Trent v. Trent

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

DAVID L. TRENT v. KATIA R. TRENT
(AC 46247)
Bright, C. J., and Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis-
solved, appealed to this court from the trial court’s judgments granting
the defendant’s motion for contempt, which alleged that the plaintiff
had failed to pay his share of child care expenses, denying the plaintiff’s
motion for contempt, which alleged that the defendant had failed to
comply with a discovery order, and denying the plaintiff’s motion to
modify alimony and child support. Held:
1. The trial court abused its discretion when it granted the defendant’s
motion for contempt: the defendant failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff had violated the court order that
required him to pay 76 percent of qualifying child care expenses and
that any such violation was wilful because she failed to satisfy her
burden of proving that the child care costs for which she sought reim-
bursement were qualifying costs that were necessary to allow her to
maintain her employment; moreover, because the defendant failed to
comply with the plaintiff’s requests for documentation verifying that
the child care expenses for which she sought reimbursement were neces-
sary to maintain her employment, the record, at best, demonstrated that
the plaintiff ceased reimbursing the defendant for such expenses due
to a good faith dispute over whether those costs were eligible for reim-
bursement under the applicable child support regulation (§ 46b-215a-2c
(g) (2)).
2. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt;
the evidence in the record that the defendant did not have knowledge
of the trial court’s discovery order because she did not receive correspon-
dence from her attorney was sufficient to support the court’s finding
that the plaintiff had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant’s noncompliance with that order was wilful.
3. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to
modify alimony and child support: the trial court’s finding that there was
not a substantial change in circumstances with respect to the plaintiff’s
request to modify alimony was based solely on its clearly erroneous
finding regarding the defendant’s 2022 earnings, as the plaintiff had
introduced undisputed documentary evidence subpoenaed from the
defendant’s employer that refuted the defendant’s financial affidavit;
moreover, there was no authority for the trial court’s conclusion that
the plaintiff’s request to modify child support was improper because he
sought only to reduce his contributions to child care expenses and
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Trent v. Trent
health care expenses rather than to amend the child support award in
its entirety.
Argued March 4—officially released July 23, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield, where the court, Grossman, J., ren-
dered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and
granting certain other relief in accordance with, inter
alia, an arbitration award; thereafter, the court, Moses,
J., granted the defendant’s motion for contempt and
denied the plaintiff’s motions for contempt and to mod-
ify alimony, child support and visitation, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
judgment directed in part; further proceedings.
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

CLARK, J. In this postdissolution matter, the plaintiff,
David L. Trent, appeals from certain judgments of the
trial court stemming from two postdissolution motions
filed by him and one postdissolution motion filed by
the defendant, Katia R. Trent.1 On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defen-
dant’s motion for contempt, which alleged that the
plaintiff failed to pay his share of child care expenses,
(2) denied his motion for contempt, which claimed that
the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order,
and (3) denied his motion to modify alimony and child
support. We agree with the plaintiff on his first and
third claims but disagree with him on his second claim.
Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment of con-
tempt and the judgment denying the plaintiff’s motion
1
The defendant did not participate in this appeal. Counsel for the defen-
dant filed correspondence with the court on January 5, 2024, indicating that
the defendant ‘‘takes no position in this appellate matter and will not be
filing a brief.’’
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

for modification as to alimony and child support. We
affirm the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for
contempt.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to the plaintiff’s claims. The parties
were married on July 31, 2004. They have twin children
who were born in October, 2013. On March 24, 2017,
the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action, alleging
that the marriage had broken down irretrievably.
On May 4, 2018, the parties filed an agreement with
the court indicating their desire to settle the matter
through binding arbitration. Specifically, they agreed to
have an arbitrator ‘‘decide any and all financial matters
submitted to the arbitrator by either party.’’ The same
day, the court, Wenzel, J., approved the parties’ stipula-
tion, indicating that ‘‘[t]he only matter reserved is that
of child support’’ and that ‘‘[t]he pendente lite orders
of the court will remain in effect until the parties return
after arbitration.’’
On June 19, 2018, the arbitrator issued her decision
requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant $800 per
week in periodic alimony ‘‘for a period of eight years,
to sooner terminate on the death of either party or the
defendant’s remarriage.’’ Upon the request of the parties
to provide a recommendation as to child support, the
arbitrator found ‘‘the presumptive child support under
the [child support] guidelines to be paid by the plaintiff
to the defendant to be $545 per week based on [the
plaintiff’s] base salary.’’ Furthermore, the arbitrator
stated: ‘‘The plaintiff should pay the defendant 77 per-
cent of all health expenditures not paid by insurance
and day care necessary for the defendant’s work.’’2 On
2
At the time of the parties’ dissolution, Connecticut law did not allow
for child support, visitation, or custody to be decided through arbitration.
See, e.g., General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 52-408 (‘‘[a]n agreement in any
written contract . . . or an agreement in writing between the parties to a
marriage to submit to arbitration any controversy between them with respect
to the dissolution of their marriage, except issues related to child support,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Trent v. Trent

June 22, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to confirm
the arbitration award, requesting the court to ‘‘enter a
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the arbitra-
tion decision.’’

