L. K. v. K. K.

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L. K. v. K. K.

L. K. v. K. K.*
(AC 45849)
Clark, Seeley and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-
solved, filed a motion to modify his unallocated alimony and child
support obligation. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Held:
1. This court rejected the argument of the defendant’s counsel, raised for
the first time at oral argument, that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion to modify his unallocated ali-
mony and child support obligation: although counsel stated that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter orders regarding
an adult child, which statement appeared to rest on the general rule
that a parent’s legal obligation to support a child terminates when the
child attains the age of eighteen, the trial court did not enter any child
support orders regarding an adult child but denied a motion to modify the
defendant’s unallocated alimony and support obligation, which stemmed
from a written agreement that he had voluntarily entered into with the
plaintiff and which was deemed fair and equitable and was approved
by the trial court.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to address his claim that a reduction in the
child support component of his unallocated alimony and child support
obligation was warranted because one of the parties’ three children had
reached the age of majority: the trial court clearly explained that the
issue of one of the parties’ children reaching the age of majority was
not before it because that issue had not been raised in the motion to
modify that was before the court.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s
motion to modify by declining to consider certain financial evidence
submitted by the defendant: although the defendant argued that the trial
court ignored his income and the information set forth on his financial
affidavit, it was clear that the court, instead, did not credit that informa-
tion; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the trial court
was not required to credit the defendant’s updated financial affidavit

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
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L. K. v. K. K.
and, therefore, the trial court’s findings with respect to the defendant’s
assertion that he suffered a reduction in income were not clearly errone-
ous, as they were based on the evidence and its credibility determina-
tions, which this court would not disturb.
Argued January 11—officially released June 18, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Tindill, J.,
rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting
certain other relief, from which the defendant appealed
to this court, Sheldon, Elgo and Stevens, Js., which
reversed the trial court’s judgment as to the financial
orders and remanded the case to that court for further
proceedings; thereafter, the court, M. Moore, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to modify unallocated alimony
and child support, and the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
William W. Taylor, with whom, on the brief, was K.
K., self-represented, for the appellant (defendant).
Igor G. Kuperman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the defendant, K. K.,1 appeals challenging the judgment
of the trial court denying his motion to modify the
amount of unallocated alimony and child support that
he is obligated to pay to the plaintiff, L. K. On appeal, the
defendant raises various claims concerning the denial
of his motion to modify, which we distill to the follow-
ing: (1) the court, in its written order denying the motion
to modify, improperly failed to address the defendant’s
1
At the time the defendant filed this appeal and his appellate briefs, he
was acting in a self-represented capacity. At oral argument before this
court, however, he was represented by counsel, who also had provided
representation to the defendant, at times, concerning various postdissolution
matters in this case.
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L. K. v. K. K.

claim that a reduction in the child support component
of the unallocated order was warranted due to the fact
that one of the parties’ three children had reached the
age of majority, and (2) the court abused its discretion
in denying the motion to modify by ignoring the tax
returns, financial statements and other financial docu-
ments that had been submitted into evidence.2 We dis-
agree and affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history guide our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant
were married on July 19, 1997, and they have three
children together. Their marriage was dissolved by a
judgment dated June 21, 2016. Pursuant to that judg-
ment, the defendant was ordered to pay unallocated
alimony and support to the plaintiff in the amount of
$12,500 per month ‘‘until the death of either party, the
plaintiff’s remarriage, or November 3, 2025, whichever
[occurred] first,’’ and the duration and amount to be
paid were nonmodifiable by either party. In making that
order, the court indicated that it was deviating from
the presumptive support amount set forth in the child
support guidelines ‘‘based on the extraordinary dispar-
ity in income and the provision of alimony.’’
The defendant appealed from the dissolution judg-
ment to this court, arguing, inter alia, that the court’s
2
We note that the defendant, in his principal appellate brief, also raises
the following claim: ‘‘The court’s order fails to address the issue of the
court’s prior order dated July 5, 2022, now enforcing an order, which it well
knows by the facts in evidence, that is not in accord with the Connecticut
child support guidelines, nor [General Statutes §] 46b-84.’’ That statement
of the claim is followed by three paragraphs of analysis, which concern the
modification of an order of unallocated alimony and child support when a
child attains the age of majority. It is not clear from that analysis, however,
what order the defendant is referring to when he argues that the ‘‘the court’s
order fails to address’’ the court’s July 5, 2022 decision denying the motion
to modify. Nonetheless, this purported third claim on appeal seems to be
related to, and subsumed within, the defendant’s first claim. For that reason,
we do not analyze it separately.
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L. K. v. K. K.

order for the payment of nonmodifiable, unallocated
alimony and child support constituted an abuse of its
discretion in that it precluded reductions based on each
child attaining the age of majority. This court agreed,
concluding in the prior appeal3 that the trial court
abused its discretion in making its order of unallocated
alimony and child support nonmodifiable as to term
and amount.4 Therefore, the judgment was reversed
only as to the financial orders and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.
Following the remand order from this court, the trial
court scheduled a hearing for May 2 and 3, 2019, to
address the financial issues. On May 2, the first day
scheduled for the hearing, the parties entered into a
written agreement that resolved the financial issues.
The agreement provided in relevant part: ‘‘The [defen-
dant] will continue to pay unallocated alimony and child
support with the next payment beginning on May 23,
2019, in the amount of [$12,500] monthly for a period
of three years. . . . After three years, he will pay unal-
located child support and alimony at the rate of [$7500]
per month or until their youngest son is eighteen years
old (last payment to be made on October 23, 2025).’’
The agreement incorporated other provisions from the
June 21, 2016 dissolution judgment and provided that
‘‘[a]ll other orders not incorporated in this agreement
from the June 21, 2016 [dissolution judgment] shall
remain null and void.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The agree-
ment further provides: ‘‘The parties have entered into
3
Because the names and identities of the parties are set forth in the prior
appeal in this matter, which was decided prior to the issuance of a protective
order, we do not include an official citation to our decision in that prior
appeal in accordance with our obligation under federal law to protect the
identity of any person or persons protected by a protective order. See 18
U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018).
4
In the prior appeal, this court also determined that the trial court errone-
ously calculated the defendant’s presumptive child support obligation on
the basis of his earning capacity, rather than his actual income.
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L. K. v. K. K.

