In re Charli M.

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In re Charli M.

IN RE CHARLI M.*
(AC 47510)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered
for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating
the father’s parental rights as to his minor child, C. On appeal, the father
claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that the Department
of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify him with C. Held:

The trial court’s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to
reunify the respondent father with C was supported by sufficient evidence
in the record.

The trial court properly determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the respondent father failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation
as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of C, he could assume a responsible position in her life.

It was not improper for the trial court to rely on certain police reports in
support of its finding that the respondent father was involved in incidents
of domestic violence because the father did not object to the admission of
the police reports at trial and the court considered and weighed the contents
of the admitted police reports as only one factor supporting its ultimate
conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate.

The trial court properly found that the respondent father’s inconsistent
visitation history with C, considered in light of the record in its entirety,
supported the conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate.

The trial court properly credited the testimony of R, a court-appointed
evaluator and expert in clinical and forensic psychology, and relied on that
testimony in support of its conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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In re Charli M.
because, although R’s in person evaluation of the father was conducted
more than two years prior to trial, R testified that she reviewed more recent
materials, all of which were admitted as full exhibits, and that her present
opinions and recommendations were based on her review of such records,
and the father had ample opportunity to cross-examine R.
Argued September 13—officially released November 6, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New London, Juvenile
Matters at Waterford, where the respondent mother
consented to the termination of her parental rights;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Hon. John
C. Driscoll, judge trial referee; judgment terminating
the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respon-
dent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Samuel J. Shapiro, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the appellee
(petitioner).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The respondent father, Tyler M., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights as to his minor
child, Charli M. (Charli).1 The respondent claims that
** November 6, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
The petitioner also sought to terminate the parental rights of Charli’s
mother. The mother later consented to such termination and is not a partici-
pant in this appeal. Accordingly, all references in this opinion to the respon-
dent are to Tyler M. only.
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In re Charli M.

the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the Depart-
ment of Children and Families (department) made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Charli
and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the
department’s reunification efforts, and (2) the respon-
dent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. ‘‘[Charli] was born [in March, 2021]. . . .
[Charli] is [the] fourth biological child [of the respon-
dent and Charli’s mother]. The mother and [the respon-
dent] began a relationship in 2012. The department
became involved with the family in 2013 after receiving
a report of domestic violence between the parents when
the mother was approximately eight months pregnant.
The department’s concerns at that time particularly cen-
tered on substance abuse by the parents, domestic vio-
lence between the parents, and the need for mental
health treatment. In 2014, the department received
reports of ongoing domestic violence between the
mother and [the respondent], including the issuance of
protective orders. In 2015, further reports of domestic
violence between the parents were received, including
violation of an active protective order. The parents’
second child was born in 2015. In 2016, the department
received more reports of domestic violence as well as
reports that [the respondent] was abusing pills and her-
oin. In March, 2016, [the respondent] was arrested for
possession of heroin with intent to sell. At the time, it
was noted that the parents were homeless, and the
department believed they lacked insight into their par-
enting deficits.’’ The two oldest children were removed
from the care of the respondent and the mother in
March, 2016, and committed to the custody of the peti-
tioner in July, 2016. ‘‘[G]uardianship of the two oldest
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In re Charli M.

children was transferred to their paternal grandmother
on April 11, 2017.
‘‘[O]n September 12, 2018, the mother gave birth to
the [parents’] third child. On September 14, 2018, the
third child was removed from their care. [The respon-
dent’s] parental rights to this child were terminated on
July 27, 2021 . . . . The presenting issues in that
child’s case were largely the same as the two older
siblings: domestic violence, substance abuse, unstable
housing, and a need for consistent mental health treat-
ment.
‘‘The department was notified of Charli’s birth by the
hospital on the day of [her] birth. The mother at the time
was a resident of an inpatient drug treatment program
in Putnam. [The respondent] was incarcerated at the
time. The mother had entered the [drug treatment] pro-
gram on February 2, 2021, having been referred there
by the office of adult probation. At the time of admis-
sion, the mother tested positive for cocaine and benzo-
diazepines. She also attempted to bring in multiple
syringes, unidentified pills, and two containers of urine.
On April 7, 2021, the department imposed an administra-
tive ninety-six hour hold on [Charli]. On April 8, 2021,
the [petitioner] obtained an ex parte order of temporary
custody from the court, Hoffman, J., vesting temporary
custody of Charli in the [petitioner]. The child then was
placed with fictive kin, her only placement to date. On
April 16, 2021, the order of temporary custody was
sustained. On November 16, 2021, the mother and [the
respondent] submitted pleas of nolo contendere, [and]
[Charli] was adjudicated neglected and committed to
the [petitioner’s custody]. Specific steps for reunifica-
tion of the child were set [at] the time of the order of
temporary custody and served on [the respondent].
‘‘[The respondent’s] presenting issues for Charli were
essentially the same as they had been for his three
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In re Charli M.

