Bucci v. Bridgeport

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Bucci v. Bridgeport

ELIZABETH BUCCI v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
(AC 46399)
Elgo, Suarez and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city for injuries
she sustained in connection with a motor vehicle accident. On the night
of the accident, after finishing their shifts, C and G, police officers
employed by the defendant, drove separately to a restaurant, where C
consumed alcoholic beverages. When they left the establishment, C was
visibly intoxicated. As G was following C to his home, C’s vehicle crossed
into the plaintiff’s lane of travel and collided with her vehicle. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable for G’s allegedly negligent
conduct in allowing C to operate his vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-557n) and for failing
to properly screen C prior to hiring him as a member of the police
department. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:
1. The trial court properly determined that a genuine issue of material
fact did not exist as to whether G was acting within the scope of his
employment or official duties so as to subject the defendant to a claim
for the plaintiff’s injuries pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (A): the affidavits
submitted by the defendant in connection with its motion for summary
judgment demonstrated that G was not engaged in any official duty of
his employment or doing something incidental to it at the time of his
allegedly negligent conduct, as G and C had been off duty for approxi-
mately four hours prior to the accident, they drove their personal vehi-
cles to the restaurant, they were not in uniform and did not have badges,
identifying insignia or service weapons on their person at the restaurant,
they had not been attending a party sponsored by the police department,
and they did not perform any police services while at the restaurant;
moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, G’s violations of the
police department’s policies and procedures did not constitute violations
of his official duties pursuant to statute (§ 54-1f) but, rather, were viola-
tions of his overall responsibility and ethical character.
2. The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff’s claim regarding
the defendant’s negligent hiring of C was barred by the applicable statute
of limitations (§ 52-584): because C was hired in 2011 and the present
case was commenced in 2019, C was hired more than three years before
the institution of the present action; moreover, the court properly deter-
mined that the plaintiff had waived her claim that the continuing course
of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations as it was procedurally
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Bucci v. Bridgeport
defective because, instead of affirmatively pleading the doctrine in avoid-
ance of the defendant’s statute of limitations special defense, she
asserted it for the first time in her memorandum of law in opposition
to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; furthermore, the court
properly rejected the plaintiff’s continuing course of conduct argument
on substantive grounds as the plaintiff failed to allege that she had a
special relationship with the defendant or to demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the defendant
committed some later, actual or affirmative wrongful act related to the
initial hiring of C.

Argued February 7—officially released August 27, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of, inter alia, the defendant’s alleged
negligence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Fairfield, where the court, Welch, J., granted
the defendant’s motion to strike the second count of
the plaintiff’s complaint; thereafter, the court, Hon.
Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee, granted the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment, denied the plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment, and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Stephanie Z. Roberge, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Bruce L. Levin, associate city attorney, for the appel-
lee (defendant).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff, Elizabeth Bucci, appeals
from the judgment rendered by the trial court following
its granting of a motion for summary judgment that was
filed by the defendant, the city of Bridgeport, and its
denial of her motion for summary judgment. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that, in granting the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, the court improperly
(1) concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did
not exist with respect to whether Bridgeport Police
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

Officer Anthony Gianpoalo1 was acting within the scope
of his employment or official duties, and (2) determined
that her claim based on the defendant’s negligent hiring
of Bridgeport Police Officer John Carrano was barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.2 We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In November, 2019, the plain-
tiff commenced this action against the defendant. In
her complaint, subsequently amended on August 5, 2021
(amended complaint), the plaintiff brought a cause of
action, sounding in negligence, based on the conduct
of Gianpoalo.3 In count one of her amended complaint,
the plaintiff alleged the following facts: ‘‘At all times
relevant . . . [Carrano] . . . [and Gianpoalo] . . .
were employed by the defendant . . . . [O]n the eve-
ning of December 22, 2017 . . . Carrano and other
1
Gianpoalo’s name is alternatively spelled ‘‘Gianpaolo’’ in the record and
in the parties’ appellate briefs. We will use the spelling Gianpoalo because
that is how his name appears on his affidavit that was submitted to the
court in connection with the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
2
The plaintiff also claims on appeal that the court erred in ‘‘holding [that]
the discretionary function doctrine barred [her August 5, 2021 amended]
complaint.’’ The court, however, did not grant the defendant’s summary
judgment motion on this ground. Accordingly, we need not address this
issue in light of our conclusions that the court correctly determined that a
genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether Gianpoalo and
Carrano were acting within the scope of their employment and that the
plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring was barred by the statute of limitations.
Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 196, 496 A.2d 491 (1985) (‘‘we need
not address other issues raised on appeal if the trial court has correctly
decided an issue that is sufficient to sustain the judgment’’ (emphasis omit-
ted)). Moreover, in light of our decision to affirm the court’s judgment
granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion, we need not address
the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
3
Although the plaintiff referred to Gianpoalo as Officer Doe in her
amended complaint, by the time that the court subsequently ruled on the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it was undisputed that Officer
Doe referred to Gianpoalo. For the purposes of clarity, all references to
Officer Doe in the plaintiff’s amended complaint have been changed to
Gianpoalo.
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police officers . . . were attending a holiday party held
by the . . . Bridgeport Police Department at Vazzy’s
Pasta & Pizza [in Bridgeport (Vazzy’s)] . . . . Between
approximately 10 p.m. on December 22, 2017, and 12:08
a.m. on December 23, 2017, [Carrano] consumed alco-
holic beverages and became visibly intoxicated while
attending said party. . . .
‘‘On December 23, 2017, at approximately 12:08 a.m.,
[Carrano] left [Vazzy’s] intoxicated and was accompa-
nied by [Gianpoalo] . . . . [Gianpoalo] . . . permit-
ted [Carrano] to drive his motor vehicle when [he] knew
or should have known that [Carrano] was intoxicated.
. . . [Gianpoalo] . . . made a plan to follow [Carrano]
to his destination when he knew or should have known
that [Carrano] was intoxicated and undertook to follow
him as planned. . . .
‘‘On December 23, 2017, at approximately 12:08 a.m.,
the plaintiff . . . was operating her motor vehicle in a
northerly direction on Broadridge Avenue, at or near
the intersection of Emerald Place, in Bridgeport . . . .
[A]s the plaintiff . . . proceeded northbound on Broa-
dridge Avenue, the vehicle operated by [Carrano], sud-
denly and without warning, crossed over the yellow
line into the plaintiff’s lane of travel and violently col-
lided into the front of her vehicle, resulting in significant
front end damage which required the plaintiff to be
extricated from the vehicle. . . . The plaintiff . . .
and [Carrano] were both transported by ambulance
from the scene of the accident to Bridgeport Hospital
for an evaluation of their injuries. . . . Following an
investigation by the Stratford Police Department, it was
discovered that [Carrano’s] blood alcohol content was
0.25 . . . at the time he was being treated at Bridgeport
Hospital following the collision.
***
‘‘As a . . . result [of the accident], the plaintiff . . .
incurred considerable expenses for emergency medical
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

care, hospitalization, physicians’ visits, diagnostic stud-
ies, physical rehabilitation, surgical intervention, fol-
low-up therapy, and medicines . . . .’’
In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that,
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n,4 the defendant,
through its agents, servants, and/or employees, was lia-
ble for the damages she sustained as a result of the
accident. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was liable because Gianpoalo allowed Car-
rano to operate his motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes §§ 14-
222 and 14-227a5 and several Bridgeport Police Depart-
ment policies.6 The plaintiff also alleged that the defen-
dant was liable because Gianpoalo failed to prevent
Carrano’s operation of his motor vehicle in violation of
General Statutes § 54-1f,7 as Gianpoalo did not arrest
4
General Statutes § 52-557n provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Except as
otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable
for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or
omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent
thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties . . . .’’
5
General Statutes § 14-222 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No person shall
operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state . . . reck-
lessly . . . .’’
General Statutes § 14-227a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such
person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood
alcohol content. For the purposes of this section, ‘elevated blood alcohol
content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-
hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight . . . .’’
6
The policies that the plaintiff alleged Gianpoalo violated include 1.1.7
Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, 1.1.7.2 Performance of the Duties of a
Police Officer, 1.1.7.9 Private Life, 1.3.4 Knowledge of Department Rules
and Regulations, 1.3.5 Violation of Rules, 1.3.7 Conformance to Laws, and
1.3.21 Unbecoming Conduct.
7
General Statutes § 54-1f provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) Members of . . .
any local police department . . . shall arrest, without previous complaint
and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe
has committed or is committing a felony.’’
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Carrano when he had reasonable grounds to believe
that Carrano was committing a felony. The plaintiff
further alleged that the defendant was liable for failing
to properly screen Carrano prior to hiring him as a
member of the Bridgeport Police Department. In count
three of her amended complaint,8 the plaintiff pleaded
in the alternative that, in the event the court finds that
the defendant’s actions were discretionary, Gianpoalo’s
duty to act was so clear and unequivocal that discretion-
ary act immunity does not apply to the defendant.
On September 2, 2021, the defendant filed an answer
in response to the plaintiff’s amended complaint. In its
answer, the defendant admitted to some of the plain-
tiff’s allegations, denied some of the allegations, and
left the plaintiff to her proof as to other allegations.