this agreement freely and voluntarily; [t]he parties find
this agreement to be fair and equitable under the cir-
cumstances; [and] [t]he parties find this agreement to
be in the best interests of their minor children.’’ The
court approved the agreement, which was made an
order of the court.
On January 22, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt, claiming that the defendant was late in mak-
ing two payments and that he also had failed to pay 50
percent of all unreimbursed medical expenses for the
children, as required by their agreement.5 The next day,
January 23, 2020, the defendant filed the motion to
modify that is the subject of this appeal—motion num-
ber 432 on the trial court docket (motion to modify
432)—seeking a modification of his unallocated ali-
mony and child support obligation based on a substan-
tial change in circumstances. The defendant filed the
motion in a self-represented capacity by filling out a
court form. On the form, he checked the box indicating
a substantial change in circumstances, with a handwrit-
ten notation stating, ‘‘[i]n addition to the attach[ed],
the motion of contempt in reference to taxes paid on
unallocated alimony [and] child support need[s] to be
addressed.’’ He also checked the boxes indicating that
he was seeking an increase and decrease in child sup-
port, as well as a decrease in alimony. Attached to the
form is a written motion, which sets forth the following
reasons why the defendant was seeking a modification
of his unallocated alimony and child support obligation:
(1) ‘‘Business partner/producer, George Goettlemann,
has called the sale of his original book of business’’;
(2) ‘‘Technology upgrades [related to the defendant’s
business] had to be made immediately. All computers
The plaintiff also filed two other motions for contempt that were consid-
5

ered by the court along with the defendant’s motion to modify: one that
was filed on January 24, 2020, and another that was filed on November
5, 2020.
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L. K. v. K. K.

are not supported by Microsoft 2007 and had to be
upgraded to Microsoft 2010. As well as scanner and
software upgrades. Total estimates $25,000’’; (3) ‘‘Busi-
ness debt needs to be paid. It has been accruing inter-
est’’; (4) ‘‘My staff has been completely overworked
since 2014. Contingency compensation has decreased
37.5 [percent] among main employees. They are asking
for salary increases and better benefits. We need to
hire additional employees to relieve workload’’; (5) ‘‘My
personal income has declined’’; (6) ‘‘We have outstand-
ing fiduciary accounts who have defaulted on premium
payments, totaling $30,000 in 2019’’; (7) ‘‘My credit has
been ruined, due [to] the plaintiff not paying the mort-
gage on the [marital] home . . . for [seventeen]
months’’; and (8) ‘‘My personal reputation has been
defamed and ruined in conjunction with the plaintiff
. . . using numerous protective order [statutes] and
creating false allegations that were subsequently pub-
lished on the Internet. Moreover, this has directly
affected my business . . . .’’

A remote hearing on the plaintiff’s motions for con-
tempt and the defendant’s motion to modify his unallo-
cated alimony and child support obligation commenced
on April 8, 2021. The hearing continued, in person, on
two more dates—March 17 and April 29, 2022, after
which the parties filed simultaneous posthearing briefs
on May 31, 2022, as ordered by the court. In a written
order dated July 1, 2022, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion to modify and granted in part the plain-
tiff’s motions for contempt. Thereafter, the defendant
filed a motion to reargue and reconsider, which the
court denied on August 11, 2022. The defendant subse-
quently filed a second motion to reargue and reconsider,
which the court also denied. This appeal followed. Addi-
tional facts and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.
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L. K. v. K. K.

Before we address the defendant’s claims on appeal,
we set forth our well established standard of review in
family matters. We review the trial court’s judgment
denying the defendant’s motion to modify his unallo-
cated alimony and child support obligation under an
abuse of discretion standard. See Berman v. Berman,
203 Conn. App. 300, 303, 248 A.3d 49 (2021). ‘‘An appel-
late court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domes-
tic relations cases unless the court has abused its discre-
tion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude
as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of
its action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court’s find-
ings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding
upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in
light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record
as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Therefore, to conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, we must find that the court
either incorrectly applied the law or could not reason-
ably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) De Almeida-Kennedy v. Kennedy, 224 Conn. App.
19, 29–30, 312 A.3d 150 (2024).
‘‘General Statutes § 46b-86 governs the modification
of an alimony or child support order after the date of
a dissolution judgment. Section 46b-86 (a) provides that
a final order for alimony or child support may be modi-
fied by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial
change in the circumstances of either party. Under that
statutory provision, the party seeking the modification
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L. K. v. K. K.

bears the burden of demonstrating that such a change
has occurred. . . . To obtain a modification, the mov-
ing party must demonstrate that circumstances have
changed since the last court order such that it would
be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.
Because the establishment of changed circumstances
is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent
for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new
circumstance warrants a modification of the existing
order. . . .
‘‘Once a trial court determines that there has been a
substantial change in the financial circumstances of
one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an
initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the
question of modification. . . . Thus, [w]hen presented
with a motion for modification, a court must first deter-
mine whether there has been a substantial change in
the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties.
. . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in
circumstances, it may properly consider the motion
and, on the basis of the [General Statutes § 46b-84]
criteria, make an order for modification. . . . A finding
of a substantial change in circumstances is subject to
the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . Flood
v. Flood, 199 Conn. App. 67, 77–78, 234 A.3d 1076, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 960, 239 A.3d 317 (2020).
‘‘Moreover, [i]t is well established that a separation
agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution
decree and its resulting judgment must be regarded as
a contract and construed in accordance with the general
principles governing contracts. . . . When construing
a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties
from the language used interpreted in the light of the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the
parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable
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L. K. v. K. K.

construction of the written words and . . . the lan-
guage used must be accorded its common, natural, and
ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly
applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . .
When only one interpretation of a contract is possible,
the court need not look outside the four corners of the
contract. . . . Giordano v. Giordano, 200 Conn. App.
130, 136, 238 A.3d 113, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 970, 240
A.3d 286 (2020); see also Winthrop v. Winthrop, 189
Conn. App. 576, 581–82, 207 A.3d 1109 (2019).’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Berman v. Berman, supra,
203 Conn. App. 304–305.
I
We first address an argument raised by the defen-
dant’s counsel during oral argument before this court.
Specifically, at the end of his rebuttal argument, the
defendant’s counsel raised an issue related to subject
matter jurisdiction that had not been briefed by the
defendant, asserting that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to ‘‘enter orders [regarding] an adult
child.’’ According to the defendant’s counsel, the case
must be remanded on that issue. We do not agree.
We first note that ‘‘[a]ppellate courts generally do
not consider claims raised for the first time at oral
argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Cicarella, 203 Conn. App. 811, 817 n.5, 251 A.3d 94,
cert. denied, 337 Conn. 902, 252 A.3d 364 (2021); see
also Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services,
300 Conn. 566, 586 n.17, 22 A.3d 518 (2011) (‘‘ ‘claims
on appeal must be adequately briefed, and cannot be
raised for the first time at oral argument before the
reviewing court’ ’’). Nevertheless, we address this issue
‘‘because [u]nlike jurisdiction over the person, subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be created through consent
or waiver. . . . Once the question of lack of jurisdic-
tion is raised, it must be disposed of no matter in what
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L. K. v. K. K.

