GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

GHP MEDIA, INC. v. TANYA HUGHES ET AL.
(AC 44921)
Alvord, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, G Co., a printing company, sought to recover damages from
the defendants T Co., a rival printing company, and H, a former employee
of G Co., in connection with H’s alleged theft and use of G Co.’s trade
secret information and other intellectual property for the benefit of T
Co. H, as an employee of G Co., had access to confidential, proprietary,
and trade secret information belonging to G Co. When H became an
employee of T Co., while she was still employed by G Co., she allegedly
brought documents belonging to G Co. to her office at T Co. and used
the information therein to solicit and divert customers from G Co. to
T Co. After G Co. commenced the action, T Co. filed a third-party
complaint against the third-party defendants, R and L, both officers of
G Co., for indemnification. T Co. alleged, inter alia, that R and L had a
duty to preserve the confidentiality of G Co.’s assets, and that R and L
breached their duties as officers of G Co. because they had authorized
H to work from home and to have access to the sensitive information
at issue. The trial court granted R and L’s motion to strike T Co.’s third-
party complaint, from which T. Co. appealed to this court. Held that
the trial court properly granted R and L’s motion to strike T Co.’s revised
third-party complaint, as T Co. could not prevail on its claim that it was
entitled to indemnification for T Co.’s alleged use of G Co.’s stolen
confidential information because R and L did not undertake reasonable
efforts to prevent H from stealing G Co.’s confidential information;
moreover, to the extent that R and L owed G Co. a fiduciary duty to
protect its confidential information, that duty was entirely different from
H’s duty not to steal G Co.’s confidential information, as well as T Co.’s
duty not to use that confidential information once it became aware that
such information had been stolen.

Argued October 18, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious
interference with contract, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where
the court, Brown, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to
cite in Reza Shafii as a party defendant; thereafter, the
court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee, granted
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

the motion of the defendant Shafiis’, Inc., to file a third-
party complaint; subsequently, the court, Hon. Arthur
A. Hiller, judge trial referee, granted the third-party
defendants’ motion to strike the third-party plaintiff’s
revised complaint; thereafter, the court, Hon. Arthur
A. Hiller, judge trial referee, granted the third-party
plaintiff’s motion for judgment and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the third-party plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
John-Henry M. Steele, for the appellant (defendant/
third-party plaintiff Shafiis’, Inc.).
Andrew A. Cohen, for the appellees (third-party
defendant John Robinson et al.).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The defendant and third-party plaintiff,
Shafiis’, Inc., doing business as TigerPress (TigerPress),1
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the third-party defendants, John Robinson
and Joseph LaValla, both officers of the plaintiff, GHP
Media, Inc. (GHP),2 after it granted their motion to strike
TigerPress’ revised third-party complaint for indemnifi-
cation. On appeal, TigerPress claims that the court, in
granting the third-party defendants’ motion to strike,
improperly concluded that its revised third-party com-
plaint failed to allege that TigerPress, Robinson, and
LaValla owed an identical duty to GHP in the underlying
action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1
TigerPress and Tanya Hughes were named as the original defendants in
the underlying action. On January 7, 2019, the plaintiff, GHP Media, Inc.,
filed a motion to cite in Reza Shafii, the president of TigerPress, as a
defendant in the underlying action. On March 15, 2019, the court, Brown,
J., granted GHP Media, Inc.’s motion.
2
It is undisputed that Robinson is an owner and officer of GHP. It is also
undisputed that LaValla is currently an officer of GHP, and that both Rob-
inson and LaValla were supervisors of the defendant Tanya Hughes and
Jennifer Wallace when they were employees of GHP.
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. GHP commenced the underlying action against
TigerPress and the defendant Tanya Hughes in Septem-
ber, 2017. In its June 10, 2020 amended complaint, GHP
alleged the following facts. On June 7, 2017, GHP pur-
chased all the assets of a commercial printing company
known as Integrity Graphics (Integrity).3 At the time of
the sale, Hughes was an employee of Integrity. From
July 10 to 19, 2017, following the sale of Integrity,
Hughes was employed by GHP as a sales consultant.
On July 12, 2017, Hughes, as a new employee of GHP,
signed an acknowledgment for the receipt of GHP’s
employee handbook. The employee handbook included
a confidentiality policy, which stated that GHP’s intel-
lectual property could not be used or disclosed by the
employee after his or her engagement with the company
ended. During her time as an employee of GHP, Hughes
took home thousands of documents containing confi-
dential, proprietary, and trade secret information
belonging to GHP. Hughes understood that she was
allowed to take these documents home because she
was an employee of GHP and was permitted to use
them solely for GHP’s purposes.
On July 17, 2017, Hughes became a paid employee
of TigerPress, a direct competitor of GHP, while she
was still employed by GHP. On July 19, 2017, Hughes
informed GHP that she was resigning from her employ-
ment at GHP to work for TigerPress. After becoming
an employee of TigerPress, Hughes brought GHP’s doc-
uments to her office at TigerPress and stored them in
her filing cabinet. In addition, Hughes and TigerPress
took possession of another set of customer files belong-
ing to GHP, which files purportedly were taken by
another former GHP employee, Jennifer Wallace, who
also became an employee of TigerPress in July, 2017.
3
It is undisputed that LaValla was the owner and officer of Integrity.
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

