State v. Robotham

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State v. Robotham
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SEAN
TYRELL ROBOTHAM
(AC 48165)
Alvord, Moll and Wilson, Js.*
Syllabus
Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of illegal possession of a weapon
in a motor vehicle, criminal possession of a pistol, criminal possession of
an electronic defense weapon, and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that his rights under the fifth amendment to the United States
constitution were violated pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610), when
a police officer testified as to the defendant’s postarrest silence. Held:
The defendant’s Doyle claim failed under the third prong of the test set forth
in State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) for unpreserved claims of constitutional
error, as the police officer’s testimony that the defendant challenged did not
reference his postarrest silence, and, accordingly, the defendant failed to
demonstrate that an alleged constitutional violation existed.
The defendant’s unpreserved claim that his constitutional right to be pres-
ent at all critical stages of the proceedings was violated when the trial court
addressed the jury in his absence on the second day of jury deliberations
failed under the third prong of Golding, as the defendant’s presence did not
bear a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend against
the charges, and the court’s remarks to the jurors, which lasted one minute
and were strictly administrative in nature, did not constitute a critical stage
of the proceedings.
Argued May 18—officially released September 15, 2026
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of illegal possession of a weapon
in a motor vehicle and one count each of the crimes of
criminal possession of a pistol, carrying a pistol without
a permit, criminal possession of an electronic defense
weapon, and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell, brought to the Superior Court in the judi-
cial district of New Britain, geographical area number
fifteen, and tried to the jury before Taylor, J.; thereafter,
the court, Taylor, J., granted in part the defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal; verdict and judgment
*The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as
of the date of oral argument.

State v. Robotham
of guilty of two counts of illegal possession of a weapon
in a motor vehicle and one count each of criminal pos-
session of a pistol, criminal possession of an electronic
defense weapon, and possession of a controlled substance
with intent to sell, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Jeffrey C. Kestenband, for the appellant (defendant).
Henry Seyue, certified legal intern, with whom were
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s attor-
ney, and, on the brief, Christian Watson, state’s attor-
ney, and Devant Joiner, senior assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The defendant, Sean Tyrell Robotham,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a
jury trial, of one count of criminal possession of a pistol in
violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217c,
one count of criminal possession of an electronic defense
weapon in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 53a-217, two counts of illegal possession of a weapon
in a vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38, and
one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in
violation of General Statutes § 21a-277. On appeal, the
defendant claims that his rights under the fifth amend-
ment to the United States constitution were violated
when (1) a police officer testified as to his postarrest
silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619,
96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), and (2) the trial
court addressed the jury in the defendant’s absence. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which reasonably could have been
found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to
our resolution of this appeal. On July 11, 2021, Officer
Michael Koss of the Rocky Hill Police Department was
on duty at a gas station in Rocky Hill when a motorist
approached his marked patrol vehicle and informed him
that a vehicle with heavily tinted windows was parked or

State v. Robotham
stopped at a red light at the Interstate 91 ramp intersec-
tion. The motorist said that the traffic light had cycled
several times and the vehicle did not turn or proceed
through the intersection. Koss drove to the location on
the Silas Deane Highway described by the motorist and
found a silver Infiniti (Infiniti) with the brake lights
on and exhaust running while in the left turn only lane
to the Interstate 91 northbound entrance. Koss later
determined, after running a check of the Infiniti’s license
plate, that it was registered to someone by the name of
Jessica Piatti.
When he approached the Infiniti, Koss saw the defen-
dant in the driver’s seat with his head down and appear-
ing “sleepy . . . .” After Koss knocked on the window
several times and yelled for the defendant’s attention,
the defendant made eye contact with Koss and complied
with Koss’ request to unlock the door. When Koss opened
the driver’s side door, he saw in the shelf or handle of
the driver’s side door a “small plastic baggie filled with
a white rock like substance,” which was later determined
to be cocaine. Koss asked the defendant to step out of
the Infiniti, placed the defendant in handcuffs, detained
him in the rear compartment of his patrol vehicle, and
advised him of his Miranda rights. Sometime between
the defendant exiting the Infiniti and being placed in the
patrol vehicle, Koss conducted a search of the defendant’s
person, which yielded a small bag of marijuana and a
large number of dollar bills wrapped together.
Once the defendant was detained, Koss conducted a
search of the Infiniti. He began at the front driver’s side,
where he identified the butt end of a pistol, which was
tucked in between the center console and the passenger
seat. After securing the pistol, Koss searched the center
console, where he uncovered what appeared to be a cell
phone, which was later discovered to be a stun gun, and
two real cell phones, one of which was later ordered by
the court to be returned to a Jessica Hill. Koss also found
in the center console a razor blade, razors, loose cash, a
digital scale, a glass smoking pipe, grinders containing

