Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

JAMES DEMARCO v. CHARTER OAK TEMPLE
RESTORATION ASSOCIATION, INC.
(AC 46099)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment rendered for the
defendant employer on the plaintiff’s claim for employment discrimina-
tion pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
(CFEPA) (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s
employment shortly after the plaintiff took a leave of absence to be
with his newborn son. The son suffered from various ailments, all alleg-
edly serious medical conditions that rendered him physically disabled
within the meaning of CFEPA. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that the defendant had violated a provision (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) of CFEPA
when it terminated the plaintiff’s employment because of his association
with a disabled individual, namely, his son. The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion to strike the operative complaint on the ground that
§ 46a-60 (b) (1) did not apply to claims of discrimination arising from
an employee’s association with a physically disabled individual. Held
that the trial court properly concluded that CFEPA does not create a
cause of action for associational discrimination: although the plain and
unambiguous language of § 46a-60 (b) (1) clearly protects physically
disabled employees from being discharged from their employment on
account of their own physical disabilities, there is no language in § 46a-
60 (b) (1) or elsewhere in CFEPA that extends protection to employees
who, though not physically disabled themselves, associate with physi-
cally disabled individuals; moreover, although CFEPA is remedial in
nature and, therefore, must be interpreted, whenever reasonably possi-
ble, to effectuate the beneficent purpose of eliminating employment
related discrimination, that principle of statutory construction did not
authorize this court to ignore the plain language of § 46a-60 (b) (1) and
the limits that the language places on achieving this purpose; further-
more, the application of the plain and unambiguous language of § 46a-
60 (b) (1) does not lead to bizarre or unreasonable results and the
statute as literally construed reaches the entire protected class of
employees who have physical disabilities.

Argued December 4, 2023—officially released June 18, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for employment discrimi-
nation, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Rosen, J., granted the defendant’s motion to
strike; thereafter, the court, Rosen, J., granted the plain-
tiff’s motion for judgment and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Bernard E. Jacques, with whom was Lauren T. Gra-
ham, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, James Demarco, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the defendant, Charter Oak Temple Restoration Asso-
ciation, Inc., following the granting of the defendant’s
motion to strike the plaintiff’s revised complaint. The
revised complaint alleged that the defendant violated
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1),1 a provision of the
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA),
General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., by terminating the
plaintiff’s employment because of his association with
a disabled individual. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
1
General Statutes § 46a-60 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) It shall be a
discriminatory practice in violation of this section:
‘‘(1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except
in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to
hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual
or to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color,
religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status,
national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellec-
tual disability, learning disability, physical disability, including, but not lim-
ited to, blindness, status as a veteran or status as a victim of domestic
violence . . . .’’
Section 46a-60 was amended after the plaintiff’s employment was termi-
nated in 2018; see, e.g., Public Acts 2019, No. 19-16, § 4; and again after he
initiated this action in 2021; see, e.g., Public Acts 2022, No. 22-78, §§ 7 and
8; but those changes are not relevant to this appeal. For convenience, we
refer to the current revision of § 46a-60.
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

the trial court improperly concluded that his allegations
failed to state a valid cause of action under CFEPA
because, as the court determined, CFEPA does not rec-
ognize claims for associational discrimination on the
basis of disability. We disagree with the plaintiff and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history and facts, as alleged
in the plaintiff’s revised complaint,2 are relevant to our
resolution of the issue on appeal. The plaintiff had been
employed by the defendant as a programming coordina-
tor since March 25, 2017. The plaintiff was qualified for
that job, was not inattentive at work and performed his
job well. At some point prior to November 7, 2018, the
plaintiff took a leave of absence from work to be with
his newborn son, who suffered from jaundice, lip tie
and silent reflux, all serious medical conditions that
rendered his son physically disabled within the meaning
of CFEPA. On November 7, 2018, the defendant termi-
nated the plaintiff’s employment. During the plaintiff’s
termination meeting, the defendant made reference to
the fact that the plaintiff’s son was ill. The defendant
believed that the plaintiff’s association with his disabled
son would cause the plaintiff to be inattentive at work.
In response to the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff
filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights
and Opportunities (commission) on May 3, 2019. The
commission issued a release of jurisdiction on October
29, 2020, and on January 27, 2021, the plaintiff com-
menced this action alleging that the defendant ‘‘violated
[CFEPA] when [it] terminated the [plaintiff’s employ-
ment] because of his association with a disabled individ-
ual,’’ namely, his son. The plaintiff filed a revised com-
plaint on May 24, 2021, and the defendant filed a motion
2
‘‘[I]n ruling on a motion to strike, we take the facts alleged in the com-
plaint as true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ring v. Litchfield Banc-
orp, 174 Conn. App. 813, 815, 167 A.3d 462 (2017).
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