On July 5, 2018, the defendant filed with the court
a child support guidelines worksheet. The worksheet
provided, inter alia, for a presumptive child support
order of $545 per week to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant. It further provided that the plaintiff would
be responsible for 76 percent of the children’s unreim-
bursed medical expenses and child care expenses, and
the defendant would be responsible for 24 percent of
those expenses. The plaintiff did not object to the calcu-
lations in the worksheet. On the same date, the parties
filed with the court an agreement, which provided in
part: ‘‘The parties agree [that] in addition to the weekly
child support of $545 per week per the child support
guidelines, the plaintiff shall [pay] 22.66 percent of the
net [of] all bonuses received.’’ The same day, the court,
Grossman, J., rendered judgment dissolving the parties’
marriage, incorporating into its judgment of dissolution
the arbitration award, the parties’ July 5, 2018 agree-
ment, and the parties’ parenting plan.3 Although neither
visitation and custody, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except
when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of
written contracts generally’’ (emphasis added)). The arbitrator, therefore,
could only make a recommendation as to child support, which was, of
course, subject to the court ultimately deciding the issue.
General Statutes § 52-408, however, no longer excludes issues related to
child support, visitation, and custody from being arbitrated, subject to certain
requirements. See General Statutes § 52-408 (‘‘[a]n agreement in any written
contract . . . or an agreement in writing between the parties to a marriage
to submit to arbitration any controversy between them with respect to the
dissolution of their marriage shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance
of written contracts generally, subject to the requirements of subsection
(e) of section 46b-66 in the case of an award with respect to a dissolution
of marriage’’).
3
The parties filed a ‘‘final parenting plan’’ with the court on May 4, 2018.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

the judgment nor the parties’ July 5, 2018 agreement
expressly required the plaintiff to contribute to qualify-
ing child care expenses, the parties agree that the judg-
ment incorporated the arbitrator’s recommendation
with respect to qualifying child care expenses but modi-
fied the plaintiff’s obligation from 77 percent to 76 per-
cent of such expenses in accordance with the defen-
dant’s child support worksheet.
On March 15, 2021, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment
motion to modify alimony, child support, and parenting
time. As to the modification of child support and ali-
mony, the plaintiff alleged that there had been a sub-
stantial change in circumstances, namely, that the
defendant had obtained employment since the date of
the dissolution judgment.4 The defendant filed an objec-
tion to the plaintiff’s motion.
On September 16, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff was wilfully
violating the court’s order requiring him to pay 76 per-
cent of qualifying child care costs. On December 6,
2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt on the
ground that the defendant had failed to comply with
the trial court’s November 8, 2022 order to respond to
all outstanding discovery requests on or before Novem-
ber 22, 2022.
On January 19, 2023, the trial court, Moses, J., issued
its order on the plaintiff’s March 15, 2021 postjudgment
motion to modify alimony, child support and visitation.
The court denied the plaintiff’s request to modify child
support, stating: ‘‘[T]his court denies the plaintiff’s
request to modify only the child support order to reduce
his contributions to child care expenses and health
In his March 15, 2021 motion to modify, the plaintiff also requested a
4

modification of his visitation schedule because it was likely that his employer
would require him to relocate to Florida in order to maintain his employment.
The court’s order as to visitation is not at issue in this appeal.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Trent v. Trent

care expenses, as it is improper given the fact that the
plaintiff is not seeking to amend the child support award
in its entirety.’’ Further, the court denied the plaintiff’s
request to modify alimony, ruling that it ‘‘does not find
a substantial change in circumstances given the fact
that the defendant is earning well under $30,000 a year.’’
In separate orders also issued on January 19, 2023,
the court granted the defendant’s September 16, 2022
motion for contempt and denied the plaintiff’s Decem-
ber 6, 2022 motion for contempt. As to the defendant’s
motion for contempt, the court found that the plaintiff
wilfully failed to comply with the court’s order requiring
him to pay 76 percent of the child care expenses. The
court ordered the plaintiff to ‘‘reimburse the defendant
for 76 percent [of] all child care expenses incurred
during the time of his noncompliance.’’ The court also
awarded the defendant attorney’s fees. As to the plain-
tiff’s motion for contempt, the court denied the motion,
concluding that the defendant’s noncompliance with
the court’s order to respond to the plaintiff’s discovery
requests was not wilful. This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff’s first and second claims of error con-
cern the court’s rulings on two motions for contempt,
one filed by him and one filed by the defendant. First,
the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the
defendant’s September 16, 2022 motion for contempt
because the defendant failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he wilfully violated the court
order that required him to pay 76 percent of qualifying
child care expenses. Second, he claims that the court
erred in denying his December 5, 2022 motion for con-
tempt because, among other things, he established by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s fail-
ure to comply with the discovery order was wilful. We
address each claim in turn.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

