition to the petitioner’s
request for leave to amend, the respondent argued that the petitioner’s
motion was an improper delay tactic. Specifically, the respondent argued
that the petitioner was unable to establish legal parentage and that her
motion was an attempt to avoid an adverse decision on the motion to

Tschummi v. Fegan
§ 46b-553 reflects an attempt by our legislature to pro-
tect against persons she characterizes as “spiteful ex-
partners,” persons who would attempt to use the act to
cause emotional harm to a legal parent without having
“real desire to be a legal parent, only to exert that con-
trol.” The petitioner argues that the facts of this case,
as reflected in the record, “establish that [she] is not
one whose parentage claims fall within the category of
a spiteful ex-partner without any real desire to be a par-
ent . . . . Rather, the facts as set forth in the entirety of
the record and as found by the trial judge establish that
[she] meets the definition of parent under the [act] . . . .”
In the present case, the trial court, M. Murphy, J.,
likewise relied on the same statements in Judge Maci-
erowski’s ruling to conclude that there was no adjudi-
cation of parentage. In denying the motion to dismiss,
the court stated: “The court in the custody application
case . . . dismissed the application for custody without
prejudice. When asked by [the petitioner’s] counsel if
the court was making an adjudication about whether the
[petitioner] was a parent of [M] in dismissing the custody
application, the court responded that it was not deciding
about the parentage of [M].”
The respondent argues that, after several evidentiary
hearings on the motion to dismiss, oral arguments, and
the submission of briefs, Judge Macierowski expressly
adjudicated the petitioner’s parentage over M in the cus-
tody action, finding, after considering the evidence that
was submitted during the course of the hearings, that,
because the petitioner did not establish parentage, she
was not a legal parent and lacked standing to seek custody
dismiss prior to December 31, 2021, so that she may seek custody of M
under the act rather than in light of then existing parentage law. The
respondent also argued that it would be legally improper for the court to
grant the petitioner’s motion while the motion to dismiss was pending.
On October 29, 2021, the court denied the petitioner’s motion. We note
that, even if the court had permitted the petition to be amended, the
petitioner, pursuant to § 46b-61, would still have had to establish that
she had standing pursuant to her claim for visitation by demonstrating
a legal relationship with M.

Tschummi v. Fegan
of M. Consequently, Judge Macierowski dismissed the
custody action. The respondent, like the petitioner, relies
on statements made by Judge Macierowski during her
ruling on the motion to dismiss to support her claim
that there was a prior adjudication of parentage. The
respondent claims that Judge Macierowski expressly
stated that she was adjudicating parentage and that
the petitioner had an obligation, pursuant to § 46b-61
(a), to file documents on or before the first hearing date
establishing a legal relationship or parentage to support
her claims relating to custody, which she failed to do. The
respondent argues that Judge Macierowski’s statement
that she was granting the motion to dismiss “without
prejudice” to the petitioner filing a petition under the
new act was dicta and that, once the court determined
it was without jurisdiction to proceed with the action, it
had no legal authority to preempt the legislative mandate
that the new act should not apply to persons such as the
petitioner whose parentage had been decided before the
effective date of the act. The respondent argues that
Judge Macierowski had no jurisdiction or other legal
authority to rule on an issue that might arise in a future
case on a law not yet in effect.
We agree with the respondent that Judge Macierow-
ski’s statement that the motion to dismiss was granted
“without prejudice” and her statements regarding the
plaintiff’s ability to file a petition under the act, which
had not yet been enacted, were dicta and that, once she
granted the motion, she had no legal authority to preempt
the legislative mandate under § 46b-553 that the new act
does not apply to the petitioner. “[I]t is axiomatic that
once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised,
it must be immediately acted upon by the court. . . . As
our Supreme Court observed more than a century ago,
[w]henever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the
notice of the court . . . cognizance of it must be taken and
the matter passed upon before it can move one further
step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the
exercise of jurisdiction. . . . Indeed, [o]nce it becomes clear
that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