to strike the revised complaint in its entirety. In support
of its motion, the defendant argued that the plain lan-
guage of CFEPA does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of an employee’s association with a disabled
individual. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defen-
dant’s motion in which he argued that ‘‘CFEPA permits
claims to be brought by individuals not specifically
included in CFEPA’s list of protected classes’’ and that,
consequently, he had properly stated a claim for associ-
ational discrimination. The defendant subsequently
filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objection.
On February 10, 2022, the court, Rosen, J., granted
the defendant’s motion to strike. The court concluded
that § 46a-60 (b) (1) is ‘‘clear and unambiguous’’ and,
by its plain language, ‘‘applies only to discrimination
based on [a plaintiff’s own] disabilities, not to alleged
discrimination based on [a plaintiff’s] association with
an individual with a disability.’’ In support of its conclu-
sion, the court observed that, ‘‘when the legislature
intended to broaden the scope of a discrimination stat-
ute to include persons associated with a disability, it
expressly did so,’’ as exemplified by General Statutes
§ 46a-64c (a) (6) (A) and (B), which prohibits associa-
tional discrimination in the housing context. The plain-
tiff thereafter filed a motion for judgment, which the
court granted on December 5, 2022. This appeal fol-
lowed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court’s conclu-
sion that CFEPA does not prohibit disability discrimina-
tion by association derives from too narrow an interpre-
tation of § 46a-60 (b) (1) and defeats its remedial
purpose. The defendant responds that the plain lan-
guage of § 46a-60 (b) (1) leaves no room for interpreta-
tion. It argues that § 46a-60 (b) (1) clearly and unambig-
uously provides protection from discrimination to
individuals who themselves have physical disabilities
but not to individuals based upon their association with
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

other individuals who have physical disabilities. We
agree with the defendant that CFEPA does not create
a cause of action for associational discrimination as
the plaintiff contends.
We begin our analysis by setting forth our standard
of review and the legal principles relevant to our resolu-
tion of this claim. ‘‘The purpose of a motion to strike
is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations
of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. . . . A motion to strike challenges the
legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently,
requires no factual findings by the trial court. . . . [The
court takes] the facts to be those alleged in the com-
plaint . . . and [construes] the complaint in the man-
ner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.
. . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would
support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be
denied. . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily
implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.
. . . It is fundamental that in determining the suffi-
ciency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s
motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts
necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as
admitted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mash-
antucket Pequot Tribal Nation v. Factory Mutual Ins.
Co., 224 Conn. App. 429, 441–42, 313 A.3d 1219 (2024).
In the present case, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to strike because it concluded that CFEPA, and
§ 46a-60 (b) (1) more specifically, does not apply to
claims of discrimination arising from an employee’s
association with a physically disabled individual. Analy-
sis of this legal conclusion presents a question of statu-
tory construction over which we exercise plenary
review. See Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc.,
314 Conn. 773, 782, 105 A.3d 103 (2014).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered. General Statutes § 1-2z.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Seramonte Associ-
ates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 83–84, 282 A.3d
1253 (2022). ‘‘[A] statute is plain and unambiguous when
the meaning . . . is so strongly indicated or suggested
by the [statutory] language . . . that . . . it appears
to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other
likely meaning. . . . [I]f the text of the statute at issue
. . . would permit more than one likely or plausible
meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and
unambiguous.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.,
338 Conn. 687, 698 n.6, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021).
We now turn to the language of § 46a-60 (b), which
provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory
practice in violation of this section . . . (1) For an
employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent,
except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
to discharge from employment any individual or to
discriminate against any individual in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed,
age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status,
national origin, ancestry, present or past history of men-
tal disability, intellectual disability, learning disability,
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