Wallace left the employment of TigerPress in Septem-
ber, 2017. Following Wallace’s departure from her
employment at TigerPress, Hughes was instructed to
take over the files left by Wallace. Hughes then incorpo-
rated Wallace’s files into her own files. Hughes used
these files to solicit and divert customers from GHP to
TigerPress, and she continued to use the confidential
information in her capacity as an employee of TigerPress.
TigerPress also participated in the diversion of custom-
ers and business from GHP to itself by using the confi-
dential information at issue.
In its amended complaint, which consists of twenty-
two counts, GHP set forth causes of action against
Hughes, TigerPress, and Reza Shafii sounding in, inter
alia, tortious interference with contract, tortious inter-
ference with business relationships, computer offenses
in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-251 (e) (1) and
(2)4 and 52-570b,5 conversion, civil theft, and violations
of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA),
General Statutes § 35-50 et seq., and the Connecticut
4
General Statutes § 53a-251 defines various computer crimes. Section 53a-
251 (e) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Misuse of computer system information.
A person is guilty of the computer crime of misuse of computer system
information when: (1) As a result of his accessing . . . a computer system,
he intentionally makes or causes to be made an unauthorized display, use,
disclosure or copy, in any form, of data residing in, communicated by or
produced by a computer system; or (2) he intentionally or recklessly and
without authorization (A) alters, deletes, tampers with, damages, destroys
or takes data intended for use by a computer system, whether residing
within or external to a computer system, or (B) intercepts or adds data to
data residing within a computer system . . . .’’
5
General Statutes § 52-570b establishes a cause of action for computer
related offenses. Section 52-570b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any
aggrieved person who has reason to believe that any other person has been
engaged, is engaged or is about to engage in an alleged violation of any
provision of section 53a-251 may bring an action against such person and
may apply to the Superior Court for: (1) An order temporarily or permanently
restraining and enjoining the commencement or continuance of such act
or acts; (2) an order directing restitution; or (3) an order directing the
appointment of a receiver. . . .’’
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110b
et seq. Out of the twenty-two counts brought against
Hughes, TigerPress, and Shafii, only count one of the
amended complaint alleged a breach of the duty of
loyalty. Specifically, GHP alleged that Hughes, ‘‘[a]s an
agent of GHP . . . had a duty to act in good faith,
loyalty, and honesty toward her employer. . . . The
solicitation and diversion of business by [Hughes], dur-
ing her paid employment by GHP, and her use of GHP’s
time and resources to pursue her own business inter-
ests, on behalf of a direct competitor, was a violation
of that duty.’’ On December 12, 2018, TigerPress filed
an answer admitting to some of the allegations in the
complaint, denying some of the allegations, and asserting
the special defense of waiver, disclosure, unclean
hands, and nonjusticiability.6 On December 17, 2018,
Hughes also filed an answer denying all of the material
allegations and adopting the special defenses in
TigerPress’ answer.7
On September 12, 2019, TigerPress moved, pursuant
to General Statutes § 52-102a,8 for permission to serve
a third-party complaint for indemnification on Robinson
and LaValla. On November 4, 2019, the court, Hon.
Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee, granted TigerPress’
motion. On December 6, 2019, TigerPress filed a third-
party complaint, subsequently revised on February 3,
6
On January 16, 2020, Shafii filed a separate answer in which he admitted
to some of the allegations in the amended complaint, denied some of the
allegations, and asserted the same special defenses as those asserted by
TigerPress.
7
On January 22, 2019, Hughes filed a revised answer admitting some of
the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint.
8
General Statutes § 52-102a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A defendant
in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff
to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim
against him. The motion may be filed at any time before trial and permission
may be granted by the court if, in its discretion, it deems that the granting
of the motion will not unduly delay the trial of the action nor work an
injustice upon the plaintiff or the party sought to be impleaded. . . .’’
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