We begin with the relevant legal principles and our
standard of review. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience to the
rules and orders of a court which has power to punish
for such an offense. . . . [C]ivil contempt is committed
when a person violates an order of court which requires
that person in specific and definite language to do or
refrain from doing an act or series of acts. . . . In part
because the contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . .
such punishment should not rest upon implication or
conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order]
declaring . . . rights should be clear, or imposing bur-
dens [should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the
parties may not be misled thereby.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 222 Conn. App. 855,
866, 307 A.3d 923 (2023).
‘‘To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party
has merely violated a court order; the violation must
be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an
order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the
alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful
noncompliance with that directive. . . . The question
of whether the underlying order is clear and unambigu-
ous is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Mitchell v. Bogonos, 218
Conn. App. 59, 68–69, 290 A.3d 825 (2023). ‘‘[I]f we
conclude that the underlying court order was suffi-
ciently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing,
or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which
includes a review of the trial court’s determination of
whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good
faith dispute or misunderstanding.’’ In re Leah S., 284
Conn. 685, 693–94, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). ‘‘Under the
abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make
every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the
trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Trent v. Trent

abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such
rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial
court correctly applied the law and reasonably could
have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn. App.
34, 59, 925 A.2d 334 (2007).
A
The plaintiff claims that the court erred when it
granted the defendant’s motion for contempt because
the defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff wilfully violated the court
order that required him to pay 76 percent of qualifying
child care expenses. Specifically, he claims that the
defendant failed to prove that the child care expenses
at issue were eligible for reimbursement as ‘‘qualifying
costs,’’ as defined in § 46b-215a-2c (g) of the Regulations
of Connecticut State Agencies, because the defendant
failed to prove that the child care was ‘‘necessary’’ for
her to maintain her employment. He therefore contends
that the defendant failed to prove any violation of the
court’s order. In addition, the plaintiff claims that, even
if he did violate the order, the defendant failed to prove
that any violation was wilful because he reasonably
requested, but the defendant refused to provide, docu-
mentation of her work hours so that he could confirm
that the child care reimbursements that she requested
from him were in fact qualifying costs. For the reasons
that follow, we agree with the plaintiff.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. In addition to filing
the arbitration decision with the court, the defendant
also filed a child support guidelines worksheet with the
court reflecting, among other things, that the plaintiff
would be responsible for 76 percent of the children’s
unreimbursed medical expenses and child care
expenses and that the defendant would be responsible
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

for 24 percent of those expenses. See footnote 2 of this
opinion. The plaintiff did not file an objection to the
calculations in the worksheet.
On September 16, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt, claiming that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff was ordered
to pay 76 percent of child care for the minor children,
which he has wilfully failed to pay.’’ The child care
expenses at issue represented the cost of an extended
day program at the children’s school. At the hearing
on the motion for contempt on January 17, 2023, the
plaintiff’s counsel argued, inter alia, that the defendant
failed, upon request, to provide him with documentation
to verify that the extended day program was necessary
for her to maintain her employment and that the plaintiff
did not have an obligation to reimburse the defendant
for child care that is not necessary to allow her to
maintain employment.
The testimony of the parties revealed that the chil-
dren’s normal school day starts at 8:30 a.m. and ends
at 3:20 p.m. The defendant testified that, if the children
were to take the school bus to and from school, the
school bus would pick them up from home at approxi-
mately 8:10 a.m. and drop them back off at approxi-
mately 3:30 p.m. The defendant testified, however, that
the children no longer take the bus to school because
she enrolled them in an extended day program that
provides before and after-school care. She explained
that she typically drops the children off to the program
at approximately 7:30 a.m. or 7:40 a.m. and that she
picks them up from the after-school program at approxi-
mately 4:45 p.m. She testified that the program in which
she has the children enrolled requires her to elect at
the beginning of school year whether they will enroll
in the program. She testified that families can choose
before or after-school care, or both, but the election
must be made in the beginning of the school year. It
cannot be switched daily or weekly.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Trent v. Trent