physical disability, including, but not limited to, blind-
ness, status as a veteran or status as a victim of domestic
violence . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) These plain and
unambiguous terms prohibit employers from ‘‘discrimi-
nating against any employee or prospective employee
in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’’
McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 67, 946 A.2d 862
(2008). With respect to a discrimination claim based on
disability, § 46a-60 (b) (1) prohibits an employer from
‘‘discharg[ing] from employment any individual . . .
because of the individual’s . . . physical disability
. . . .’’3 (Emphasis added.) The use of the term ‘‘individ-
ual’s’’ as a possessive noun attached to ‘‘physical disabil-
ity’’ plainly establishes that the ‘‘physical disability’’ is
that of the employee. See Glastonbury Volunteer
Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Com-
mission, 227 Conn. 848, 852, 633 A.2d 305 (1993) (con-
struing statute ‘‘in the light of ordinary rules of English
grammar and sentence structure’’). This language
evinces only one meaning—that § 46a-60 (b) (1) pro-
tects physically disabled employees from being dis-
charged from their employment on account of their
own physical disabilities. See Ledyard v. WMS Gaming,
Inc., supra, 338 Conn. 698 n.6; see also Desrosiers v.
Diageo North America, Inc., supra, 314 Conn. 775
(‘‘[u]nder [CFEPA] . . . employers may not discrimi-
nate against certain protected classes of individuals,
including those who are physically disabled’’).
Moreover, as the plaintiff recognizes, there is no lan-
guage in § 46a-60 (b) (1), or elsewhere in CFEPA, that
extends protection to employees who, though not physi-
cally disabled themselves, associate with physically dis-
abled individuals. ‘‘[I]t is a well settled principle of statu-
tory construction that the legislature knows how to
General Statutes § 46a-51 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(15) ‘Physically
3

disabled’ refers to any individual who has any chronic physical handicap,
infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury,
organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to,
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

convey its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or
limiting terms when it chooses to do so.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Costanzo v. Plainfield, 344
Conn. 86, 108, 277 A.3d 772 (2022). In fact, as the trial
court observed, the legislature did precisely that in
§ 46a-64c (a) (6) (A) and (B), pertaining to discrimina-
tion in housing practices. Section 46a-64c (a) (6) (A)
and (B) expressly prohibits discrimination in connec-
tion with the sale or rental of a dwelling to any buyer
or renter because of, inter alia, ‘‘a . . . physical . . .
disability of . . . any person associated with such
buyer or renter. . . .’’ This supports the conclusion
that, if the legislature had intended to include disability
discrimination by association within the purview of
CFEPA, it would have conveyed that intent expressly.
Indeed, ‘‘[w]here a statute, with reference to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such provi-
sion from a similar statute concerning a related subject
. . . is significant to show that a different intention
existed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Cody M., 337 Conn. 92, 103, 259 A.3d 576 (2020).
A long-standing distinction between CFEPA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (2018), buttresses this conclusion. See
Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for
Women, 168 Conn. 26, 35 n.5, 357 A.2d 498 (1975) (‘‘we
follow the usual rule in statutory interpretation that
the difference between the state and federal acts was
purposeful and is meaningful’’). The ADA prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of physical disability at the
federal level and, unlike CFEPA, it expressly prohibits
employers from ‘‘excluding or otherwise denying equal
jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship
epilepsy, deafness or being hard of hearing or reliance on a wheelchair or
other remedial appliance or device . . . .’’
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