older children. They included his criminal behavior,
especially his domestic violence with the mother, his
unstable housing and income, his untreated mental
health needs, his substance abuse needs, and lack of
consistent contact with [Charli]. [The respondent’s]
specific steps were designed to address these con-
cerns. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] first met [Charli] when she was
five months old at the office of Dr. [Nancy] Randall.
The department had made a timely referral for a psycho-
logical evaluation of [the respondent], including a par-
ent-child interactional. . . .
‘‘Randall evaluated [the respondent] in August, 2021.
She opined that [the respondent] had a significant his-
tory of substance abuse, as well as significant anger
issues. She also noted his guarded disclosures. She was
concerned about [the respondent’s] criminal history,
particularly his domestic violence, his long history of
substance abuse, and his instability in housing and
employment. She indicated that [the respondent]
should address his individual issues in order to provide
parenting reunification. She recommended that he par-
ticipate in at least weekly, consistent visitation. She
recommended that he participate in individual counsel-
ing to work on interpersonal relationships, domestic
violence, and moving toward more independence and
stability. She recommended continued substance abuse
treatment including drug testing and regular drug coun-
seling with a consistent counselor, supplemented by
twelve step meetings at least three times [per] week.
Most importantly, she recommended that [the respon-
dent] should not be considered appropriate for reunifi-
cation if further incidents of domestic violence
occurred and that stable housing and income were
necessities for reunification. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] was involved in domestic violence
incidents with the mother thrice following [Randall’s]
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evaluation. On the night of August 29, 2022, the mother
called the Ansonia Police Department to report a verbal
dispute with [the respondent]. The police responded,
but no arrest was made. On January 2, 2023, the Ansonia
Police Department responded to a 911 call from the
mother at 4:50 a.m. A neighbor in a second floor apart-
ment reported [that] the argument on the first floor was
so loud that she was awakened. The police had difficulty
gaining entrance to [the respondent’s] apartment and
obtained contradictory and implausible stories from
the mother and [the respondent].’’ The respondent was
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct in viola-
tion of General Statutes § 53a-182. ‘‘The mother was
screened for domestic violence lethality and assessed
as a high danger based upon her score. She did not
wish to cooperate. Two weeks later, on January 15,
2023 . . . the Ansonia Police Department responded
to the home, again at the mother’s request, and again
contradictory statements were given by the mother and
[the respondent]. Both were arrested as a result of the
incident.’’ The respondent was charged with assault in
the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
61 and disorderly conduct in violation of § 53a-182.
On March 23, 2023, the petitioner filed a petition
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights, which
alleged that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) and (E).2 The court, Hon.
2
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and
Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify
the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-
111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is
not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section
17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not
required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . .
(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court
to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . .
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In re Charli M.