form it is presented. . . . The court must fully resolve
it before proceeding further with the case.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booker, 28 Conn.
App. 34, 39, 611 A.2d 878, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919,
614 A.2d 826 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 916, 113
S. Ct. 1271, 122 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1993); see id., 38–39
(addressing issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised
for first time at oral argument before reviewing court).
‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of
a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented
by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly
lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to
entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is deter-
mined that a tribunal has authority or competence to
decide the class of cases to which the action belongs,
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in
favor of entertaining the action. . . . It is well estab-
lished that, in determining whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring juris-
diction should be indulged.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) O’Bryan v. O’Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 53–54,
787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff’d, 262 Conn. 355, 813 A.2d 1001
(2003). ‘‘[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction is
a question of law . . . and, once raised, either by a
party or by the court itself, the question must be
answered before the court may decide the case. . . .
[B]ecause [a] determination regarding . . . subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jefferson
Solar, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protec-
tion, 224 Conn. App. 688, 698, 313 A.3d 514 (2024).
‘‘[T]he Superior Court is a general jurisdiction tribu-
nal with ‘plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction
over legal disputes in ‘‘family relations matters’’ ’ under
General Statutes § 46b-1’’; Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn.
757, 776–77, 143 A.3d 578 (2016); which includes ali-
mony and support. Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724,
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L. K. v. K. K.

729, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999); see also Hepburn v. Brill,
348 Conn. 827, 842–43, 312 A.3d 1 (2024). Our Supreme
Court previously has explained that § 46b-1, together
with General Statutes § 46b-86 (a), which ‘‘provides the
trial court with continuing jurisdiction to modify sup-
port orders,’’ provide a trial court with subject matter
jurisdiction over a motion to modify a child support
order. Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 729.
Additionally, we also recognize that, ‘‘[a]s a general
matter, it is settled that the statutory obligation of a
parent to support a child normally terminates when the
child attains the age of majority, which currently is
eighteen.’’6 Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632, 654,
910 A.2d 963 (2006). Thus, ‘‘a court may issue support
orders only for minor children under the age of eighteen
. . . .’’ Id., 660; see also Hughes v. Hughes, 95 Conn.
App. 200, 208–209, 895 A.2d 274 (‘‘[t]he statutory grant
of jurisdiction to the Superior Court in matters relating
to child support incident to the dissolution of a marriage
likewise expressly circumscribes the court’s jurisdic-
tion to orders involving only minor children’’ (footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 280 Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 90 (2006); Lowe v. Lowe,
47 Conn. App. 354, 357, 704 A.2d 236 (1997) (‘‘ ‘[a]bsent
. . . a written agreement by the parties, the court does
not have jurisdiction to order payment of child support
6
There are two notable exceptions to this rule pertaining to postmajority
support. First, ‘‘under General Statutes § 46b-56c (b), (c) and (e), a court
may issue an educational support order for college age children upon a
motion of a party and after making certain findings.’’ Loughlin v. Loughlin,
280 Conn. 632, 657, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). Second, under ‘‘General Statutes
§ 46b-66 (a) . . . if the parties to a dissolution action submit to the court
a written agreement providing for the care, education, maintenance or sup-
port of a child beyond the age of eighteen and the court finds the agreement
to be fair and equitable, it may incorporate it by reference into the order
or decree of the court.’’ Id., 658. ‘‘Thus, [i]n the absence of a statute or
agreement providing for postmajority assistance . . . a parent ordinarily is
under no legal obligation to support an adult child.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
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L. K. v. K. K.

beyond the age of majority and may not enforce such
an order’ ’’).
Our resolution of this claim requires little discussion.
First, there is no question that the trial court in the
present case had subject matter jurisdiction over the
defendant’s motion to modify his unallocated alimony
and child support obligation. See Amodio v. Amodio,
supra, 247 Conn. 729. The defendant’s claim appears
to rest on the general rule that a parent’s legal obligation
to support a child terminates when the child attains the
age of eighteen. As stated previously in this opinion,
at the close of oral argument before this court, the
defendant’s counsel asserted that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to ‘‘enter orders [regarding]
an adult child.’’ In the present case, however, the court
did not enter any child support orders regarding an
adult child; rather, it denied a motion to modify the
defendant’s unallocated alimony and child support obli-
gation. Significantly, the defendant’s child support obli-
gation stems from a written agreement that he volunta-
rily had entered into with the plaintiff, which was
deemed fair and equitable and was approved by the
court. If, and to whatever extent, that agreement does
provide for postmajority support for the children,7
under General Statutes § 46b-66 trial courts have ‘‘juris-
diction to enforce written provisions in dissolution
agreements, incorporated into court orders, for the
care, education, maintenance or support of a child
beyond the age of eighteen . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 205
n.21, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007); see Tarbox v. Tarbox, 84
Conn. App. 403, 410, 853 A.2d 614 (2004) (‘‘§ 46b-66
permits parents to agree in writing to provide child
support for a child beyond the age of eighteen years’’);
see also footnote 6 of this opinion. We, therefore, reject
7
See part II of this opinion.
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L. K. v. K. K.