The plaintiff testified that, until approximately
August, 2022, he was current in reimbursing the defen-
dant for his portion of child care expenses. He testified,
however, that, in or about September, 2022, he stopped
reimbursing the defendant for the child care costs that
she requested from him because, from what he could
tell from documents obtained through discovery, the
extended day program was not necessary for the defen-
dant’s employment because she was not working during
the time the children were in the program.
Specifically, the plaintiff testified that, prior to the
time he stopped reimbursing the defendant for child
care expenses, he had made numerous requests to the
defendant to produce documents verifying her work
hours. He testified that she failed to comply with those
requests.5 Indeed, when the defendant was asked by
the plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing whether she pro-
vided the plaintiff with her time card reports when he
asked for information regarding her work hours in order
to resolve their disagreement about her requests for
reimbursement of child care expenses, she responded,
‘‘I guess not.’’
After he stopped reimbursing the defendant for child
care expenses due to her failure to provide him with
documentation verifying her work hours, the plaintiff
subpoenaed the defendant’s employer for her employ-
ment records. Through the subpoena, the plaintiff
obtained the defendant’s time cards and pay stubs.6
5
The record shows that, on August 11, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion
to compel with the court seeking the defendant’s compliance with his request
for disclosure and production postjudgment. It does not appear that the
August 11, 2021 motion was ever acted upon by the court.
6
As we discuss in greater detail in part I B of this opinion, the plaintiff
also filed a motion for order of compliance with the court on November 4,
2022, requesting that the court order the defendant to comply with the
plaintiff’s request for disclosure and production. On November 8, 2022, the
court, Truglia, J., granted the motion, ordering the defendant to comply
with ‘‘all outstanding discovery requests on or before November 22, 2022.’’
The defendant did not comply with that order.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

When questioned at the hearing about her time cards,
the defendant explained that she worked from home
approximately twenty-five hours per week and
acknowledged that her time cards reflected that she,
in almost all instances, worked no later than 3 p.m. on
any given day even though her children remained in
the after-school program until 4:45 p.m. The time cards
admitted into evidence confirmed this testimony,
revealing that she ended work on most days no later
than 2:30 p.m., with many days ending earlier than that.
When asked by the plaintiff’s counsel whether her start
time and end time were flexible, the defendant stated,
‘‘I believe so if I ask.’’7
In his closing argument, the plaintiff’s counsel argued
that the ‘‘crux of the matter, Your Honor, is the child
care costs incurred by the defendant have to be work-
related. And Your Honor has her time cards specifically,
which I had to subpoena and get, which show that there
are extremely rare circumstances where she is ever
working past 3 p.m., maybe a handful of time[s] in an
entire year and a half period of time worth of time
cards. So, I don’t think that it is reasonable or necessary
for the defendant to incur these costs and ask that my
client pay 76 percent of the bill when the costs could
have been avoided and are not necessary in the first
place. . . .
‘‘Now, in terms of the morning program, though, Your
Honor also heard testimony that she has enough flexibil-
ity in her job and that the kids get on the bus at about
8:10 in the morning where if she wanted to clock in at
8 o’clock in the morning and the kids get on the bus
7
The plaintiff’s counsel asked that, ‘‘if, for example, you asked your
employer if you could clock in and begin your workday at 8:15, that may
not be an issue with them. Is that fair to say?’’ The defendant responded:
‘‘I believe that the phones start at eight.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel then asked:
‘‘Okay. So, theoretically then, you could ask them to begin your workday
at eight?’’ The defendant responded: ‘‘I could.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Trent v. Trent

at 8:10, she could do that. But instead, she chooses to
drop the kids off at the extended day program. She
works from home. . . .
‘‘[T]here is no testimony from the defendant that she
wouldn’t be able to do that, that she wouldn’t be able
to see them off onto the bus and have a ten minute gap
of when she has to begin her work and begin taking
calls versus dropping them off early in the morning
for the extended day program. So, I don’t think in the
mornings either [is] a necessity. It’s something that’s
simply a convenience for the defendant.’’
On January 19, 2023, the court, Moses, J., issued an
order stating: ‘‘The court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff had notice of the court’s
orders on child support [docket entries ##168.00 and
169.00], which required the plaintiff to pay 76 percent
of the child care for the minor children. The court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the order was
clear and unambiguous in its direction for the plaintiff
to pay a certain percentage towards child care. The
court further finds that the plaintiff failed to comply
with the aforesaid order in that he refused to pay child
care expenses. The court finds the plaintiff’s noncompli-
ance wilful. The court ORDERS the plaintiff to reim-
burse the defendant for 76 percent [of] all child care
expenses incurred during the time of his noncompli-
ance. The court orders the defendant’s counsel to file
an affidavit regarding attorney’s fees.’’
The plaintiff does not dispute that the court’s dissolu-
tion judgment was clear and unambiguous as to his
obligation to pay 76 percent of child care costs in accor-
dance with the child support guidelines. Instead, the
plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in
issuing the contempt order because the defendant failed
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

