C. W. v. E. W.

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C. W. v. E. W.

C. W. v. E. W. ET AL.*
(AC 46122)
Alvord, Suarez and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia,
breach of contract and unjust enrichment in connection with an alleged
oral agreement pursuant to which the defendants agreed to sell to the
plaintiff certain residential property after he performed repairs to it.
The plaintiff claimed that he expended substantial funds and personal
labor with the understanding that the agreed upon purchase price would
be in compensation for the labor and materials he supplied. The defen-
dants filed an answer to the amended complaint, asserting that they did
not agree to sell the property to the plaintiff. At trial, the court admitted
into evidence an exhibit offered by the plaintiff that documented the
tasks that the plaintiff claimed to have performed at the property and his
hours worked. The plaintiff testified that he used a project management
software program to create the table of tasks in the exhibit from data
that he contemporaneously entered as he worked. The court found that,
although there was no agreement to sell the property, the plaintiff had
incurred certain costs for materials and labor to rehabilitate the property
and rendered judgment for the plaintiff on his unjust enrichment claim.
In awarding the plaintiff damages for his labor, the court found that the
plaintiff’s evidence of his labor was unreliable, specifically, his exhibit
documenting the number of hours he had worked, and, instead, relied
on E’s valuation of the plaintiff’s services. On the plaintiff’s appeal to
this court, held:
1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
rendered judgment for the defendants on his breach of contract claim
because the court failed to consider judicial admissions allegedly made
by the defendants in their original answers as to the existence of a
contract: although the defendants’ original answers asserted that they
had agreed to sell the property for a reduced price because the plaintiff
is the defendant E’s son, the defendants’ amended answer denied the
existence of an agreement, which was consistent with E’s testimony at
trial; moreover, the amended answer had been filed more than two

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
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C. W. v. E. W.
months before trial, and the plaintiff had filed a reply to the special
defenses asserted therein.
2. The trial court, in ruling on the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, erred
in finding that the plaintiff’s evidence of his labor was unreliable: the
court’s decision rested on clearly erroneous factual findings as to how
the exhibit depicting the plaintiff’s logged work hours was created, as the
plaintiff’s uncontroverted testimony was that his hours were recorded
contemporaneously and that he had entered his hours into the computer
program, which recorded the hours over a period of time, not that the
hours were based on the plaintiff’s memory as to the number of hours
worked, or that they were a product of computations created by the
software; moreover, because the trial court’s clearly erroneous factual
findings as to the plaintiff’s exhibit constituted harmful error, this court
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial as to his unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit claims.
Submitted on briefs February 13—officially released June 11, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the
case was tried to the court, Hon. Joseph H. Pellegrino,
judge trial referee; judgment in part for the defendants,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court; there-
after, the plaintiff withdrew the remaining count of the
complaint and filed an amended appeal. Reversed in
part; further proceedings.
Bruce P. Bennett, for the appellant (plaintiff).
E. W. and A. W., self-represented, the appellees
(defendants).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, C. W., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court rendered following a court
trial in an action seeking enforcement of an alleged
oral agreement pursuant to which the self-represented
defendants, E. W. and A. W., would sell the plaintiff
real property in Waterbury after he performed repairs
to it. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
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improperly (1) rendered judgment in favor of the defen-
dants on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim after
failing to consider judicial admissions allegedly made
by the defendants as to the existence of the contract,
and (2) found, in the portion of its memorandum of
decision addressing the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim, the plaintiff’s evidence of his labor at the property
to be unreliable.1 We agree with the plaintiff’s second
claim and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment in
part.2
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In 2009,
E. W., who had immigrated to the United States from
Jamaica, purchased with his sister, A. W., real property
located in Waterbury (property). In 2014, the plaintiff,
who is E. W.’s son, also immigrated to the United States
from Jamaica. E. W. encouraged the plaintiff to come
to the United States and undertook the responsibilities
of providing the plaintiff with shelter and support. When
the plaintiff arrived in the United States, he initially
stayed with E. W. in New York, but there was no bed-
room available for him and disagreements ensued
among family members. As a result, E. W. drove the
plaintiff to Connecticut to live at the property and told
him that he could live there so long as he paid the taxes
on the property. At that time, the third floor of the
property was habitable but the first and second floors
See footnote 7 of this opinion. The plaintiff also states, in his statement
1

of issues, that the court erred in failing to address real property taxes
paid by the plaintiff and in declining to award damages for the plaintiff’s
expenditures related to electrical repairs. Aside from that statement, the
only other mention of these two claims is in the nature of a conclusion in
the plaintiff’s brief. ‘‘[When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues
but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Darin v. Cais, 161 Conn. App. 475, 483, 129 A.3d
716 (2015). We conclude that these claims are inadequately briefed and,
accordingly, we decline to address them.