the jurisdictional claim raised by the defendant’s coun-
sel at oral argument and turn to the claims raised by
the defendant in this appeal.
II
We next address the defendant’s claim that the court,
in its written order denying the motion to modify,
improperly failed to address his claim that a reduction
in the child support component of the unallocated order
was warranted because one of the parties’ three chil-
dren had reached the age of majority. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. At the outset of the remote
hearing that took place on April 8, 2021, at which the
defendant appeared in a self-represented capacity, the
court sought to clarify the motions that were before it at
the hearing. In addition to several motions for contempt
filed by the plaintiff, the court indicated that the defen-
dant’s motion to modify 432 was one of the motions to
be addressed at the hearing. When the court asked the
defendant what he had to say about ‘‘what motions
we are addressing today,’’ the defendant responded by
referencing an amended motion to modify that he had
filed on April 5, 2021, just three days prior to the hearing,
which is motion number 460 on the trial court docket
(motion to modify 460). Thereafter, the following collo-
quy transpired:
‘‘The Court: Sir, we can’t hear a motion that you filed
on [April 5] today. Okay.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, but—
‘‘The Court: You can’t file a motion—hold on, sir.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah.
‘‘The Court: —three days before the hearing and
expect [the] plaintiff and [the] plaintiff’s counsel to be
prepared to defend whatever your allegations are on a
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motion that, from what I understand, hasn’t even been
served yet. You don’t have a date on the—
‘‘[The Defendant]: It’s been served.
‘‘The Court: Okay. . . .
‘‘[The Defendant]: It was served on April 5th . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, it has been
served . . . upon the plaintiff on April 5th and filed on
April 6th, and I got it, I believe, either yesterday at night
or today in the morning.
‘‘The Court: Okay. And, sir, do you have a date on
the motion, a date, a citation date?
‘‘[The Defendant]: That it was served?
‘‘The Court: No. . . . That you need to appear for
the . . . modification. . . .
‘‘[The Defendant]: No, not yet.
‘‘The Court: Okay.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Okay. But it’s pretty much the same
motion, except there’s a few other issues that have
developed.
‘‘The Court: Well, sir, we are not going to hear the
few other issues that developed today. We will hear the
motion for modification, which is motion 432, but not
the motion for modification that you filed two or three
days ago, okay? . . .
‘‘[The Defendant]: . . . Judge . . . I am asking you
that it all be heard. It’s not . . . you guys are aware of
some of my health issues. You know, my daughter is
going to be eighteen years old, so child support issues
can be addressed, and then there’s some [COVID-19]
issues. The only thing that—they don’t even have to
prepare for it. I can prove it. It’s just to show how much
business I have lost because of [COVID-19].
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‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I will object.
. . . I will object to . . . obviously not to the questions
about . . . [COVID-19] and all of that. We can defi-
nitely—because it’s part of an ongoing situation with
the defendant. But the issue that the defendant raises
with respect to the kids turning a certain age is a com-
pletely separate issue from anything and everything that
he was raising before. And it requires a . . . separate
showing of evidence because, Your Honor, I believe
this particular factor has been addressed in the original
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. So,
as far as the defendant is claiming new issues that were
not raised previously, Your Honor, that will require a
separate hearing and separate preparation.
‘‘The Court: So, sir, did you raise this issue previously
in your motion for modification about your daughter
turning eighteen?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, the reason why—Your
Honor, the reason why I did not, because, when I put
in the original motion over a year ago, my daughter
wasn’t—she was a year and change away from being
eighteen. Now that, because of [COVID-19] and because
of . . . these motions getting delayed, now my daugh-
ter is eighteen. So, there isn’t much to debate. She is
eighteen. We have a, you know, a child . . . an
amended child form and there is really nothing to debate
here. She is eighteen and she is going to be eighteen.
And, you know, child support should be adjusted when
they are eighteen. It’s not very complicated. It’s stan-
dard procedure among—
‘‘The Court: Well, sir, here’s the issue . . . . You’re
seeking a modification today, but you haven’t filed an
updated financial affidavit.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, I just did. I did. I filed it just
recently.
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‘‘The Court: When? . . . There’s no financial affida-
vit in your file. There is no financial affidavit in the
clerk’s office.
***
‘‘The Court: . . . You are representing yourself,
okay, and you have been for quite some time. There
are trial management, hearing management orders that
you need to produce these documents not today, but
a minimum of five days prior to the hearing date. Okay.
Today is not five days prior to the hearing date. There
is no financial affidavit in the courthouse. I had the clerk
look yesterday. I had the clerk look today.’’ (Emphasis
added.)
The court concluded the discussion by stating that,
with respect to the defendant’s motion to modify 460
that he ‘‘just filed that is pending,’’ the defendant would
‘‘get a hearing date for that, at which point [he could]
proceed with [his] motion for modification.’’ The court
further stated: ‘‘[T]his is what we are going to do. Since,
again, I don’t have your financial affidavit, sir, what you
are going to do is [speak with an attorney about what
your issues are as you have indicated] and then the
next time everyone is back for the modification, sir,
provided your financial affidavit has been filed, then
we can address it after you have an opportunity to
speak with [an attorney].’’ Thereafter, the hearing on
that day proceeded forward with respect to the plain-
tiff’s motions for contempt.
The hearing resumed on March 17, 2022, and the
defendant, represented by counsel, testified regarding
motion to modify 432 that he had filed in January, 2020.
Specifically, the defendant testified that he has health
issues stemming from the fact that he had contracted
COVID-19 twice, that he has an aortic aneurysm that
is being monitored, and that he has a nodule in his
thyroid that might need to be removed. He also testified
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that, as a result of his physical ailments and COVID-19,
he was not able to do certain things for a long period
of time, and that he no longer works forty hours per
week, due, in part, to the fact that he had not been
feeling well and, in part, because his office was closed.
The defendant testified further that he has not seen
his children in a long time, that his business has been
affected in a number of ways by the COVID-19 pan-
demic, and about various loans and business transac-
tions. In support of his testimony, the defendant offered
into evidence a number of financial documents, includ-
ing personal and business tax returns for various years,
and an updated financial affidavit. When asked what
had caused him to file his motion to modify in January,
2020, the defendant responded that he could not afford
to keep paying the amount set for unallocated alimony
and child support because he was getting further in
debt and having trouble keeping up with other things
that needed to be paid and because he had lost business
in January, 2020, which was further compounded by
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic shortly thereafter.
The defendant also testified about why he had entered
into the May 2, 2019 agreement to continue paying the
plaintiff $12,500 monthly, the same amount ordered in
the dissolution judgment that had been reversed on
appeal.8 At no point during the testimony of the defen-
dant or the plaintiff concerning motion to modify 432
was anything mentioned about any of the children
reaching the age of majority,9 nor was there any mention
8
Specifically, the defendant testified, inter alia, that he made the decision
to do so (1) to clarify tax responsibilities in the unallocated order, (2)
because it gave him the opportunity to negotiate a drop to $7500, and (3)
in the hope that it would resolve some issues with respect to their children
so that he could see them.
9
In fact, during the hearing on March 17, 2022, the defendant testified
that he was under stress because his children do not talk to him anymore.
He was asked when the last time was that he had any access with his
children, to which he replied that he had not seen his son since the son
graduated from middle school in 2021. That prompted the defendant’s coun-
sel to ask, ‘‘[h]ow old are your kids?’’ The defendant responded only that
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of the defendant’s motion to modify 460, in which that
issue had been raised. In his posthearing brief, the
defendant made a cursory reference to this issue when