In particular, the defendant admitted that it employed
Carrano and Gianpoalo as Bridgeport police officers
and that the officers were at Vazzy’s between approxi-
mately 8:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. on December 22, 2017,
but denied that they were attending a holiday party held
by the Bridgeport Police Department. The defendant
also admitted that, between approximately 10 p.m. and
11:45 p.m. that evening, Carrano consumed alcoholic
beverages and left Vazzy’s intoxicated, accompanied by
Gianpoalo. Moreover, the defendant admitted that, at
approximately 12:08 a.m. on December 23, 2017, the
vehicle operated by Carrano crossed over the yellow
line into the plaintiff’s lane of travel and violently col-
lided into the front of her vehicle. The defendant further
admitted that the plaintiff and Carrano were trans-
ported by ambulance from the scene of the accident
to Bridgeport Hospital and that Carrano had a blood
8
On October 13, 2020, and July 2, 2021, the court, Welch, J., struck count
two of the plaintiff’s original and substitute complaints, respectively. There-
after, the plaintiff left count two intentionally blank in her amended com-
plaint. The plaintiff does not challenge the court’s granting of the defendant’s
motion to strike in this appeal.
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alcohol content of 0.25 at the time he was treated at
the hospital. In addition, by way of a special defense,
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff operated her
motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-36.9
On September 13, 2021, the plaintiff filed a reply to
the defendant’s special defense raised in its September
2, 2021 answer, denying the defendant’s allegations con-
tained therein. On May 20, 2022, the defendant filed a
request for leave to amend its answer and special
defense to include two additional special defenses. Spe-
cifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendant negligently hired Carrano was barred
by the statute of limitations, as this action was com-
menced more than three years from the defendant’s
hiring of Carrano. The defendant also alleged that the
plaintiff’s claims were barred by governmental immu-
nity. On May 27, 2022, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the defendant’s request to amend its answer and
special defense, arguing that the request would cause
undue delay and significant prejudice to the plaintiff.
On June 20, 2022, the court, Welch, J., overruled the
plaintiff’s objection and allowed the defendant to
amend its answer to include the two additional special
defenses. Later, the court permitted the defendant to
file a fourth special defense based on an allegation
that the plaintiff had released any claim sounding in
negligence against Carrano.10
9
General Statutes § 14-36 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) . . . (2) The
youth instruction permit shall entitle the holder, while such holder has the
permit in his or her immediate possession, to operate a motor vehicle on
the public highways, provided such holder is under the instruction of, and
accompanied by, a person who holds an instructor’s license . . . or a person
twenty years of age or older who has been licensed to operate, for at least
four years preceding the instruction, a motor vehicle of the same class as
the motor vehicle being operated and who has not had his or her motor
vehicle operator’s license suspended by the commissioner during the four-
year period preceding the instruction. . . .’’
10
On July 12, 2022, the defendant filed a second request to amend its
answer to include a fourth special defense alleging that, ‘‘[t]o the extent
that the negligence of . . . Carrano is an element of any claim or cause of
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On July 6, 2022, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment and a supporting memorandum of
law. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant
argued that Carrano and Gianpoalo were off duty during
the events alleged in the plaintiff’s amended complaint
and were not acting within the scope of their employ-
ment pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (A). See footnote 4
of this opinion. The defendant also argued that the
plaintiff’s claim of negligence for its hiring of Carrano
was barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-584.11 The defendant further
asserted that the plaintiff’s claim of negligence involved
discretionary acts for which there is governmental
immunity, and the plaintiff had not claimed that any
exception to governmental immunity applied. In sup-
port of its motion, the defendant submitted multiple
exhibits including, inter alia, affidavits from Carrano,
Gianpoalo, Bridgeport Police Captain Kevin Gilleran,
Kristine Kelley Dwyer (a manager of Vazzy’s), and the
former Bridgeport Chief of Police Armando Perez; the
deposition transcript of the acting Bridgeport Chief of
Police Rebeca Garcia; and a letter of findings and disci-
pline imposed on Gianpoalo by the internal affairs divi-
sion of the Bridgeport Police Department.
In both Carrano’s and Gianpoalo’s affidavits, the offi-
cers stated that, on December 22, 2017, at approxi-
mately 8 p.m., they were dismissed from their detail,
action, that claim or cause of action is barred by the plaintiff having released
Carrano for $50,000 consideration.’’ On July 27, 2022, the plaintiff filed an
objection to the defendant’s request to amend, arguing that the defendant’s
request to amend its answer would cause an unreasonable delay and was
unnecessary. On August 8, 2022, the court overruled the plaintiff’s objection
and allowed the defendant to amend its answer to include its fourth spe-
cial defense.
11
General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No action to recover
damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be
brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained
or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discov-
ered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years
from the date of the act or omission complained of . . . .’’
