State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH
DUNN, CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL
OFFICER v. NANCY BURTON
(AC 45710)
Alvord, Elgo and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court vesting in the
plaintiff ownership of numerous goats in the defendant’s possession found
to be neglected and cruelly treated and from the judgment of the court
dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim. The defendant claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly determined that she failed to comply with its
order to relinquish ownership of the goats or pay a surety or cash bond by
the deadline. Held:

The defendant’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the verified
petition to vest temporary custody of the goats with the Department of
Agriculture failed because the petition sufficiently detailed the defendant’s
neglect and cruel treatment of the goats so as to comply with the require-
ments of the governing statute ((Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (c)).

This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claims
that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress certain evi-
dence, that it did not decide her motion to relinquish the goats in a timely
manner, that it improperly denied her motion to relinquish, that § 22-329a
is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in the present case, and that
the trial court improperly dismissed her counterclaim, in part, on the ground
of sovereign immunity.

This court could not conclude that the defendant was denied due process
when she was not allowed to present her motion to suppress certain evidence
at the hearing regarding the temporary custody of the goats, as that hearing
resulted in only an order of temporary custody of the goats and, had the
defendant posted bond as required by § 22-329a (f), she could have presented
her concerns about the evidence at a subsequent hearing.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that she was entitled
to notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats pursuant to statute
(§ 19a-341), the defendant having failed to identify where in the voluminous
record the trial court’s ruling on that claim could be found.

The trial court did not incorrectly conclude that temporary custody of the
goats should vest with the department, the plaintiff having established that
it was more probable than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly
treated by the defendant.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton
The trial court’s finding that the defendant did not relinquish ownership of
the goats by the deadline ordered by the court was supported by the record
and was not clearly erroneous.

The trial court did not improperly determine that the defendant failed to
pay the bond ordered by the court pursuant to § 22-329a (c), as there was
no dispute that she did not pay the required amount by the deadline.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, in part, the defen-
dant’s counterclaim on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine because
the present action and a separate action brought by the defendant that was
pending before the Superior Court were virtually alike.

Argued March 5—officially released November 26, 2024

Procedural History

Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in favor
of the plaintiff of certain animals in the defendant’s
possession that allegedly were neglected or cruelly
treated, and other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
Cobb, J., issued an order vesting temporary custody of
the animals with the plaintiff; thereafter, the case was
transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, where the
court, Bellis, J., denied the defendant’s motion to sup-
press certain evidence and rendered judgment vesting
permanent custody of the animals with the Department
of Agriculture, from which the defendant appealed to
this court; subsequently, the defendant filed a counter-
claim; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., granted the plain-
tiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and rendered
judgment thereon, and the defendant filed an amended
appeal. Affirmed.
Nancy Burton, self-represented, the appellant (defen-
dant).
Matthew I. Levine, deputy associate attorney general,
with whom were Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney
general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (plaintiff).
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented defendant, Nancy
Burton, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
vesting permanent custody with the Commissioner of
Agriculture, through the Department of Agriculture
(department), of sixty-five goats owned by the defen-
dant and from the judgment of the court dismissing the
defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiff, the state
of Connecticut. On appeal, the defendant raises a num-
ber of claims, which we distill to the following: (1) the
court lacked jurisdiction over the verified petition filed
by Jeremiah Dunn, the chief animal control officer of
the plaintiff, to vest temporary custody of the goats
with the department, (2) the court improperly denied
her motion to suppress, which attacked the process by
which the warrant to search her property and seize the
goats was issued pursuant to General Statutes (Supp.
2022) § 22-329a (b),1 (3) she was ‘‘denied due process
when she was not allowed to present [her] motion to
suppress for adjudication,’’ (4) she was entitled to
notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats
pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-341,2 (5) the court
improperly determined that the goats were subjected
to neglect and cruel treatment, (6) the court improperly
determined that the defendant failed to comply with its
order to relinquish ownership of the goats by April 16,
2021, or pay a surety or cash bond in the amount of
$32,000 by that date, (7) § 22-329a is unconstitutional
on its face and as applied in this case, and (8) the court
improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim on
the ground that the claims raised in the counterclaim
were barred by either sovereign immunity or the prior
1
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 22-329a in
this opinion are to the version of the statute set forth in the 2022 supplement
to the General Statutes.
2
Although § 19a-341 was amended in 2024; see Public Acts 2024, No. 24-
70, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. For
simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

pending action doctrine. We affirm the judgments of
the court.
The following facts, as set forth in the record or the
trial court’s memorandum of decision vesting tempo-
rary custody of the goats with the department, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At all
relevant times, the defendant was the owner of real
property located at 147 Cross Highway in Redding
(property), on which she kept a herd of goats. The
Redding Police Department (police department) had
received at least 120 complaints regarding the goats
kept on the property, most of which related to roaming
goats and violations of town ordinances. In April, 2020,
one of the goats was in the road and was struck by a
motor vehicle.3 The department, as well, received at
least five complaints regarding the goats, most of which
concerned their care and condition. On or about Octo-
ber 7, 2020, the state animal control unit received a
complaint concerning injured and/or neglected goats
kept on the property. Following that complaint, on
October 15, 2020, Barbara Godejohn, a state animal
control officer, along with Redding Police Detective
Christina Dias, observed approximately fifty goats on
the property, one of which appeared to be walking on
its knees and unable to stand. Subsequently, Charles
DellaRocco, a state animal control officer, was assigned
to investigate a complaint made by the defendant and,
on December 10, 2020, he went to the property.
Although the defendant did not allow DellaRocco onto
the property, DellaRocco was able to observe thirty-
five to forty-five goats from a distance, one of which
was visibly limping. On February 3, 2021, DellaRocco
observed the goats from a nearby location, where he
viewed the defendant as she provided a minimal amount
3
As a result of the motor vehicle accident involving the goat, the defendant
was arrested and charged with animal cruelty. That case is pending before
the Superior Court.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