he asserted: ‘‘To date, the number of minor children has
reduced from three to one (see current child support
guidelines worksheet, Def. Trial Ex. C),’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
child support order must be reduced from $603 a week
. . . to $297 per week . . . as only one child remains
a minor.’’
In its July 1, 2022 written order denying the defen-
dant’s motion to modify, the court expressly set forth
the motions that were covered by the order and refer-
enced motion to modify 432, the defendant’s January
23, 2020 motion to modify; the written order does not
reference motion to modify 460, the defendant’s
amended motion to modify that was filed on April 5,
2021, in which the defendant sought a modification on
the ground that one of his children had reached the age
of majority. As a result, the court did not address that
ground in deciding the January, 2020 motion to modify.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to reargue
and reconsider the denial of his motion to modify, in
which he argued, inter alia, that the court improperly
failed to address the issue of whether his unallocated
alimony and child support obligation had to be reduced
due to one of the children reaching the age of majority.
On August 11, 2022, the court denied the defendant’s
motion to reargue and for reconsideration. In its written
order, the court stated: ‘‘The defendant’s motion [to
modify] 432 fails to request a modification of unallo-
cated alimony and child support based on a child reach-
ing the age of majority. ‘[P]leadings have their place in
our system of jurisprudence. While they are not held
to the strict and artificial standard that once prevailed,
his son was fifteen and did not mention anything about any of the other
children reaching the age of majority.
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we still cling to the belief, even in these iconoclastic
days, that no orderly administration of justice is possi-
ble without them. . . . It is fundamental in our law
that the right of a party to recover is limited to the
allegations in his pleading. Thus, it is clear that the
court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those
raised in the pleadings.’ Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC,
210 Conn. App. 725, 753, 271 A.3d 141 (2022).
‘‘Practice Book § 25-26 (e) provides in relevant part:
‘Each motion for modification shall state the specific
factual and legal basis for the claimed modification
. . . .’ In Prial v. Prial, [67 Conn. App. 7, 12–13, 787
A.2d 50 (2001)], the Appellate Court held [that] it was
an abuse of discretion for the court to consider grounds
not raised in a motion to modify financial orders. . . .
‘‘At the commencement of the hearing on [April 8,
2021], the defendant was self-represented. Motion [to
modify] 460 [which raised the issue of one of the chil-
dren reaching the age of majority] was filed by the
defendant three (3) days prior to the commencement
of the hearing. The court informed the defendant [that]
motion [to modify] 460 was not being heard by the court
because the plaintiff was not provided adequate notice
that the motion was before the court. The self-repre-
sented defendant failed to request a continuance and
the hearing proceeded on the defendant’s motion [to
modify] 432 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
Despite the court’s clear explanation as to why the
issue of one of the parties’ children reaching the age
of majority was not before it with respect to the defen-
dant’s motion to modify 432, the defendant, nonethe-
less, filed another motion to reargue and for reconsider-
ation raising the same argument about one of his
children reaching the age of majority. The court sum-
marily denied the motion.
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On appeal, the defendant makes a number of argu-
ments in support of his claim that the court erred in
failing to address the issue of one of his children reach-
ing the age of majority and to modify the child support
portion of his unallocated alimony and child support
obligation accordingly. First, he argues that he ‘‘clearly
checked the box on the court form ([motion to modify]
432) that he was requesting a ‘decrease in child sup-
port,’ ’’ and that, as a self-represented party at that time,
he should have been allowed deference or leeway. He
also asserts that, at the hearing, he ‘‘introduced evi-
dence, by way of testimony, regarding the ages of his
children,’’ as well as a child support guidelines work-
sheet, which included the children’s names and dates
of birth. (Emphasis added.) Next, he argues that Con-
necticut law ‘‘mandates’’ that the court take this fact
into account and that, by law, he is entitled to a reduc-
tion in the child support portion of his unallocated
alimony and child support obligation. Finally, the defen-
dant argues that, under Connecticut law, there was a
substantial change in circumstances as a result of one
of his children turning eighteen years old.
Before we address the defendant’s claims, we first
set forth general principles governing this issue. ‘‘Our
rules of practice state what a party must include in any
motion to modify custody. Motions to modify custody
are governed by Practice Book § 25-26. Section 25-26
(e) provides: ‘Each motion for modification shall state
the specific factual and legal basis for the claimed modi-
fication and shall include the outstanding order and
date thereof to which the motion for modification is
addressed.’ ’’ Petrov v. Gueorguieva, 167 Conn. App.
505, 513, 146 A.3d 26 (2016). The purpose of a pleading
‘‘is to limit the issues at trial, and . . . pleadings are
calculated to prevent surprise. . . . It is fundamental
in our law that the right of a [party] to recover is limited
to the allegations in his [pleading]. . . . Facts found
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but not averred cannot be made the basis for a recovery.
. . . Thus, it is clear that [t]he court is not permitted
to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings.
. . . A judgment in the absence of written pleadings
defining the issues would not merely be erroneous, it
would be void. . . . Breiter v. Breiter, [80 Conn. App.
332, 335–36, 835 A.2d 111 (2003)]; see also Westfall v.
Westfall, 46 Conn. App. 182, 185, 698 A.2d 927 (1997)
([a] judgment cannot be founded on a finding of facts
not in issue, although they may have been shown in
evidence to which no proper objection was taken
. . .).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov v.
Gueorguieva, supra, 516.
‘‘[I]n the context of motions to modify support orders,
we have held that a court’s reliance on a ground not
raised in a motion to modify is an abuse of discretion in
the absence of an amendment to the motion.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Marcus v. Cassara, 223
Conn. App. 69, 83–84, 308 A.3d 39 (2023); see, e.g., id., 84
(court improperly considered whether extracurricular
activities order was deviation under child support
guidelines and modified order on ground not contained
in motion for modification). ‘‘In exercising its statutory
authority to inquire into the best interests of the child,
the court cannot sua sponte decide a matter that has
not been put in issue, either by the parties or by the
court itself. Rather, it must . . . exercise that authority
in a manner consistent with the due process require-
ments of fair notice and reasonable opportunity to be
heard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov v.
Gueorguieva, supra, 167 Conn. App. 515.
In the present case, the defendant’s appeal challenges
the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to
modify 432. In that motion, the defendant did not raise
any claim seeking a modification on the ground that
one of his children had reached the age of majority,
and he acknowledged that fact at the hearing on April
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8, 2021. When the defendant requested that the court
also consider at that hearing his motion to modify 460,
in which such a claim was raised, the court expressly
declined to do so on the ground that motion to modify
460 had just been filed three days before the hearing,
and that proceeding on that motion would deprive the
plaintiff of an opportunity to prepare to defend against
the allegations raised in the motion. Moreover, the plain-
tiff’s counsel objected, arguing that the defendant, in
making that claim, was raising an issue that was entirely
separate from what he previously had raised and would
require ‘‘a separate hearing and separate preparation.’’
It is also noteworthy that the hearing on the defendant’s
motion to modify 432 did not resume until almost one
year later, on March 17, 2022. At no time between the
initial hearing date of April 8, 2021, and the second
hearing date of March 17, 2022, did the defendant, or
his counsel, who filed an appearance on April 13, 2021,
renew the defendant’s request that his motion to modify
460 be consolidated with his motion to modify 432.
Furthermore, at no time during the hearing on March
17, 2022, did the defendant, through his counsel, men-
tion his motion to modify 460, nor was any testimony
presented concerning the issue of one of the parties’
children reaching the age of majority. On the basis of
this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused
its discretion in declining to consider a claim that was
not raised in the motion before it and of which the
plaintiff had not been given proper notice.