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

removed their police uniforms, and dressed in civilian
attire. Thereafter, they drove their personal vehicles
to Vazzy’s. At Vazzy’s, the officers did not have any
identifying insignia, service weapons, or police badges
on their persons. They also stated that there were no
police holiday parties, or parties held by the defendant,
at Vazzy’s on December 22, 2017, nor did the defendant
provide the officers with alcoholic beverages, encour-
age their drinking, or compensate them for being at
Vazzy’s. The affidavits by Dwyer and Perez further sup-
ported the officers’ statements that there were no holi-
day parties at Vazzy’s involving the Bridgeport Police
Department on that date. Dwyer also averred that Car-
rano and Gianpoalo were not in uniform and did not
have any police markings on their clothing at Vazzy’s
that evening. Furthermore, Gianpoalo averred that he
and Carrano left Vazzy’s at approximately 11:40 p.m.,
and, shortly before midnight, he witnessed Carrano’s
vehicle veer into the northbound lane, striking the plain-
tiff’s vehicle.
On September 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment and supporting memorandum of
law, and an objection to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and supporting memorandum of
law. In her memorandum of law in support of her sum-
mary judgment motion, the plaintiff argued the defen-
dant was liable to her, pursuant to § 52-557n, because
‘‘following the policies and procedures of the Bridge-
port Police Department is part of an officer’s official
duties.’’ Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that,
‘‘[a]lthough [Gianpoalo] was off duty at the time he
knowingly permitted and facilitated his intoxicated fel-
low police officer to drive on December 23, 2017, he
was nonetheless acting within the scope of his employ-
ment or official duties.’’ In support of her argument,
the plaintiff relied on the testimony from the deposition
of Garcia where she affirmed that following the policies
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

and procedures of the Bridgeport Police Department is
part of an officer’s official duties. The plaintiff also
referenced the findings from the Bridgeport Police
Department’s internal affairs investigation and suspen-
sion of Gianpoalo for violating the police department’s
policies and procedures regarding his conduct on
December 23, 2017, while he was off duty. Moreover,
the plaintiff argued that § 54-1f mandated Gianpoalo to
intervene and arrest Carrano to stop him from operating
his motor vehicle while he was visibly intoxicated.
In her memorandum of law in support of her objec-
tion to the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the
plaintiff, for the first time, asserted that her negligent
hiring claim was not barred by the statute of limitations
on the basis of the continuing course of conduct doc-
trine. Specifically, she argued that ‘‘Carrano was unfit
to serve as a police officer from the day he was hired
and every day thereafter. . . . The [defendant’s] minis-
terial duty to keep an unfit police officer from the police
force continued from . . . Carrano’s date of hire until
his resignation. The actionable harm that occurred as
a result of that breach occurred on December 23, 2017,
and the plaintiff instituted this action well within the
applicable statute of limitations.’’ (Citation omitted;
emphasis omitted.)
On November 15, 2022, the defendant filed a memo-
randum of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment. In its memorandum, the defendant
argued that ‘‘[t]he statute [of limitations] is not extended
on the unpleaded grounds of continuing course of con-
duct because there was no special relationship—in fact,
no relationship at all—between the [defendant] and the
plaintiff. Nor is there a special relationship between
either Carrano and Gianpoalo with either the [defen-
dant] or the plaintiff when they are off duty.’’
On November 21 and 28, 2022, the court, Stevens, J.,
held oral argument on the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

respective motions for summary judgment. On March
17, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision
granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion and
denying the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. In
its memorandum of decision, the court stated that ‘‘[a]
dispositive issue for the [plaintiff’s] claims against [the
defendant] is whether [Carrano and Gianpoalo] were
‘acting within the scope of [their] employment or official
duties’ within the meaning of § 52-557n.’’ The court con-
cluded that the defendant had produced sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy its initial burden of showing the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact that Gianpoalo
and Carrano were not acting within the scope of their
employment. In support thereof, the court referenced
the affidavits submitted by the defendant, which con-
firmed that, on December 22, 2017, the officers were
off duty when they arrived at Vazzy’s. Accordingly, the
court shifted the burden to the plaintiff to ‘‘provide an
evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
the plaintiff essentially argued, in opposition to the
defendant’s position, that Bridgeport police officers
always have a duty to follow the policies and procedures
of the Bridgeport Police Department, and, therefore,
Gianpoalo and Carrano were acting within the scope of
their official duties during the events of the automobile
accident. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument,
explaining that such an argument would ‘‘dissolve the
distinction between an employee’s official and unoffi-
cial acts because under [the plaintiff’s] reasoning all
personal and private activities, no matter how attenu-
ated from the employer’s legitimate business concerns,
could be labeled as official duties.’’ Accordingly, the
court concluded that the defendant was entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law regarding the alleg-
edly negligent conduct of Carrano and Gianpoalo.