of hay to a goat paddock containing ten goats. On the
basis of DellaRocco’s observations of the goats on Feb-
ruary 3, 2021, the department decided to conduct fur-
ther surveillance of the property for the purpose of
determining the condition of the herd. That surveil-
lance, which concluded on March 4, 2021, resulted in
a number of animal health and property management
concerns, including that the goats were not given
enough food and fresh water, they were not provided
with adequate shelters from the elements, the existing
shelters were in disrepair, either missing walls or a roof,
and the goats were living in unsanitary conditions as a
result of manure piling up several feet high. The goats
themselves appeared to be in poor condition as well,
with some having overgrown hooves, which affected
their gait and mobility.
As a result of these concerns, Dunn filed an applica-
tion for a search and seizure warrant pursuant to § 22-
329a (b) to seize the goats. The warrant application
was accompanied by an affidavit from DellaRocco, who
attested, on the basis of his observations, that the goats
were being treated cruelly.4 The court granted the appli-
cation and issued the warrant on March 9, 2021, finding
that there was probable cause that the goats were
neglected or cruelly treated. The following day, the
warrant was executed, and the department took cus-
tody of sixty-five live goats and one dead goat from
the property. Furthermore, members of the department
who were present during the execution of the warrant
discovered between forty and fifty dead goats, in vari-
ous stages of decomposition, in multiple locations
throughout the property. Thereafter, Dunn filed a veri-
fied petition seeking, inter alia, temporary custody of
the goats and requesting the court to issue an order to
the defendant to show cause why the court should not
4
Tanya Wescovich, a state animal control officer, was a coaffiant on the
affidavit in support of the search warrant.
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vest custody of the goats in the department.5 The court
granted that request, issued a show cause order to the
defendant and ordered a remote hearing to be held on
March 30, 2021. The court held an evidentiary hearing
on the verified petition for temporary custody on March
30 and April 8, 2021. Thereafter, the court, Cobb, J.,
granted the petition in part and ordered, inter alia, that
‘‘[t]emporary care and custody of the sixty-four live
goats seized by the [plaintiff] . . . shall continue to be
vested in the [plaintiff] . . . .’’
In its memorandum of decision relating to the plain-
tiff’s request seeking an order of temporary custody of
the sixty-five goats seized from the property, the court
made the following findings: ‘‘The defendant is the
owner of the property located at 147 Cross Highway,
Redding . . . and sixty-five live goats that lived on the
property prior to March 10, 2021, when the animals
were seized by the [plaintiff]. The defendant had owned
other goats that died on the property. Forty to fifty
goats were found dead and decaying on the property,
with some of the carcasses found decaying in black
plastic bags and Rubbermaid plastic bins. In October,
2020, the defendant voluntarily transferred twenty-
three live goats from her property and placed them at
an animal rescue facility.
‘‘The defendant neglected the goats and treated them
cruelly in a number of ways, including: (1) The defen-
dant did not properly maintain the hooves of many of
5
In the verified petition, Dunn also requested that (1) upon vesting tempo-
rary custody of the animals in the department, the court issue an order
requiring the defendant either to relinquish ownership of the goats or post
a surety or cash bond with the department, (2) the court make a finding
that the goats were in imminent harm, neglected and/or cruelly treated in
violation of General Statutes § 53-247, (3) the court vest permanent owner-
ship and custody of the goats with the department, and (4) the court order
the defendant to pay to the department the expenses incurred by the depart-
ment to provide proper food, shelter and care to the goats, calculated at a
rate of $15 per goat per day until ownership of the goats is vested in the
plaintiff, as well as veterinary costs and expenses incurred.
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the goats, allowing the hooves to grow too long which
impacted their mobility.
‘‘(2) The defendant did not maintain the property or
the shelters in that she did not remove manure that
accumulated on the property and inside the shelters.
Certain of the shelters had manure piled up to a foot
high. The buildup of the manure in the shelters limited
the space available in the shelters for the goats and
impeded the goats’ ability to use them. The manure was
also a hazard to the goats’ health and safety.
‘‘(3) Many of the goats seized by the [plaintiff] had
manure caked into their fur and were missing significant
areas of fur on their coats.
‘‘(4) The defendant failed to provide the goats with
adequate food or water. Many of the goats were under-
weight. Also, photographs depict many empty and dry
food and water containers on the property. Certain of
the buckets appeared to have had water in them but
the water had frozen due to the freezing temperatures.
When state investigators conducted a surveillance of
the property over a two day period, one noted she did
not see the defendant provide any food or water at
any time.
‘‘(5) When the defendant did provide water to the
goats, she did not use a hose system, but rather pur-
chased plastic gallon water bottles. The amount of
water provided to the goats from these water bottles
was insufficient. Also, the defendant then allowed
empty plastic water bottles to be left around the prop-
erty, where the goats had access and could chew on
them.
‘‘(6) The defendant did not provide the goats with
proper or adequate shelter. The number of shelters
located on the property [was] limited and sufficient to
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accommodate only about thirty-five goats, not the sixty-
five goats living on the property. In addition, the shelters
were decrepit with missing walls and parts of ceilings.
As a result, many of the shelters failed to provide proper
protection for the animals from the rain, snow, cold,
wind and other inclement weather.
‘‘(7) The defendant allowed the property to be riddled
with numerous dead and decaying goats.
‘‘(8) The defendant allowed at least one goat to die
on the property without proper care or treatment nor
did she provide the goat with a proper or humane death.
On March 10, the [plaintiff] found a recently deceased
goat lying on the floor of a shelter used by the live
goats. There was evidence that the deceased goat had
fallen and could not get up and had been scraping his
legs against the floor of the shelter prior to its death.
Parts of that dead goat’s body had been eaten by rodents
or other vermin.
‘‘Since the goats were seized by the [plaintiff] on
March 10, 2021, and have been in the [department’s]
custody, one goat has died and six kids have been born,
putting the number of goats in the [department’s] care at
seventy. When the six kids were born, their birthweights
were unusually low, and all needed human intervention
to survive.
‘‘The court finds that while in the defendant’s care,
the sixty-five goats were in imminent harm and were
neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant. The
court, therefore, determines that the [plaintiff] has met
its burden to establish reasonable cause to find that the
animals’ condition and the circumstances surrounding
their care by the defendant require that temporary care
and custody continue to be assumed by the [plaintiff]
to safeguard the goats’ welfare.’’
The court, therefore, vested temporary care and cus-
tody of the sixty-four live goats seized and the newly
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born kids in the department. The court also ordered
that the defendant, ‘‘[o]n or before April 16, 2021 . . .
relinquish ownership of the animals to the [plaintiff] or
post a surety or cash bond with the [department] in the
amount of [$500] per each of the sixty-four remaining
live goats seized by the [plaintiff] to pay for the reason-
able expenses in caring and providing for such animals
. . . .’’ The court further ordered the defendant to ‘‘pay
the expenses incurred by the [department] in providing
proper food, shelter and care to each animal calculated
at the rate of [$15] per goat per day beginning March
11, 2021, and continuing until the goats are returned to
the defendant, the defendant relinquishes custody of
the goats or permanent custody of the goats is vested
in the [department] . . . [and] . . . pay all veterinary
costs and expenses incurred for the welfare of the ani-
mals, which costs are not covered in the per diem rate
during the period the goats remain in the [department’s]
temporary care and possession.’’
On April 20, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for an
order requesting that the court vest permanent custody
of the goats in the department. The basis for the motion
was the defendant’s failure to post a bond or to volunta-
rily relinquish ownership of the goats, as ordered by
the court on April 9, 2021, and as required by § 22-329a
(f).6 In its motion, the plaintiff asserted: ‘‘Pursuant to
6
General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (f) provides: ‘‘If the court issues
an order vesting the animal’s temporary care and custody in some suitable
state, municipal or other public or private agency or person, the owner or
owners shall either relinquish ownership of the animal or post a surety bond
or cash bond with the agency or person in whom the animal’s temporary
care and custody was vested. The surety bond or cash bond shall be in the
amount of five hundred dollars for each animal placed in the temporary
care or custody of such agency or person and shall secure payment for the
reasonable expenses of the agency or person having temporary care and
custody of the animal in caring and providing for such animal until the court
makes a finding as to the animal’s disposition under subsection (g) of this
section. The requirement that a bond be posted may be waived if such
owner provides satisfactory evidence that such owner is indigent and unable
to pay for such bond.’’
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the order of the court, the defendant was given a choice
of posting a bond, in order to protect the plaintiff from
the increasing expense of caring for her goats during
the pendency of these proceedings, or relinquishing
ownership over them. The order unambiguously
required the defendant to choose. The court required
the defendant to post a surety or cash bond in the
amount of $32,000 ($500 per animal). The defendant
has refused to comply with the order of the court.
Instead, the defendant sent a check to the plaintiff in
the amount of $450 and has attempted to unilaterally
modify the order to her benefit. Notably, the defendant’s
attempt to ignore the order is based, in part, on her
desire to proceed only to oppose the [plaintiff’s] efforts
to obtain ownership over nine specifically identified
goats. By any metric, the defendant has wilfully defied
the order of the court by failing to post the bond as
required by the court or [to] relinquish ownership over
the goats. As a result of the defendant’s refusal to com-
ply with the court’s order, ownership must be vested
in the [department].’’ The defendant filed an objection
to the plaintiff’s motion for an order on April 27, 2022.
On May 4, 2022, the court granted the plaintiff’s
motion for an order. In its written order, the court,
Bellis, J., stated: ‘‘The clear and unambiguous order of
the court . . . on April 9, 2021, required the defendant
to either relinquish control of the goats to the [plaintiff]
or post surety or cash bond with the [department] in
the amount of [$500] for each of the sixty-four remaining
live goats no later than April 16, 2021. While the defen-
dant filed a motion to ‘Relinquish Ownership of Goats
for Immediate Release to Qualified Animal Rescue
Sanctuaries’ on the April 16, 2021 deadline, that motion,
which was subsequently denied, was an offer to relin-
quish ownership of the goats to two animal sanctuaries
and various private individuals of the defendant’s own
choosing. Simply put, it was not an offer to relinquish
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

control of the goats to the [plaintiff]. As such, the defen-
dant did not relinquish control of the goats to the [plain-
tiff] by the April 16, 2021 court deadline. Therefore, the
sole issue for the court is whether the defendant posted
surety or cash bond with the [department] in the amount
of [$500] for each of the sixty-four remaining live goats.
The total amount due, on or before April 16, 2021, pursu-
ant to the court’s order, was $32,000. The defendant
makes no claim that the $32,000 was paid. The court
rejects the defendant’s argument that the [plaintiff]
waived the $32,000 based on her claim that the [plaintiff]
had done so in the past in other matters. There is neither
argument nor evidence in this case that the [plaintiff]
has waived the surety or cash bond, but, more import-
antly, the imposition of the surety or cash bond was a
binding order of the court [that] the parties were
required to comply with. For these reasons, the motion
of the [plaintiff] is granted. Permanent ownership of all
of the defendant’s goats and their offspring, born and
unborn, is vested in the [department]. Additionally, pur-
suant to . . . § 22-329a (h), the sum of $39,360 ($15/
day for forty-one days of care for sixty-four goats) plus
any veterinary costs not covered by the per diem rate
associated with the care of the goats for that forty-one
day time period shall be paid by the defendant to the
[department].’’ (Emphasis in original.)
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for judg-
ment in accordance with the court’s May 4, 2022 order.
On June 22, 2022, the court, Bellis, J., granted the
motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff with
respect to its action against the defendant but noted
that a counterclaim filed by the defendant remained
pending. The defendant appealed to this court from
the June 22, 2022 judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., granted a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim filed by the plaintiff following
argument on the motion, and the defendant filed an
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amended appeal with this court challenging the judg-
ment dismissing her counterclaim. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the verified petition to vest
temporary custody of the goats with the department.
The defendant bases this claim on her assertion that,
because the verified petition fails to identify the goats
individually and to ‘‘plainly state’’ facts pertaining to
the neglect and cruel treatment with regard to each
goat seized, the goats were never brought within the
jurisdiction of the court as a result of this alleged defi-
ciency in the verified petition. Thus, according to the
defendant, the court lacked jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to the governing statute, § 22-329a (c). The
plaintiff, on the other hand, counters that this claim,
which concerns the sufficiency of the verified petition,
does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court. We conclude that, even if we assume, without
deciding, that the claim implicates the court’s jurisdic-
tion over the matter, the claim nonetheless fails, as
the verified complaint sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the statute.
We first set forth our standard of review for this
claim. The defendant’s claim ‘‘presents a question of
statutory construction over which we exercise plenary
review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur funda-
mental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,
we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the mean-
ing of the statutory language as applied to the facts
of [the] case, including the question of whether the
language actually does apply. . . . The meaning of a
statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from
the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-
2z. . . . [A] statute is plain and unambiguous when the
meaning . . . is so strongly indicated or suggested by
the [statutory] language . . . that . . . it appears to be
the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely
meaning. . . . [I]f the text of the statute at issue . . .
would permit more than one likely or plausible mean-
ing, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambig-
uous.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Demarco v. Charter Oak
Temple Restoration Assn., Inc., 226 Conn. App. 335,
339–40, 317 A.3d 1137, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 923, 321
A.3d 1130 (2024). ‘‘It is a basic tenet of statutory con-
struction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and
read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a
reasonable overall interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Townsend v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 226 Conn. App. 313, 331, 317 A.3d 1147 (2024).
Applying these principles to § 22-329a (c), and for the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant’s
interpretation of § 22-329a (c) is not consistent with
the plain language of the statute.