State v. Robotham
suspected marijuana residue, as well as numerous plastic
baggies, glassine baggies, and small black rubber bands.
In addition, Koss found a chocolate bar with a label indi-
cating that it was infused with THC, as well as numerous
small, Tupperware like screw on containers with green
lids. On the basis of the items recovered, Koss placed the
defendant under arrest.
Thereafter, the defendant was charged in a substi-
tute, long form information with one count of criminal
possession of a pistol in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217c, one count of carrying a pistol
without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
to 2021) § 29-35 (a), one count of criminal possession
of an electronic defense weapon in violation of General
Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217, two counts of illegal
possession of a weapon in a vehicle in violation of § 29-38,
and one count of possession of narcotics with intent to
sell in violation of § 21a-277.
The case was tried to a jury in January 2024, and
Koss testified as a witness for the state. During closing
argument, defense counsel asked the jurors to consider
whether the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant knew that the firearm, the stun gun,
and the narcotics related items were in the Infiniti, sug-
gesting that the items may not have been visible to the
defendant and may have belonged to a third party with
access to the Infiniti.
On January 18, 2024, the jury returned a verdict find-
ing the defendant guilty on the five counts submitted to
it.1 The court sentenced the defendant to a total effec-
tive sentence of fifteen years of incarceration, execution
suspended after eleven years, two of which were the
mandatory minimum, followed by five years of probation.
1On January 16, 2024, after the state rested its case, defense counsel
moved for, and the court granted, a judgment of acquittal on the charge
of carrying a pistol in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 29-35 (a) on the ground that the state’s evidence that the gun was found
tucked between the console and the passenger seat did not sufficiently
demonstrate that the defendant “carr[ied]” the gun.

State v. Robotham
This appeal followed. Additional procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that “[h]is fifth amendment
right to remain silent was violated when, following his
arrest and receipt of a Miranda warning, the arresting
officer [Koss] testified four times—twice explicitly and
twice implicitly—that [the defendant] did not provide
him with exculpatory information . . . .” The defendant
did not object to the testimony that he alleges improperly
commented on his silence; however, he seeks review of
his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,
239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yas-
iel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). The
state argues, inter alia, that the defendant’s claim fails
because the challenged testimony “did not reference his
post-Miranda silence.” We agree with the state.
“Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of
constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the
following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate
to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of
constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fun-
damental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation
. . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;
and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s
claim will fail. . . . The first two [Golding] requirements
involve a determination of whether the claim is review-
able; the second two requirements involve a determina-
tion of whether the defendant may prevail. . . . Whether
Golding is satisfied presents a question of law over which
this court exercises plenary review.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Alexis, 194 Conn. App. 162, 173–74, 220 A.3d
38, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 904, 219 A.3d 800 (2019).
The first two prongs of Golding are satisfied, as the
record is adequate for review and the issue raised is of

State v. Robotham
constitutional magnitude. We therefore turn to whether
the alleged constitutional violation exists.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the third prong of Golding. “Pursuant to Doyle, evi-
dence of a defendant’s postarrest and post-Miranda
silence is constitutionally impermissible under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment [to the
United States constitution]. . . . The factual predicate
of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a
defendant’s postarrest and post-Miranda silence either
for impeachment or as affirmative proof of his guilt. . . .
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally
unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence
will not be used against him and thereafter to breach
that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial
testimony. . . . Silence following Miranda warnings is
insolubly ambiguous because it may be nothing more than
a defendant’s exercise of his or her Miranda rights. . . .
Once the government assures a defendant through the
issuance of Miranda warnings that his silence will not
be used against him, it is fundamentally unfair for the
state to break that promise by using his silence against
him at trial. . . . Comments by the state on a defendant’s
silence following Miranda warnings are not only consti-
tutionally impermissible, but also inadmissible under
the principles of evidence.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 174–75.
“Likewise, our Supreme Court has recognized that it
is also fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process for the state to use evidence of the defendant’s
post-Miranda silence as affirmative proof of guilt . . . .
Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain
silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence
will not be used against him. . . . Because it is the Miranda
warning itself that carries with it the promise of protec-
tion . . . the prosecution’s use of [a defendant’s] silence
prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings does not violate
due process. . . . Therefore, as a factual predicate to an
alleged Doyle violation, the record must demonstrate