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

As to the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim with respect
to Carrano, the court concluded that it was barred by
the statute of limitations, pursuant to § 52-584. Specifi-
cally, the court agreed with the defendant that, because
Carrano was hired on April 25, 2011, and the present
case was filed in 2019, Carrano was hired more than
three years before the institution of the present action,
and, thus, her negligent hiring claim was time barred.
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff’s continu-
ing course of conduct argument on both procedural
and substantive grounds. The court noted that the plain-
tiff had asserted the doctrine only in response to the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and that her
reliance on the doctrine was not reflected anywhere
in the pleadings prior to the filing of the defendant’s
summary judgment motion. Therefore, pursuant to
Practice Book § 10-57,12 the court held that, ‘‘[b]ecause
the continuing course of conduct doctrine was not
pleaded or timely raised, the doctrine must be deemed
waived.’’
Moreover, the court determined that, ‘‘even if [the
plaintiff] had properly asserted the continuing course
of conduct doctrine, this argument would fail as a mat-
ter of law because she has not satisfied all of the ele-
ments necessary for its application.’’ Specifically, the
court explained that, ‘‘in order to establish that a duty
continued to exist after the alleged[ly] wrongful hiring
of Carrano, [the plaintiff] must provide ‘evidence of
either a special relationship between the parties giving
rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful
conduct of a defendant, related to the prior act.’ ’’ The
court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged or
shown that a special relationship existed between the
parties. The court also determined that, even if the
12
Practice Book § 10-57 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Matter in avoidance
of affirmative allegations in an answer or counterclaim shall be specially
pleaded in the reply. . . .’’
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Bucci v. Bridgeport

plaintiff had established that the defendant’s initial hir-
ing of Carrano was negligent, the plaintiff failed to show
that the defendant committed some later, actual or affir-
mative wrongful act related to its prior negligent con-
duct. The court held that ‘‘the continuing course of
conduct doctrine cannot be invoked in a situation that
merely or solely involves an initial wrong that continues
unabated or uncorrected until it reaches and harms a
victim. Such a concept would absorb the statute of
limitations to such an extent that the limitation period
would be rejected in virtually all the cases for which
it would appropriately apply.’’ This appeal followed.
Additional procedural history will be set forth as neces-
sary.

Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
we begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and relevant legal principles. ‘‘In seeking sum-
mary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden
of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The
courts are in entire agreement that the moving party
for summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts,
which, under applicable principles of substantive law,
entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts
hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his
burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite
clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt
as to the existence of any genuine issue of material
fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in sup-
port of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-
moving party has no obligation to submit documents
establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once
the moving party has met its burden, however, the
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opposing party must present evidence that demon-
strates the existence of some disputed factual issue.
. . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party
merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.
Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to estab-
lish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, can-
not refute evidence properly presented to the court
under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the
trial court’s decision to grant [or to deny a] motion
for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kuselias v. Zingaro & Cretella, LLC,
224 Conn. App. 192, 207–208, 312 A.3d 118, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
I
The plaintiff first claims that, in rendering summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, the court improp-
erly concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did
not exist with respect to whether Gianpoalo was acting
within the scope of his employment or official duties.
The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he evidence supports a find-
ing that [Gianpoalo’s] conduct on December 22, 2017,
was a violation of his official duties.’’ Specifically, the
plaintiff contends that the policies and procedures of
the Bridgeport Police Department and the results of
its internal affairs investigation support the fact that
Gianpoalo violated his official duties as a matter of law
under § 52-557n. In further support thereof, the plaintiff
refers to the testimony of Garcia, who, in her deposition,
affirmed that following the policies and procedures of
the Bridgeport Police Department is part of an officer’s
official duties. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. On Decem-
ber 7, 2021, and June 21, 2022, the plaintiff’s attorney
conducted remote depositions of Garcia, the acting
Bridgeport chief of police. At her December 7, 2021
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deposition, the plaintiff’s attorney asked Garcia
whether ‘‘abiding by or following the policies and proce-
dures of the . . . Bridgeport Police Department is part
of an officer’s official duties . . . .’’ Garcia responded
in the affirmative. Thereafter, during her June 21, 2022
deposition, the plaintiff’s attorney asked Garcia
whether Gianpoalo’s violations of the Bridgeport Police
Department’s policies and procedures, as found by its
internal affairs investigation, were ‘‘violation[s] of
[Gianpoalo’s] official duties as a police officer . . . .’’
Garcia clarified that ‘‘[the violations] were not part of
[his] official duties per se, because he was not working
at the time that this incident occurred. . . . If he would
have been working, it would be part of his official duties.