To the extent that the defendant suggests he is enti-
tled to a reduction because one of his children has
turned eighteen years old, regardless of whether the
claim was made in the motion that was before the court,
we do not agree. This court has stated previously that
the fact that a child has attained the age of majority does
not ‘‘automatically entitle the [parent] to a reduction
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L. K. v. K. K.

in his alimony and support obligation’’ but, rather, ‘‘pro-
vides a basis for the [parent] to seek a modification.’’
Hughes v. Hughes, supra, 95 Conn. App. 209. Specifi-
cally, ‘‘[w]hen, as part of a divorce decree, a parent is
ordered to pay a specified amount periodically for the
benefit of more than one child, the emancipation of
one child does not automatically affect the liability of
the parent for the full amount. . . . The proper remedy
. . . is to seek a modification of the decree.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. The defendant in the pres-
ent case already has filed a motion to modify asserting
this ground as a basis for modifying his unallocated
alimony and child support obligation. When that motion
is heard, the parties can litigate the issue of whether
the parties took into consideration the children reach-
ing the age of majority when they crafted their agree-
ment regarding financial matters,10 which is structured
in such a way as to have two built-in step-downs: the
defendant is required to pay $12,500 monthly for three
years, after which he will pay ‘‘$7500 per month or
until their youngest son is eighteen years old . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) The present appeal, however, con-
cerns the court’s judgment denying a different motion
in which this issue was not raised. The defendant has
not directed this court to any authority, nor are we
aware of any, to support his claim that the court was
mandated under Connecticut law to take the ages of his
children into consideration when it denied his motion
to modify 432, even though that issue was not raised
in the motion before the court and the court specifically
stated that it would not be deciding the issue pertaining
10
This issue was suggested by the plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing on
April 8, 2021, when counsel objected to the defendant’s raising the issue of
the children reaching a certain age and stated, ‘‘Your Honor, I believe this
particular factor has been addressed in the original agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant.’’ The plaintiff’s appellate counsel also stated at
oral argument before this court that this issue was ‘‘contemplated by the
parties as [referenced] by [the] agreement
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L. K. v. K. K.

to the children reaching the age of majority, which
would be adjudicated at a different time, when the
defendant’s motion to modify 460 raising that issue is
heard. Indeed, the court arguably would have acted in
abuse of its discretion if it had decided the motion
before it on the basis of a ground not raised in the
motion. See Marcus v. Cassara, supra, 223 Conn.
App. 83–84.
We also briefly address the assertion by the defendant
in his appellate brief and by his appellate counsel at oral
argument before this court that evidence and testimony
concerning the issue of one of the parties’ children
reaching the age of majority were presented, without
objection, at the hearings in this matter. ‘‘[I]n the con-
text of a postjudgment appeal, if a review of the record
demonstrates that an unpleaded cause of action actually
was litigated at trial without objection such that the
opposing party cannot claim surprise or prejudice, the
judgment will not be disturbed on the basis of a pleading
irregularity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov
v. Gueorguieva, supra, 167 Conn. App. 517. The present
case, however, does not present such a circumstance.
First, the record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff’s
counsel objected to the court’s consideration of the
defendant’s motion to modify 460 and to the issue of
any of the children reaching a certain age being heard
at the hearing on April 8, 2021. Second, the only refer-
ences in the transcripts of the underlying proceedings to
one of the parties’ children attaining the age of eighteen
occurred when the court engaged in a colloquy at the
outset of the hearing with the plaintiff’s counsel and
the defendant, as a self-represented party, to clarify the
motions that were being heard at the hearing, which
occurred before the court heard testimony on any of
the motions. When the court heard testimony on the
defendant’s motion to modify 432 on March 17, 2022,
there was not a single reference to any of the children
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L. K. v. K. K.

reaching the age of majority in any of the testimony
presented.
The defendant asserts in his appellate brief multiple
times that he introduced testimony regarding the ages
of the children, without any citation to the transcripts.11
See Practice Book § 67-4. It is not clear whether the
defendant is asserting that his colloquy with the court
and opposing counsel constituted testimony and, thus,
evidence concerning the ages of the children. It is well
known that ‘‘arguments of counsel are not evidence
. . . .’’ State v. Gonzalez, 188 Conn. App. 304, 317, 204
A.3d 1183 (2019), aff’d, 338 Conn. 108, 257 A.3d 283
(2021). That rule applies equally to the statements and
arguments of parties who appear in a self-represented
capacity. As this court has stated: ‘‘Argument is argu-
ment, it is not evidence. . . . So, too, arguments of a
pro se litigant are not proof. . . . In re Justin F., 116
Conn. App. 83, 96, 976 A.2d 707, appeal dismissed, 292
Conn. 913, 973 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 914,
978 A.2d 1109 (2009), cert. denied sub nom. Albright-
Lazzari v. Connecticut, 559 U.S. 912, 130 S. Ct. 1298,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1087 (2010); see also Baker v. Baker, [95
Conn. App. 826, 832–33, 898 A.2d 253 (2006)] (represen-
tations of counsel are not evidence).’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 182 Conn. App. 736,
11
‘‘[A]lthough we recognize and adhere to the well-founded policy to
accord leeway to self-represented parties in the appeal process, our defer-
ence is not unlimited; nor is a litigant on appeal relieved of the obligation
to sufficiently articulate a claim so that it is recognizable to a reviewing
court.’’ Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pollard, 182 Conn. App. 483,
487, 189 A.3d 1232 (2018). ‘‘[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut
courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not
interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice
liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless,
[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of
self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law. . . . Burton v. Dept. of Environ-
mental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803–804, 256 A.3d 655 (2021).’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d
271 (2022).
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756, 191 A.3d 182 (2018), aff’d, 335 Conn. 377, 238 A.3d
687 (2020); see also, e.g., Berman v. Berman, supra,
203 Conn. App. 313 (self-represented defendant’s state-
ments and closing argument at hearing did not consti-
tute evidence).
Nevertheless, any such claim is unavailing given the
court’s ruling that motion to modify 460, in which the
claim concerning the ages of the children was raised,
was not before the court and would not be heard at
the hearing. Thus, the fact that the children’s ages were
mentioned during the brief colloquy between the court,
the plaintiff’s counsel and the defendant had no bearing
on the court’s decision. We also reject the defendant’s
argument that he introduced evidence of his children’s
ages, without objection, through the child support
guidelines worksheet he submitted, which shows the
dates of birth of the children. First, as this court has
stated previously, ‘‘[f]acts proved but not averred can-
not be made the basis of a recovery . . . . A judgment
cannot be founded on a finding of facts not in issue,
although they may have been shown in evidence to
which no proper objection was taken.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Westfall v. West-
fall, supra, 46 Conn. App. 185. Second, ‘‘[w]hen pre-
sented with a motion for modification, a court must
first determine whether there has been a substantial
change in the financial circumstances of one or both
of the parties. . . . Second, if the court finds a substan-
tial change in circumstances, it may properly consider
the motion and . . . make an order for modification.
. . .
‘‘In the context of a trial court’s consideration of a
motion to modify, the guidelines become relevant only
after a change in circumstances has been shown, if
that is the ground urged in support of modification
. . . or in determining whether the existing child sup-
port order substantially deviates from the guidelines,
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28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
L. K. v. K. K.