or association . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (b) (4) (2018). The ADA was enacted in 1990;
see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327; and, although our legislature has
amended CFEPA several times since 1990, it has not
adopted the same or similar language. This strongly
suggests that our legislature intended to maintain this
distinction between CFEPA and the ADA and that its
decision not to include associational discrimination
within the scope of CFEPA was purposeful. See Beason
v. United Technologies Corp., 337 F.3d 271, 277–78 (2d
Cir. 2003) (‘‘Given that the definition of disability used
by the ADA essentially pre-dates the definition of physi-
cal disability promulgated by the Connecticut General
Assembly for [CFEPA], the General Assembly, had it
wished to do so, could have adopted the ADA definition.
The fact that the General Assembly chose not to adopt
that language readily supports an inference that the
Connecticut legislature appreciated the scope of the
ADA definition and intended the CFEPA definition to
be different.’’); Wallace v. Caring Solutions, LLC, 213
Conn. App. 605, 625–26, 278 A.3d 586 (2022) (legisla-
ture’s failure to alter causation standard for CFEPA
discrimination claims to comport with standards
employed at federal level, despite having amended
CFEPA numerous times, was indicative of its intention
to maintain existing standard). We conclude, for these
reasons, that § 46a-60 (b) (1), by its plain and unambigu-
ous terms, does not prohibit disability discrimination
by association.
The plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that we should con-
strue § 46a-60 (b) (1) ‘‘to include the protection of
employees from associational disability discrimination
even though such protection is not explicitly stated’’
therein. He relies primarily on ‘‘CFEPA’s remedial pur-
pose’’ and argues that the ‘‘broad interpretation’’ he
advocates furthers the legislature’s intent to ‘‘stamp out
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

employment discrimination in all of its forms.’’ He also
places great emphasis on our Supreme Court’s decision
in Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., supra, 314
Conn. 773, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
decision in Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 992
N.E.2d 354 (2013), and cases construing Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments.

With respect to the plaintiff’s reliance on CFEPA’s
remedial purpose, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that remedial stat-
utes should be construed liberally in favor of those
whom the law is intended to protect . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hernandez v. Apple Auto
Wholesalers of Waterbury, LLC, 338 Conn. 803, 815, 259
A.3d 1157 (2021). To this end, we acknowledge that
CFEPA generally reflects this state’s laudable public
policy to eliminate employment related discrimination.
See, e.g., McWeeny v. Hartford, supra, 287 Conn. 70;
Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260
Conn. 691, 706, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). Even so, ‘‘[a]lthough
we agree that the important and salutary public policy
expressed in the antidiscrimination provisions of [§ 46a-
60 (b) (1)] cannot be overstated . . . the plain language
of [§ 46a-60 (b) (1)] limiting its protections to [the class
of persons identified therein] is, itself, an expression
of public policy that cannot be separated from the policy
reflected in the [statute’s] ban on discriminatory
employment practices.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford, supra, 70.
‘‘[O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .
[W]e are not free to accomplish a result that is contrary
to [that] intent . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance, 322 Conn. 154,
165, 140 A.3d 190 (2016).
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

Construing § 46a-60 (b) (1) as the plaintiff proposes
would contravene, not further, the legislature’s clearly
expressed intent. Although CFEPA is remedial in nature
and, therefore, must be interpreted, whenever reason-
ably possible, to effectuate the beneficent purpose of
eliminating employment related discrimination, that
principle of statutory construction does not authorize
this court to ignore the plain language of § 46a-60 (b)
(1) and the limits that the language places on achieving
this purpose. See Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 697,
699 A.2d 52 (1997) (‘‘[a]lthough the parties . . . called
. . . attention to the public policy implication of [the]
case, the issue presented [was], at bottom, a matter of
statutory construction’’). As we have explained, § 46a-
60 (b) (1) clearly and unambiguously limits the class
of individuals CFEPA protects from employment dis-
crimination based upon a physical disability to those
who are, themselves, physically disabled. It is the prov-
ince of the legislature, not this court, to determine
whether to expand this class by adding disability dis-
crimination by association to the list of practices § 46a-
60 (b) (1) prohibits. See Stratford Police Dept. v. Board
of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343 Conn. 62, 73, 272
A.3d 639 (2022) (‘‘it is well settled that [this court is]
not permitted to supply statutory language that the leg-
islature may have chosen to omit’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The case law upon which the plaintiff relies to sup-
port his argument that we should read protection
against disability discrimination by association into
CFEPA also is unpersuasive. Turning first to our
Supreme Court’s opinion in Desrosiers v. Diageo North
America, Inc., supra, 314 Conn. 773, the plaintiff argues
that the court in that case broadly construed CFEPA
to protect individuals who were perceived as disabled
even though ‘‘such protection [was] not explicitly
stated’’ and that we should apply the same logic ‘‘in
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