State v. Robotham
that the defendant received a Miranda warning prior
to the period of silence that was disclosed to the jury.”
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Palumbo, 193 Conn. App. 457, 463, 219 A.3d
878, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 909, 221 A.3d 43 (2019),
cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct. 2674, 206 L. Ed.
2d 825 (2020).
The defendant alleges there are two instances of Koss’
testimony in which Koss explicitly commented on the
defendant’s right to remain silent. In the first instance,
defense counsel inquired, “when you went to search the
car, you didn’t know how long [the defendant] had been
in the car,” to which Koss responded, “No, sir. He did
not verbalize that to me.” The second instance occurred
shortly after the first, when defense counsel asked, “But
other than personal effects, you weren’t aware if anyone
else had been in that car?” Koss replied, “No, sir. Your
client did not make me aware of anything like that.”
Additionally, the defendant alleges that there are two
instances of Koss’ testimony in which Koss implicitly
commented on the defendant’s right to remain silent.
With respect to the first instance, the defendant claims
the improper comment “occurred on direct examina-
tion, when Koss answered that ‘[n]ot one person’ had
come forward to give a statement about the case, which
implicitly included [the defendant] . . . .”2 With respect
to the second instance, the defendant argues that it
was improper for Koss to testify on cross-examination
as follows: “No, nobody ever came forward to make a
2The colloquy occurred as follows:
“[The Prosecutor]: And, did any time in your investigation this Jessica
Hill come to give a statement?
“[Koss]: No, sir.
“[The Prosecutor]: This is your case, correct, Officer Koss?
“[Koss]: Yes, it is, sir.
“[The Prosecutor]: If someone were to want to give a statement about
this case, would you have been informed?
“[Koss]: Yes, sir, I would have.
“[The Prosecutor]: Did anyone come forward since July 11th of 2021
to give a statement regarding this case?
“[Koss]: No, sir. Not one person.”

State v. Robotham
statement on this case, supplement my case, anything.
This case—my investigation of this case ended when this
report was submitted, and [the defendant] was booked
and processed.”
Koss’ testimony is distinguishable from testimony in
cases in which our courts have determined a Doyle vio-
lation occurred in that his responses did not implicate
the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent.3
Thus, this is not a situation in which we must examine
whether ambiguous remarks about a defendant’s invo-
cation of his right to remain silent naturally and neces-
sarily would have been viewed by the jury as referring
to a defendant’s pre-Miranda or post-Miranda silence.
Cf. State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn. 565, 586–87, 280
A.3d 461 (2022) (adopting contextualized approach to
address whether ambiguous prosecutorial remarks refer
to defendant’s pre-Miranda or post-Miranda silence).
3As our case law reflects, witness testimony in violation of Doyle often
specifically refers to the action or inaction that a defendant takes to
assert his or her right to remain silent. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery,
254 Conn. 694, 715–16, 759 A.2d 995 (2000) (there was no question
that defendant invoked his right to remain silent when he stopped
answering questions and terminated interview; consequently, evidence
of defendant’s refusal to answer that was adduced by state at trial was
fundamentally unfair and in violation of his rights under fifth and
fourteenth amendments); State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 465–68,
545 A.2d 1071 (1988) (defendant’s conduct, including his statement
that he would “ ‘sit and listen’ ” and his subsequent silence, clearly
demonstrated intent to invoke his right to remain silent, and state’s
use of that silence as evidence in its case-in-chief violated defendant’s
due process rights under Doyle), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.
Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1989); State v. Bereis, 117 Conn. App. 360,
374, 978 A.2d 1122 (2009) (notation on arrest and alcohol test report
indicating that defendant refused to answer, inter alia, whether she had
consumed any drugs or alcohol, was evidence of defendant’s silence that
was admitted in violation of Doyle); cf. State v. Silva, 166 Conn. App.
255, 285, 141 A.3d 916 (state’s use of defendant’s failure to answer
question in midst of police interview was not Doyle violation where
defendant remained selectively silent when asked if he had committed
crime but answered questions before and after about his relationship
with victim and his whereabouts on morning of incident), cert. denied,
323 Conn. 913, 149 A.3d 495 (2016), cert. denied, 581 U.S. 972, 137
S. Ct. 2118, 198 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2017).