if that is the ground urged in support of modification.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Brown v. Brown, 199 Conn. App.
134, 157–58, 235 A.3d 555 (2020); see also De Almeida-
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 188 Conn. App. 670, 679, 205 A.3d
704 (‘‘because the defendant did not raise as a basis
for the court’s review his claim that his unallocated
alimony and child support obligation substantially devi-
ated from the child support guidelines, the court prop-
erly did not make findings under the child support
guidelines when it determined that there was not suffi-
cient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances
to justify modification’’), cert. denied, 332 Conn. 909,
210 A.3d 566 (2019). In the present case, because the
ground urged in support of motion to modify 432 was
that a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred, the guidelines would have been relevant only
after such a change in circumstances had been shown,
which the defendant failed to do.
Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s assertion that
the court, in its written order denying motion to modify
432, improperly failed to address the defendant’s claim
that a reduction in the child support component of the
unallocated order was warranted due to the fact that
one of the parties’ three children had reached the age
of majority.
III
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to modify by ignoring
the tax returns, financial statements and other financial
documents that had been submitted into evidence, and
that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings
in denying the motion to modify. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. In its written order denying the defendant’s
motion to modify 432, the court made the following
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findings: ‘‘At the time of entering the agreement in May,
2019, the defendant filed a financial affidavit (pleading
[number] 408 [on the trial court docket]). He listed gross
weekly income of $3867.07 and net weekly income of
$2891.99. He listed total liabilities of $1,810,471.69 and
total cash value of assets of $231,645. Additionally, he
listed total weekly expenses and liabilities of $1486.
The defendant list[ed] on his financial affidavit dated
[April 5, 2021] (pleading [number] 462 [on the trial court
docket]), gross weekly wage at $2423 and his net weekly
wage at $1691.51. The defendant list[ed] total weekly
expenses and liabilities at $1215 and total liabilities to
be $2,160,721. In neither of the defendant’s affidavits
[did] he list when the debts were incurred or the weekly
payments. Taking the defendant’s financial affidavit at
face value, he pays $812 per week for rent or mortgage
and $80 per week for restaurants.
‘‘In 2019, the defendant listed ownership of a house
in Weston. He failed to list the value and only the mort-
gage. In 2022, the home disappeared from his financial
affidavit; however, the defendant testified [that] he con-
tinued to reside in the home and pay for improvements.
The defendant purchased a Mercedes Benz automobile
for his employees to drive and a new Jeep for himself.
He continues to live an extravagant lifestyle for an indi-
vidual with failing health and reduced income, as he
claims. The defendant asserts a reduction in business
income as a result of the pandemic; however, he
reduced the payments of alimony and child support
prior to the commencement of the pandemic. Moreover,
he received pandemic loans and assistance. The court
does not find the defendant’s testimony credible.’’ The
court stated further that ‘‘[a] review of the evidence
shows the defendant has no issue spending on himself,
including meals out, travel and transportation. The
defendant paid off significant debts during the period
of time he engaged in self-help and reduced his alimony
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L. K. v. K. K.

and child support payments to the plaintiff. The defen-
dant controlled sufficient funds to pay his agreed upon
alimony and child support order; however, he unilater-
ally chose not to do so.’’
As we stated previously in this opinion, we review the
trial court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion
to modify his unallocated alimony and child support
obligation under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Berman v. Berman, supra, 203 Conn. App. 303. That
is, we ‘‘will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic
relations cases unless the court has abused its discre-
tion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude
as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of
its action. . . . [T]he trial court’s findings [of fact] are
binding upon this court unless they are clearly errone-
ous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the
record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erro-
neous when there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port it . . . or when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id.
Under § 46b-86 (a), the defendant had the burden,
as the party seeking a modification, of establishing a
substantial change in circumstances since the last court
order, which was the parties’ May 2, 2019 agreement.
See id., 304. The establishment of a substantial change
in circumstances is a condition precedent for the party
seeking relief. See id. Only if such a change is estab-
lished may the court ‘‘properly consider the motion and,
on the basis of the [General Statutes § 46b-84] criteria,
make an order for modification. . . . A finding of a
substantial change in circumstances is subject to the
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L. K. v. K. K.

clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. In the present case, the trial
court, which cited the proper standard in its decision,
made no express finding concerning whether a substan-
tial change in circumstances had been established. A
fair reading of the court’s decision denying the motion
to modify, however, leads us to conclude that the court
implicitly found that no substantial change in circum-
stances had been established by the defendant. See
id., 310.
On appeal, the defendant first asserts that the court
ignored ‘‘all tax returns, financial statements, debt state-
ments and hundreds of pages of other financial docu-
ments that were in evidence.’’ In particular, the defen-
dant argues that the court improperly ignored the
information on his financial affidavit. We do not agree.
Although the defendant argues that the court
‘‘ignored’’ his income and the information set forth on
his financial affidavit, it is clear that the court, instead,
did not credit that information. See Gainty v. Infantino,
222 Conn. App. 785, 809–10, 306 A.3d 1171 (2023)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that court improperly
failed to consider financial affidavits when ‘‘court
expressly found the defendant not credible with respect
to his claimed decrease in earnings’’), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024); Giordano v. Giordano,
203 Conn. App. 652, 659, 249 A.3d 363 (2021) (court
did not ignore defendant’s letters and accounting but,
rather, discredited them, and this court would not dis-
turb that credibility determination). In doing so, the
court noted that certain information was missing from
the defendant’s financial affidavit concerning when cer-
tain claimed debts were incurred. It also found a dis-
crepancy concerning a home in which the defendant
resided, as the defendant listed ownership of the home
on his 2019 financial affidavit but the home was not
mentioned on the defendant’s most current financial
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affidavit, despite his testimony that he continued to
reside there and pay for improvements. The defendant
was questioned extensively about his tax returns and
discrepancies on those returns, as well as concerning
discrepancies with his revenue and expenses as set
forth on an expense summary versus his tax returns,
which showed different numbers. Contrary to the defen-
dant’s assertions, the court was not required to credit
the defendant’s updated financial affidavit. See Talbot
v. Talbot, 148 Conn. App. 279, 293–94, 85 A.3d 40, cert.
denied, 311 Conn. 954, 97 A.3d 984 (2014). As this court
has stated previously, ‘‘[c]redibility must be assessed
. . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by
observing firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor and
attitude. . . . An appellate court must defer to the trier
of fact’s assessment of credibility because [i]t is the
[fact finder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus
[the fact finder] is best able to judge the credibility of
the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences there-
from. . . . Because the trial court is the sole arbiter
of witness credibility, it has discretion to reject even
uncontested evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Blum v. Blum, 109 Conn. App.
316, 329, 951 A.2d 587, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 929, 958
A.2d 157 (2008).