Section 22-329a (c) applies after the department has
taken custody of animals and provides in relevant part
that an animal control officer ‘‘shall file with the [S]upe-
rior [C]ourt . . . a verified petition plainly stating such
facts of neglect or cruel treatment as to bring such
animal within the jurisdiction of the court . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) The defendant argues that we
should construe ‘‘such animal’’ as used in the statute as
meaning each individual animal. She does so, however,
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

without citation to any authority supporting that inter-
pretation.7 ‘‘Courts are not permitted to read words into
the statute that the legislature did not insert.’’ Dusto v.
Rogers Corp., 222 Conn. App. 71, 108, 304 A.3d 446
(2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 274 (2024);
see also Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126,
143, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘ ‘[w]e will not read into a
[statute] words or limitations that are not there’ ’’). We,
therefore, decline to read into the statute words that
are not stated therein.
Furthermore, as we have stated, the statute must be
read as a whole. Subsection (b) of § 22-329a permits
any animal control officer to take physical custody of
‘‘any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding proba-
ble cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly
treated . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘[S]uch animal’’
under the statute thus means any animal over which
the animal control officer, i.e., the department, takes
custody, which could range from one to many animals.
In the present case, custody was taken over sixty-five
7
In her appellate briefs, the defendant cites only to other Superior Court
animal welfare cases in which the verified petitions addressed specific
animals in support of her claim that each of the sixty-five goats had to be
referenced individually in the verified petition in the present case. See State
ex rel. Dunn v. Kornstein, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 20, 2020) (seizure of 1 cow, 137
chickens, 33 ducks, 6 dogs, and 18 cattle); State ex rel. Connors v. Olajos,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(March 8, 2016) (seizure of 32 horses, 78 chickens, 19 rabbits and 2 dogs);
State ex rel. Dunn v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 4, 2021) (seizure of eight horses).
These cases, in addition to being nonbinding authority, do not provide
support for that proposition. Although the verified petition in each case
made specific references to some of the animals seized, each petition did
not do so with respect to the remainder of the seized animals and, instead,
referred to them generally or as a whole by category of animal. These cases,
thus, do not support a conclusion that the plaintiff is obligated under the
statute to identify each animal that is part of the seizure and make specific
factual allegations regarding each animal individually, and the defendant
has not provided any other authority demonstrating otherwise.
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goats. It logically follows that the requirement in sub-
section (c) of a plain statement of facts of neglect and
cruel treatment in the verified petition must be made
as to the animals—the sixty-five goats—over which the
department took custody. In the present case, the veri-
fied petition set forth in great detail the observations
of various animal control officers during the course of
the surveillance operation that took place prior to the
seizure of the goats. Those observations revealed health
concerns related to the goats, as well as property man-
agement concerns, including that ten to twelve ‘‘goats
had extremely long hooves that affected their mobility,’’
one of the goats appeared to be limping and unable to
stand, the animals had to take shelter in manure filled
enclosures because manure was allowed to accumulate
in and around the paddocks, ‘‘the animals [did] not
have adequate access to fresh water,’’ and ‘‘the shelter
provided in the paddocks did not provide enough space
to shelter all of the animals and the shelters did not
provide an adequate wind break for high winds and
cold weather.’’ The verified petition further outlined the
conditions of the goats and the property following the
seizure. For example, it explained that, ‘‘[d]uring the
execution of the warrant, dozens of dead goats, esti-
mated to be between forty . . . and fifty . . . were
discovered in multiple locations on the property in vari-
ous stages of decomposition’’ and that dead goats were
found in plastic bags, inside trash containers, and in a
shallow pit that was covered by plywood. Of the sixty-
five goats that were seized, the verified petition alleged
that a number of them were visibly underweight, had
fur that was missing, matted, or caked in mud and
manure, and had ‘‘extremely long hooves that were not
being maintained and were affecting the mobility of the
animals.’’
We conclude that the facts alleged in the verified
petition sufficiently detailed the neglect and cruel treat-
ment of the goats so as to comply with the terms of
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§ 22-329a (c). The clear and unambiguous language of
the statute requires the animal control officer to include
in the verified petition a plain statement of the facts
demonstrating neglect and cruel treatment of ‘‘such
animal’’ over which custody has been taken. In the
present case, sixty-five goats were seized from the prop-
erty. The verified petition sets forth a plain statement
of the facts pertaining to the neglect and cruel treatment
of the herd of goats that resided on the property. There
is no language in the statute requiring that the plain
statement of facts of neglect and cruel treatment single
out ‘‘each’’ individual animal seized, as argued by the
defendant. Moreover, the allegations of cruel treatment
pertaining to the goats stemmed in large part from the
defendant’s management of the property. As we have
stated, the verified petition alleged that the defendant
failed to provide adequate shelter for the goats, failed
to give them sufficient access to fresh water, and
allowed the goats to live in manure filled shelters and
with dead goats in various stages of decomposition
strewn about the property. All of the goats on the prop-
erty were being subjected to these unsanitary condi-
tions. It, thus, would be nonsensical for the statute
to require that the verified petition assert a separate
allegation as to each individual goat when, as here, the
allegations contained therein plainly stated the cruel
treatment to which the goats, as a herd, were being
subjected. ‘‘[A] court must construe a statute as written.
. . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions
. . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that
good reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of
the legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed,
is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say,
but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiom-
atic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to
accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the
legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
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v. Richard P., 179 Conn. App. 676, 688, 181 A.3d 107,
cert. denied, 328 Conn. 924, 181 A. 3d 567 (2018). The
defendant’s claim, therefore, is unavailing.
II
The defendant next challenges the court’s denial of
her April 8, 2021 motion to suppress,8 which attacked
the process by which the warrant to search her property
and seize the goats was issued pursuant to § 22-329a
(b). In her motion, the defendant alleged that the war-
rant was ‘‘procured under false pretenses’’ by Della-
Rocco, that his affirmations under oath to procure the
warrant were ‘‘highly suspect,’’ and that his affidavit
was ‘‘replete with false, fanciful and ridiculous’’ asser-
tions that were made recklessly and that did not estab-
lish probable cause. The defendant sought a new proba-
ble cause hearing, the warrant ‘‘stricken,’’ and the goats
returned. On appeal, the defendant reiterates her asser-
tions that DellaRocco lacked credibility and that the
warrant failed to establish probable cause. She now
argues for the first time that (1) DellaRocco lacked
credibility because he wilfully withheld facts, namely,
that he failed to disclose a prior arrest on felony charges
of larceny and forgery, and that such facts, if known,
‘‘would have doomed the [warrant] application’’; and
(2) the trial judge who made the finding of probable
cause to issue the warrant had a conflict of interest.
Because these arguments were not raised in the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress9 and are being raised for the
8
In an order dated April 13, 2022, the court, Bellis, J., denied the motion
summarily.
9
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the defendant ‘‘does not have a
fourth amendment right to suppress evidence in civil proceedings like animal
welfare actions.’’ As the plaintiff maintains, ‘‘[o]ur jurisprudence has long
held that one cannot exclude evidence based on an alleged fourth amend-
ment violation in civil cases.’’ Although this court recently determined that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of a civil animal welfare
action involving a warrantless search; see State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly,
228 Conn. App. 458, 459–60, A.3d (2024); the present case, in contrast,
involves a claim that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained
assertions that were known to be false and omitted material facts, thereby
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first time on appeal, we decline to review them.10 See
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke, 218 Conn.
App. 542, 546 n.4, 292 A.3d 81 (declining to review claim
raised for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 347 Conn.
904, 297 A.3d 567 (2023). Moreover, with respect to her
claim that DellaRocco’s allegations in his affidavit in
support of the warrant lacked credibility and did not
establish probable cause, the defendant makes conclu-
sory assertions without any citation to authority or anal-
ysis of the law as applied to this case. ‘‘Where the parties
cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we
do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 133,
101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107
implicating Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 667 (1978). See footnote 10 of this opinion. We need not decide
whether the exclusionary rule applies in such circumstances in light of
the defendant’s failure to adequately brief her claim regarding her motion
to suppress.
10
We note that, in her motion to suppress, the defendant cited to Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978),
in support of her claim that the warrant affidavit was premised on false
statements and omitted material facts. ‘‘In Franks v. Delaware, supra, [438
U.S.] 155–56, the United States Supreme Court held that where the defendant
makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by
the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause, the [f]ourth [a]mendment requires
that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. . . . The court in Franks
mentioned only a false statement . . . included . . . in the warrant affida-
vit; subsequent cases, however, have extended Franks to include material
omissions from such an affidavit.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 519–20, 944 A.2d 947, cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S. Ct. 271, 172 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2008). On appeal,
the defendant has neither cited to Franks nor argued in her appellate briefs
that she was entitled to a Franks hearing. We, therefore, deem any such
claim abandoned. See Samelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 249, 255
n.3, 184 A.3d 741 (2018) (claim raised at trial but not argued on appeal was
deemed abandoned); see also Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital & Health
Center, Inc., 306 Conn. 304, 319, 50 A.3d 841 (2012) (‘‘[a]n appellant who
fails to brief a claim abandons it’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918, 133 S. Ct. 1809, 185 L. Ed. 2d
812 (2013).
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20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
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(2014). ‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Prescott v. Gilshteyn, 227 Conn. App. 553, 571
n.8, 322 A.3d 1060 (2024). Because the defendant has
inadequately briefed her challenge to the denial of her
motion to suppress, we decline to review this claim.11
11
We are mindful that ‘‘[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut
courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not
interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice
liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless,
[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of
self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803–804, 256
A.3d 655 (2021); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Caldrello, 192 Conn.
App. 1, 34, 219 A.3d 858 (‘‘ ‘[a]lthough we are solicitous of the rights of pro
se litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and proce-
dure as those qualified to practice law’ ’’), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 905, 220
A.3d 37 (2019). ‘‘[A]lthough we recognize and adhere to the well-founded
policy to accord leeway to self-represented parties in the appeal process,
our deference is not unlimited; nor is a litigant on appeal relieved of the
obligation to sufficiently articulate a claim so that it is recognizable to a
reviewing court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) L. K. v. K. K., 226
Conn. App. 279, 303 n.11, 318 A.3d 243 (2024); see also Burton v. Dept. of
Environmental Protection, supra, 804; Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey,
227 Conn. App. 94, 107 n.9, 321 A.3d 441 (2024). Moreover, although the
defendant is a self-represented party, she was a licensed attorney prior
to being disbarred in 2008; see https://www.jud.ct.gov/attorneyfirminquiry/
JurisDetail.aspx (last visited November 15, 2024); and, therefore, has legal
training that most self-represented litigants do not have. See Nationstar
Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi, 226 Conn. App. 467, 480 n.8, 319 A.3d 794 (2024);
see also United States v. Pierce, 649 Fed. Appx. 117, 117 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016)
(‘‘[The defendant] was a licensed attorney before he was automatically
disbarred as a result of his conviction in this case. . . . While [i]t is well
established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude
to [self-represented] litigants, it is also well established that a lawyer repre-
senting himself [or herself] ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all. . . .
Because the rationale for this latter rule is that an attorney is experienced
in litigation and familiar with the procedural setting presented . . . it
extends to disbarred attorneys . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
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III