John C. Driscoll, judge trial referee, held a trial on
August 31 and October 5, 2023. On January 29, 2024,
the court issued a memorandum of decision granting
the petition. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the department made reasonable efforts
to reunify Charli with the respondent, that the respon-
dent was unable or unwilling to benefit from those
reunification efforts, and that he had failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation to encour-
age the belief that within a reasonable time he could
assume a responsible position in Charli’s life. This
appeal followed.3 Additional facts will be set forth as
necessary.
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court erred
in concluding that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify him with Charli.4 We disagree.
and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to
facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129
and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the
life of the child . . . [or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven
years who is neglected, abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is
unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encour-
age the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age
and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in
the life of the child and such parent’s parental rights of another child were
previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of
Children and Families . . . .’’
3
Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c), the attorney for the
minor child filed a statement with this court adopting the brief of the
petitioner and supporting the affirmance of the judgment terminating the
respondent’s parental rights.
4
The respondent also argues that the provision of § 17a-112 (j) (1) excusing
the petitioner from making reasonable efforts to reunify ‘‘if the court has
determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b . . . that such efforts
are not required’’ is unconstitutional because it ‘‘allows for an impermissible
end run around the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required, as
a matter of due process, in all termination hearings.’’ As the respondent
acknowledges, however, the petitioner did not rely on that provision in the
petition, and the trial court found, on the basis of clear and convincing
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The following legal principles and standard of review
govern our resolution of the respondent’s claim. ‘‘The
reasonableness of the department’s efforts must be
assessed in the context of each case. The word reason-
able is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts
in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged,
using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Nei-
ther the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, how-
ever, defined by our legislature or by the federal act
from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]eason-
able efforts means doing everything reasonable, not
everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objec-
tive standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have
been proven depends on the careful consideration of
the circumstances of each individual case. . . .
‘‘Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard
of review [which asks] whether the trial court could
have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that
the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to
justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . In so doing, we
construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court and will not
disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Judah B., 221 Conn.
App. 387, 394–95, 300 A.3d 1253 (2023).
In reviewing the trial court’s reasonable efforts deter-
mination, this court ‘‘[does] not examine the record to
evidence, that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respon-
dent and Charli. Accordingly, we need not address the respondent’s constitu-
tional claim. See In re Kyreese L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 714 n.6, 299 A.3d
296 (declining to address identical claim ‘‘[b]ecause the court properly found,
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that the department made
reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and the child’’), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023).
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determine whether the trier of fact could have reached
a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . In our
review of the record for evidentiary sufficiency, we are
mindful that, as a reviewing court, [w]e cannot retry
the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.
. . . Rather, [i]t is within the province of the trial court,
when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence
presented and determine the credibility and effect to
be given the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Caiden B., 220 Conn. App. 326, 349, 297 A.3d
1025, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d 527 (2023).
The evidence before the trial court reveals that the
department referred the respondent to the Quality Par-
enting Center at The Village (QPC) for supervised visita-
tion with Charli, in which the respondent participated
from April through July, 2022. After the respondent
missed two visits in April, 2022, due to reported issues
with transportation, the department offered to arrange
transportation for him. Despite the department’s
efforts, the respondent was discharged from QPC after
he missed consecutive visits without notice in July,
2022. The department then referred the respondent to
Kids Advocates, which provided supervised visitation
beginning in August, 2022. Although the department
again offered to arrange transportation for the respon-
dent, he missed nine of forty-five scheduled visits, sev-
eral of which were due to alleged transportation issues.
The department also assisted the respondent with
locating a therapist by providing him with online
resources from which he could search for a provider
in his area based on his specific needs. Once the respon-
dent reported that he had found a therapist, the depart-
ment communicated with the therapist to review the
respondent’s specific steps and the issues that needed
to be addressed to facilitate reunification, including
intimate partner violence (IPV). The department also
discussed with the respondent the importance of
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addressing IPV and anger management with his thera-
pist. Although the respondent told the department that
he started seeing the therapist in February, 2022, the
therapist reported to the department in November,
2022, that she had only been working with the respon-
dent for three months. The trial court found that, ‘‘[a]fter
those three months, [the respondent] became grossly
inconsistent’’ with his therapy.
The department also referred the respondent to sup-
portive housing, a housing assistance program, in an
effort to help him find a home suitable for raising a
child. The trial court found that, ‘‘[f]ollowing his dis-
charge from incarceration, [the respondent] was in a
halfway house until October, 2021, at which time he
moved into a shelter. In March, 2022, [the respondent]
provided documentation indicating he had been living
in a motel [since] November, 2021.’’ Amanda Parsons,
the social worker employed by the department who
oversaw the respondent’s case, testified that she visited
the respondent at the motel and told him that, to facili-
tate reunification, it was important that he find housing
appropriate for raising a child. Initially, the respondent
was ineligible for supportive housing because the pro-
gram allows only one parent to participate at a time,
and the department already had referred the mother.
In May or June, 2022, the department transitioned the
supportive housing referral from the mother to the
respondent and started working with employees of the
program to locate appropriate housing for the respon-
dent. In September, 2022, however, the respondent
obtained an apartment on his own, which made him
ineligible for supportive housing.
In addition, there was evidence that the department
made other reunification efforts. The respondent was
referred to Boys & Girls Village for a reunification readi-
ness assessment, which was conducted from Decem-
ber, 2022, through January, 2023. The respondent, how-
ever, cancelled two of the eight scheduled appointments
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In re Charli M.

and did not disclose that he was arrested twice for
domestic violence incidents around the same time as
the assessment. Parsons also testified that she referred
the respondent to Fatherhood Engagement Services,
but he declined to participate. On the basis of all of the
efforts described herein, the trial court found by clear
and convincing evidence that the department made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Charli.
In challenging the trial court’s reasonable efforts
determination, the respondent focuses primarily on the
fact that the department did not refer him to a special-
ized IPV program. The respondent argues that ‘‘[t]he
failure to provide appropriate IPV counseling signifi-
cantly impacted the case’’ because IPV ‘‘was the most
significant issue preventing reunification.’’ As noted
previously, however, the department communicated
with the respondent and his therapist about the impor-
tance of addressing IPV as part of his counseling, and
the therapist confirmed that she was addressing such
issues with the respondent. There is no evidence that
the respondent ever claimed that his therapist’s efforts
were insufficient or that he requested that the depart-
ment refer him to a specialized IPV program. To the
contrary, the record suggests that, to the extent the
respondent did not sufficiently address his IPV issues
in therapy, it was due to his failure consistently to
engage with his therapist, rather than any deficiency
with respect to the department’s reunification efforts.
See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 164–66, 107
A.3d 539 (2014) (determination of whether department
made reasonable efforts to reunify may be assessed in
light of respondent’s failure to engage in services), rev’d
in part on other grounds, 317 Conn. 723, 120 A.3d
1177 (2015).
Moreover, it is well established that ‘‘[r]easonable
efforts means doing everything reasonable, not every-
thing possible,’’ and that ‘‘courts are instructed to look
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In re Charli M.