2
See footnote 11 of this opinion.
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were not. The plaintiff assisted E. W., who provided
expertise, in the rehabilitation of the first and second
floors of the property. The plaintiff worked on the prop-
erty in some instances by himself when E. W. was not
present, purchased materials, and provided labor to
accomplish the repairs. A. W. was aware of the work
the plaintiff was performing at the property.
The plaintiff commenced the present action in Janu-
ary, 2020. In the operative, amended complaint filed in
May, 2022, the plaintiff alleged causes of action sound-
ing in breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, detrimental reli-
ance, and bad faith. He also sought foreclosure of a
mechanic’s lien that he had recorded on the land
records relating to work he claimed to have performed
at the property. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that
E. W. told the plaintiff in March, 2015, that he did not
want to devote any additional funds or efforts to repair
the property, the defendants would sell the property to
the plaintiff for $35,000, and the plaintiff should obtain
a mortgage to purchase the property.3 The plaintiff
alleged that, because he could not obtain a mortgage
to purchase the property due to the property being
in a state of disrepair, the defendants agreed that the
plaintiff would repair the property and, upon comple-
tion of the repairs, the plaintiff would obtain a mortgage
and the defendants would sell him the property for
3
In counts two and five of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation and detrimental reliance, on the basis of the
allegations that the defendants represented to the plaintiff that he could
reside at the property rent free and purchase the property for $35,000. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendants had the intent of inducing the plaintiff
to expend personal labor and funds to repair the property. The plaintiff
further alleged that the representations were knowingly material, false and
misleading and that the plaintiff relied on the representations to his detri-
ment.
In count six, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ conduct was mali-
cious and evidenced a reckless disregard for his rights.
In count seven, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien.
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$35,000. The plaintiff alleged that he expended substan-
tial funds and personal labor with the understanding
that the $35,000 purchase price of the property would be
in compensation for the labor and materials he supplied.
The plaintiff alleged that he requested, in August, 2019,
that the defendants put their agreement into writing so
that he could obtain a mortgage, but the defendants
refused to do so. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dants subsequently breached the alleged oral contract
in various ways, including informing the plaintiff that
he would have to pay rent, listing the property at a sale
price of $125,000, removing his personal belongings
from the property, informing the plaintiff that he could
purchase the property for $60,000, rather than the pre-
viously agreed upon price of $35,000, serving him with
a notice to quit, and commencing a summary process
eviction action against him.
In count three, the plaintiff alleged a claim for unjust
enrichment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he
provided substantial labor and materials toward the
improvement of the property and the defendants
unjustly refused to reimburse or compensate him. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendants benefitted from his
labor and materials and have been unjustly enriched
at the plaintiff’s expense. In count four, the plaintiff
asserted a quantum meruit claim. He alleged, inter alia,
that the reasonable value of the labor and funds he had
expended was at least $135,000, and that he is entitled
to compensation in that amount.