The defendant next claims that she was ‘‘denied due
process when she was not allowed to present [her]
motion to suppress for adjudication.’’ We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. At the end of the day of the
hearing on March 30, 2021, concerning the plaintiff’s
verified petition, the plaintiff’s counsel requested that
the court issue an order for temporary custody, which
he argued would trigger subsection (f) of § 22-329a and
allow for the remainder of the hearing to address a
permanent order for custody of the goats. The court
declined to issue any order at that time. On April 8,
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1104, 137 S. Ct. 841, 197 L. Ed. 2d
78 (2017); Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that ‘‘the degree of solicitude’’ afforded to self-represented litigants is not
identical and ‘‘may be lessened where the particular [self-represented] liti-
gant is experienced in litigation and familiar with the procedural setting
presented’’). The defendant also has represented herself in numerous appeals
before this court and our Supreme Court. See Burton v. Dept. of Environ-
mental Protection, supra, 337 Conn. 781; Burton v. Commissioner of Envi-
ronmental Protection, 323 Conn. 668, 150 A.3d 666 (2016); Burton v. Domin-
ion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011); Statewide
Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 10 A.3d 507 (2011); Burton
v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 970 A.2d
640 (2009); Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting
Council, 286 Conn. 57, 942 A.2d 345 (2008); Statewide Grievance Committee
v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 966 (2007); Jackson v. Drury, 191 Conn.
App. 587, 216 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 938, 218 A.3d 1050 (2019);
Burton v. Freedom of Information Commission, 161 Conn. App. 654, 129
A.3d 721 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 136 A.3d 642 (2016); Burton
v. Connecticut Siting Council, 161 Conn. App. 329, 127 A.3d 1066 (2015),
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 925, 133 A.3d 459 (2016); Burton v. Dominion
Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 129 Conn. App. 203, 21 A.3d 824, cert. denied, 302
Conn. 929, 28 A.3d 342 (2011); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton,
88 Conn. App. 523, 871 A.2d 380 (2005), aff’d, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 966
(2007); Honan v. Dimyan, 85 Conn. App. 66, 856 A.2d 463 (2004). As a
result, she is more experienced in litigation than most self-represented
parties and is well versed with the rules of appellate procedure. See Turner
v. Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 196, 224, 242 A.3d 512
(2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 945, 250 A.3d 694 (2021).
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2021, at the outset of the second day of the hearing,
the court referred to the conversation from the previous
day concerning the issue of whether the hearing should
be for a permanent or temporary order. The court stated
that it believed that the statute called for a two step
process, that is, the court first had to determine whether
a temporary order of custody was necessary and then,
if necessary, it could address permanency at a separate
proceeding. Both counsel for the plaintiff and the defen-
dant initially agreed with the court proceeding that way
and focusing the hearing on whether an order of tempo-
rary custody was warranted. Thereafter, the defendant
notified the court that she had filed a motion to suppress
and requested that her motion take priority over the
proceedings that day, as she believed that ‘‘it should
be considered first before anything else happen[ed] fur-
ther in th[e] case.’’ The court responded by stating that
the proceedings that day would be moving forward and
indicated that it would not be addressing the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress at the hearing that day, after
which the defendant objected to the way in which the
court was proceeding with the hearing, arguing that her
due process rights required the court to consider her
motion to suppress before continuing with the hearing.
The court, nonetheless, overruled her objection to mov-
ing forward on the issue of a temporary order and
stated: ‘‘With respect to your motion to suppress, this
is a civil proceeding, it’s not a criminal proceeding. Your
motion will be taken up in due course, but not right
now. This is a temporary proceeding, as I said before.’’
(Emphasis added.)
The defendant asserts in her appellate brief that ‘‘[t]he
motion was later marked ‘off’ . . . sua sponte by [Hon.
Jane S. Scholl, judge trial referee], who had virtually
no other involvement in the case. The motion was even-
tually denied without notice or a hearing by Judge Bellis
on April 13, 2022 . . . a full year later. The defendant’s
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supplement to motion to suppress . . . and motion in
limine were also summarily disposed of by denial.
Thereby, the defendant was denied the opportunity to
pursue her challenge to the warrant, which, if success-
ful, would have led to immediate release of all the goats
and termination of this case and threats of excessive
monetary penalties. The court’s refusal to allow the
defendant a hearing on the motion to suppress and
related motions was a clear denial of due process.’’
(Emphasis added.)

We next set forth general principles governing due
process claims. ‘‘Whether a party was deprived of his
[or her] due process rights is a question of law to which
appellate courts grant plenary review. . . . The core
interests protected by procedural due process concern
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. . . . Fundamental tenets of
due process require that all persons directly concerned
in the result of an adjudication be given reasonable
notice and opportunity to present their claims or
defenses. . . . Due process, unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unre-
lated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Instead,
due process is a flexible principle that calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cameron v. Santiago, 223 Conn. App. 836,
842–43, 310 A.3d 391 (2024). ‘‘Due process does not
mandate full evidentiary hearings on all matters, and
not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call
for the same kind of procedure. . . . So long as the
procedure afforded adequately protects the individual
interests at stake, there is no reason to impose substan-
tially greater burdens . . . under the guise of due pro-
cess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah
S., 110 Conn. App. 576, 589 n.7, 955 A.2d 657 (2008).
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Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[t]he extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he [or
she] may be condemned to suffer grievous loss. . . .
Whether the loss threatened by a particular type of
proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant more than
average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on
both the nature of the private interest threatened and
the permanency of the threatened loss.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD),
189 Conn. 276, 297, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).
Under the statutory scheme of § 22-329a, if an animal
has been seized pursuant to a warrant finding probable
cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated
under subsection (b), an animal control officer must
file a verified petition plainly stating the facts of neglect
or cruel treatment. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022)
§ 22-329a (b) and (c). Pursuant to subsection (d) of
§ 22-329a, ‘‘[i]f physical custody of an animal has been
taken pursuant to subsection . . . (b) . . . and it
appears from the allegations of the petition filed pursu-
ant to subsection (c) of this section and other affirma-
tions of fact accompanying the petition, or provided
subsequent thereto, that there is reasonable cause to
find that the animal’s condition or the circumstances
surrounding its care require that temporary care and
custody be immediately assumed to safeguard its wel-
fare, the court shall either (1) issue an order to show
cause why the court should not vest in some suitable
state, municipal or other public or private agency or
person the animal’s temporary care and custody pend-
ing a hearing on the petition, or (2) issue an order
vesting in some suitable state, municipal or other public
or private agency or person the animal’s temporary care
and custody pending a hearing on the petition. A hearing
on the order issued by the court pursuant to subdivision
(1) or (2) of this subsection [(show cause order)] shall
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

be held not later than fourteen days after the issuance
of such order.’’ If, following a hearing on the show
cause order, a court vests temporary ‘‘care and custody’’
of the animal ‘‘in some suitable state, municipal or other
public or private agency or person,’’ the owner ‘‘shall
either relinquish ownership of the animal or post a
surety bond or cash bond’’ to pay for the reasonable
expenses of the agency having temporary care of the
animal until there is a final disposition pursuant to
subsection (g). General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-
329a (f).
Following an order of temporary custody, § 22-329a
(g) (1) requires that a hearing must be held at which
it must be demonstrated that the animal, in fact, is or
is not being neglected or cruelly treated.12 Subsection
(g) of § 22-329a provides in relevant part: ‘‘If, after hear-
ing, the court finds that the animal is neglected or cru-
elly treated, it shall vest [permanent] ownership of the
animal’’ with the department or ‘‘any state, municipal
or other public or private agency . . . or . . . per-
son,’’ but if the court finds that the animal is not
neglected or cruelly treated, it may return the animal
to its owner. General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a
(g) (1) and (3). At this hearing, the animal owner has
an opportunity to contest the seizure, which necessarily
includes challenging the validity of the warrant. Thus,
under the statute, the deprivation of an animal owner’s
right in a temporary custody adjudication is neither
final nor irrevocable; such order must be followed by
a hearing to determine permanent ownership of the
animal, including consideration of whether such animal
must be returned to the owner. See Cookson v. Cookson,
201 Conn. 229, 235, 514 A.2d 323 (1986) (‘‘the depriva-
tion of rights in a temporary custody adjudication is
12
We note that there is nothing in the statute that prevents parties from
agreeing to hold a hearing in one step, as long as the hearing is held within
fourteen days of the show cause order.
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26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