to the totality of the facts and circumstances presented
in each individual case in deciding whether reasonable
efforts have been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Caiden B., supra, 220 Conn. App. 349–50.
Furthermore, ‘‘[o]ur focus in conducting a review for
evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether
there exists support for a different finding—the proper
inquiry is whether there is enough evidence in the
record to support the finding that the trial court made.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lillyanne D.,
215 Conn. App. 61, 88, 281 A.3d 521, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 913, 283 A.3d 981 (2022). Thus, the question for
this court is not whether some evidence would support
a determination that the department should have
referred the respondent to an IPV program but, rather,
whether the totality of the evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that the department’s reunification
efforts, considered cumulatively, were reasonable. See,
e.g., In re L. T., 220 Conn. App. 680, 694–95, 299 A.3d
1229 (2023) (respondent’s claim that department’s deci-
sion not to make referral for specific service rendered
its reunification efforts unreasonable ‘‘ignores the prin-
ciple that the department need not do everything possi-
ble, just everything reasonable, to promote reunifica-
tion’’); In re Alexander T., 81 Conn. App. 668, 673, 841
A.2d 274 (‘‘[i]n light of the entire record, the failure
to provide [a] referral [for a psychiatric examination],
while a lapse, does not make the overall efforts of the
department fall below the level of what is reasonable’’),
cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004). On
the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that
there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that the department made reasonable efforts to
reunify the respondent with Charli.5
5
The respondent also claims that the trial court erred in concluding that
he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification
efforts. Pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), however, ‘‘[t]he [petitioner] must prove
[by clear and convincing evidence] either that [the department] has made
reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling
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In re Charli M.

II
The respondent also claims that the trial court erred
in concluding that he failed to rehabilitate. We disagree.
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern the respondent’s claim. ‘‘In the adjudicatory
phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding,
the court must determine whether one of the . . . stat-
utory grounds that may serve as a basis for termination
of parental rights exists. . . . Failure of a parent to
achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of [the]
statutory grounds on which a court may terminate
parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112. . . . That ground
exists when a parent of a child whom the court has
found to be neglected fails to achieve such a degree of
rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within
a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the
child, the parent could assume a responsible position
in the life of that child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Aurora H., 222 Conn. App. 307, 317–18, 304
A.3d 875, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 931, 306 A.3d 1 (2023).
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B)] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her
former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . .
The statute does not require [a parent] to prove pre-
cisely when [he] will be able to assume a responsible
position in [his] child’s life. Nor does it require [him]
to prove that [he] will be able to assume full responsibil-
ity for [his] child, unaided by available support systems.
or unable to benefit from the reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly
provides that the [petitioner] is not required to prove both circumstances.
Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B.,
supra, 220 Conn. App. 361 n.22. Because we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s reasonable efforts determination, we
need not address the respondent’s claim that the court erred in concluding
that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunifica-
tion efforts.
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. . . Rather, [§ 17a-112] requires the trial court to ana-
lyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to
the needs of the particular child, and further, that such
rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable
time. . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabili-
tation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of
that which would reasonably encourage a belief that
at some future date [he] can assume a responsible posi-
tion in [his] child’s life.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Kyreese L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 719, 299 A.3d
296, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023).
‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its
weighing of the facts in assessing whether those find-
ings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate
standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,
that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, upon the facts established and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative
effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ulti-
mate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 587–88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015).6
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On August
6
‘‘Prior to In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 569, courts had applied the
clear error standard of review both to a trial court’s determination that a
parent failed to rehabilitate and to that court’s subordinate factual findings.’’
In re Kyreese L., supra, 220 Conn. App. 720 n.8. In his brief, the respondent
argues that ‘‘the standard of review as established by our Supreme Court
in In re Shane M. should be replaced by the former clear error standard.’’
As the respondent acknowledges, however, this court ‘‘is bound by the
precedent from our Supreme Court and is unable to modify it.’’ In re Denzel
W., 225 Conn. App. 354, 380 n.14, 315 A.3d 346, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918,
317 A.3d 1 (2024).
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31, 2023, prior to the commencement of evidence, the
trial court asked the parties whether there were ‘‘any
agreements as to anything, including exhibits . . . .’’
The petitioner’s counsel notified the court that the par-
ties stipulated that the state had entered a nolle prosequi
on the criminal charges against the respondent stem-
ming from the January 2 and 15, 2023 arrests. The peti-
tioner’s counsel further notified the court that the par-
ties agreed to the admission of all proposed exhibits
except for portions of an affidavit and a social study,
both prepared by Parsons. The respondent’s counsel
argued that references to certain criminal charges from
2013 and 2016 should be redacted from the affidavit and
social study. The trial court overruled both objections.
Police reports relating to the three incidents involving
the respondent and the mother were admitted as full
exhibits by agreement of the parties.
At trial, Parsons testified regarding the department’s
reunification efforts and its concerns about the respon-
dent’s ability to provide a safe and stable home for
Charli. Parsons testified that, although the respondent
was able to maintain his sobriety, he did not meaning-
fully address the other concerns reflected in his specific
steps, namely, his involvement in domestic violence,
lack of stable housing and employment, and need for
consistent mental health treatment. In addition, Parsons
testified that the respondent was not forthright with
the department about his lack of progress in complying
with his specific steps. With respect to the domestic
violence incidents involving the mother, Parsons testi-
fied that the respondent did not notify the department
about the arrests or the underlying incidents. In fact,
the respondent repeatedly insisted to the department
that, other than to speak about Charli, he no longer
maintained a relationship with the mother. Contrary to
his representations to the department, the respondent
told the police at the time of his January 2, 2023 arrest
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that the mother was his girlfriend, and he listed her as
a source of support for Charli during the reunification
assessment with Boys & Girls Village.
Parsons also testified that, around the time the
department referred the respondent to supportive hous-
ing, he told Parsons that he would not have any problem
affording an apartment and that his primary obstacle
was locating an apartment close to his work. Yet the
respondent stopped paying rent for his apartment in
November, 2022, just two months after he signed the
lease, and his landlord commenced eviction proceed-
ings in March, 2023. In addition, the respondent lost
his job in February, 2023, but he did not notify the
department until May, 2023. Even then, he told the
department that ‘‘he was able to pay his rent and utilities
based on his unemployment [benefits],’’ even though
at that point he had not paid rent for approximately
six months.
As discussed previously, the respondent also told the
department that he found a therapist in February, 2022,
but the therapist told Parsons in November, 2022, that
she had been seeing the respondent for only three
months. At the time of trial, the respondent had not seen
his therapist in approximately five months. Parsons also
testified that the respondent missed four supervised
visits with Charli before being discharged from QPC
and nine of forty-five visits while engaged with Kids
Advocates. The respondent often cited difficulties with
transportation as a reason for missing such visits, even
though the department repeatedly offered to arrange
transportation for him. The respondent also missed two
visits without notice while engaged with QPC and one
while engaged with Kids Advocates.
The court also considered the report and testimony
of Randall, a court-appointed evaluator and expert in
clinical and forensic psychology. Based on her in person
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evaluation of the respondent in August, 2021, Randall
recommended that the respondent participate in weekly
visitation with Charli and that he engage in individual
therapy to address his issues with interpersonal rela-
tionships and domestic violence. She further recom-
mended that stable housing and income should be con-
sidered necessary to support reunification and that
reunification would not be appropriate if the respon-
dent was involved in any further incidents of domestic
violence.