The defendants filed an answer and special defenses
on May 23, 2022; see footnote 5 of this opinion; and
the plaintiff filed a reply denying the allegations of the
special defenses on August 2, 2022.
A trial was held before the court over several dates
in August and September, 2022. In addition to his own
testimony, the plaintiff presented the testimony of Alan
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Thomas O’Doherty, a licensed real estate salesperson
who testified as to the amount for which the property
could sell; Clyde Saunders, an expert in the construction
industry; and Martin Gail, an electrician who testified
to electrical work performed at the property. The defen-
dants presented the testimony of E. W.; H. I., a son of
E. W.; and J. T., a tenant at the property. The court
also received documentary evidence, and all parties
submitted posttrial briefs.
On December 9, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it found that ‘‘there was nei-
ther an express written agreement nor was there any
oral agreement to sell the property.’’ The court, accord-
ingly, ruled in favor of the defendants on the breach
of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, detrimental
reliance, and bad faith counts. As to the plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment claim; see footnote 11 of this opinion; the
court found that the plaintiff provided materials to reha-
bilitate the property, the defendants were aware of and
benefitted from the materials, and, thus, the plaintiff
was entitled to reimbursement in the amount of
$11,999.63. With respect to labor, the court found the
value of the plaintiff’s work at the property to be $1768
and awarded him that amount. The total award in favor
of the plaintiff was $13,767.63. See footnote 10 of this
opinion. This appeal followed.4 Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
4
As to the foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien, the court stated in its
memorandum of decision that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff must wait twenty days after
the judgment in this case is filed and if no appeal is filed, he may seek to
foreclose the amount of this judgment.’’ On May 5, 2023, this court ordered
the parties to file memoranda ‘‘addressing whether this appeal should be
dismissed for lack of a final judgment because the trial court’s decision did
not dispose of all counts of the complaint or of all the causes of action
brought by or against any party . . . unless the plaintiff withdraws the
outstanding seventh count of the operative complaint seeking foreclosure
of a mechanic’s lien and files an amended appeal on or before May 15,
2023.’’ (Citations omitted.) On May 15, the plaintiff withdrew the foreclosure
count and filed a response to the order in which he notified this court of
the withdrawal. On June 28, 2023, this court ordered that the appeal would
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I
The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal is that the court
erred in rejecting his breach of contract claim on the
basis that it failed to recognize that the defendants
judicially admitted, in their March, 2020 answers to the
plaintiff’s original complaint, that they had agreed to
sell the property to the plaintiff. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant. In the plaintiff’s original complaint, he alleged
that, ‘‘[o]n or about November 4, 2019, in contravention
of the 2014 agreement, the defendants informed the
plaintiff that rather than the $35,000 purchase price
previously agreed to pursuant to the 2014 agreement,
the purchase price would be $60,000.’’ In answers filed
on March 6 and 9, 2020, E. W. responded to this allega-
tion by stating: ‘‘Denies as to the allegation contained
in the first part of this paragraph 18 that states ‘in
contravention of the 2014 agreement.’ [E. W.] admits
to the second part of the allegation to the extent it
states that the defendant agreed to sell the property to
his son, the plaintiff herein, for $60,000 instead of the
market price/listed price of $125,000. The only consider-
ation for [E. W.] to reduce this price was that the plain-
tiff is a son of the defendant, [E. W.].’’ In A. W.’s March
6, 2020 answer, she responded similarly, with the excep-
tion of identifying the plaintiff as her nephew.

On May 9, 2022, the plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint with a similar allegation. In the defendants’ joint
answer; see footnote 5 of this opinion; they asserted:
‘‘Objection, there cannot be a breach as the defendants
. . . have no agreement with the plaintiff to repair and
sell property to the plaintiff.’’ At trial, E. W. testified
be dismissed unless the plaintiff filed an amended appeal on or before July
10, 2023. On July 5, 2023, the plaintiff amended his appeal to reflect the
withdrawal.