State v. Robotham
With respect to the first two instances on which the
defendant relies, and which he considers to be explicit
references to his silence, the record, up until the chal-
lenged testimony, does not indicate that the defendant
ever was questioned by or engaged in any meaningful
interaction with Koss beyond Koss’ yelling to get his
attention, instructing him to exit the Infiniti, and read-
ing him his Miranda rights. On the basis of these few
interactions, a jury reasonably could have concluded that
Koss never asked the defendant how long he had been
in the Infiniti or if anyone else had been in the Infiniti.
A jury also reasonably could have concluded that the
defendant was unable to provide even minimal informa-
tion, given his physical condition, which Koss described
as “sleepy, lethargic, a little bit out of it,” adding that
“[the defendant] was mumbling low and slow, and not
saying . . . too many words.”
Moreover, even if this information was asked of the
defendant and even if the defendant was silent, it does not
necessarily follow that he did not provide any response
after he was advised of his Miranda rights. See State
v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 463, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988)
(although Supreme Court deemed record insufficient, pri-
marily on ground that there was no evidence that defen-
dant had read written Miranda warning, it also noted
that officer’s testimony that defendant “ ‘did not deny’ ”
his charge reasonably could have been interpreted to
mean that “the defendant did, in fact, respond, but that
his response did not constitute a denial of the charge”),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed.
2d 979 (1989). Therefore, we are not persuaded that
a jury would reasonably interpret Koss’ responses as
comments on the defendant’s silence. Accordingly, we
conclude that neither response is in violation of Doyle.
With respect to the second two instances of Koss’ testi-
mony on which the defendant relies, which the defendant
characterizes as implicit references to his silence, in
neither instance did Koss make a specific reference to the
defendant. The defendant contends that the first implicit

State v. Robotham
comment “occurred on direct examination, when Koss
answered that ‘[n]ot one person’ had come forward to give
a statement about the case, which implicitly included [the
defendant] . . . .” Earlier in the exchange, the prosecutor
asked Koss about whether Jessica Hill, whose phone was
found in the Infiniti, had made a statement. Shortly, but
not immediately, after, the prosecutor asked generally if
anyone had made a statement. There was no reason for
a juror to construe this as an implicit reference to the
defendant, given that the prior question referenced a
third party and that the prosecutor had referred to the
defendant by name on multiple occasions throughout
Koss’ direct examination. Had the prosecutor intended
to elicit information concerning the defendant’s conduct,
or failure to provide information, it would follow that
the question would reference the defendant by name.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that a jury reasonably
would have construed Koss’ general response that “[n]ot
one person” had come forward as referencing the defen-
dant, much less the defendant’s silence. Accordingly,
this testimony did not violate Doyle.
The defendant contends that the second implicit com-
ment occurred when Koss testified on cross-examination:
“No, nobody ever came forward to make a statement on
this case, supplement my case, anything. This case—my
investigation of this case ended when this report was sub-
mitted, and [the defendant] was booked and processed.”
Prior to this testimony, defense counsel sought to cast
doubt on Koss’ investigative efforts, posing a series of
questions highlighting the fact that Koss never inter-
viewed Jessica Piatti, the person to whom the Infiniti
was registered, and the lack of certain information in his
police report. At one point, defense counsel asked Koss
if he ever had filed a supplemental report, to which Koss
responded in part, “I didn’t write a supplemental report
as far as my investigation because my investigation
concluded with [the defendant’s] booking and process-
ing and once the evidence was all taken into our property
facility.” Several questions later, the line of inquiry
targeted Koss’ knowledge of Jessica Hill with defense

State v. Robotham
counsel asking: “You never interviewed [Jessica Hill],
right? . . . You don’t know if . . . the person who picked .
. . the phone up by court order was named Jessica Hill?”
And, “you don’t know if Jessica Hill is the same person
as Jessica Piatti?” Approximately five questions later,
defense counsel asked, “Jessica Hill never came forward,
right?” Koss responded with the challenged testimony.
In its full context, Koss’ response does not portray a
manifest intent to comment on the defendant’s silence
but, rather, an intent to respond to the insinuation that
his investigative efforts were inadequate or that he did
not provide all the relevant details in his police report.
See State v. Alston, 272 Conn. 432, 441–42, 862 A.2d
817 (2005) (exchange was not in violation of Doyle where
officer’s testimony that defendant terminated interview
“merely described the investigative efforts of police”).
Additionally, because defense counsel had just inquired
about Jessica Hill and Jessica Piatti and sought to high-
light third-party access to the Infiniti, Koss’ specific
reference to “nobody” coming forward more likely mani-
fested an intent to refer to third parties, like those who
were the subject of prior questioning. There is noth-
ing in the colloquy to suggest that this testimony was
calculated to refer to the defendant or his silence, and,
accordingly, we are not persuaded that a jury reasonably
would construe it as such. We therefore conclude that
the defendant failed to demonstrate that an alleged con-
stitutional violation existed, and, thus, his unpreserved
Doyle claim fails under the third prong of Golding.
II
The defendant next claims that his constitutional right
to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding was
violated when the court addressed the jury in the defen-
dant’s absence on the second day of jury deliberations.
The defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve
this claim but asserts that it is reviewable under Golding.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
review of this claim. Before the second day of jury