. . . He was comporting himself in . . . his private
life, so it was not his official duties. . . . The private
life is in concert with being a police officer, but it’s not
an official duty. An official duty is if you’re actually
working within your capacity as a police officer.
***
‘‘[T]here is such a thing as an officer being off duty
and not being held as a police officer himself or herself;
they’re not working within their official capacity
. . . .’’ Garcia explained that the policies and proce-
dures of the Bridgeport Police Department are not part
of an officer’s official duties but, rather, ‘‘part of the
ethical makeup of that officer and [his] responsibility.’’
In its March 17, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
court referenced this portion of Garcia’s testimony, stat-
ing that ‘‘Garcia explains that the general responsibili-
ties of a police officer and the issues of a police investi-
gation present separate questions than whether
Gianpoalo was acting in an official capacity at the time
of the accident. . . . Garcia explains that the policies
and procedures of the Bridgeport Police Department,
which Gianpoalo is said to have violated, are part of
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the overall police officer’s responsibility and ethical
character. She specifically does not categorize the viola-
tions as part of Gianpoalo’s, or any other officer’s, offi-
cial duties and distinguishes between the policies and
procedures which govern private life and official police
conduct.’’ (Citation omitted.)
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that, ‘‘although [Gian-
poalo] was off duty, because he failed to intervene to
prevent a fellow officer from driving while intoxicated,
he violated his official duties thereby subjecting the
defendant . . . to a claim for the plaintiff’s injuries pur-
suant to . . . § 52-557n.’’ We are not persuaded.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘Section 52-557n (a)
provides that a local government will not be liable for
the negligent acts or omissions of an employee unless
the employee was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment or official duties. In determining whether an
employee has acted within the scope of employment,
courts look to whether the employee’s conduct: (1)
occurs primarily within the employer’s authorized time
and space limits; (2) is of the type that the employee
is employed to perform; and (3) is motivated, at least
in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. . . . Ordi-
narily, it is a question of fact as to whether a wilful tort
of the servant has occurred within the scope of the
servant’s employment . . . [b]ut there are occasional
cases [in which] a servant’s digression from [or adher-
ence to] duty is so clear-cut that the disposition of the
case becomes a matter of law. . . . More specifically,
we have held that a police officer’s actions occurred
in the course of duties if [the actions] took place (1)
within the period of employment, (2) at a place where
the employee could reasonably be, and (3) while the
employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of employ-
ment or doing something incidental to it.’’ (Citation
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omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Flan-
igan, 201 Conn. App. 411, 431–32, 243 A.3d 333, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 901, 242 A.3d 711 (2020).
In the present case, the affidavits by Carrano, Gian-
poalo, and Gilleran set forth undisputed evidence that
Gianpoalo and Carrano were released from their detail
at approximately 8 p.m. on December 22, 2017, and
were off duty for approximately four hours prior to the
time of the accident or the allegedly negligent conduct.
Moreover, the affidavits by Gianpoalo, Carrano, and
Dwyer support the conclusion that the officers drove
their personal vehicles to Vazzy’s, were not in uniform,
and did not have their badges, identifying insignia, or
service weapons on their person at Vazzy’s. The affida-
vits also revealed that the officers were not attending a
Bridgeport Police Department sponsored holiday party
that evening, nor did they perform any police services
while at Vazzy’s. These submissions demonstrated that,
at the time of Gianpoalo’s allegedly negligent conduct,
he was not engaged in any official duty of his employ-
ment or doing something incidental to it. On the basis
of the aforementioned evidence, the court properly con-
cluded that the defendant had produced sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy its initial burden of showing an absence
of any genuine issue of fact that Gianpoalo was not
acting within the scope of his employment as a police
officer at the time of his allegedly negligent conduct.
Moreover, in its March 17, 2023 memorandum of deci-
sion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
Gianpoalo’s violations of the policies and procedures
of the Bridgeport Police Department illustrate that he
violated his official duties. The court noted that ‘‘the
general responsibilities of a police officer and the issues
of a police [internal affairs] investigation present sepa-
rate questions than whether Gianpoalo was acting in
an official capacity at the time of the accident. . . .
Garcia explains that the policies and procedures of the
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Bridgeport Police Department, which Gianpoalo is said
to have violated, are part of the overall police officer’s
responsibility and ethical character. She specifically
does not categorize the violations as part of Gian-
poalo’s, or any other officer’s, official duties and distin-
guishes between the policies and procedures which
govern private life and official police conduct.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted.) In doing so, the court reasoned that ‘‘[the
plaintiff’s] argument would dissolve the distinction
between an employee’s official and unofficial acts
because under her reasoning all personal and private
activities, no matter how attenuated from the employ-
er’s legitimate business concerns, could be labeled as
official duties.’’