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that he did not agree to sell the property to the plaintiff
for $35,000.
Although the plaintiff raised his judicial admission
claim in his testimony and posttrial brief, he relied on
the answers filed by the defendants to his original com-
plaint. He did not brief the effect of the answer filed
by the defendants to his amended complaint. In its
memorandum of decision, the court found that ‘‘there
was neither an express written agreement nor was there
any oral agreement to sell the property.’’
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. ‘‘An admission in a defendant’s
answer to an allegation in a complaint is binding as a
judicial admission. . . . A judicial admission dispenses
with the production of evidence by the opposing party
as to the fact admitted, and is conclusive upon the party
making it. . . . Upon the amendment of the original
answer, the superseded pleading ceases to be a conclu-
sive judicial admission and becomes nothing more than
an evidentiary admission to be weighed and considered
by the trial court along with the rest of the evidence.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 52 Conn. App. 545, 550–51,
727 A.2d 755 (1999), aff’d, 253 Conn. 416, 752 A.2d
509 (2000).
In the present case, the defendants filed an amended
answer shortly after the plaintiff amended his com-
plaint.5 The amended answer was filed more than two
months before trial began, and the plaintiff filed a reply
to the special defenses asserted therein. In their
5
The plaintiff contends that the operative responsive pleadings are the
original, March, 2020 answers filed in response to the plaintiff’s original
complaint. We are not persuaded. Although the answer to the amended
complaint was filed by the self-represented defendants under the heading
‘‘objection to the plaintiff’s second amended complaint’’ and the court
marked it ‘‘overruled,’’ the filing in substance consisted of an answer with
special defenses, and the plaintiff filed a reply to it.
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amended answer, the defendants denied the existence
of an agreement to sell the property to the plaintiff,
and the denial of any agreement was consistent with
the defendants’ position during the trial. Accordingly,
the plaintiff’s claim that the responses contained in
the defendants’ original answers constituted judicial
admissions that there existed an agreement to sell the
property is without merit. See, e.g., Crowell v. Danforth,
222 Conn. 150, 155, 609 A.2d 654 (1992). To the extent
that the plaintiff requests this court to treat the super-
seded responses as evidentiary admissions, we decline
to do so. See Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306,
331, 285 A.3d 59 (2022) (‘‘[t]his court will not reweigh
the evidence or resolve questions of credibility’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
903, 287 A.3d 601 (2023). Accordingly, we reject the
plaintiff’s claim.6
II
The plaintiff next claims that, in its memorandum of
decision, the court improperly found his evidence of
his labor at the property to be unreliable, after admitting
the document that set forth his work as a full exhibit
at trial. The defendants respond that the court properly
rejected exhibit 7 ‘‘for lack of trustworthiness and relia-
bility.’’ We agree with the plaintiff.
6
The plaintiff also argues that the court’s citation to the statute of frauds,
set forth in General Statutes § 52-550, in rejecting his breach of contract
claim, was improper. It is unnecessary for this court to consider the merits
of a claim of error that is unrelated to the grounds on which the court based
its judgment. See, e.g., Ingels v. Saldana, 103 Conn. App. 724, 728–29, 930
A.2d 774 (2007) (court declined to address merits of appellant’s claim of error
related to breach of contract claim because trial court based its decision
on breach of fiduciary duty claim and, thus, claimed error was ‘‘irrelevant
to the judgment from which the defendant appeal[ed]’’). Because the court
expressly found that ‘‘there was neither an express written agreement nor
was there any oral agreement to sell the property,’’ we need not address
any contention that the court improperly relied on the statute of frauds in
denying the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. (Emphasis added).