neither final nor irrevocable’’ (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In the present case, the court made it clear to the
parties that it would be addressing the verified petition
in a two step process: first, it would determine, follow-
ing the March 30 and April 8 hearings, whether an order
of temporary custody of the goats was necessary. If it
did so and issued such an order, and if the defendant
subsequently paid the bond set by the statute and did
not relinquish ownership of her goats, then a second
hearing would be held to address permanent custody
of the goats. Thus, when the defendant raised the issue
of her motion to suppress and the court told her it
would not be addressed at that temporary proceeding
but that it would be ‘‘taken up in due course,’’ the court
was indicating that it was not appropriate to address
the motion at that time, but that it would be addressed
at a future hearing. Pursuant to § 22-329a (g) (1), there
would have been a hearing on permanent custody, pro-
vided the defendant paid the bond as set forth in the
court’s order and the statute. In the present case, how-
ever, the defendant did not post the bond and, conse-
quently, a subsequent hearing on permanent custody,
at which she could have raised her challenge to the
validity of the search warrant, never took place. On
the basis of this record, we cannot conclude that the
defendant was denied due process. In light of the fact
that the hearing on April 8, 2021, resulted in an order
of temporary custody of the goats, the defendant was
not denied due process as a result of the court’s failure
to consider her motion to suppress at that hearing.13 As
13
In State v. Kane, 218 Conn. 151, 588 A.2d 179 (1991), the Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue in the context of a probable cause hearing. Pursuant
to General Statutes § 54-46a, a defendant charged with any crime punishable
by death, life imprisonment without the possibility of release or life imprison-
ment is entitled to a probable cause hearing. In Kane, the defendant argued
on appeal that he was denied due process because the statute governing
probable cause hearings precluded him from having a hearing on his motion
to suppress at the probable cause stage of the proceedings. See id., 155.
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the court stated, the motion would be ‘‘taken up in due
course.’’ The fact that the motion was never ultimately
‘‘taken up’’ is due to the defendant’s failure to post the
bond as required by the statute and ordered by the
court, which obviated the need for a permanent custody
hearing. See part VI B of this opinion. The defendant’s
concerns about the validity of the warrant could have
been raised at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner had she posted a bond for the goats following
the order vesting their temporary custody in the depart-
ment. The defendant’s claim that she was denied due
process, therefore, fails.
IV
The defendant’s next claim is that she was entitled
to notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats
pursuant to § 19a-341.14 Specifically, the defendant
In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Supreme Court explained that ‘‘[a]
preliminary hearing is not designed to be a dress rehearsal for the trial.
. . . [A]s long as the defendant was afforded the opportunity to challenge
the admissibility of his statements at trial, the adjudicatory phase of the
proceeding against him, his right to due process was preserved.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 159.
14
General Statutes § 19a-341 is titled, ‘‘Agricultural or farming operation
not deemed a nuisance; exceptions. Spring or well water collection operation
not deemed a nuisance,’’ is located in the chapter of the General Statutes
titled, ‘‘Public Health and Well-being,’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general statute or municipal ordi-
nance or regulation pertaining to nuisances to the contrary, no agricultural
or farming operation, place, establishment or facility, or any of its appurte-
nances, or the operation thereof, shall be deemed to constitute a nuisance,
either public or private, due to alleged objectionable (1) odor from livestock,
manure, fertilizer or feed, (2) noise from livestock or farm equipment used
in normal, generally acceptable farming procedures, (3) dust created during
plowing or cultivation operations, (4) use of chemicals, provided such chemi-
cals and the method of their application conform to practices approved
by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection or, where
applicable, the Commissioner of Public Health, or (5) water pollution from
livestock or crop production activities, except the pollution of public or
private drinking water supplies, provided such activities conform to accept-
able management practices for pollution control approved by the Commis-
sioner of Energy and Environmental Protection; provided such agricultural
or farming operation, place, establishment or facility has been in operation
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

asserts that an investigation of her property and the
goats was conducted in 2017 and 2018 pursuant to § 19a-
341, which resulted in a finding that the goats
‘‘appear[ed] to be in good condition with food and water
available.’’ That finding is set forth in a 2018 investiga-
tion report by the department that was admitted as a
full exhibit at the March 30, 2021 hearing. On appeal, the
defendant relies on that report as ‘‘prima facie evidence
that [her] goat operation conforms with generally
accepted agricultural practices pursuant to § 19a-341
. . . .’’ She also argues that the plaintiff was thus
required to ‘‘overcome such prima facie evidence at a
hearing preceded by notice before it could lawfully
proceed with the 2021 seizure . . . .’’ We decline to
review this claim.
First, the defendant does not include any citations
in her appellate brief to the record showing when she
raised this claim before the court or when it was
addressed or decided by the court. Indeed, the report
itself, on which the defendant relies in making this
claim, makes no reference to § 19a-341. Instead, the
report was generated in connection with a complaint
of animal cruelty filed against the defendant pursuant
to General Statutes § 53-247 (a), and it simply concludes
that, at the end of the investigation that occurred in
2017 and 2018, ‘‘all goats on the property appear[ed]
to be in good condition with food and water available,’’
without mentioning any compliance with § 19a-341.
Moreover, at the March 30, 2021 hearing, when the
defendant offered the report into evidence, she made
no reference to § 19a-341 or to her claim that it entitled
her to a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats; instead,
for one year or more and has not been substantially changed, and such
operation follows generally accepted agricultural practices. Inspection and
approval of the agricultural or farming operation, place, establishment or
facility by the Commissioner of Agriculture or the commissioner’s designee
shall be prima facie evidence that such operation follows generally accepted
agricultural practices . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
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she questioned DellaRocco about the investigation of
the complaint of animal cruelty that formed the basis
of the report. Also, on the basis of our review of the
record up to and through the temporary custody hearing
held on March 30 and April 8, 2021, we could not find
any motion filed by the defendant claiming that she
was entitled to notice and a hearing under § 19a-341
prior to the seizure of her animals in early March, 2021.
As our Supreme Court recently has stated, it is the
responsibility of parties, not an appellate court, ‘‘to
clearly identify how and where in the record the claim
that the party is raising on appeal was preserved for
review and where in the record the trial court’s ruling
on the claim may be found . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513, 589–90, 321 A.3d
295 (2024). That is especially true in a case such as the
present one, in which the pleadings are voluminous.
We, therefore, decline to review this claim.
V
The defendant next challenges the court’s determina-
tion that the plaintiff met its burden to establish that
the goats were subjected to neglect and cruel treatment
while in the defendant’s care. In its April 9, 2021 decision
vesting temporary custody of the goats with the depart-
ment, the court determined that the plaintiff met its
burden to establish ‘‘reasonable cause’’ that the goats
were neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant.
In support of her claim on appeal, the defendant first
argues that the court should have held the plaintiff to
the burden of proving its claim by a fair preponderance
of the evidence15 but, instead, improperly applied a
15
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means, after a consideration
of all the evidence fairly and impartially, there is enough evidence to produce
‘‘a reasonable belief that what is sought to be proven is more likely true
than not true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aviles, 277 Conn.
281, 317, 891 A.2d 935, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 840, 127 S. Ct. 108, 166 L. Ed.
2d 69 (2006). Thus, to meet the fair preponderance of the evidence standard,
the evidence had to induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable or
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‘‘minimal standard’’ of reasonable cause.16 The defen-
dant further argues that there was no evidence pre-
sented at the temporary custody hearing to support a
finding that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated
and, thus, that even the lower standard of reasonable
cause was not met. We need not decide which standard
applies to an order vesting temporary custody following
a show cause hearing17 because, even under the higher
standard of a fair preponderance of the evidence, the
defendant’s claim fails.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
‘‘[T]he scope of our appellate review depends upon the
proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial
court. To the extent that the trial court has made find-
ings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether
such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however,
the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is
plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions
are legally and logically correct and find support in the
facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn. App. 1,
29, 320 A.3d 1008 (2024). When, as in the present case,
likely than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated. See generally
State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716, 725, 760 A.2d 1001 (2000).
16
The reasonable cause standard is akin to that of probable cause. See
Karen v. Loftus, 228 Conn. App. 163, 193, A.3d (2024); Prioleau v.
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 116 Conn. App. 776, 783,
977 A.2d 267 (2009). Probable cause ‘‘is a bona fide belief in the existence
of facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant
a [person] of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circum-
stances, in entertaining it.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220
Conn. 307, 316, 596 A.2d 426 (1991).
17
We note that the defendant has not adequately briefed her claim that
the court applied the wrong standard. In light of the inadequate briefing,
the plaintiff briefly counters this claim by asserting that the defendant
incorrectly argues that a preponderance of the evidence standard applies
and that the correct standard is the reasonable cause standard. We thus
leave for another day our decision on this issue.
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the resolution of a question of law ‘‘depends on underly-
ing facts that are in dispute, that question becomes, in
essence, a mixed question of fact and law. Thus, we
review the subsidiary findings of historical fact . . .
for clear error, and engage in plenary review of the trial
court’s application of . . . legal standards . . . to the
underlying historical facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier, 208 Conn. App. 731,
742, 267 A.3d 197 (2021).

In State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 947
A.2d 282 (2008), our Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what constitutes ‘‘neglect’’ for purposes of § 22-329a.
In doing so, the court started ‘‘with the relevant lan-
guage of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2005)] § 22-329a (a):
‘The Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control
officer or any municipal or regional animal control offi-
cer may lawfully take charge of any animal found
neglected or cruelly treated, in violation of sections 22-
366, 22-415 and 53-247 to 53-252, inclusive, and shall
thereupon proceed as provided in subsection (b) of this
section . . . .’ It is clear from this language that § 22-
329a does not contain an independent standard of
neglect but, instead, incorporates by reference the stan-
dards of the specific statutes enumerated therein. . . .
[Section] 53-247 is the only statute listed in § 22-329a
that applies to [the defendant’s] conduct. Accordingly,
to determine what constitutes neglect under § 22-329a
under the circumstances of this case, we must look to
the language of § 53-247. Section 53-247 provides in
relevant part: ‘(a) Any person who . . . deprives of
necessary sustenance . . . any animal, or who, having
impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such
animal proper care or . . . fails to supply any such
animal with wholesome air, food and water, or . . .
having charge or custody of any animal . . . fails to
provide it with proper food, drink or protection from
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the weather . . . shall be fined not more than one thou-
sand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or
both. . . .’ It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that
the neglect referred to in § 22-329a includes the failure
to provide necessary sustenance, proper care, whole-
some air, food and water under § 53-247 (a).’’ State ex
rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 153–54; see also Bethle-
hem v. Acker, 153 Conn. App. 449, 463, 102 A.3d 107
(‘‘[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the neglect referred
to in § 22-329a includes the failure to provide necessary
protection from the weather’’), cert. denied, 315 Conn.
908, 105 A.3d 235 (2014).