Tschummi v. Fegan
hear the plaintiffs’ complaint, any further discussion of
the merits is pure dicta. Lacking jurisdiction, neither
the trial court nor this court should deliver an advisory
opinion on matters entirely beyond our power to adju-
dicate. . . . For that reason, as soon as the jurisdiction
of the court to decide an issue is called into question, all
other action in the case must come to a halt until such
a determination is made.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Dunsby, 182 Conn.
App. 855, 860–61, 191 A.3d 260 (2018).
Further, we recognize that the proceeding before Judge
Macierowski was on a motion to dismiss a custody action
for lack of standing, and not on a petition for an adjudica-
tion of parentage. Nor was the proceeding before Judge
Macierowski a petition for an adjudication of parentage
under the act, which was not in existence at the time of
the court’s ruling. We also recognize, however, that
the application for custody brought by the petitioner
necessarily required the court to determine whether
the petitioner was a legal parent of M as she alleged,
and, therefore, we conclude that it was a proceeding on
an adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage of M that
occurred prior to January 1, 2022. The court’s judg-
ment granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss and
dismissing the custody action for lack of standing was
necessarily dependent on an adjudication of parentage. In
fact, the court expressly indicated that it was determin-
ing parentage based on the law as it existed at the time,
as set forth in Raftopol. The limitation on the applica-
tion of the act, set forth in § 46b-553, provides that the
act only applies to “a proceeding in which no judgment
has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a
person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated
by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by
operation of law.”
To the extent the petitioner contends that the court’s
determination in the custody action was not a “proceed-
ing” as contemplated by § 46b-553, we disagree. The
language in the provision does not define “proceeding”

Tschummi v. Fegan
nor does it limit its application to a certain type of pro-
ceeding. The provision states that the application of the
act applies to “a proceeding” in which no prior adjudica-
tion of parentage has occurred. Thus, if a “proceeding”
in which parentage was adjudicated occurred prior to
January 1, 2022, the act does not apply. Contrary to
the petitioner’s argument that we should restrict the
types of proceedings to which the limitation in § 46b-553
applies, we are bound to construe statutes as they are
written, and we may not rewrite a statute to accomplish
a particular result. See Del Rio v. Amazon.com Services,
Inc., 354 Conn. 151, 172, 349 A.3d 570 (2026); see also
Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527, 541,
344 A.3d 527 (2025).11
Moreover, because the act does not define the term
“proceeding,” we must look to the commonly approved
usage of the term. “[T]he term proceeding, as ordinarily
used, is generic in meaning and broad enough to include
all methods involving the action of courts. . . . Other
definitions are similarly broad. A proceeding is defined
as any application to a court of justice, however made,
for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress
of injuries, for damages, or for any remedial object.
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) [p. 1000].”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn.
App. 589, 596, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn.
926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000). We readily conclude that a
hearing on a motion to dismiss in a custody action falls
within the broad definition of “proceeding.”
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the hear-
ing on the motion to dismiss was a proceeding that
occurred prior to January 1, 2022, in which there was
11As previously noted, the petitioner also argues that § 46b-553 does
not apply to her because she is not within the category of a “spiteful
ex-partner” without any real desire to be a parent, the type of claim the
petitioner argues § 46b-553 was intended to protect against. We decline
to adopt the petitioner’s narrow interpretation of § 46b-553, which
effectively would make that provision applicable only to “spiteful ex-
partners” because it lacks any support in the statute’s plain language.

Tschummi v. Fegan
an adjudication of parentage by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise, as the petitioner
urges us to do, would require us to disregard the fact
that the petitioner raised and fully litigated the issue
of parentage at that prior proceeding and that it was
the dispositive factor that led the court to dismiss the
custody action. Accordingly, pursuant to § 46b-553, the
petitioner did not have standing to bring the petition
seeking an adjudication of parentage and therefore the
motion to dismiss should have been granted.
The judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal par-
ent of the minor child is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to grant the respondent’s motion to dis-
miss the petition for an adjudication of parentage under
the act.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.