At trial, Randall testified that, following her in person
evaluation of the respondent, she reviewed the social
study prepared by Parsons, an addendum to the social
study, the respondent’s criminal history, and the police
reports relating to the August, 2022 and January, 2023
incidents between the respondent and the mother. On
the basis of that review, Randall had several concerns
regarding the respondent’s ability to properly care for
Charli. First, she found it ‘‘very concerning’’ that ‘‘there
have still continued to be incidents of domestic violence
between [the respondent and the mother].’’ Relatedly,
Randall was concerned that in light of the couple’s long
history of domestic violence and the mother’s active
substance abuse, the respondent’s ongoing, close inter-
personal relationship with the mother may put Charli
at risk. Specifically, Randall testified that spending time
with a person who is actively using illegal drugs is
‘‘probably the most common trigger to relapse’’ and
that by maintaining an ongoing relationship with the
mother, the respondent ‘‘put himself at risk for relapsing
. . . .’’ She further testified that substance abuse can
be a trigger for episodes of domestic violence and that
the respondent’s relationship with the mother while she
was actively using illegal drugs ‘‘increases the risk for
domestic violence’’ and calls into question the respon-
dent’s ability to provide ‘‘a stable, safe home’’ for Charli.
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Randall also testified that the respondent’s repeated
failure to maintain housing and employment indicates
that the respondent ‘‘is not taking control of . . . those
basic steps that need to happen to be a parent and care
for his child in the home.’’ She explained that because
Charli has only ever lived with her current foster par-
ents, removing her from that home would result in
trauma and ‘‘she would need additional care more than
most [children her age] because of that experience.’’
She testified that the respondent ‘‘has not demonstrated
that he is able to really be consistent in the treatments’’
and that she ‘‘question[ed] his willingness to participate
in services that [Charli] would need . . . .’’
Finally, Randall testified that she was especially con-
cerned that the respondent’s failure consistently to fol-
low through with supervised visitation calls into ques-
tion his ability to establish and maintain a consistent
relationship with Charli. She testified that, especially
at Charli’s age, the respondent’s failure consistently to
be there for her could create trust issues and have a
damaging impact on how Charli views relationships in
general. Ultimately, Randall opined ‘‘that it would not
be appropriate or safe for Charli to be returned to [the
respondent] at this time.’’
On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court
found that, although the respondent ‘‘has made a laud-
able effort’’ by achieving and maintaining sobriety since
his release from incarceration, ‘‘[the respondent’s]
sobriety is his only consistent compliance with his
reunification steps.’’ The court found that the respon-
dent ‘‘did not obtain stable housing, employment, visita-
tion, or an appropriate interpersonal relationship with
the mother.’’ The court further found that the respon-
dent’s involvement in three incidents of domestic vio-
lence ‘‘directly contravened [Randall’s] recommenda-
tion’’ and demonstrated that the respondent ‘‘had not
mastered his anger or learned coping skills to deal with
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the tensions surrounding a difficult interpersonal rela-
tionship.’’ The court shared Randall’s concern that the
respondent ‘‘continued his relationship with the mother
despite his awareness that [she] has not addressed her
significant substance abuse history and was actively
using illegal drugs [at the time of the arrests],’’ noting
that ‘‘[t]his exposure puts [the respondent’s] sobriety at
risk and increases the likelihood of domestic violence.’’
Finally, the court found that the respondent’s ‘‘inability
or unwillingness to maintain consistent, regular visita-
tion demonstrates a lack of insight into his parenting
obligations and his daughter’s needs.’’ The trial court
concluded that the respondent failed to achieve a
degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, he could assume a
responsible position in Charli’s life.
On appeal, the respondent presents three arguments
in support of his claim that the trial court erred in
concluding that he failed to rehabilitate. First, the
respondent argues that the court improperly relied on
the police reports in support of its finding that he was
involved in incidents of domestic violence. Second, the
respondent argues that the record does not support
the court’s factual findings regarding the respondent’s
visitation history. Third, the respondent argues that the
court gave undue weight to the expert opinion of Ran-
dall. We address each argument in turn.
The respondent first argues that the trial court could
not rely on the police reports to support its finding
that he was involved in incidents of domestic violence
because such reports ‘‘can only show that a police offi-
cer determined there was probable cause to make an
arrest,’’ which ‘‘does not rise to the level of clear and
convincing evidence.’’ This argument is unavailing for
two reasons.
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First, the respondent did not object to the admission
of the police reports at trial.7 It is well settled that
‘‘[w]henever evidence is admitted without objection,
the trier of fact can rely on its contents for whatever
they are worth on their face.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Kasmaesha C., 148 Conn. App. 666, 678,
84 A.3d 1279, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 937, 88 A.3d 549
(2014). ‘‘Hearsay evidence admitted because no objec-
tion was voiced can be considered to prove the matters
in issue for whatever its worth on its face. . . . If the
evidence is received without objection, it becomes part
of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to
the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Dufresne v. Dufresne, 191 Conn. App. 532, 546–47, 215
A.3d 1259 (2019). Because the respondent did not object
to the admission of the police reports, it was within
the province of the trial court to determine the probative
value of such reports in determining whether the respon-
dent failed to rehabilitate. See In re Gabriella A., 319
Conn. 775, 790, 127 A.3d 948 (2015) (‘‘[i]t is within the
province of the trial court, when sitting as the fact
finder, to weigh the evidence presented and determine
the credibility and effect to be given the evidence’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, the respondent’s argument misapprehends
the manner in which the court relied on the police reports.
Although the mere fact that the respondent was arrested
would, as the respondent contends, ‘‘only show that a
police officer determined there was probable cause to
7
In his principal appellate brief, the respondent states that he ‘‘objected
to certain aspects of the police [reports]’’ but not to the reports in their
entirety. The respondent does not, however, provide any citation to the
record to support his assertion. As discussed previously, the record reflects
that the respondent objected only to the admission of portions of Parsons’
affidavit and the social study. After the court overruled those objections,
the respondent’s counsel stated, ‘‘that is the last of . . . my objections.’’
All other exhibits, including the police reports, were admitted by agreement.
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In re Charli M.