Applying the fair preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard to the present case, and on the basis of our careful
review of the record relating to the two day evidentiary
hearing held on March 30 and April 8, 2021, we conclude
that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to pro-
duce a reasonable belief that it is more probable or
likely than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly
treated. DellaRocco testified to the information in his
investigative report, which was admitted into evidence.
Specifically, he testified to the poor conditions of the
property observed during the preseizure surveillance,
including that the shelters on the property were inade-
quate to house the goats, filled with manure and in a
dilapidated condition with the roof caving in on one of
them. He also testified to observing goats limping and
having issues with their hooves and with walking, as
well as to the large number of empty plastic water
bottles on the property and to the fact that he never
saw the defendant provide water to the goats during
his surveillance. He explained that when the warrant
was executed, he walked the entire property and con-
firmed his prior observations. He further testified that
there was not enough room for every goat to be in
a shelter.
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State Animal Control Officer Tanya Wescovich pro-
vided testimony as well regarding a report she prepared
following the investigation of the property, which was
admitted as a full exhibit, and as to her observations of
the goats having extremely long hooves, the excessive
amount of manure piled up in the shelters, which caused
her concern for the health of the goats, and the large
number of empty plastic water bottles on the property
to which the goats had access. She further testified that
there were nine pregnant goats at the time of the seizure,
that five of them gave birth to six kids in total, and that
none of the kids would have survived without human
intervention. Similar to DellaRocco’s testimony, Wes-
covich testified that she did not see the defendant give
water to the goats during her surveillance shifts, during
which she observed ten to fifteen goats that were either
limping or could not move properly. Wescovich
explained that once she gained access to the property
during the execution of the warrant, she became aware
that even more goats had issues. Other witnesses who
testified during the two day hearing included Nancy
Jarvis-Deluca, a state animal control officer who partici-
pated in the execution of the warrant; Rosa Buonomo,
the operator of an animal rescue; and the defendant.
In addition to the exhibits entered into evidence that
were previously mentioned, the exhibits before the
court also included, inter alia, numerous photographs
taken on the day of the seizure, which showed the
condition of the property, shelters and goats; the search
warrant application and supporting affidavit; a supple-
mental investigative report submitted by Jarvis-Deluca;
and satellite images of the property.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented
shows that the defendant failed to provide the goats
with adequate shelter, both in terms of space to shelter
all the goats and for protection from high winds and
cold weather; failed to give them sufficient access to
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fresh water; failed to properly care for the goats’ hooves
by letting them become overgrown, which affected the
mobility of the goats; and allowed the goats to live in
unsanitary conditions with manure filled shelters and
with dead goats in various stages of decomposition
strewn about the property. That evidence was sufficient
to demonstrate that it is more probable than not that
the goats were not provided with proper care, drink
and protection from the weather to establish neglect
for purposes of § 22-329a. See State ex rel. Gregan v.
Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 153–54;18 Bethlehem v. Acker,
supra, 153 Conn. App. 463. In her appellate brief, the
defendant focuses much of her challenge to the court’s
finding of neglect on the fact that her goats were not
identified to have any serious medical conditions and
did not appear to be dehydrated so as to warrant their
seizure. This court has determined previously, however,
that ‘‘[n]owhere does our statutory, regulatory, or com-
mon-law scheme require an animal to be suffering from
a present illness as a prerequisite to finding that the
animal is neglected.’’ Bethlehem v. Acker, supra, 467
n.12. Moreover, this claim ignores the court’s factual
findings that the goats not only endured extreme cruelty
and neglectful conditions, but as many as forty to fifty
of them died in the defendant’s care as well.
We conclude that the plaintiff established that it is
more probable than not that the goats were neglected
18
In State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 157–58, ‘‘the defen-
dant was keeping forty-six live cats and one dead cat in a 950 square foot
residence, much of which was so cluttered with personal effects, trash and
bags of raw garbage that it was unusable. The [trial] court . . . found, and
the evidence amply demonstrated, that the residence was, and had been
for some time, in a ‘deplorable, filthy, unsanitary [and] unhealthy’ condition,
with cat feces, vomit and urine present throughout. . . . [A] person of
ordinary intelligence would know that confining forty-six cats in these
unhealthy conditions constituted a failure to provide proper care for the
cats under any reasonable standard.’’ Our Supreme Court thus found that the
defendant’s conduct in allowing the cats to live in unsanitary and unhealthy
conditions fell within the ‘‘ ‘unmistakable core of prohibited conduct’ ’’ and
constituted neglect under § 22-329a. Id., 157.
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or cruelly treated.19 The defendant, therefore, has failed
to demonstrate that the court incorrectly concluded
that temporary custody of the goats should vest with
the department.
VI
The defendant’s next two claims concern the court’s
April 9, 2021 order that, ‘‘[o]n or before April 16, 2021,
the defendant shall relinquish ownership of the animals
to the [plaintiff] or post a surety or cash bond with the
[department] in the amount of [$500] per each of the
sixty-four remaining live goats seized by the [plaintiff]
to pay for the reasonable expenses in caring and provid-
ing for such animals . . . .’’ With respect to this order,
the defendant claims that (1) she complied with the
order to the extent that it required relinquishment of
the goats by April 16, 2021, and (2) she complied with
the bond requirement of the order. We disagree with
both claims and address them in turn.
A
The defendant first asserts that she complied with
the order regarding relinquishment by filing a motion
on April 16, 2021, in which she sought to ‘‘relinquish
ownership of [her] goats for immediate release to quali-
fied animal rescue facilities and individuals as identified
by the defendant’’ (motion to relinquish). In connection
with this claim, the defendant also appears to be arguing
that the court did not issue a ruling in a timely manner
and, ultimately, improperly denied her motion. We are
not persuaded.
After the court issued its April 9, 2021 order requiring
the defendant, by April 16, 2021, either to relinquish
19
Of course, in light of our conclusion that the plaintiff established that
it is more probable than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated,
it necessarily follows that the court correctly determined that the plaintiff
proved there was reasonable cause that the goats were neglected or cru-
elly treated.
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ownership of the goats to the plaintiff or to post a surety
or cash bond in the amount ordered, the defendant,
instead, filed her motion to relinquish. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion for an order requesting that
the court vest permanent custody of the goats in the
department as a result of the defendant’s failure to
relinquish ownership of the goats or to post a bond, as
required by § 22-329a (f). In its written order granting
the plaintiff’s motion and vesting permanent custody
of the goats with the department, the court stated that
the language of its prior order was clear and unambigu-
ous and ‘‘required the defendant to either relinquish
control of the goats to the [plaintiff] or post surety or
cash bond with the [department] in the amount of [$500]
for each of the sixty-four remaining live goats, no later
than April 16, 2021.’’ The court further stated that the
defendant’s motion to relinquish ‘‘was not an offer to
relinquish control of the goats to the [plaintiff]. As such,
the defendant did not relinquish control of the goats to
the [plaintiff] by the April 16, 2021 court deadline.’’
(Emphasis in original.) The defendant’s claim, there-
fore, appears to be challenging the court’s finding, made
in its order vesting permanent custody of the goats with
the department, that the defendant had not complied
with its April 9, 2021 order regarding relinquishment of
the goats. That raises an issue of fact, which we review
under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See
Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC, 227 Conn.
App. 64, 73, 319 A.3d 826 (2024) (‘‘A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed . . . . Our author-
ity, when reviewing the findings of a judge, is circum-
scribed by the deference we must give to decisions of
the trier of fact, who is usually in a superior position
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to appraise and weigh the evidence. . . . The question
for this court . . . is not whether it would have made
the findings the trial court did, but whether in view of
the evidence and pleadings in the whole record it is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)).
The court’s April 9, 2021 order, which tracked the
language of § 22-329a (f), gave the defendant the choice
between two options to be completed by April 16, 2021,
namely, relinquish ownership of the goats to the plain-
tiff or post a surety or cash bond in the amount ordered.
We agree with the court that filing a motion was not a
proper response to the court’s order. Moreover, the
court was correct in finding that the motion to relin-
quish ‘‘was not an offer to relinquish control of the
goats to the [plaintiff].’’ (Emphasis altered.) Rather, as
the defendant states in her appellate brief, ‘‘[t]he motion
[sought] to relinquish the goats with the single qualifica-
tion that they be rehomed to facilities and individuals
selected by the defendant.’’ The addition of that qualifi-
cation by the defendant, however, is contrary to the
general rule that ‘‘[a]n order of the court must be obeyed
until it has been modified or successfully challenged.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Celini v. Celini,
115 Conn. App. 371, 382, 973 A.2d 664 (2009); see also
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 530, 710 A.2d 757
(1998). In the present case, the defendant is improperly
attempting, unilaterally, to modify the requirement of
the court’s order that she relinquish ownership of the
goats to the plaintiff by adding the qualification that
the goats be rehomed to a facility or individual of her
choosing, which she cannot do, regardless of whether
she believes any particular animal rescue is a more
suitable environment for the goats. There is nothing in
the statutory scheme governing the welfare of animals
that allows the owner of a seized animal to decide or
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