order to permit [his] claim of disability discrimination
by association.’’ The plaintiff’s reliance on Desrosiers
is misplaced.
In Desrosiers, the plaintiff’s employer terminated her
employment the day after she informed her manager
that she would need time off to have surgery to address
a tumor on her shoulder. Desrosiers v. Diageo North
America, Inc., supra, 314 Conn. 777. She brought an
action in which she alleged, among other things, that
her employer had discriminated against her on the basis
of her ‘‘physical disability and/or her perceived disabil-
ity.’’ Id., 778. The trial court granted the employer’s
motion for summary judgment to the extent the plaintiff
alleged a cause of action based on a perceived disability
because ‘‘a cause of action based on a perceived disabil-
ity is not a legally recognized action in Connecticut.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The disputed
issue on appeal was whether CFEPA’s prohibition
against discrimination based on an ‘‘individual’s . . .
physical disability’’ pertained only to individuals who,
in fact, had physical disabilities or whether those indi-
viduals who were merely perceived by their employers
as being physically disabled were protected as well.
Id., 775.
After examining the pertinent provisions of § 46a-60,
the court in Desrosiers concluded that the statute’s
plain text did ‘‘not protect individuals who are perceived
to be physically disabled from employment discrimina-
tion . . . .’’ Id., 784. The court explained, however, that
a literal application of that language to the facts in
Desrosiers would lead to bizarre results. Id., 785–86.
The court reasoned that, ‘‘under the plain [statutory]
language . . . if an employee has a chronic disease,
the employer may not discharge the employee on that
basis. If, however, the employee is undergoing testing
that leads his employer to believe that he has a chronic
disease, the literal terms of [the statute] do not protect
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

the employee from discharge on that basis, despite the
fact that the employer’s action, in both cases, was prem-
ised on the same discriminatory purpose. Similarly . . .
an employee who is discharged because his employer
believes a rumor that he has a chronic impairment can
pursue a cause of action, but only if the rumor is true
and the employee actually has the chronic impairment.
If the rumor is false, and the employee does not have
the impairment, but is merely believed to have the
impairment, the employee has no recourse, despite the
fact that in either case the employer’s action was based
on the same discriminatory motive.’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Id., 785. In other words, it should not matter
whether the physical disability was perceived or actual
because either way the employer’s actions would be
predicated on the ‘‘individual’s . . . physical disabil-
ity.’’ A literal application of the statutory language to
the facts in Desrosiers, however, would not have pro-
hibited all discriminatory actions based upon an ‘‘indi-
vidual’s . . . physical disability,’’ and thus some mem-
bers of the protected class would have been left
vulnerable to discrimination and without recourse.
Because that interpretation would have led to an
absurd and unworkable result, the court considered
extratextual evidence to assist in its construction of
the statute and, after doing so, held that CFEPA also
‘‘protects individuals who are perceived to be physically
disabled from employment discrimination . . . .’’ Des-
rosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., supra, 314 Conn.
781. The court did not broadly construe CFEPA’s plain
and unambiguous language to add a new protected class
of persons that the legislature did not identify. Rather, it
interpreted CFEPA in accordance with the well settled
rules of statutory construction to give effect to the
‘‘legislature’s clear statement that discrimination based
on [an individual’s] physical disability is prohibited’’
and concluded that it applied to all the members of that
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Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