violated the order or that, if he did violate the order,
that any such violation was wilful. We agree.
The record in this case makes clear that the plaintiff’s
child care contribution amount was calculated in accor-
dance with the child support and arrearage guidelines
on a worksheet filed with the court. Although the work-
sheet itself does not define or explain which child care
costs qualify for contribution, the child support guide-
lines expressly address this. See Regs., Conn. State
Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (g) (2). Specifically, in
‘‘[d]etermining the child care contribution,’’ the regula-
tions state that ‘‘[c]hild care costs shall qualify for a
contribution from the noncustodial parent only to the
extent that they: (i) are reasonable, (ii) are necessary
to allow a parent to maintain employment, (iii) are not
otherwise reimbursed or subsidized, and (iv) do not
exceed the level required to provide quality care from
a licensed source. . . .’’ Id. The preamble of the child
support guidelines reiterates that child care costs ‘‘sub-
ject to noncustodial parent reimbursement must be rea-
sonable and necessary for the custodial parent to main-
tain employment.’’ Child Support and Arrearage
Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (g) (5) (B), p. xiv; see
also Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 92–93, 995 A.2d
1 (2010) (‘‘[t]he guidelines are accompanied by a pream-
ble that is not part of the regulations but is intended
to assist in their interpretation’’). Consistent with these
definitions of reimbursable child care costs, the arbitra-
tor’s recommendation concerning child support, which
was incorporated into the judgment, required the plain-
tiff to pay the defendant for ‘‘day care necessary for
the defendant’s work.’’ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff
in this case was therefore required to contribute 76
percent of child care costs that were reasonable and
necessary to allow the defendant to maintain employ-
ment, that were not otherwise reimbursed or subsi-
dized, and that did not exceed the amount required to
provide quality care from a licensed source.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Trent v. Trent

In the context of the defendant’s motion for con-
tempt, it was the defendant’s burden, as the party seek-
ing the order of contempt, to prove, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, the plaintiff’s allegedly wilful
noncompliance with the child care order. See Puff v.
Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 365, 222 A.3d 493 (2020). To satisfy
that burden, the defendant was required to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the child care costs
for which she sought reimbursement were qualifying
costs, namely, that they were, inter alia, necessary to
allow her to maintain employment, and that the plaintiff
wilfully violated his obligation to pay those costs. See
Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2c (g) (2); cf.
Schull v. Schull, 163 Conn. App. 83, 97, 134 A.3d 686
(‘‘there has been no showing [by the plaintiff] that these
bills are ‘unreimbursed medical expenses’ for which
she is entitled to be ‘reimbursed’ by the defendant’’),
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 930, 133 A.3d 461 (2016). On
the basis of our review of the record in this case, we
conclude that she failed to satisfy her burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff vio-
lated the order much less wilfully violated the order.
At the hearing on the motion for contempt, the plain-
tiff introduced into evidence the defendant’s time card
reports that he subpoenaed from the defendant’s
employer, which unambiguously showed that the defen-
dant ended her workday earlier than 3 p.m. nearly every
day. The plaintiff’s counsel also called the defendant
as a witness. In response to questions from the plaintiff’s
counsel about whether her work hours were flexible,
the defendant testified that her employer likely would
be flexible with respect to when she started and finished
her workday. The defendant also testified that she runs
personal errands and does grocery shopping some days
when the children are in the after-school program.
Although the defendant testified that every forty-five
days or so she needed to attend a work meeting in
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

person in Shelton for ‘‘five to seven hours,’’ this infre-
quent commitment does not demonstrate that the chil-
dren’s enrollment in the before and after-school pro-
gram five days a week was reasonable and necessary
for her to maintain her employment. In short, she made
little effort at the hearing to show that the child care
costs in question were necessary to allow her to main-
tain her employment, leaving an evidentiary lacunae
linking the child care costs to her work schedule. On
this record, we conclude that she failed to satisfy her
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the child care costs for which she sought reim-
bursement were qualifying costs. It necessarily follows
that she also failed to prove that the plaintiff violated the
court’s child care order because he had no obligation
to reimburse her for nonqualifying child care costs.
Furthermore, even if the defendant had satisfied her
burden of demonstrating that the costs for which she
sought reimbursement were qualifying costs and that
the plaintiff violated the support order by failing to
reimburse her for those costs, we cannot, on this record,
conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence
that the plaintiff wilfully violated the order. The record
shows that, for approximately one year, the plaintiff
asked the defendant for documentation verifying that
the child care expenses for which she sought reimburse-
ment were necessary for her to maintain employment.
The defendant failed to comply with those requests and
the plaintiff suspended reimbursements. Thus, at best,
the record demonstrates that the plaintiff ceased reim-
bursing the defendant for child care expenses due to
a good faith dispute over whether those costs were
eligible for reimbursement under the child support regu-
lations. See, e.g., In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 694
(‘‘we must . . . determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a
judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Trent v. Trent

trial court’s determination of whether the violation was
wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunder-
standing’’ (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the trial
court’s judgment of contempt must be reversed and the
orders stemming from that judgment are vacated.
B
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for contempt. He
contends that the defendant admitted that she failed to
comply with a discovery order and that the court should
not have credited her excuse for failing to comply with
that order. He further contends that attempts by the
defendant’s attorney to assume blame for the defen-
dant’s noncompliance should not be countenanced. The
plaintiff argues that the record is clear that the defen-
dant’s noncompliance was wilful and that the court
erred in concluding that it was not. We are not per-
suaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant for our resolution of this claim. On Decem-
ber 6, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt
regarding the defendant’s alleged failure to comply with
the plaintiff’s discovery requests. Specifically, he
alleged that he filed a postjudgment motion for modifi-
cation of alimony, child support, and visitation on
March 15, 2021, and that the plaintiff served on the
defendant his request for disclosure and production
postjudgment on April 6, 2021. He further alleged that,
although the defendant partially complied with the April
6, 2021 request, she did not fully comply. In addition,
he alleged that, on September 20 and October 18, 2022,
he requested via email updated production documents
from the defendant for the period December 7, 2021,
to September 20, 2022. According to the plaintiff, as of
December 6, 2022, the defendant had not produced
the requested updated documents to the plaintiff. The
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