direct where a seized animal must go following a finding
of neglect or cruel treatment of the animal. The court’s
finding that the defendant did not relinquish ownership
of the goats by April 16, 2021, is supported by the record
and is not clearly erroneous.
To the extent that the defendant claims on appeal
that the court did not decide her motion to relinquish
in a timely manner and then improperly denied it, we
conclude that such claims are inadequately briefed. The
defendant has not cited any authority demonstrating
that there was a time period in which the motion had
to be decided or why the court’s ultimate denial of the
motion was improper.20 ‘‘[F]or this court judiciously and
efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their
arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not
merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the rela-
tionship between the facts of the case and the law cited.
. . . State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868
(2016). Claims are inadequately briefed when they are
merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare asser-
tion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when
20
Instead, the defendant makes one reference to § 22-329a (g) (1), arguing
that it ‘‘mandates that, once a judge has made a finding of neglect and cruel
treatment, as Judge Cobb did in her April 9, 2021 order, she was under
obligation to immediately vest ownership of the goats, as distinguished from
temporary custody, in a [26 U.S.C.] § 501 (c) (3) facility permitted by law
to care for neglected and cruelly treated animals, such as [the animal rescue
she had suggested], with no prior hearing requirement, or a state, municipal-
ity or individual.’’ This statute does not pertain to motions to relinquish or
in any way explain why the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion was
improper. Furthermore, we do not construe the statutory language as requir-
ing the court to immediately vest ownership of the goats to an animal rescue
of the defendant’s choosing. The statute specifically provides that, ‘‘[i]f, after
hearing, the court finds that the animal is neglected or cruelly treated, it
shall vest ownership of the animal in any state, municipal or other public
or private agency which is permitted by law to care for neglected or cruelly
treated animals or with any person found to be suitable or worthy of such
responsibility by the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Supp.
2022) § 22-329a (g) (1). The court complied with the statute when it exercised
its discretion to vest ownership of the goats with the department.
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they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with
no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no
citations from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Roberts, 227 Conn. App. 159,
185–86, 320 A.3d 989 (2024). The defendant’s brief is
devoid of citations to authority to support her asser-
tions. Consequently, we decline to review these claims.
B
Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly
determined that she failed to pay the bond ordered by
the court pursuant to § 22-329a (f) within the deadline
set by the court. Specifically, she argues that she com-
plied with the order regarding the bond when she sub-
mitted a bank check to the plaintiff’s counsel by the
deadline in the amount of $450 along with a letter, which
identified nine goats. The defendant subsequently sub-
mitted payments totaling $5070, which she claims is a
sufficient amount for ten of the goats. Our resolution
of this claim requires little discussion.
As we stated, the court’s April 9, 2021 order provided
the defendant with two options: relinquish ownership
of the goats or pay a bond as set by the court. With
respect to the bond issue, the court stated: ‘‘The total
amount due, on or before April 16, 2021, pursuant to
the court’s order, was $32,000. The defendant makes
no claim that the $32,000 was paid.’’ There is no dispute
in the record that the defendant did not pay the required
amount by the April 16 deadline. On appeal, she argues
first that she was not required to pay the bond because
she relinquished ownership of the goats by way of her
motion to relinquish. We already have rejected that
claim. Because the defendant did not relinquish owner-
ship of the goats, she was required to pay the $32,000
bond by April 16, 2021, which she failed to do. The
defendant also makes a number of arguments about
how the deadline to pay the bond was extended, by
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which point she had made incremental deposits totaling
more than $4500, which she claimed was sufficient to
secure more than nine goats. The order, however, did
not give the defendant the option to pay a bond in an
amount that would cover only nine goats, beyond the
deadline. Even if we were to agree, without deciding,
that the deadline had been extended, the defendant
never paid the required amount of the bond. Her claim,
therefore, fails.21
VII
The defendant next claims that § 22-329a is unconsti-
tutional on its face and as applied in this case. We
decline to review this claim due to inadequate briefing.
We begin by noting that, in her principal appellate
brief, the defendant states that she challenged the con-
stitutionality of § 22-329a by motion, which was denied.
She then states: ‘‘The defendant asserts the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute facially and as applied to her
on appeal by incorporating the argument previously
presented and presenting additional issues herein.’’ Our
rules of practice contain page and word limits for appel-
late briefs. See Practice Book §§ 67-3 and 67-3A. The
defendant cannot sidestep those requirements by
directing us in her appellate brief to arguments in sup-
port of her claim that are raised in another document.
See Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine,
204 Conn. App. 595, 612, 254 A.3d 915 (2021) (‘‘The
plaintiff’s attempt to incorporate by reference his
amended verified complaint into his principal appellate
brief is not procedurally proper. As is apparent in this
case, permitting legal claims to be incorporated by ref-
erence into an appellate brief would, among other
21
There is also no merit to the defendant’s claim that she paid a sufficient
bond pursuant to Practice Book § 38-8, which pertains to cash bail in criminal
matters, as the present case is controlled by the bond provision set forth
in § 22-329a (f).
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things, enable litigants to circumvent the page limita-
tions set forth in Practice Book § 67-3. See, e.g., Papic
v. Burke, 113 Conn. App. 198, 217 n.11, 965 A.2d 633
(2009) (‘it is not permissible to use [an] appendix [to
an appellate brief] either to set forth argument or to
evade the thirty-five page limitation provided in Practice
Book § 67-3 and already met by the [appellant’s] brief’).’’
(Footnote omitted.)), cert. denied, 338 Conn. 911, 259
A.3d 654 (2021).
In her principal appellate brief, the defendant argues
that § 22-329a is unconstitutional on its face, stating
that ‘‘[t]he statute suffers from constitutional defects
in addition to those cited . . . in her motion’’ and list-
ing the alleged defects. According to the defendant, the
statute, on its face and as applied, denies ‘‘fundamental
freedoms and protections from abusive conduct by the
state in violation of the first, fourth, eighth and four-
teenth amendments.’’
In her appellate brief, the defendant devotes a few
sentences to a short paragraph to each of these claimed
grounds challenging the statute’s constitutionality, with
no citation to authority. She also fails to include any
relevant law concerning what must be shown to estab-
lish that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied. In all, the defendant devotes three pages of
her appellate brief to her challenge to the constitutional-
ity of § 22-329a on all of these grounds and pursuant
to the first, fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the federal constitution. As our Supreme Court has
cautioned, ‘‘[a]lthough the number of pages devoted to
an argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative,
relative sparsity weighs in favor of concluding that the
argument has been inadequately briefed. This is espe-
cially so with regard to first amendment and other con-
stitutional claims, which are often analytically complex.
See, e.g., Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843,
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42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