2020 (revised third-party complaint), against Robinson
and LaValla for indemnification. In its revised third-
party complaint, TigerPress alleged that, ‘‘[i]n its
[amended] complaint, GHP purportedly claims that it
has sustained damages as a consequence of the alleged
wrongful conduct of . . . Hughes and [TigerPress],
arising from . . . Hughes and [TigerPress’] alleged
breach of duties to preserve the confidentiality of cer-
tain GHP assets, intellectual property, trade informa-
tion, and alleged extremely confidential, proprietary,
and trade secret documents and customer files.’’
Although TigerPress denied the existence of such pur-
ported duties, it alleged that, ‘‘if such duties exist . . .
it is Robinson [and LaValla], as [officers] . . . of GHP,
who had a duty to preserve the confidentiality of the
alleged GHP assets, intellectual property, trade informa-
tion, and claimed extremely confidential, proprietary,
and trade secret documents and customer files.’’
TigerPress further alleged that Robinson and LaValla
breached their duty to preserve the confidentiality of
GHP’s assets by authorizing Hughes to work from home
and allowing her to take trade secret information to
her house. Specifically, TigerPress alleged that, ‘‘[d]espite
the existence of [their] fiduciary duty to preserve GHP’s
alleged assets, intellectual property, trade information,
and trade secrets that Robinson [and LaValla] owed to
GHP . . . Robinson authorized . . . Hughes to work
from home . . . . Similarly, even though Robinson
[and LaValla] knew that . . . Hughes, while working
from home, must have had in her possession the kind of
information [they] now [claim] is GHP’s alleged assets,
intellectual property, trade information, and trade
secrets, when . . . Hughes gave her notice that she
was terminating her employment and going to work for
an entity that Robinson [and LaValla] knew was a direct
competitor of GHP . . . [they] . . . did not ask or
direct anyone else to ask . . . Hughes if she had any
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