plaintiff noted that he filed a motion for compliance on
November 4, 2022, and that the defendant was ordered
to comply fully with all outstanding discovery requests
on or before November 22, 2022. Because the defendant
allegedly had not complied with the court’s order to
comply with producing all outstanding discovery, the
plaintiff requested, inter alia, an order of contempt.
At the January 17, 2023 hearing on the motion for
contempt, the defendant acknowledged that there was
a motion to compel her discovery responses and a sub-
sequent ruling issued by Judge Truglia ordering her to
produce all responsive documents by November 20,
2022. When asked by the plaintiff’s counsel whether
she complied with Judge Truglia’s order, she testified
that she did not. She acknowledged that her noncompli-
ance caused the plaintiff’s counsel to subpoena her
employment records from her employer and certain
financial records from her bank. In response to ques-
tions from her own counsel, the defendant testified that
‘‘I guess you guys called me several times—I never got
a call on my phone—or emailed me, and I think you
had the wrong email.’’ The defendant’s counsel then
asked: ‘‘Did we discover just recently that our emails
were going into a spam or junk email?’’ The defendant
responded, ‘‘Yes,’’ and indicated that she had not
received emails from her counsel. The defendant’s
counsel then asked the defendant, ‘‘You weren’t physi-
cally in court before Judge Truglia, were you?’’ The
defendant answered that she was not. When asked by
her counsel whether his firm’s attempts to communi-
cate Judge Truglia’s orders got through to the defen-
dant, the defendant testified, ‘‘No, they did not.’’
On January 19, 2023, the court issued an order deny-
ing the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. It stated that it
did ‘‘not find evidence that the defendant’s noncompli-
ance was wilful.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Trent v. Trent

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in denying
his motion for contempt because the court improperly
determined that the defendant’s noncompliance was
not wilful. He contends that the defendant’s uncorrobo-
rated excuse that she lacked knowledge of the trial
court’s orders because the emails from her attorney
were going into her spam folder while at the same time
the calls from her attorney were not being recorded on
her cell phone, are simply too far-fetched to be deemed
credible. The plaintiff points out that the defendant was
able to speak to her attorney to authorize the filing
of a motion for contempt on September 16, 2022, but
nevertheless claims that, four days later, both her email
and her phone stopped receiving communications from
her attorney for three months. The plaintiff therefore
claims that the court abused its discretion in concluding
that the defendant’s noncompliance was not wilful. We
disagree.
There is evidence in the record that the defendant
did not have knowledge of the discovery order for which
she did not comply because she did not receive corre-
spondence and communications from her attorney.
That evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding
that the plaintiff had failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant’s noncompliance
was wilful. See In re Leah S., supra, 284 Conn. 692
(judgment of civil contempt is improper if ‘‘the contem-
nor, through no fault of his [or her] own, was unable
to obey the court’s order’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Although the plaintiff argues that the defen-
dant’s testimony was not credible, this court does not
retry the facts or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
Rather, ‘‘[t]he trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the weight to be given spe-
cific testimony and, therefore, is free to accept or reject,
in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either
party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasowitz
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

v. Kasowitz, 140 Conn. App. 507, 512, 59 A.3d 347 (2013).
On this record, we cannot conclude that the court
abused its discretion in concluding that the defendant’s
noncompliance was not wilful.
II
The plaintiff’s final claims pertain to the court’s denial
of his motion for modification as it relates to alimony
and child support. As to the alimony portion of his
motion for modification, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to prove a substantial change in
circumstances ‘‘given the fact that the defendant is earn-
ing well under $30,000 a year.’’ The plaintiff claims that
the court’s sole finding that the defendant ‘‘is earning
well under $30,000 a year’’ is clearly erroneous, as the
documentary evidence introduced at the hearing
showed that defendant was in fact making more than
$30,000.
As to the plaintiff’s motion for modification of child
support, he requested that his child care contribution
and unreimbursed medical contributions be reduced.8
The court denied the motion for modification of child
support, indicating that it was ‘‘improper given the fact
that the plaintiff [was] not seeking to amend the child
support award in its entirety.’’ The plaintiff claims that
the court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that
he could not seek modification as to only one or two
components of the child support award without seeking
modification of the other components of the child sup-
port award. We address the plaintiff’s claims in turn.
We begin with our well known standard of review.
Our appellate courts ‘‘will not disturb the trial court’s
8
In the plaintiff’s motion for modification filed with the court, he argued
that the circumstances warranted modification of the ‘‘child support orders,
including the orders concerning child care, health care expenses and extra-
curricular activity expenses.’’ During the hearing on his motion for modifica-
tion, the plaintiff limited his modification request to child care and unreim-
bursed medical and dental expenses.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Trent v. Trent