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The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. At trial, the plain-
tiff’s counsel offered into evidence, as exhibit 7, a docu-
ment reflecting, inter alia, the tasks the plaintiff claimed
to have performed at the property and the number of
hours he spent performing each task. The plaintiff’s
counsel represented that exhibit 7 also included statis-
tics published by the Connecticut Department of Labor
as to the annual median wage of tradespeople per-
forming labor tasks similar to those identified by the
plaintiff. The defendants objected to the admission of
the exhibit on a number of different bases, none of
which implicated hearsay or the reliability of the soft-
ware program used by the plaintiff to record his hours
worked. The court ruled that the evidence of the labor
rates was inadmissible and, following the request by
the plaintiff’s counsel that it take judicial notice of the
labor rates, declined to do so.7 Exhibit 7 otherwise was
admitted into evidence as a full exhibit.8
The plaintiff testified that he is an information tech-
nology professional by trade and had used the computer
application Microsoft Project, a project management
software program, as a recording tool in connection
7
On appeal, the plaintiff also claims that the court erred in failing to take
judicial notice of the labor rates and in declining to recognize the testimony
of the plaintiff’s expert witness in support of the plaintiff’s proposed value
of his labor. The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in accepting E.
W.’s valuation of the plaintiff’s work on the project. Because we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial on the
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, we decline to address these issues in
this opinion.
8
The exhibit list initially did not reflect exhibit 7. On October 13, 2022,
the plaintiff filed a motion for order seeking to amend the exhibit list to
include exhibit 7. On October 18, 2022, the court issued an order stating in
relevant part that the ‘‘[p]laintiff’s trial exhibit 7 was admitted as a full
exhibit with the redaction of the last three columns entitled—Task—CT
DOL Labor Rate and value. The court marked this as a full exhibit with the
redactions as mentioned at trial and [it] should be included in the list of
full exhibits.’’ An amended list of exhibits subsequently was filed reflecting
exhibit 7’s status as a full exhibit.
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with prior construction projects that he had performed
in Jamaica. As relevant to the present case, the plaintiff
testified that he used Microsoft Project to record his
hours and schedule his work at the property. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff testified ‘‘it’s basically my input, but
it’s recorded over a period of time. So, the . . . app is
just storing what I’m putting into it. It’s not telling me
what it was. I’m putting in the information.’’ Data from
the software then was used to generate a table of tasks
shown on exhibit 7. The plaintiff also testified as to
each of the tasks listed on exhibit 7 and the hours he
spent completing those tasks. A. W. and the trial court
extensively questioned the plaintiff, both on cross-
examination during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief and on
direct examination during the defendants’ case, about
Microsoft Project, his use of the software, and the man-
ner in which he logged his hours.9 A. W. also cross-
examined the plaintiff as to the number of hours he
9
The following colloquy occurred during the defendants’ direct examina-
tion of the plaintiff as to the tasks reflected in exhibit 7:
‘‘[A. W.]: How did you come up with the hours that you worked for the
first row, make, and prep, and install the window—
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I’ve answered this already.
‘‘The Court: You can answer it again, sir, if she asked you the question.
How’d you come up with 120 hours?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I had all the hours in the app that I used to track the
progress of the project.
‘‘The Court: You did it from an app.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: No. I entered the—I recorded the hours in the app that
I used to track . . . the progress of the project.
‘‘The Court: Have you any—did you write these hours down? Do you have
a notebook or anything indicating the hours you spent on each of these tasks?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: The app pretty much—
‘‘The Court: No, no.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Not on notebook.
‘‘The Court: Just answer my question.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: No. Not on notebook, no.
‘‘The Court: No, okay. And is this an estimate as to the amount of hours
you spent?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: It would be more actual.
‘‘The Court: Excuse me.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: It would be actual.
‘‘The Court: These are the actual hours that you spent.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Right, right.
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spent on the tasks reflected in exhibit 7. In their posttrial
briefing, aside from A. W. arguing that the plaintiff’s
labor bill was ‘‘exorbitant’’ and that it included ‘‘a few
overlapping hours and overlapping dates,’’ the defen-
dants did not otherwise contest exhibit 7.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated:
‘‘The plaintiff next seeks to recover monies for the labor
‘‘The Court: And, in some way, you’ve recorded the actual hours.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Right, right.