customer files or other documents or information . . .
[or] demand or direct anyone else to demand that . . .
Hughes return [the] customer files or other documents
or information that GHP now claims are its . . .
extremely confidential, proprietary and trade secret
documents/customer files . . . .’’
On May 14, 2020, Robinson and LaValla filed a motion
to strike the revised third-party complaint, arguing that
TigerPress failed to allege therein that ‘‘[TigerPress],
on [the] one hand, and [Robinson] and [LaValla], on the
other, owe identical duties to [GHP], for which they
are jointly and severally liable.’’ On May 14, 2020, Rob-
inson and LaValla filed a memorandum of law in support
of their motion to strike TigerPress’ revised third-party
complaint. In their memorandum of law, Robinson and
LaValla argued that TigerPress’ revised third-party com-
plaint ‘‘does not set forth any facts showing that
[TigerPress] has any joint obligation or identical duties
with [Robinson] and [LaValla]. . . . [Robinson] and
[LaValla] have independent legal relationships with, and
consequent duties to, their own company, [GHP]. Spe-
cifically, [Robinson], as an officer and owner of [GHP],
had a fiduciary duty to preserve the confidentiality of
his own company’s assets. . . . [LaValla] had the same
duty. . . . But this cannot possibly constitute identical
duties with [TigerPress] as to [GHP], for which [Rob-
inson] and [LaValla] are jointly and severally liable.’’
On July 17, 2020, TigerPress filed a memorandum of
law in opposition to the motion to strike its revised
third-party complaint. In its memorandum of law,
TigerPress contended that ‘‘[t]he allegations in the third-
party complaint demonstrate that, if [GHP] sustained
any injuries here, which is denied, the fault lies with
GHP’s owner, [Robinson], and one of GHP’s corporate
officers, [LaValla], for their failure to preserve the
alleged confidential, trade secret nature of this informa-
tion. . . . This is the identical duty that [GHP] alleges
that [Hughes] and [TigerPress] violated.’’
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On December 18, 2020, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it granted Robinson and LaVal-
la’s motion to strike TigerPress’ revised third-party com-
plaint. In its memorandum of decision, the court relied
on this court’s decision in Chicago Title Ins. Co. v.
Accurate Title Searches, Inc., 173 Conn. App. 463, 481,
164 A.3d 682 (2017), for the legal principle that, ‘‘[t]o
assert a common-law indemnity claim, the asserting
party must show that both parties had an identical duty
to the third party and that both parties are jointly and
severally liable for the loss incurred.’’ The trial court
stated that officers owe fiduciary duties to their corpo-
rations, including a duty of loyalty. Furthermore, a duty
of loyalty encompasses the duty not to disclose confi-
dential information. The court concluded that
‘‘[TigerPress] has alleged that [the duty to not disclose
confidential information] is the duty breached by [Rob-
inson and LaValla]. . . . [TigerPress] does not owe
[GHP] this duty, as it is a competing corporation. It is
therefore precluded from asserting an indemnity claim
against [Robinson and LaValla] because it does not
allege an identical duty with [them] that caused the
losses incurred by [GHP].’’
On January 7, 2021, TigerPress filed a motion to rear-
gue in which it agreed with the court’s conclusion that
it owed no duty to preserve the confidential information
of GHP, as it is a competing corporation, but asserted
that GHP has also alleged that TigerPress is liable for
violating GHP’s rights under certain provisions of
CUTSA, namely, § 35-51 (b) (1) and (2) (B) (iii).9 In
9
General Statutes § 35-51 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘ ‘Misappropria-
tion’ means: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or (2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
consent by a person who . . . (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew
or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was . . . (iii)
derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use . . . .’’
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

particular, TigerPress argued that its liability ‘‘is
claimed by [GHP] here to be derived from [Hughes]
and [Wallace], whom [GHP] claims owed [it] a duty to
maintain the secrecy and limit the use of its alleged
trade secrets.’’ On February 18, 2021, the court issued
a memorandum of decision on TigerPress’ motion to
reargue, denying the motion. In its memorandum of
decision, the court reasoned that the analysis and con-
clusion in its December 18, 2020 memorandum of deci-
sion applies equally to TigerPress’ CUTSA argument.
Specifically, the court stated that ‘‘CUTSA does not
define an identical duty for which the third-party plain-
tiff and [third-party] defendants are jointly and severally
liable to [GHP]. The language in clause (iii) does not
explicitly define any duty, much less an identical one.
It simply refers to the person who owes a duty: ‘derived
from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.’
As the duty is not defined in the statute, it must arise
from elsewhere. Consequently, even if [Robinson and
LaValla] could be jointly liable with [TigerPress] under
the statute, their duty would be the very duty of loyalty
alleged in the indemnification claim, which the court
already has held to be distinct from [TigerPress’] duty.’’
On March 5, 2021, TigerPress appealed from the
court’s decision granting the third-party defendants’
motion to strike and from the denial of TigerPress’
motion to reargue. That appeal was docketed under AC
44563. On July 29, 2021, this court ordered, sua sponte,
that the parties file memoranda addressing why the
appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judg-
ment. See Pellecchia v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.,
139 Conn. App. 88, 90–91, 54 A.3d 658 (2012) (‘‘[t]he
granting of a motion to strike . . . ordinarily is not a
final judgment because our rules of practice afford a
party a right to amend deficient pleadings’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 950,
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