ruling on a motion for modification of alimony or child
support unless the court has abused its discretion or
reasonably could not conclude as it did, on the basis
of the facts presented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 200 Conn. App. 229,
245–46, 240 A.3d 688 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 909,
244 A.3d 561 (2021). ‘‘Furthermore, [t]he trial court’s
findings [of fact] are binding upon this court unless
they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and
the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence
in the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Moore v. Moore, 216 Conn. App.
179, 189, 283 A.3d 994 (2022). ‘‘In determining whether
a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic
relations matters, we allow every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . To
the extent that the [plaintiff] has raised legal issues
within his overarching claim[s], we review those claims
de novo.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Giordano v. Giordano, 200 Conn. App. 130,
135, 238 A.3d 113, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 970, 240 A.3d
286 (2020).
‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-86 governs the modification
or termination of an alimony or support order after the
date of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case,
the disputed issue is alimony [or child support], the
applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which
provides that a final order for alimony [or child support]
may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of
a substantial change in the circumstances of either
party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the party
seeking the modification bears the burden of demon-
strating that such a change has occurred. . . . To
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

obtain a modification, the moving party must demon-
strate that circumstances have changed since the last
court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable
to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of
changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a
party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire
as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modifi-
cation of the existing order.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) De Almeida-Kennedy v. Kennedy, 224 Conn.
App. 19, 30–31, 312 A.3d 150 (2024).
A
The plaintiff claims that the court’s determination
that there was not a substantial change in circum-
stances to modify alimony was predicated on the sole
finding that the defendant ‘‘is earning well under $30,000
a year.’’ He further claims that, because the court’s sole
finding with respect to his motion was clearly errone-
ous, the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion and that reversal is warranted. We agree.
In the present case, the defendant filed with the court
a financial affidavit in which she averred that her gross
income from wages per week was $450, or $23,400 per
year. The plaintiff, however, introduced undisputed
documentary evidence subpoenaed from the defen-
dant’s employer that refuted the defendant’s financial
affidavit. Specifically, the defendant’s 2021 W-2 showed
that the defendant made $27,416.75 from wages that
year. The defendant testified, however, that she did not
start her employment until February, 2021, meaning
that her gross earnings on her 2021 W-2 reflected only
ten months of work. The plaintiff also introduced into
evidence the defendant’s pay stubs from 2022 for the
period from January 1 through December 3, 2022. The
pay stubs show that the defendant earned $30,629.25 by
December 3, 2022, with remaining paychecks to follow.
When presented with this evidence at the hearing, the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Trent v. Trent

defendant conceded that her gross weekly pay was
approximately $625 instead of the $450 that she had
indicated on her financial affidavit. Furthermore, during
closing arguments, the defendant’s counsel explained
to the court that ‘‘[m]y client earns about $30,000 a
year.’’ The court’s finding that the defendant was ‘‘earn-
ing well under $30,000 a year’’ was therefore clearly
erroneous.
Because the court’s finding that there was not a sub-
stantial change in circumstances was predicated solely
on the court’s clearly erroneous factual finding, we are
left with no choice but to conclude that the court abused
its discretion in denying the motion for modification as
it pertained to alimony. See, e.g., Berman v. Berman,
203 Conn. App. 300, 313, 248 A.3d 49 (2021) (‘‘lack of
an evidentiary basis in the record for the court’s finding
of an exchange of assets or equity for lifetime alimony,
on which its ultimate decision denying the plaintiff’s
motion for modification was based at least in part, com-
pels us to find that the court abused its discretion in
denying the plaintiff’s motion’’). As a result, this matter
must be remanded to the trial court for a new hearing
on the plaintiff’s motion for modification as it relates
to alimony. See Steller v. Steller, 181 Conn. App. 581,
598, 187 A.3d 1184 (2018) (because trial court’s decision
on motion for modification was based, in part, on clearly
erroneous finding, case was remanded for new hearing
on motion for modification). At the rehearing, the trial
court must determine whether the plaintiff established
a substantial change in circumstances and, if so, what
modification of alimony, if any, is appropriate.9
9
Superior Court judges making postjudgment dissolution rulings are
encouraged, in accordance with our rules of practice, to set forth in detail
the factual and legal bases for their rulings, including an explanation of the
evidence considered and relied upon and the credibility determinations of
witnesses. See Practice Book § 6-1 (a) (‘‘[t]he judicial authority’s decision
shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties
and the factual basis therefor’’); Practice Book § 64-1 (a) (‘‘[t]he court’s
decision shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by
the parties and the factual basis therefor’’).
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