‘‘The Court: We just don’t have . . . the document or . . . the notebook
where you kept the actual hours.
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yeah, the tablet.
‘‘The Court: The what?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: TabIet.
‘‘The Court: Okay. He answers the question. He [said], these are the
actual hours.
‘‘[A. W.]: Okay.
‘‘[A. W.]: Will you be—if we ask you to provide the—show us how it’s
been logged on—can you show how it’s been logged on the tablet?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: You have the data here.
‘‘[A. W.]: Pardon me?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: You have the data right here.
‘‘[A. W.]: No, no, no, no. Can you provide us how you logged the hours
on there, meaning is it going by day or by week? How were they logged?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I start the project. I put in the time. And then, each day
that I go, I mark the progress when I stop. Next day, I go—I continue, I
enter that, and I keep going on.
‘‘[A. W.]: But that’s what I’m asking now. Can you provide that evidence
to us?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: What do you mean, the procedure.
‘‘[A. W.]: Of how it’s been logged, yeah, because you said you start and
you stop; so we need to see the evidence?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: You need to see the evidence of the procedure of doing
it. So, basically . . .
‘‘The Court: Wait a minute. I think she’s asking, can you provide us with
the document that you recorded these hours while you were doing the work?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m . . . gonna object. There’s no
testimony that it was on a document. [The plaintiff] has testified that it was
recorded each day on an app, an application on a digital or an electronic
tablet. Is that the program that he’s talking about that he did that?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: It—it’s a program. It’s a computer program.
‘‘[A. W.]: Okay. . . . So, it’s a computer program. But doesn’t he have a
backup that shows you the hours—
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: The device . . . broke while I was working one day on
the house.
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he personally expended renovating the property. The
plaintiff claims that he devoted 2486 hours to working
on the property, as evinced by exhibit 7. At trial, the
plaintiff testified at one point that the total number of
hours worked was computed with the assistance of a
computer program. When the court pressed him on the
involvement of the computer program, the plaintiff said
that he remembered all of the hours he worked on the
project although he never made any simultaneous notes
or memorandum as to the hours worked, and relied on
his memory as to the number of hours he worked on
the project. There was no testimony at trial as to any
computer program that was used to compute the hours
worked as stated. The plaintiff testified that the number
of hours worked, as shown in exhibit 7, was from his
recollection. In the plaintiff’s [posttrial] brief, dated
October 13, 2022, the plaintiff’s attorney states that
‘corresponding to the expenses he incurred for the
material incorporated into the repair and improvement
of the property, the plaintiff performed extensive labor
in the repair and improvement of the property. . . .
By the use of the computer application Microsoft Proj-
ect, the plaintiff tracked the time he spent repairing
and improving the property. The time is reflected in
the plaintiff’s trial exhibit 7.’ As stated, there was never
any evidence presented at trial that the time computed
in exhibit 7 was from a Microsoft program. The plaintiff
has admitted, through his attorney, that the hours gener-
ated in exhibit 7 were the product of a computer pro-
gram, which certainly is contrary to his testimony in
court. The court cannot consider the plaintiff’s claim
that the hours generated in exhibit 7 was the product
of a computer program because the plaintiff has failed
to provide any evidence of the program’s trustworthi-
ness and reliability. . . . Accordingly, the court rejects
‘‘[A. W.]: And you never have—did you have a backup?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: No.’’
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C. W. v. E. W.

the plaintiff’s claim that he worked 2486 hours renovat-
ing the property.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The court then stated that it accepted E. W.’s valua-
tion of the plaintiff’s work at the property, which
amounted to $1768. In accepting E. W.’s valuation, the
court stated that E. W. ‘‘is a skilled craftsman with
experience and expertise in the construction industry.