60 A.3d 740 (2013). On August 25, 2021, TigerPress filed
a motion for judgment on its third-party complaint. On
August 26, 2021, the trial court rendered judgment on
the third-party complaint in favor of Robinson and
LaValla. On August 30, 2021, TigerPress filed the present
appeal from the court’s December 18, 2020 judgment
granting the third-party defendants’ motion to strike.
That appeal was docketed under AC 44921. On Septem-
ber 8, 2021, this court dismissed the appeal docketed
under AC 44563, and further ordered, sua sponte, that
all future filings be made Docket No. AC 44921.
On appeal, TigerPress claims that the judgment in
favor of the third-party defendants ‘‘should be vacated
and the order granting the motion to strike reversed.’’
TigerPress argues that it alleged ‘‘an identical duty owed
to [GHP] by [Robinson and LaValla] that GHP alleges
[TigerPress] owes to GHP.’’ We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘Because a motion to strike challenges the legal suffi-
ciency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no
factual findings by the trial court, our review of the
court’s ruling . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts
to be those alleged in the complaint that has been
stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner
most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . .
Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support
a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.
. . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily
implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.
. . . It is fundamental that in determining the suffi-
ciency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s
motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts
necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as
admitted. . . . Although [w]e assume the truth of both
the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly prov-
able thereunder . . . [a motion to strike] . . . does
not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

opinions stated in the pleadings. . . . A motion to
strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere
conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts
alleged. Furthermore, [t]he interpretation of pleadings
is always a question of law for the court and . . . our
interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 212 Conn.
App. 274, 284, 275 A.3d 735, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931,
276 A.3d 433 (2022).
‘‘[W]e have long eschewed the notion that pleadings
should be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather,
[t]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut,
is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather
than narrowly and technically. . . . [T]he complaint
must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give
effect to the pleadings with reference to the general
theory upon which it proceeded, and to substantial jus-
tice between the parties. . . . Our reading of pleadings
in a manner that advances substantial justice means that
a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain
all that it fairly means but carries with it the related
proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way
so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension.
. . . [E]ssential allegations may not be supplied by con-
jecture or remote implication . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Accurate
Title Searches, Inc., supra, 173 Conn. App. 479.
Having set forth our standard of review, we turn to
the governing legal principles that are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. ‘‘Indemnification involves a
claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a
primary responsibility is claimed to rest, while appor-
tionment, sometimes called contribution, involves a
claim for reimbursement of a share of a payment neces-
sarily made by the claimant which equitably ought to
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