protected class. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 785–86.
In the present case, the application of the plain and
unambiguous language of § 46a-60 (b) (1) does not lead
to bizarre or unreasonable results and the plaintiff does
not argue otherwise. Applied literally, § 46a-60 (b) (1)
allows employees to bring discrimination claims based
on their own protected conditions, including, but not
limited to, their own physical disabilities. As applied
to the facts of this case, and unlike the situation in
Desrosiers, the statute as literally construed reaches the
entire protected class of employees who have physical
disabilities. Although the plaintiff is an employee, he
does not have a physical disability. Likewise, although
the plaintiff’s son has a physical disability, he is not an
employee or a prospective employee. Thus, neither is
a member of the protected class and, consequently,
Desrosiers provides no support for the position advo-
cated by the plaintiff.
Nor does Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., supra, 466 Mass. 23,
advance the plaintiff’s cause. In Flagg, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that claims for associ-
ational discrimination based on a handicap fit within
the scope of the Commonwealth’s antidiscrimination
statutory scheme even though the applicable statutory
provision, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4 (16) (2012), did
not expressly identify such claims as a form of unlawful
employment discrimination. Id., 24. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court recited the relevant statutory lan-
guage4 and ‘‘[t]he general and familiar rule . . . that a
4
The court in Flagg was interpreting the following pertinent language
from Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4 (16) (2012), which makes it unlawful
‘‘[f]or any employer, personally or through an agent, to dismiss from employ-
ment or refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discrim-
inate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified
handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the
position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation required to be made to the physical
or mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

statute must be interpreted according to the intent of
the [l]egislature ascertained from all its words con-
strued by the ordinary and approved usage of the lan-
guage, considered in connection with the cause of its
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied
and the main object to be accomplished.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 28. The court then looked
to the purpose and objectives of the statute before
‘‘return[ing] to the language of’’ the statute; id., 31; and
evaluating that language ‘‘in the context of the overarch-
ing purpose of the statute itself.’’ Id., 28. The court did
not assess, in the first instance, the text of the statute to
ascertain whether that text was plain and unambiguous
and, if so, whether its application yielded absurd or
unworkable results, before turning to extratextual evi-
dence, as we are required to do. See, e.g., Desrosiers
v. Diageo North America, Inc., supra, 314 Conn. 785;
see also State v. Ruocco, 151 Conn. App. 732, 753–54,
95 A.3d 573 (2014) (‘‘Section 1-2z directs us to determine
the meaning from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after doing so, the term
is plain and unambiguous then our inquiry ends and
extratextual evidence shall not be considered.’’), aff’d,
322 Conn. 796, 144 A.3d 354 (2016); Matamoros v. Bro-
ward Sheriff’s Office, 2 F.4th 1329, 1332–33 (11th Cir.
2021) (plain language of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,
Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq., does not prohibit discrimina-
tion based on plaintiff’s association with disabled indi-
vidual); Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC,
617 S.W.3d 339, 341–42 (Ky. 2021) (plain language of
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010
et seq., does not create cause of action for associational
discrimination). As set forth herein, the plain text of
§ 46a-60 (b) (1) and its relationship to other Connecticut
statutes provide no indication that CFEPA prohibits
employer’s business . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., supra, 466 Mass. 27–28.
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

disability discrimination by association. Accordingly,
Flagg is not persuasive precedent for purposes of our
resolution of the present case.
Finally, the plaintiff relies on Title VII5 and the deci-
sions by courts that, he claims, have interpreted it ‘‘to
ban [associational] discrimination.’’ Although courts
have recognized associational discrimination as a viola-
tion of Title VII, the circumstances in which they have
done so involve allegations of discrimination due to the
employee’s own protected condition. See, e.g., Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 128 (2d Cir.
2018) (recognizing violation of Title VII for associational
discrimination based on sex and holding that ‘‘sexual
orientation discrimination . . . is based on an employ-
er’s opposition to association between particular sexes
and thereby discriminates against an employee based
on their own sex’’ (emphasis added)), aff’d sub nom.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020); Holcomb v. Iona College, 521
F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (‘‘where an employee is
subjected to adverse action because an employer disap-
proves of interracial association, the employee suffers
discrimination because of the employee’s own race’’
(emphasis in original)); Parr v. Woodmen of the World
Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (‘‘[w]here
a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interra-
cial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition,
5
‘‘In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous
announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant
to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees. . . . The text
of Title VII provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.
2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 140 S. Ct.
1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020).
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18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc.

that he has been discriminated against because of his
race’’ (emphasis altered)). Here, the plaintiff is not alleg-
ing discrimination based upon his own protected condi-
tion but, rather, the protected condition of someone
else.
For these reasons, we conclude that the court prop-
erly granted the defendant’s motion to strike because
§ 46a-60 (b) (1), by its plain and unambiguous terms,
does not prohibit disability discrimination by associa-
tion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.