Before immigrating to this country, [E. W.] was active
in all fields of construction in Jamaica, where he special-
ized in carpentry and joinery, as well as performing
plumbing and electrical work. When [E. W.] arrived in
the United States, he continued to work in the construc-
tion industry. Additionally, he obtained an electrical
certificate from Southern Westchester BOCES Adult
Education in June, 2006 . . . . Accordingly, [E. W.] is
eminently qualified to assess the value of the plaintiff’s
work . . . .’’ The court then awarded the plaintiff $1768
for his work at the property, along with $11,999.63 for
the materials he purchased and used to renovate the
property.10
In its memorandum of decision, the court relied on
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carabetta, 55 Conn. App.
369, 377, 739 A.2d 301, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 927, 742
A.2d 280 (1999), to conclude that the plaintiff had failed
to establish that the software program used to create
exhibit 7 was trustworthy and reliable. Carabetta relies
on the seminal case of American Oil Co. v. Valenti,
179 Conn. 305, 359, 426 A.2d 305 (1979). In American Oil
Co., our Supreme Court ‘‘first addressed the standard
to be used in admitting computer generated evidence
[adopting] a general rule, requiring testimony by a per-
son with some degree of computer expertise, who has
sufficient knowledge to be examined and cross-exam-
ined about the functioning of the computer. In that
10
We note that the court, in calculating the total award to the plaintiff,
misstated its labor award as $1700. Thus, the total award reflected in the
memorandum of decision was $68 less than it should have been.
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C. W. v. E. W.

case, the court cautioned, [c]omputer machinery may
make errors because of malfunctioning of the hardware,
the computer’s mechanical apparatus. Computers may
also, and more frequently, make errors that arise out
of defects in the software, the input procedures, the
data base, and the processing program. . . . In view
of the complex nature of the operation of computers
and general lay unfamiliarity with their operation, courts
have been cautioned to take special care to be certain
that the foundation is sufficient to warrant a finding of
trustworthiness and that the opposing party has full
opportunity to inquire into the process by which infor-
mation is fed into the computer.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 806–
807, 847 A.2d 921 (2004).
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles
governing our review of the plaintiff’s claim. In the
present case, the trial court made factual findings predi-
cated on its understanding and rejection of exhibit 7.
‘‘[W]here the factual basis of the [trial] court’s decision
is challenged we must determine whether the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision are supported by
the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and
the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Under the clearly erroneous standard
of review, a finding of fact must stand if, on the basis
of the evidence before the court and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from that evidence, a trier of
fact reasonably could have found as it did. . . . In
reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the
record to determine whether the [court] could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
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Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . .
in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . .
‘‘[W]here . . . some of the facts found [by the trial
court] are clearly erroneous and others are supported
by the evidence, we must examine the clearly erroneous
findings to see whether they were harmless, not only
in isolation, but also taken as a whole. . . . If, when
taken as a whole, they undermine appellate confidence
in the court’s [fact-finding] process, a new hearing is
required.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Circulent, Inc. v. Hatch & Bailey Co., 217
Conn. App. 622, 629–30, 289 A.3d 609 (2023).
We thoroughly have reviewed the record and con-
clude that the trial court’s decision as to the plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim rests on clearly erroneous fac-
tual findings as to how exhibit 7 was created. Specifi-
cally, the court mistakenly found that the plaintiff did
not make ‘‘simultaneous notes or memorandum of the
hours worked,’’ ‘‘[t]here was no testimony at trial as to
any computer program that was used to compute the
hours worked as stated,’’ and ‘‘the hours generated in
exhibit 7 were the product of a computer program
. . . .’’ Our review of the record reveals that these find-
ings are not supported by the evidence. First, the plain-
tiff testified that his hours were recorded contempora-
neously, specifically, that ‘‘I start the project. I put in
the time. And then, each day that I go, I mark the
progress when I stop. Next day, I go—I continue, I enter
that, and I keep going on.’’ Second, the plaintiff testified
at length regarding his use of Microsoft Project, that he
input his hours into the software, and that the software
‘‘recorded [his hours] over a period of time.’’ The defen-
dants offered no evidence to the contrary on either of
these points. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence was
that the hours were contemporaneously recorded by
the plaintiff in Microsoft Project, not that they were
based on the plaintiff’s ‘‘memory as to the number of
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18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
C. W. v. E. W.

hours he worked on the project’’ or were a ‘‘product’’
of computations created by the Microsoft Project soft-
ware.