State v. Robotham
deliberations commenced, the following colloquy between
the court and defense counsel took place in the absence
of the jury:
“The Court: Good morning. All right, we can bring
[the jury] in. I’m just going to bring them in . . . and just
make an accounting, make sure they’re all here and then
have them start. I propose for the rest of the day, we’ll
let them come and go on their own.
“[Defense Counsel]: I was under the impression that’s
what we were doing this morning, that’s why I didn’t
come down.
“The Court: Oh, no problem, I just want to do it in the
morning.
“[Defense Counsel]: That’s fine.
“The Court: Just to make sure everybody’s here.
“[Defense Counsel]: No objection, and we’ll waive [the
defendant’s] presence.”
Shortly thereafter, at 10:12 a.m., the jurors entered
the courtroom, and the court addressed them as follows:
“All right, ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to send you
back out to continue your deliberations under the rules,
which I have gone over previously. What I’m going to do
in the future, for lunch, we will have you folks come and
go on your own. Remember, you can’t deliberate unless
all of you are there and the exhibits are all there, and
we’ll see about this evening. So, with that, ladies and
gentlemen, please return to your deliberations. Thank
you very much.” The jurors then exited the courtroom
at 10:13 a.m.
It is well established that “[t]he right to personal pres-
ence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to
counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defen-
dant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Elias V., 168 Conn. App. 321, 330, 147 A.3d 1102, cert.
denied, 323 Conn. 938, 151 A.3d 386 (2016). “In judging
whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding

State v. Robotham
constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution,
courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and
just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s]
absence or whether his presence has a relation, reason-
ably substantial, to the [fullness] of his opportunity to
defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Gilberto L., 292 Conn. 226, 237, 972
A.2d 205 (2009).
In Gilberto L., our Supreme Court determined that the
playback of testimony to a jury during its deliberations
was not a critical stage of the proceedings that would have
required the defendant’s presence. Id., 239–40. The court
reasoned that “a playback is a relatively straightforward,
mechanical procedure that requires no substantive deci-
sions implicating the defendant’s opportunity to defend.
Although potential distractions may occur during the
playback, such as interruptions by individual jurors, the
jury’s request to end the playback before it is completed,
unauthorized talking among the jurors and a reading of
the testimony in a less than neutral manner . . . none of
these distractions directly affects the opportunity of the
defendant to influence the proceeding in a substantive
manner. Thus, the defendant is relegated, for all practical
purposes, to the status of a passive listener.” (Citation
omitted.) Id., 239.
In the present case, the court’s brief remarks involved
a similarly straightforward procedure, as the court gath-
ered the jurors for the mere purpose of making sure all
were in attendance and to let them know they could come
and go on their own with respect to the lunch break. The
proceeding here arguably was less consequential than the
playback in Gilberto L., during which jurors listened to a
replay of testimonial evidence that could influence their
verdict. See id., 232, 235–36. The court’s remarks in the
present case did not concern any evidentiary matters and
were strictly administrative in nature.
The defendant argues that, because the judge, the
prosecutor, defense counsel and all jurors were present,
the jurors “reasonably would have asked themselves why

State v. Robotham
everyone except [the defendant] should be required to be
present for his trial when he had so much at stake. The
proceeding bore a reasonably substantial relation to [the
defendant’s] opportunity to defend himself because such
thoughts reasonably would have weighed against [him]
during the ongoing deliberations, which concluded with
convictions on all counts barely one hour after the court
addressed the jury.” (Emphasis in original.) We are not
persuaded by the defendant’s speculation as to what
the jurors would have thought in the very brief time
they were in the courtroom. The jurors’ presence in the
courtroom lasted one minute while the court greeted
them, noted that they could come and go on their own for
lunch, and reminded them to refrain from deliberating
until all jurors were present. There was no reference to
the defendant, the charges against him, the evidence
presented, the law to be applied, or any other matter that
a juror would perceive as consequential to the case such
that the defendant’s ability to influence the proceeding in
a substantive manner would be diminished. We therefore
are not persuaded that the defendant’s presence bore a
reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to
defend against the charges, and we conclude that the
court’s remarks to the jurors did not constitute a criti-
cal stage of the proceeding. Thus, the defendant’s claim
fails under Golding’s third prong.4
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
4 The first two prongs of Golding are satisfied, as the record is adequate
for review and the issue raised is of constitutional magnitude.