871–72 (4th Cir. 1998) (‘[f]irst [a]mendment jurispru-
dence is a vast and complicated body of law that grows
with each passing day’ and involves ‘complicated and
nuanced constitutional concepts’), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 1252, 143 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1999);
Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,
620 F.2d 1301, 1326 (8th Cir.) (first amendment issues
are ‘complex’), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842, 101 S. Ct. 122,
66 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1980); see also In re Melody L., 290
Conn. 131, 154–55, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (one and one-
half page equal protection claim was inadequate), over-
ruled on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn.
726, 746–47, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, [266 Conn.
108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003)] (claim under takings
clause was inadequately briefed when plaintiff provided
‘no authority or analysis in support of its specific
claim’); In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 181, 743
A.2d 165 (1999) (attempt to brief two constitutional
claims in two and one-half pages was inadequate).’’
State v. Buhl, supra, 321 Conn. 726. We conclude that
the defendant has not adequately briefed her claim chal-
lenging the constitutionality of § 22-329a, both on its
face and as applied to her. Therefore, we decline to
review this claim.
VIII
The defendant’s last claim is that the court improperly
dismissed her counterclaim. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. In her counterclaim dated May
3, 2022, the defendant made a number of claims, which
can be summarized as follows: (1) the defendant’s
fourth amendment rights were violated because the
affidavit submitted by DellaRocco in support of the
search warrant omitted material facts and contained
false statements and because the verified petition did
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not plainly state the facts of neglect and cruel treatment
as required by § 22-329a (c); (2) the department violated
§ 22-329a (i) by allowing favored individuals priority to
adopt the goats; (3) the department violated the defen-
dant’s due process rights by providing false testimony
at the hearing before Judge Cobb held on March 30 and
April 8, 2021; (4) the defendant’s first amendment rights
were violated by the commencement of these proceed-
ings in retaliation for the defendant’s speech; and (5)
§ 22-329a is unconstitutional on its face and as applied
to the defendant and infringes on the defendant’s first
amendment rights. The relief sought in the counterclaim
included the ‘‘return of the goats, a declaratory judg-
ment that § 22-329a is unconstitutional, and the extin-
guishment of all demands for bonds or other monetary
payments.’’ The plaintiff moved to dismiss the counter-
claim on four grounds, namely, that the counterclaim
was (1) barred by sovereign immunity, (2) barred by
the prior pending action doctrine, (3) untimely and (4)
not properly brought in this in rem proceeding. The
court based its decision dismissing the counterclaim
on the grounds of sovereign immunity and the prior
pending action doctrine. We therefore limit our discus-
sion regarding this claim to those two grounds and
address them in turn.
A
The court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground of sovereign immunity only with respect to three
of the five claims asserted in the counterclaim.22 The
court concluded that the three claims did not allege
sufficient facts to bypass sovereign immunity or to show
22
The court declined to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground of
sovereign immunity as to the defendant’s first two claims of violations of
the fourth amendment and § 22-329a (i). Nevertheless, as to those two claims,
the court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims were
precluded under the prior pending action doctrine, which we address in
part VIII B of this opinion.
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that an exception to the state’s sovereign immunity
applied, in that the claims failed to set forth a substantial
claim that the defendant’s constitutional rights were
violated.
The defendant’s briefing on this issue consists of
three short paragraphs. She first appears to suggest
that, because the trial court declined to grant the motion
to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as to two
of the grounds raised in the counterclaim, sovereign
immunity did not justify dismissal of the other three
grounds in the counterclaim. Next, the defendant
asserts that dismissal of the counterclaim should have
been raised, if at all, by way of a motion to strike, rather
than a motion to dismiss, because, according to the
defendant, the issues raised in the motion to dismiss
concerned the sufficiency of the allegations pursuant
to Practice Book § 10-39, not the jurisdiction of the
court. See Practice Book § 10-30. Aside from referenc-
ing those two rules of practice, the defendant provided
no other citation to authority to support her assertions,
and her brief lacks any analysis of applicable law con-
cerning sovereign immunity or any exceptions thereto,
including how any exception to the state’s sovereign
immunity applies to her claims.23 As we have stated
23
‘‘The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or
sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. . . . It has
deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin
in ancient common law. . . . Not only have we recognized the state’s immu-
nity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act
only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning
a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the
state. . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed
under our jurisprudence. . . . Chief Information Officer v. Computers Plus
Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 79–80, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013).’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Jakobowski v. State, 219 Conn. App. 839, 848, 296 A.3d 226
(2023). ‘‘[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter
jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Spillane v. Lamont, 350 Conn. 119, 126,
A.3d (2024).
‘‘It is . . . well established that [t]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
state is not absolute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public
Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223, 237, 315 A.3d 1081 (2024). Indeed, ‘‘[o]ur
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previously in this opinion, ‘‘[c]laims are . . . inade-
quately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory
assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority
and minimal or no citations from the record’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Caldrello, 192 Conn. App. 1, 35, 219 A.3d 858, cert.
denied, 334 Conn. 905, 220 A.3d 37 (2019); and ‘‘parties
may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing
the relationship between the facts of the case and the
law cited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaccaro
v. D’Angelo, 184 Conn. App. 467, 488, 195 A.3d 443
(2018). In the present case, the defendant’s brief on this
issue contains no meaningful analysis of how the court’s
dismissal of a portion of the counterclaim on the ground
of sovereign immunity was improper, nor does it cite
to relevant legal principles or analyze how the facts of
this case relate to any applicable law. As a result of the
defendant’s inadequate briefing,24 we decline to review
case law has identified three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity:
‘(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implica-
tion, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an
action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial
claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitu-
tional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive
relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote
an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority.’ ’’ Spillane
v. Lamont, supra, 350 Conn. 127. Relevant to this appeal are the second
and third exceptions. ‘‘For a claim made pursuant to the second exception,
complaining of unconstitutional acts, [our Supreme Court] require[s] that
[t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed
in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally pro-
tected interests. . . . For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs
must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of
their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts
that reasonably support those allegations. . . . In the absence of a proper
factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions,
the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is
proper.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia
Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 350, 977 A.2d
636 (2009).
24
For similar reasons, we also decline to review the defendant’s claim
that the court should have granted her motion to open and vacate the
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the ground of fraud. Like with
many of her other claims on appeal, the defendant has provided no citation
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her claim that the court improperly dismissed her coun-
terclaim, in part, on the ground of sovereign immunity.
B
We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the court
improperly dismissed her counterclaim, in part, on the
basis of the prior pending action doctrine. Although the
defendant’s briefing of this claim also is minimal, the
defendant clearly raises two grounds for challenging
the court’s decision to dismiss a portion of her counter-
claim on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine,
namely, that the prior pending action doctrine ‘‘does
not apply because one of its key elements—identity of
parties—is not met’’ and because the two actions seek
different relief. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. Prior to filing her counterclaim, the defendant
commenced an action in the Superior Court on April
6, 2021, against a number of parties, including the
department, alleging a variety of claims regarding the
seizure of the goats from her property. See Burton v.
Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury,
Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S (Mason action). That action is still pending in the
Superior Court. In the present case, in granting the
motion to dismiss, in part, on the basis of the prior
pending action doctrine, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he depart-
ment argues that the counterclaim is virtually identical
to authority to support her claim, let alone an analysis of relevant authority
as it pertains to her claim. Instead, in two short paragraphs, she makes
unfounded allegations about alleged retaliatory conduct of the trial judge.
In its order denying the motion to open and vacate, the court cautioned the
defendant ‘‘not to assert a claim unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous’’ and that ‘‘personal attacks on the court are
inappropriate and will not be tolerated’’ and may subject the defendant to
sanctions, should she continue to assert groundless claims. We echo those
words of caution and remind the defendant that unsupported accusations
that have no basis in fact or law cannot be properly considered by this
court and have no place in proceedings before this court.
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to the pending claims against the department in [the
Mason action]. The remaining claims are that the
department violated the [defendant’s] fourth amend-
ment rights when DellaRocco lied in his affidavit to
obtain a search warrant and that the department vio-
lated § 22-329a (i) by allowing favored individuals prior-
ity to adopt the goats. In [the Mason action], the [defen-
dant] brings these exact same claims. Although the
relief sought is slightly different, as the [defendant]
seeks monetary damages in [the Mason action] but not
in the present case, and declaratory relief in the present
case but not in [the Mason action], the actions are
still virtually identical. In such instances, the court has
discretion to decide whether the circumstances justify
dismissal. In the present case, the circumstances clearly
justify dismissal. The counterclaim is yet another trans-
parent attempt to relitigate Judge Cobb’s order of tem-
porary care and custody. The [defendant] has already
filed a motion to disqualify Judge Cobb, a motion to
vacate, a motion to reopen the hearing, a motion to
reargue, a motion to declare . . . § 22-329a unconstitu-
tional, a motion to suppress and for return of property,
and a motion for immediate release of her goats, as
well as motions to reargue these motions. Given the
blatantly ‘oppressive and vexatious’ nature of the coun-
terclaim, dismissal under the prior pending action doc-
trine is justified. Any claims that the [defendant] may
have against the department and its agents can be adju-
dicated in the [Mason action].’’
We next set forth the legal principles and standard
of review that govern our resolution of this claim. ‘‘[T]he
prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dis-
miss a second case that raises issues currently pending
before the court. The pendency of a prior suit of the
same character, between the same parties, brought to
obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good
cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be
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any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and,
therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious. This is
a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and
always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in
the same jurisdiction. . . . The policy behind the doc-
trine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a
burden on crowded court dockets.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cameron v. Santiago, supra, 223 Conn.
App. 840 n.3.
‘‘Under the prior pending action doctrine, the court
must determine whether the two actions are: (1) exactly
alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or
seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction;
(2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same
underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking
different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to war-
rant the doctrine’s application. . . . If the two actions
are exactly alike or lacking in sufficient similarities, the
trial court has no discretion. In the former case, the
court must dismiss the second action, and in the latter
instance, the court must allow both cases to proceed
unabated. Where the actions are virtually, but not
exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discre-
tion in determining whether the circumstances justify
dismissal of the second action.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Loch View, LLC v. Windham, 211
Conn. App. 765, 772–73, 274 A.3d 140 (2022). ‘‘In order
to determine whether the actions are virtually alike, we
must examine the pleadings . . . to ascertain whether
the actions are brought to adjudicate the same underly-
ing rights of the parties. . . . The trial court’s conclu-
sion on the similarities between the cases is subject to
our plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Rousseau v. Weinstein, 204 Conn. App. 833, 844,
254 A.3d 984 (2021). We also note that ‘‘a motion to
dismiss is the proper vehicle to raise the issue of a prior
pending action’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)
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A1Z7, LLC v. Dombek, 188 Conn. App. 714, 722 n.2, 205
A.3d 740 (2019); and that ‘‘[t]he prior pending action
doctrine applies equally to claims and counterclaims.’’
Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn. App. 174, 178, 579 A.2d
576 (1990).
Because these claims are seeking different remedies,
we examine the pleadings in both actions to determine
whether they have been brought to adjudicate the same
underlying rights of the parties. The two claims in the
counterclaim that were dismissed on the basis of the
prior pending action doctrine alleged a violation of the
defendant’s fourth amendment rights stemming from
the allegedly illegal search of her property and a viola-
tion of § 22-329a (i) by the department. Our review of
the pleadings in the Mason action demonstrates that
those very same claims have been raised against the
department in that action. Like in the counterclaim in
the present case, the defendant alleges in the Mason
action that the department violated her fourth amend-
ment rights because DellaRocco lied in his testimony
at the hearing on March 30, 2021, his affidavit included
false statements and omitted facts, and the search of her
property was illegal and was not supported by probable
cause. She also alleges in the Mason action that the
department violated § 22-329a (i).
We conclude, following our review of the record
before us, that the present case and the Mason action
both stem from the same factual circumstance—the
seizure of the goats from the defendant—and involve
the same parties and identical claims. Even though the
relief sought in both actions is not identical, both
actions seek the same goals or objectives, namely, to
adjudicate the defendant’s rights and the propriety of
the seizure of the goats and the proceedings that fol-
lowed. See Lodmell v. LaFrance, 154 Conn. App. 329,
335, 107 A.3d 975 (2014) (‘‘ ‘[T]he applicability of the
doctrine does not turn on the issue of whether the two
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actions seek the same remedy. . . . The key question
is whether the two actions are brought to adjudicate
the same underlying rights.’ ’’), cert. denied, 315 Conn.
921, 107 A.3d 959 (2015). Moreover, the defendant’s
argument that the doctrine does not apply to the present
case because the parties are not identical fails in light of
this court’s decision in Modzelewski v. William Raveis
Real Estate, Inc., 65 Conn. App. 708, 783 A.2d 1074,
cert. denied, 258 Conn. 948, 788 A.2d 96 (2001). In that
case, the defendant raised a similar argument, which
this court rejected, concluding that, ‘‘[w]hile the parties
are not ‘identical’ in that there are two additional parties
to the prior action, the identical parties to the present
action are involved in the prior one.’’ Id., 714. The rea-
soning in Modzelewski applies equally to the present
case; the parties in the present action are both involved
in the Mason action, and the fact that there are addi-
tional defendants in the Mason action does not preclude
application of the prior pending action doctrine to the
present case. See id. Accordingly, we agree with the
court that both actions are virtually alike. We further
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the circumstances justified dismissal,
in part, of the counterclaim against the department in
the present case on the basis of the prior pending action
doctrine.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.