make an arrest,’’ the court’s decision did not rely on
the fact that the respondent was arrested. Rather, the
court considered and weighed the contents of the admit-
ted police reports—which included the responding offi-
cers’ observations, as well as statements of the respon-
dent, the mother, and the respondent’s neighbor—as a
factor supporting its ultimate determination that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate. Specifically, the police
reports described the respondent’s volatile interactions
with the mother—while she was actively abusing illegal
substances—during a crucial period in which the
respondent was attempting to reunify with Charli. As
discussed previously, the court agreed with Randall
that, given that ‘‘substance abuse has played a signifi-
cant role in [prior incidents of] domestic violence
between the mother and [the respondent],’’ the respon-
dent’s ongoing relationship with the mother despite her
active substance abuse ‘‘puts [the respondent’s] sobri-
ety at risk and increases the likelihood of domestic
violence.’’ The court relied on the content of the police
reports in finding that the incidents between the respon-
dent and the mother ‘‘directly contravened [Randall’s]
recommendation’’ and demonstrated that ‘‘[the respon-
dent] had not mastered his anger or learned coping
skills to deal with the tensions surrounding a difficult
interpersonal relationship.’’
The trial court was not required to make these subsid-
iary factual findings on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence. In In re Zamora S., 123 Conn. App. 103, 998
A.2d 1279 (2010), this court recognized that ‘‘§ 17a-112
(j) requires the petitioner to establish three specific
elements by clear and convincing evidence in order to
prevail on a termination of parental rights petition,’’
namely, that (1) the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify the parent and child or that the parent
was unable or unwilling to benefit from such efforts,
(2) termination of parental rights is in the best interest
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of the child, and (3) one of the statutory grounds for
termination set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) exists. Id., 112.
This court further recognized, however, that ‘‘any subor-
dinate facts that, together, led the court to the conclu-
sion that those elements have been met need not be
proven by that heightened standard of proof.’’ Id., 114.
Here, the court’s subsidiary findings regarding the
respondent’s ongoing relationship with the mother and
involvement in domestic violence incidents supported
its ultimate determination that the respondent failed
to rehabilitate, and the court properly considered the
police reports in support of such findings. See id., 113
(where failure to rehabilitate was alleged as ground
for termination of parental rights, respondent’s ongoing
involvement in relationship marked by domestic vio-
lence ‘‘was relevant as a subordinate fact to the court’s
eventual finding of whether the respondent had, in fact,
failed to rehabilitate herself’’).
We further note that the incidents of domestic vio-
lence that were documented in the police reports were
not the sole basis for the court’s conclusion that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate. Rather, as noted pre-
viously, the court also found that the respondent ‘‘did
not obtain stable housing, employment, visitation, or
an appropriate interpersonal relationship with the
mother.’’ The court further found it significant that,
‘‘[e]ven with a termination petition pending, [the
respondent] could not demonstrate consistent follow-
through on services.’’ Finally, the court credited Ran-
dall’s testimony ‘‘that whatever efforts [the respondent]
was making were too little and too late’’ and ‘‘[gave]
added weight to her opinion that it would not be appro-
priate or safe to return [Charli] to [the respondent]
. . . .’’ On the basis of all of its subsidiary findings, the
court determined by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation
to ‘‘encourage the belief that within a reasonable period
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of time [the respondent] could assume a responsible
position [in] the life of [Charli].’’ Accordingly, we con-
clude that the trial court did not improperly rely on the
police reports as one factor that supported its ultimate
determination that the respondent failed to rehabilitate.
With respect to the respondent’s argument that the
record does not support the trial court’s subsidiary fac-
tual findings regarding his visitation history, the respon-
dent points to a finding, contained in the portion of the
memorandum of decision addressing whether termina-
tion of parental rights was in the best interest of Charli,
that the respondent ‘‘missed 20 percent of his scheduled
visits without a valid excuse.’’8 The respondent argues
that the evidence does not support the finding that he
had no ‘‘valid excuse’’ because, of the nine visits he
missed while engaged with Kids Advocates, he missed
three visits due to illness and five visits due to ‘‘transpor-
tation issues.’’ We are not persuaded.
We first note that the respondent appears to assume
that, because the record demonstrates that he had pro-
vided a reason for missing the visits in question, there
was no basis for the trial court to find that he missed
such visits ‘‘without a valid excuse.’’ In reviewing the
record for evidentiary sufficiency, however, ‘‘[o]ur func-
tion as an appellate court is to review and not retry the
proceeding . . . . The probative force of conflicting
8
On appeal, the respondent does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion
that termination of his parental rights was in Charli’s best interest. Although
the court relied on the fact that the respondent missed 20 percent of his
visits while engaged with Kids Advocates in concluding that the respondent
failed to rehabilitate, in so concluding, the court did not expressly rely on
the separate finding in its best interest analysis that the respondent had no
‘‘valid excuse’’ for missing such visits. Moreover, for the reasons explained
herein, even assuming that the court’s finding that the respondent had no
valid excuse for the missed visits did, in fact, form part of the basis for its
conclusion that the respondent failed to rehabilitate, we conclude that the
court’s findings regarding the respondent’s visitation history are reasonably
supported by the record.
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evidence is for the trier to determine.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Nevaeh W., supra, 154 Conn.
App. 170. Moreover, ‘‘[w]e will not disturb the court’s
subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erro-
neous. . . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when
it is not supported by any evidence in the record or
when there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 490, 308
A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960
(2024). In the present case, the petitioner presented
testimony that specifically called into question the valid-
ity of the respondent’s excuses for the visits he missed
due to alleged transportation issues. Specifically, Par-
sons testified that the department repeatedly offered
to arrange transportation for the respondent, but he
declined to take advantage of such offers. The trial
court was free to credit such testimony in assessing
the respondent’s visitation history.