B
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court erred in
denying his motion to modify child support. He notes
that the court’s sole stated basis for denying his motion
was that ‘‘ ‘the plaintiff’s request to modify only the
child support order to reduce his contributions to child
care expenses and health care expenses’ ’’ was
‘‘ ‘improper given the fact that the plaintiff [was] not
seeking to amend the child support award in its
entirety.’ ’’ He contends that there is no authority for
the court’s conclusion. We agree.
The question of whether, and to what extent, a child
support order can be modified is a question of law over
which this court’s review is plenary. See Maturo v.
Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 88.
The law is clear that child support in Connecticut is
generally comprised of four components, or awards,
which include current support payments, health care
coverage, child care contribution, and periodic pay-
ments on arrearages. Indeed, General Statutes § 46b-
215b (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he child sup-
port and arrearage guidelines . . . shall be considered
in all determinations of child support award amounts,
including any current support, health care coverage,
child care contribution and past-due support amounts,
and payment on arrearages and past-due support within
the state. . . .’’ The law further provides in relevant
part: ‘‘In all such determinations, there shall be a rebut-
table presumption that the amount of such awards
which resulted from the application of such guidelines
is the amount to be ordered. . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 46b-215b (a).
The regulations reiterate the mandates of § 45b-215b.
They define ‘‘child support award’’ as ‘‘the entire pay-
ment obligation of the noncustodial parent, as deter-
mined under the child support and arrearage guidelines,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
Trent v. Trent

and includes current support payments, health care cov-
erage, child care contribution and periodic payments
on arrearages.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-
1 (6). The regulations further provide in relevant part
that ‘‘[t]he current support, health care coverage contri-
bution, and child care contribution amounts calculated
under section 46b-215a-2c of the Regulations of Con-
necticut State Agencies, and the amount of the arrear-
age payment calculated under section 46b-215a-3a of
the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, are pre-
sumed to be the correct amounts to be ordered. . . .’’
Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-5c (a).
Section 46b-86 (a) governs the modification of a child
support order after the date of a dissolution judgment.
It provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]ny final order for the
periodic payment of permanent alimony or support
. . . may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set
aside, altered or modified by the court upon a showing
of a substantial change in the circumstances of either
party or upon a showing that the final order for child
support substantially deviates from the child support
guidelines established pursuant to [General Statutes §]
46b-215a, unless there was a specific finding on the
record at a hearing, or in a written judgment, order or
memorandum of decision of the court, that the applica-
tion of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappro-
priate. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46-86 (a). This court
has explained that, pursuant to that provision, a court
may modify a child support order in one of two alterna-
tive circumstances: upon a showing of a substantial
change in the circumstances of either party or a substan-
tial deviation from the child support guidelines. See
Brown v. Brown, 199 Conn. App. 134, 153, 235 A.3d 555
(2020); Righi v. Righi, 172 Conn. App. 427, 433, 160
A.3d 1094 (2017).
The plaintiff argues that there is no authority for the
court’s conclusion that it was improper for him to seek
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Trent v. Trent

modification of just one or two components of the child
support award. We agree. On the basis of our review
of the modification statute and the relevant case law,
we have found no authority prohibiting a party from
seeking to modify a child support award through a
change to just one or two components of the total
child support award instead of seeking to modify all
components of a child support award. Significantly,
§ 46b-86 (a) includes no such limitation. That statute
simply provides that a court may modify ‘‘any final
order for the periodic payment of . . . support’’ upon
the showing, inter alia, of a substantial change in the
circumstances of either party. (Emphasis added.) Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-86 (a). There can be little dispute
that orders requiring a noncustodial parent to pay a
percentage of child care expenses and unreimbursed
medical expenses are orders of ‘‘support’’ subject to
modification under § 46b-86 (a). Although child care
orders and health care orders are often included in an
omnibus award containing the orders as to each of the
four components of child support, we see no reason
why a party cannot seek modification of some but not
all of the components that comprise the total child
support award.

Of course, a party seeking modification of only one
or two of the child support components must still dem-
onstrate a substantial change in circumstances. See
Brown v. Brown, supra, 199 Conn. App. 157 (‘‘[t]he
party seeking modification bears the burden of showing
the existence of a substantial change in the circum-
stances’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). If a court
finds a substantial change has occurred, it may then
properly consider what, if any, modification is war-
ranted. See Berman v. Berman, supra, 203 Conn. App.
304; Syragakis v. Syragakis, 79 Conn. App. 170, 174,
829 A.2d 885 (2003).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27
Trent v. Trent

Because the court improperly denied the plaintiff’s
motion for modification on the basis that he sought to
reduce the order of support through a reduction to just
two components of the total child support award, we
must remand the matter to trial court to determine
whether the plaintiff established a substantial change
in circumstances and, if so, whether and to what extent
a modification of the child support award is appro-
priate.
The judgment of contempt is reversed and the orders
stemming from that judgment are vacated, and the case
is remanded with direction to deny the defendant’s
motion for contempt; the judgment denying the plain-
tiff’s motion to modify alimony and child support is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion; and the judgment
denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.