The court also expressly stated in its decision that
it did not find the defendant’s testimony credible with
respect to his claimed decrease in income, and it is not
for this court to second-guess that credibility determina-
tion. ‘‘The trial court . . . is not bound by the uncontra-
dicted testimony of any witness . . . and is in fact free
to reject such testimony. . . . [T]he trial court is free
to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence
presented by any witness, having the opportunity to
observe the witnesses and gauge their credibility. . . .
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This court defers to the trial court’s discretion in mat-
ters of determining credibility and the weight to be
given to a witness’ testimony. . . . We cannot retry the
matter, nor can we pass on the credibility of a witness.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn. App. 813, 878–79, 784
A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 788 A.2d 95 (2001),
and cert. denied sub nom. Vernon Village, Inc. v. Giu-
lietti, 258 Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 97 (2001), and cert.
denied, 258 Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 96 (2001), and cert.
denied sub nom. Giulietti v. Vernon Village, Inc., 258
Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 96 (2001). We, therefore, reject the
defendant’s claim that the court abused its discretion
by ignoring his financial affidavit and other financial
documents.
The defendant also asserts that the court made a
number of clearly erroneous findings, namely, that the
defendant asserted a reduction in his business income
as a result of the pandemic, that the defendant paid
off significant debts during the time period when he
reduced his alimony and child support payments to
the plaintiff, that the court did not find his testimony
credible, that he continued to live an extravagant life-
style and that he ‘‘controlled sufficient funds to pay
the agreed upon alimony and child support order [but]
unilaterally chose not to do so.’’12 We disagree.
12
The defendant also asserts, without any analysis, that ‘‘[t]he holding
[in] Ferraro v. Ferraro, 168 Conn. App. 723, 147 A.3d 188 (2016), necessitates
reversal in this case.’’ In Ferraro, this court concluded that the trial court’s
‘‘finding as to the defendant’s weekly net income [was] without evidentiary
support’’ because ‘‘[t]he federal and state tax deduction figures used by the
court to determine net income, as reflected in its . . . child support guide-
lines worksheet, did not come from the parties’ testimony at trial, the exhibits
submitted, or the parties’ financial affidavits.’’ Id., 733. We decline to review
this claim as inadequately briefed, as the defendant has simply made the
conclusory statement that Ferraro ‘‘necessitates reversal,’’ without any
explanation about how the circumstances in Ferraro apply to the present
case. See Simms v. Zucco, 214 Conn. App. 525, 546 n.14, 280 A.3d 1226
(When an ‘‘assertion is unaccompanied by any supporting analysis . . . we
decline to review this claim on the ground that it is inadequately briefed.
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With respect to the court’s finding that ‘‘[t]he defen-
dant asserts a reduction in business income as a result
of the pandemic; however, he reduced the payments of
alimony and child support prior to the commencement
of the pandemic,’’ the defendant asserts that his Janu-
ary, 2020 motion to modify did not list COVID-19 as a
reason for the modification sought. Nevertheless, in
his testimony at the hearing on March 17, 2022, the
defendant referred to COVID-19 numerous times. Spe-
cifically, he testified that he has health issues and recur-
ring lung problems as a result of having contracted
COVID-19 twice, and how that has affected his business,
including that it caused him to close down his office.
He testified further how all of these issues caused his
income to substantially decrease. When asked if he
believed that his income had substantially decreased
‘‘based on all these factors, COVID-19, your health
issues, any other factors [or his] business,’’ he
responded that, prior to COVID-19, he started ‘‘losing
a bunch of business,’’ but that COVID-19 ‘‘accentuated
all that on top of it.’’ At another point in his testimony
the defendant clearly stated, ‘‘[COVID-19] affected my
business.’’ In summary, the defendant repeatedly
referred to COVID-19 in his testimony explaining his
purported decrease in income, which was a ground
raised in his motion to modify 432. It was not unreason-
able, therefore, for the court to find that the defendant,
in claiming in his motion to modify that his income had
decreased, was asserting COVID-19 as a basis, even
though COVID-19 had not been referenced specifically
in the motion. We conclude that the court’s finding was
based on the defendant’s testimony and was not clearly
erroneous.
See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 749, 183 A.3d 611
(2018) (declining to review claim asserted in single sentence as inadequately
briefed); Studer v. Studer, 320 Conn. 483, 493 n.11, 131 A.3d 240 (2016)
(declining to review claim that was made in four sentences in appellate brief
as inadequately briefed).’’), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 919, 284 A.3d 982 (2022).
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The defendant next argues that the court’s finding
that he ‘‘paid off significant debts during the period of
time he engaged in self-help and reduced his alimony
and child support payment to the plaintiff’’ is clearly
erroneous. In making that argument, the defendant
relies on his financial affidavits as well as his testimony
at the hearings. As we stated previously in this opinion,
the court reasonably could have found not credible
the defendant’s testimony and the information in his
financial affidavit, and we will not second-guess the
court’s credibility determinations. This claim, there-
fore, fails.
Finally, the defendant asserts that the following state-
ments of the court are unsupported by the record: (1)
‘‘[t]he court does not find the defendant’s testimony
credible’’; (2) the defendant ‘‘continues to live an extrav-
agant lifestyle for an individual with failing health and
reduced income as he claims’’; and (3) ‘‘[t]he defendant
controlled sufficient funds to pay the agreed upon ali-
mony and child support order; however, he unilaterally
chose not to do so.’’ There is no merit to the defendant’s
assertions. First, it was within the discretion of the
court, as the sole arbiter of witness credibility, to find
the defendant’s testimony not credible, even if it was
uncontested. See Blum v. Blum, supra, 109 Conn. App.
329. That ‘‘credibility finding is unassailable on appeal.
See Ruiz v. Gatling, 73 Conn. App. 574, 576, 808 A.2d
710 (2002) (‘[w]here the trial court is the arbiter of
credibility, this court does not disturb findings made
on the basis of the credibility of witnesses’).’’ J. Wm.
Foley, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. App.
27, 57, 118 A.3d 573 (2015). Second, there was evidence
and testimony in the record to support those findings
of the court. Given all of the discrepancies in the defen-
dant’s claimed expenses and income, one of which
amounted to a $40,000 difference, the court’s failure to
credit the defendant’s testimony regarding the decrease
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in his business income, as well as the evidence and
testimony concerning a loan from the defendant to
another individual for $138,000, the court reasonably
could have concluded that the defendant had sufficient
funds to pay his alimony and child support obligation.
Its finding about the defendant’s extravagant lifestyle
is further supported by the evidence concerning the
defendant’s purchases of a Mercedes Benz automobile
for his employees to drive and a new Jeep for himself,
despite the defendant’s claims of his reduced income.
According to the defendant’s testimony, he purchased
the Jeep for $40,000. The record also contains the defen-
dant’s credit card statements, which provide further
evidence of his extensive spending on such things as
restaurants, clothing, and home improvements. In fact,
the defendant testified that, in 2019, he spent $8600
on clothing, which amounted to about $700 worth of
clothing every month, and $16,000 on restaurants. On
the basis of this record, we conclude that the court’s
findings are supported by evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.
Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate
that the court erred in denying his motion to modify
his unallocated alimony and child support obligation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.