Having concluded that the court’s judgment as to the
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment count relied on the court’s
clearly erroneous factual findings regarding exhibit 7,
we ‘‘are compelled to conclude that the court’s error
was harmful, requiring a new trial.’’ Circulent, Inc. v.
Hatch & Bailey Co., supra, 217 Conn. App. 632; see
also, e.g., Downing v. Dragone, 184 Conn. App. 565,
574–75, 195 A.3d 699 (2018) (trial court’s reasoning sub-
stantially relied on clearly erroneous factual finding,
requiring new trial). As the trial court stated in its mem-
orandum of decision, ‘‘[a]t issue in the present case is
the value of the services and materials rendered by
the plaintiff that the defendants either knew about or
impliedly accepted.’’ The court credited the plaintiff’s
evidence of the expenditures for the materials pur-
chased, finding that ‘‘the cost of the materials used and
paid for by the plaintiff, as shown in exhibits 3 and 4,
were provided by the plaintiff to rehabilitate the prop-
erty in the amount of $11,999.63. The court further finds
that the defendants were aware of and benefitted from
the materials provided, and therefore the plaintiff
should be reimbursed based on the theory of unjust
enrichment.’’ Turning to the value of the plaintiff’s labor,
the court rejected his claim that he worked 2486 hours
renovating the property largely because of its misunder-
standing as to the plaintiff’s use of Microsoft Project,
in favor of accepting E. W.’s valuation of the plaintiff’s
services in the amount of $1768. Accordingly, we con-
clude that the court’s clearly erroneous factual findings
as to exhibit 7 constitute harmful error, and the plaintiff
is entitled to a new trial on his unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit claims.11
11
Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are related causes of action.
‘‘Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine to be applied when no remedy is
available pursuant to a contract. . . . Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust
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C. W. v. E. W.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit counts of the
plaintiff’s complaint and the case is remanded for a
new trial on those counts; the judgment is affirmed in
all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the
defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that
the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment. . . . Quantum meruit
is a theory of contract recovery that does not depend upon the existence
of a contract, either express or implied in fact. . . . Rather, quantum meruit
arises out of the need to avoid unjust enrichment to a party, even in the
absence of an actual agreement. . . . Centered on the prevention of injus-
tice, quantum meruit strikes the appropriate balance by evaluating the equi-
ties and guaranteeing that the party who has rendered services receives a
reasonable sum for those services.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Pollansky v. Pollansky, 162 Conn. App. 635, 657–58, 133
A.3d 167 (2016).
In a footnote in his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff contends that
‘‘[t]he trial court concluded that there was no contract to sell the property
but did not make any factual finding as to any agreement to repair and
improve the property. It appears the damages to be awarded would be for
quantum meruit, ‘the value of the services rendered.’ [Shapero v. Mercede,
262 Conn. 1, 7, 808 A.2d 666 (2002)].’’
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that ‘‘[t]he fourth count
of the complaint sounds in quantum meruit, as the plaintiff seeks to recover
the value of the services rendered. The court has awarded damages under
the claim of unjust enrichment and therefore will not consider this count
having awarded damages on the basis of unjust enrichment.’’ Because the
court’s ruling on the quantum meruit count was dependent on its adjudica-
tion of the unjust enrichment count, our reversal of the judgment as to the
unjust enrichment count also requires reversal of the judgment of the court
as to the quantum meruit count.