The plaintiff argues that the court’s analysis too nar-
rowly defines what constitutes ‘‘official duties.’’ In sup-
port of her argument, the plaintiff cites to this court’s
decision in State v. Ramirez, 61 Conn. App. 865, 871,
767 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 903, 772 A.2d 599
(2001), for the principle that the actions of off-duty
police officers have been found by this court to be
part of their official duties. The plaintiff’s reliance on
Ramirez, however, is misplaced, as that case is factually
distinguishable from the present case. In Ramirez, an
off-duty police officer was assaulted in a nightclub after
attempting to break up an altercation. Id., 867–68. Dur-
ing the altercation, the officer specifically identified
himself as a police officer, and, after the altercation
appeared to have been settled, the officer turned his
back to use the restroom. Id., 868. The defendant then
struck the officer in the back of the head, causing the
officer to fall to the floor, and proceeded to kick him
repeatedly in the face. Id. The defendant subsequently
was arrested and convicted, inter alia, of assault of a
peace officer. Id., 867. On appeal, this court held that,
‘‘[u]nder the circumstances of this case, there was suffi-
cient evidence for the jury to find that [the officer] was
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acting within the scope of his duty as a police officer.’’
Id., 871. This court stated that, although the officer was
not in uniform and did not display a badge, he identified
himself as a police officer and performed his obligation
as a police officer. Id. Specifically, this court reasoned
that ‘‘[a] police officer has the duty to enforce the laws
and to preserve the peace. . . . The test is whether
the [police officer] is acting within that compass or
is engaging in a personal frolic of his own.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff did not present evi-
dence that Gianpoalo was performing his duties as a
police officer at any time after being released from his
detail on December 22, 2017. The undisputed evidence
produced by the defendant illustrates that the officers
were in civilian clothing, drove their personal vehicles
to and from Vazzy’s, did not identify themselves in any
way as police officers, and did not perform any police
services at Vazzy’s. Unlike the officer in Ramirez, Gian-
poalo was ‘‘ ‘engaging in a personal frolic of his own’ ’’
at the time of the accident. Id. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court properly determined that a genuine issue
of material fact did not exist as to whether Gianpoalo
was acting within the scope of his employment or offi-
cial duties.
II
Next, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
determined that her claim for the defendant’s negligent
hiring of Carrano was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court
misapplied the continuing course of conduct doctrine
on both procedural and substantive grounds. Contrary
to the court’s conclusion, the plaintiff asserts that, pro-
cedurally, she sufficiently pleaded the doctrine in her
amended complaint. The plaintiff also contends that,
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substantively, the act of Carrano driving while intoxi-
cated constituted an affirmative wrongful act that was
related to the defendant’s initial negligence of hiring
Carrano. We disagree.
The following standard of review and legal principles
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘The ques-
tion of whether a party’s claim is barred by the statute
of limitations is a question of law, which this court
reviews de novo. . . . The issue, however, of whether
a party engaged in a continuing course of conduct that
tolled the running of the statute of limitations is a mixed
question of law and fact. . . . We defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly errone-
ous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical
Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707,
754–55, 264 A.3d 130, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264
A.3d 94 (2021).
‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment
based on a statute of limitations special defense, [the
defendant] typically [meets its] initial burden of show-
ing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by
demonstrating that the action had commenced outside
of the statutory limitation period. . . . When the plain-
tiff asserts that the limitations period has been tolled
by an equitable exception to the statute of limitations,
the burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish
a disputed issue of material fact in avoidance of the
statute. . . . Put differently, it is then incumbent upon
the party opposing summary judgment to establish a
factual predicate from which it can be determined, as
a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material fact
exists.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuselias
v. Zingaro & Cretella, LLC, supra, 224 Conn. App. 208.
‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized . . . that the
statute of limitations and period of repose contained
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in . . . § 52-584 may be tolled, in the proper circum-
stances, under . . . the continu[ing] course of conduct
doctrine . . . thereby allowing a plaintiff to bring an
action more than three years after the commission of
the negligent act . . . . [T]he continuing course of con-
duct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing
relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific
tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify
and may yet be remedied. . . . For example, the doc-
trine is generally applicable under circumstances where
[i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a
particular negligent act or omission that caused injury
or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or
omissions and it is appropriate to allow the course of
[action] to terminate before allowing the repose section
of the statute of limitations to run . . . .

‘‘It is axiomatic that [w]hen the wrong sued upon
consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute
does not begin to run until that course of conduct is
completed. . . . [I]n order [t]o support a finding of a
continuing course of conduct that may toll the statute
of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of
a duty that remained in existence after the commission
of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must
not have terminated prior to commencement of the
period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong.