Moreover, the respondent focuses solely on the trial
court’s statistical finding that he missed 20 percent of
his visits while engaged with Kids Advocates, while
ignoring the full context of the court’s factual findings
regarding his visitation history. The court, however,
took a broader view of the evidence by discussing the
respondent’s overall commitment to supervised visita-
tion based on his record with QPC and Kids Advocates.
Specifically, the court found that when the department
referred the respondent to QPC, ‘‘[i]t took at least four
attempts before an intake could be scheduled,’’ and
that, although ‘‘[the respondent] participated in this visi-
tation, [he] was discharged in August, 2022, after two
consecutive no call/no show visits.’’ The court then
found that after the department referred the respondent
to Kids Advocates, he received ‘‘[a] very positive report’’
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In re Charli M.

but ‘‘missed 20 percent of his available visits.’’ Further-
more, although not referenced in the memorandum of
decision, the record also reflects that, in addition to
the two ‘‘no call/no show’’ visits that resulted in the
respondent’s discharge from QPC, he missed at least
two other visits while engaged with QPC due to alleged
transportation issues.
Additionally, Randall testified that, ‘‘regardless of the
reason, for [the respondent] to miss multiple visits
ongoing with his daughter, that’s a letdown for her . . .
[e]very time that she expects there to be a visit, and
then he doesn’t show up. So that to me is something
that is very significant for her.’’ The court relied on
Randall’s opinion in finding that the missed visits
‘‘would have a deleterious effect upon a young child,
creating trust issues for that child.’’ On the basis of
the entire record, the court ultimately found that ‘‘[the
respondent’s] inability or unwillingness to maintain
consistent, regular visitation demonstrates a lack of
insight into his parenting obligations and his daughter’s
needs.’’ Considering the record in its entirety and con-
struing the evidence in the light most favorable to sus-
taining the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that the
court properly found that the respondent’s inconsistent
visitation history supported the conclusion that he
failed to rehabilitate.
Finally, the respondent argues that the trial court
erred by giving ‘‘added weight’’ to Randall’s testimony
because her opinion was based on outdated informa-
tion. Relying on this court’s decisions in O’Neill v.
O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied,
207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988), and Merkel v. Hill,
189 Conn. App. 779, 207 A.3d 1115 (2019), the respon-
dent argues that Randall’s testimony was ‘‘stale’’
because her in person evaluation occurred more than
two years before trial.
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The respondent’s reliance on O’Neill and Merkel is
misplaced. In O’Neill, the trial court in a dissolution of
marriage action awarded sole custody of the parties’
child to the father on the basis of a family relations
case study report written thirteen months before trial.
See O’Neill v. O’Neill, supra, 13 Conn. App. 302. In
reversing the judgment of the trial court, this court
noted that the case study report referred to past events
in the mother’s life ‘‘which [were] not probative of [her]
present parenting abilities’’ and that the family relations
officer who authored the report expressly testified ‘‘that
due to the passage of time he could not competently
testify as to whether the parties’ stability and security
had changed since his report.’’ Id., 303. This court con-
cluded that the trial court erred in relying on the out-
dated report because it ‘‘[did] not focus on the present
abilities or infirmities of the [mother] as they may affect
her ability to be a primary caretaker of the child.’’ Id.
Similarly, in Merkel, this court reversed a judgment
modifying a child custody and parental access plan
because the trial court adopted recommendations from
a family relations custody report completed ten months
before trial, despite the family relations counselor’s tes-
timony that she had no updated information about the
family and could not confirm that her recommendations
were still valid. See Merkel v. Hill, supra, 189 Conn.
App. 788–89. The counselor ‘‘testified that she could
not opine as to the particulars of the report at issue
because she was not expecting to testify that day’’ and
‘‘had not reviewed the file, report, or notes’’ prior to
her testimony. Id., 784. The counselor further testified
that she believed her report would have been ‘‘outdated
after six months’’ and that she had ‘‘no basis to say that
it’s still valid . . . [and] would be doing a disservice to
the minor child to say that.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 785. This court concluded that the trial
court erred because, ‘‘[n]otwithstanding the staleness
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In re Charli M.

of the report and the testimony of [the counselor] that
it did not represent her present recommendations, the
court surprisingly found that [the counselor’s] testi-
mony ‘validated the report and her recommendations,’
and . . . adopted her stale recommendations as its
own.’’ Id., 789.
Unlike in O’Neill and Merkel, Randall testified that,
prior to trial, she reviewed Parsons’ social study, an
addendum to the social study, the respondent’s criminal
history, and the police reports and that her present
opinions and recommendations were based on her
review of such records. All of the materials that Randall
reviewed were admitted as full exhibits, so the respon-
dent had ample opportunity to cross-examine Randall
concerning her testimony. The record reflects that the
respondent availed himself of that opportunity. For
example, the respondent’s counsel elicited from Ran-
dall that her knowledge of the respondent’s visitation
history and reunification assessment was based solely
on the social study and that she had not reviewed the
underlying documentation. In addition, the respon-
dent’s counsel emphasized during closing argument that
‘‘Randall had only met Charli and . . . [the respondent]
once’’ and argued that her evaluation ‘‘was so long ago
at this point [that] the recommendations are not up
to date.’’
Contrary to the respondent’s argument, it was not
improper for the trial court to credit Randall’s testimony
and to rely on that testimony in support of the conclu-
sion that the respondent failed to rehabilitate. ‘‘It is well
established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the
trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony.
. . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony
is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is
privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably
believes to be credible. . . . On appeal, we do not retry
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the facts or pass on the credibility of witnesses. . . .
It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to
reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or
disbelieve any expert testimony. . . . The trier may
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of
an expert offered by one party or the other.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Aubrey K., 216 Conn.
App. 632, 658–59, 285 A.3d 1153 (2022), cert. denied,
345 Conn. 972, 286 A.3d 907 (2023).
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclu-
sion that the respondent failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of Charli, he could assume a responsible position
in her life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.