be paid in part by others. . . . In an action for indem-
nity . . . one tortfeasor seeks to impose total liability
upon another.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Valente v. Securitas Security Services,
USA, Inc., 152 Conn. App. 196, 203, 96 A.3d 1275 (2014).
‘‘In the absence of an express contract for indemnifi-
cation or statutory provisions authorizing actions for
indemnification . . . a party may nonetheless assert
an implied right to indemnification as a measure of
restitution. . . . Where a party seeks restitution in the
form of common-law indemnification, several authori-
ties agree that the party seeking indemnity and the
party from whom indemnification is sought must be
considered jointly and severally liable for the loss
incurred by the putative indemnitee. See 42 C.J.S. [98,
Indemnity § 2 (2007)] ([i]ndemnity applies only where
there is an identical duty owed by one and discharged
by another); see also id., § 33, p. 149 ([a] cause of action
for implied indemnification requires a showing that the
plaintiff and the defendant owed a duty to a third party,
and that the plaintiff discharged the duty which, as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, should have
been discharged by the defendant); 41 Am. Jur. 2d [383,
Indemnity § 1 (2015)] ([i]ndemnity requires that a com-
mon duty be mutually owed to a third party); 1
Restatement (Third), Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment, § 23, comment (d) (2011) (A claim to indemnity
or contribution arises when the claimant has discharged
all or part of a joint obligation. A claim under this
section is readily distinguishable, therefore, from the
similar claim that arises when A and B owe independent
duties to a third party C; or when A, acting with adequate
justification, renders a performance to C for which B
would have been liable to C directly. . . . The restitu-
tion claim that arises from such transactions is . . .
more often referred to as a claim to equitable subroga-
tion.). The consensus expressed by these authorities
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GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

fully aligns with our jurisprudence concerning claims
for common-law indemnification.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Accurate Title Searches, Inc.,
supra, 173 Conn. App. 480–81.
Even if we assume, without deciding, that there is
a common-law action for indemnification based upon
intentional torts,10 TigerPress’ argument that its revised
third-party complaint alleged an identical duty owed by
it, Robinson, and LaValla to GHP warrants little discus-
sion. In essence, the revised third-party complaint
asserts that TigerPress is entitled to indemnification
for TigerPress’ use of GHP’s stolen confidential infor-
mation because Robinson and LaValla did not under-
take reasonable efforts to prevent Hughes from stealing
10
Claims for indemnification typically arise in cases in which the defendant
is alleged to have acted negligently. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Accurate
Title Searches, Inc., supra, 173 Conn. App. 485. In the present case, GHP
did not allege, in its amended complaint, a cause of action for negligence
against Hughes or TigerPress. Rather, GHP alleged that Hughes and
TigerPress were liable for various intentional torts. Although there is no
controlling appellate authority in Connecticut, the majority of our Superior
Courts have held that a party cannot seek indemnification for intentional
torts. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hume, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 30, 2015); Wood v. Club, LLC, Superior
Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(November 29, 2013) (57 Conn. L. Rptr. 238, 240); Martel v. Burkamp, Docket
No. CV-H7684, 2009 WL 2243768, *2 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2009); Starview
Ventures Ltd., LLC v. Acadia, Ins., Superior Court, judicial district of New
Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 9, 2008) (46 Conn. L. Rptr.
342, 345). In Martel, the court reasoned that ‘‘the denial of indemnification
claims where the only allegation against the claimant is premised on inten-
tional misconduct serves to discourage such misconduct and is consistent
with sound public policy.’’ Martel v. Burkamp, supra, 2009 WL 2243768, *2.
Moreover, as one Superior Court judge has observed, ‘‘plaintiffs cannot
assert a common-law indemnity claim by merely attaching a negligence label
to allegations for which negligence does not apply.’’ Maxwell v. Bozelko,
Docket No. CV-11-6006411S, 2017 WL 3251294, *4 (Conn. Super. June 30,
2017). Because GHP has not argued that TigerPress’ indemnification claim
fails on the basis that it seeks indemnification for its alleged intentional
torts, we assume without deciding that such an indemnification claim is
permissible if the duties owed by the defendant and alleged indemnitor
are identical.
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes

GHP’s confidential information. To the extent that Rob-
inson and LaValla owe GHP a fiduciary duty to protect
its confidential information, that duty is entirely differ-
ent from Hughes’ duty not to steal GHP’s confidential
information, and TigerPress’ duty not to use that confi-
dential information once it became aware that such
information had been stolen.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly
granted the third-party defendants’ motion to strike.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.