. . . Where [our Supreme Court has] upheld a finding
that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the
act or omission relied upon, there has been evidence
of either a special relationship between the parties giv-
ing rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful
conduct of a defendant related to the prior act. . . .
Furthermore, [t]he doctrine of continuing course of
conduct as used to toll a statute of limitations is better
suited to claims where the situation keeps evolving
after the act complained of is complete . . . .
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‘‘In deciding whether the trial court properly granted
the [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment, we
must determine if there is a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to whether the defendant: (1) commit-
ted an initial wrong upon the plaintiff, and (2) whether
a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the act
or omission relied upon by (a) evidence of a special
relationship between the parties giving rise to such a
continuing duty or (b) some later wrongful conduct
of the [defendant] related to the prior act.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Macellaio
v. Newington Police Dept., 145 Conn. App. 426, 434–36,
75 A.3d 78 (2013).
‘‘Practice Book § 10-57 provides in relevant part that
[m]atter in avoidance of affirmative allegations in an
answer or counterclaim shall be specially pleaded in
the reply. . . . Under § 10-57, the continuing course of
conduct doctrine is a matter that must be pleaded in
avoidance of a statute of limitations special defense.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer
Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 300, 94 A.3d 553
(2014). ‘‘Beyond the trial courts’ discretion to overlook
violations of the rules of practice in the absence of a
timely objection from the opposing party . . . it may
be just to reach the merits of a plaintiff’s claim to a toll
of the statute of limitations, even when not properly
pleaded pursuant to . . . § 10-57, if the issue is other-
wise put before the trial court and no party is prejudiced
by the lapse in pleading. For example, in Bellemare v.
Wachovia Mortgage Corp., [94 Conn. App. 593, 607, 894
A.2d 335 (2006), aff’d, 284 Conn. 193, 931 A.2d 916
(2007), this court] deemed it just to reach the merits
of a plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was
tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine,
despite the plaintiff’s failure to plead the doctrine prop-
erly pursuant to . . . § 10-57, when the plaintiff
asserted the doctrine’s applicability for the first time
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in a pleading filed in opposition to the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, observing that however
imperfectly, the plaintiff placed the issue before the
court . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co.,
LLC, supra, 301–302.
In the present case, the plaintiff asserted the continu-
ing course of conduct doctrine, for the first time, in her
memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. She did not affirmatively
plead the doctrine as a matter in avoidance of the defen-
dant’s statute of limitations special defense. Therefore,
the court found that the plaintiff waived her continuing
course of conduct claim as it was procedurally defec-
tive. The court nevertheless exercised its discretion and
considered the substance of the plaintiff’s claim.13
In addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the
court stated that ‘‘[n]o special relationship between the
parties has been either alleged or shown. Furthermore,
assuming arguendo that [the plaintiff] has established
an initial wrong in the hiring of Carrano (a finding that
the court expressly does not make), she has failed to
show that the [defendant] committed some later, actual
or affirmative, wrongful act that related to any such
prior conduct. . . . Contrary to [the plaintiff’s] appar-
ent position, the continuing course of conduct doctrine
cannot be invoked in a situation that merely or solely
13
‘‘We previously have afforded trial courts discretion to overlook viola-
tions of the rules of practice and to review claims brought in violation of
those rules . . . . It necessarily follows, therefore, that, when a party prop-
erly objects to a violation of the rules of practice, the trial court may
disregard the improperly raised claim if doing so is not an abuse of discre-
tion.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 273–74, 819 A.2d 773 (2003).
The issue of whether the court properly exercised its discretion in addressing
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim is not raised by the parties on appeal. See
State v. Connor, 321 Conn. 350, 362, 138 A.3d 265 (2016) (‘‘appellate courts
generally do not consider issues that were not raised by the parties’’).
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involves an initial wrong that continues unabated or
uncorrected until it reaches and harms a victim.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted.)
It is undisputed that the plaintiff has failed to allege
that she has a special relationship with the defendant.
Instead, she argues merely that Carrano’s act of driving
while intoxicated on December 23, 2017, was an affirma-
tive wrongful act directly related to the defendant’s
hiring of Carrano. Even if we were to assume that the
plaintiff established that the defendant negligently hired
Carrano, her continuing course of conduct claim fails
as a matter of law because, as the court concluded,
she has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of
material fact exists with respect to whether the defen-
dant committed some later, actual or affirmative wrong-
ful act related to its initial hiring of Carrano. The plaintiff
has attempted to demonstrate only that Carrano, acting
in his individual capacity, committed a wrongful act
by driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, we conclude
that court properly determined that the plaintiff’s claim
for the defendant’s negligent hiring of Carrano was
barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.